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**HISTORY OF THE  
THIRTY-THIRD FOOT**







THE HON. ARTHUR WELLESLEY  
(AFTERWARDS DUKE OF WELLINGTON)  
LT.-COL. 33rd FOOT 1793  
AGED 24



# History of the Thirty-third Foot

Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) Regiment

BY

ALBERT LEE

Author of

"History of the Tenth Foot," "England's Sea Story,"

"Story of Royal Windsor," "Famous British Admirals,"

"The World's Exploration Story," &c.

"The peculiar distinction of being the only British  
Regiment named after a subject—not Royal."



PRINTED BY

JARROLD & SONS, LTD., THE EMPIRE PRESS, NORWICH

1922

## PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGNS, BATTLES, ETC., OF THE 33RD

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# CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. The Raising of the Regiment .	3
SERVICE IN SPAIN	
II. The Early Campaigns . . .	10
III. The Disaster at Almanza . . .	21
IV. Rehabilitation . . .	29
WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION	
V. Dettingen . . . . .	37
VI. Disaster and Glory at Fontenoy .	46
VII. Service in Scotland and Flanders	53
THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR	
VIII. The Failure at St. Malo . . .	62
IX. Strenuous Campaigns . . .	70
THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE	
X. First Experiences in America .	85
XI. A Brilliant but Fruitless Campaign	102
XII. In the Vicinity of New York .	111
XIII. The Campaigns in South Carolina	120
XIV. The Closing Campaign—Disaster at York Town . . . . .	126
XV. Between the Wars . . . . .	139
NETHERLANDS CAMPAIGNS	
XVI. Disastrous Netherlands Campaign	147
SERINGAPATAM	
XVII. The Advance on Seringapatam .	157
XVIII. The Capture of Seringapatam .	171
XIX. The Mahratta War . . . . .	180
XX. Sir Arthur Wellealey, Colonel of the 33rd . . . . .	186



## THE STRUGGLE WITH NAPOLEON

CHAPTER		PAGE
XXI.	Fighting in the Netherlands . . .	195
XXII.	The 33rd at Quatre Bras . . .	220
XXIII.	Waterloo . . . . .	232
XXIV.	The Victors in France . . . . .	249

## WEST INDIAN AND HOME SERVICE

XXV.	Between the Wars . . . . .	257
------	----------------------------	-----

## THE CRIMEAN WAR

XXVI.	Landing in the Crimea . . . . .	270
XXVII.	The Battle of the Alma . . . . .	279
XXVIII.	Balaclava . . . . .	290
XXIX.	Inkermann . . . . .	297
XXX.	The Progress of the Siege of Sebastopol . . . . .	305
XXXI.	The Fall of Sebastopol . . . . .	318
XXXII.	Central Indian Mutiny Service . . . . .	333

## THE ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION

XXXIII.	Preparing for the Expedition . . . . .	344
XXXIV.	The March to Magdala . . . . .	350
XXXV.	The Fall of Magdala . . . . .	358
XXXVI.	Garrison Duty . . . . .	367

## SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

XXXVII.	The Relief of Kimberley . . . . .	378
XXXVIII.	Pursuit and Capture of Cronje . . . . .	389
XXXIX.	The Fall of Bloemfontein . . . . .	403
XL.	The Driving Campaigns . . . . .	409

APPENDIX A . . . . .	421
APPENDIX B . . . . .	432
APPENDIX C . . . . .	437
APPENDIX D . . . . .	442
APPENDIX E . . . . .	447
APPENDIX F . . . . .	456
INDEX . . . . .	461

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# CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. The Raising of the Regiment .	3
SERVICE IN SPAIN	
II. The Early Campaigns . . .	10
III. The Disaster at Almanza . . .	21
IV. Rehabilitation . . .	29
WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION	
V. Dettingen . . .	37
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THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR	
VIII. The Failure at St. Malo . . .	62
IX. Strenuous Campaigns . . .	70
THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE	
X. First Experiences in America .	85
XI. A Brilliant but Fruitless Campaign	102
XII. In the Vicinity of New York .	111
XIII. The Campaigns in South Carolina	120
XIV. The Closing Campaign—Disaster at York Town . . .	126
XV. Between the Wars . . .	139
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XVI. Disastrous Netherlands Campaign	147
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XIX. The Mahratta War . . .	180
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CHAPTER		PAGE
XXI.	Fighting in the Netherlands . . .	195
XXII.	The 33rd at Quatre Bras . . .	220
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------	----------------------------	-----

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XXVI.	Landing in the Crimea . . . . .	270
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XXVIII.	Balaclava . . . . .	290
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XXX.	The Progress of the Siege of Sebastopol . . . . .	305
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XXXV.	The Fall of Magdala . . . . .	358
XXXVI.	Garrison Duty . . . . .	367

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XXXVII.	The Relief of Kimberley . . . . .	378
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XXXIX.	The Fall of Bloemfontein . . . . .	403
XL.	The Driving Campaigns . . . . .	409

APPENDIX A . . . . .	421
APPENDIX B . . . . .	432
APPENDIX C . . . . .	437
APPENDIX D . . . . .	442
APPENDIX E . . . . .	447
APPENDIX F . . . . .	456
INDEX . . . . .	461

**HISTORY OF  
THE THIRTY-THIRD FOOT**



# HISTORY OF THE THIRTY-THIRD FOOT

## CHAPTER I

### THE RAISING OF THE REGIMENT

WHEN Charles the Second, the feeble-minded and childless King of Spain, died, it was discovered that he had made a will calculated to create the gravest excitement in the diplomatic world.

The Courts of Europe were taken by surprise; for when the document was read it was in absolute contradiction of what the Powers had been led to expect from the words which had fallen from the monarch's lips less than two years before. In an assembly within the palace at Madrid Charles, having first pledged his councillors to secrecy, told them that his successor to the Crown would be the Electoral Prince of Bavaria. Neither by word nor by letter did the monarch, during the remainder of his life, give any hint of a change of purpose; yet, when the actual will was read, within an hour of his death, it was discovered that the Electoral Prince was set aside, and that the choice of the dead king had fallen on Philip, Duke of Anjou, the second son of the Dauphin.

The situation thus produced was one which Germany and William the Third, as representing Holland and England, could not tolerate, since it meant that with France and Spain so closely united, they would count

as a single Power of such enormous strength that the consequences could not fail to be disastrous to the rest of Europe. And especially to England would there be disadvantage. Statesmen realised that the combination of Spain and France would result in the development of a maritime strength which would become more than "a menace to English naval supremacy." The whole of the Bourbon dominion, says Innes, would have been closed for British commerce, while the British Colonies in America and British trade in the East would have been seriously endangered.

William III realised the far-reaching results of such a combination, and his policy throughout the crisis was to preserve the Balance of Power so gravely threatened. He, like the Powers who regarded him as their leader, awaited with anxiety the decision to which Louis the Fourteenth would come, hoping that the French monarch would avoid precipitating a disastrous quarrel. Louis' ambition, however, led him to yield to the temptation which the dead king's will presented. He decided to act upon it and face the consequences. Accordingly, the news travelled to the Courts of the Continent that in defiance of all treaties Louis had proclaimed the young Duke of Anjou King of Spain, under the title of Philip the Fifth.

William III was hampered by the unsympathetic attitude of the English people. He realised that if he joined the other interested Powers in declaring war against France, it was doubtful whether he would receive the co-operation of his English subjects; hence, at the outset, he would be seriously embarrassed, alike for want of money and of men. What could he and his Allies, who composed the GRAND ALLIANCE, do, when a tremendous coalition, made up of France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, existed, while England denied money and men and moral support in a contest with Louis, who possessed such enormous resources?

The English King was paralysed. In spite of his statesmanship, he was reduced to the position of a looker-on, while Louis became the dominating power in European politics, in reality the arbiter of the Continent's destinies. Louis, however, took a course which aroused England out of her indifference, and awoke her indignation when, on the death of the exiled king at St. Germain's, *Le Grand Monarque* recognised James the Second's son as King of England.

This afforded William his opportunity. In response to his appeal the Lords and the Commons, resenting the insult to the nation, assured him in unmistakable terms of "their firm resolve to defend the succession against the pretended Prince of Wales, and all other pretenders whatsoever." The Commons went further, for they gave the king the assurance that they would "to the utmost of their power enable his Majesty to make good all alliances he had made." They did more, for they passed votes of supply, and a Bill of Attainder against the Pretender, as the exiled Prince of Wales was henceforth named.

William the Third thus saw his way to war, and drew up an estimate of the forces required to meet the crisis. The estimate was accepted almost without discussion by the Commons, and the resolution, passed without a dissentient, ran as follows: "That the proportion of land forces to act in conjunction with those of the Allies, for making good the Alliances, should be 40,000 men, consisting of 33,000 foot, and 7,000 horse and dragoons; that 40,000 men should be employed in the sea service for the year 1702, and that as was usual for the maintaining of so many seamen, four pounds per month should be allowed them, including the ordnance for the sea service."

Preparations on such a scale created alarm in France, and might well have caused the French monarch to reconsider his position. An accident to William brought about his death on March 8th, 1702, and the conflict with France was postponed.

It remained to be seen what Queen Anne's attitude would be.

She made it sufficiently clear when her first speech was read in Parliament. The clause which referred to the question of the Spanish Succession was decisive enough: "That too much cannot be done for the encouragement of our Allies to reduce the exorbitant power of France." Europe immediately realised the situation, that "England was to be the soul of the Grand Alliance against France." The Emperor of Germany, such of the Netherlands as came under the sway of William the Third, and England, made up this coalition which was to play its part against Louis in what became known as the War of the Spanish Succession. The Grand Alliance was in reality "a league to wrest the whole of the Spanish dominions from Philip in favour of the Austrian Archduke, Charles," the Emperor of Germany's second son.

So far as war went, England at the time was hopelessly unready. She was practically without an army. The policy of Parliament with regard to the military forces of the Crown was astounding. Whenever a war was progressing, money was voted to maintain the army at the requisite fighting strength; but as soon as peace was declared there was a wholesale disbandment of regiments in order to reduce expenditure. The result was, that whereas there had been an army of 70,000 men during the last war, it was scarcely possible now to muster 20,000. Of these, little more than 7,000 belonged to the English Establishment, the remaining 12,000 being stationed in Ireland.

There can be little doubt that Louis XIV realised that with such a meagre standing army England need scarcely be reckoned with, and hence he could pursue his policy of aggrandisement, as well as insult the nation by espousing the cause of the Pretender. It now remained for the Government to bring up the army to the required strength, and provide at least

40,000 soldiers to play their part in the coming war. As many as fifteen regiments were therefore hastily raised, the 33rd among them.

The following order was issued to the Earl of Huntingdon on March 14th, 1702 :

### ANNE R.

These are to authorise you by Beat of Drum or otherwise, to raise Voluntiers for a regiment of Foot under your command, which is to consist of twelve Companys, of Two Serjeants, Three Corporals, Two Drummers, and Fifty-nine private soldiers, with the addition of one Serjeant more to the Company of Grenadiers. And as you shall raise the said voluntiers you are to give notice thereof to our Commissary General of the Musters, that they may be mustered according to our directions in that behalf. And when the whole number of non-commission officers and soldiers shall be fully or near completed, in each company, they are to march to our city of Gloucester, appointed for the rendezvous of the said regiment. And you are to order such person or persons as you think fit to receive Arms for our said regiment out of the Stores of our Ordnance. And all Magistrates, Justices of the Peace, Constables and other our Officers, whom it may concern are to be assisting to you in providing Quarters and otherwise as there shall be occasion.

Given at our Court of St. James' this 14th day of March, 1702, in the first year of our Reign.

To our Trusty and Well-beloved

The Earl of Huntingdon,

Col. of One of Our Regiments

of Foot.

The names of the Officers of the Commission



Register stand as follows for the Earl of Huntingdon's Regiment of Foot :

George, Earl of Huntingdon, Colonel.  
Robert Duncanson, Lieut.-Colonel.  
John Rose, Major.

It has been stated that the first Colonel of the 33rd was James Stanhope, first Earl of Stanhope. It would have been a credit to the new regiment to have had so fine a soldier for its commander, for he was spoken of by friend and foe as "high-minded, liberal, and well-skilled in the higher functions of statescraft." It must have been impossible that he should be the Colonel of the 33rd, for on the 12th of the preceding month he was appointed Colonel of the 11th Regiment, and was serving with it under Marlborough on the Meuse in 1703. There is nothing in the "Complete Peerage," which deals with Stanhope's career fully, to show that he had any connection with the 33rd, however remote.

George Hastings, who succeeded to the Earldom of Huntingdon, was undoubtedly the first Colonel of the Regiment, and was not more than twenty-five years old when he received the Commission to form the Regiment, coming from the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards, of which he was Lieutenant-Colonel.

The young Colonel's task was not any easy one, to raise the Companies as indicated in the Order. So many of those to whom the appeal was issued to offer themselves as "Voluntiers" had already seen service, and were among the "disbanded." They remembered the miseries of soldier life, the abominable housing of the troops, with consequent sickness, "want of firing and the badness of the barracks." It was common knowledge that with the troops already in the Service, one regiment alone had been reduced by death and desertion to about one half their number. Added to that was the experience as

to arrears of pay. It touched every rank, and Fortescue points out how the distress in the army became acute, and that the constant cry was "arrears, arrears, arrears," while some of the officers knew what it was to go hungry for lack of means to buy a meal. Consequently the "Voluntiers" held back until levy money to the amount of £3 was paid to every man who offered himself.

It was under such difficulties of enlistment that the 33rd Regiment was raised.

NOTE.—From stray notes concerning the story of the regiment it is found that the 33rd was first composed of men chiefly from the Midland and South Western counties, although, perhaps, some companies were raised in Kent. In July, 1702, the whole or a large portion of the regiment was stationed at Hereford. Advertisements of deserters in the "London Gazette" give the names of three of the original captains, Henry Blount, Milton Lambarde, and Philip Honeywood. No list seems available to furnish the names of other officers.

I am indebted to Colonel Duke for the following note: "For a very considerable time Sowerby, near Halifax, has been regarded as the original recruiting ground of the 33rd. This, therefore, serves to indicate the association of the regiment with the county of Yorkshire. In 1782 the description of First Yorkshire West Riding Regiment was given. The nickname of 'Havercake Lads' dates from about the same time."

# Service in Spain

## CHAPTER II

### THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS

1702. JOHN, Earl of Marlborough, already Captain-General of the English Forces, and Master-General of the Ordnance, was appointed to the command of the English Army, and ultimately, but only after considerable dispute, he was chosen Generalissimo of the Allied Army. His operations were carried on in Flanders; but the war was also prosecuted in the Spanish Peninsula, where the 33rd were to have their first experience of war.

The Peninsular Army was under the supreme command of the Duke of Ormond, who had served with distinction at Sedgmoor, Stienkirk, and Landen. In conjunction with Admiral Sir George Rooke, he was instructed to make a descent on Cadiz, the Spanish naval arsenal, and important at all times; but especially was it so at this juncture, as being the port into which the treasure of the New World found its way. It was felt that if Cadiz could be captured, Louis XIV, and the Spaniards who supported his nominee on the throne, would be hampered, since the inflow of wealth would be retarded. Already, with the French king's extravagant schemes, he was crippled for want of funds, and to cut off supplies through Cadiz might well be disastrous. This had been the plan proposed by William the Third, and it was adopted

by the Allies when the War of the Spanish Succession began.

Ormond's instructions were to reduce and take the town and island of Cadiz, but if the place should prove impregnable, he was to attack any other town, Vigo, Ponte Vedra, and Corunna being named.

The folly of dividing the command made itself apparent when the fleet came within sight of Cadiz. Ormond wished to land his troops, consisting of 10,000 English soldiers and 4,000 Dutch, and make a sudden escalade assault; but Rooke declared that if that were attempted the fleet could not adequately support him. Stanhope shows what angry dissensions sprang up between the English and the Dutch, the landmen and the seamen, and how these dissensions, which Ormond lacked the energy to control, proved fatal to the enterprise. What took place in this venture, when "no discipline was kept," and "no spirit was displayed," need not detain us. The whole affair was a miserable fiasco, and a return to England was the only course.

It was not an encouraging commencement to the fighting experiences of the 33rd.

There was one great happening which went far towards lessening the smart of disappointment while the fleet was carrying the army home; something also which lent the appearance of glory to an expedition which was likely to carry back a record of disaster. News was brought by a frigate that a treasure fleet from the West Indies, under the command of the French Admiral, Chateau-Renaud, had gone into Vigo. Rooke went after him. Ormond landed his troops with the intention of assaulting the south battery and tower, having previously arranged with Rooke that when he had achieved the capture, the Admiral should attack the French fleet. Ormond's movements were successful. The fleet was captured, and the enormous booty fell into the hands of the Allies. It was Ormond's wish to capture Vigo, but Rooke objected, leaving the

Duke no alternative but to re-embark and sail home.

For a short while after that the 33rd were mustered in Holland, the Earl of Huntingdon's regiment being among those that were designated for the service. The 33rd, however, took no part in the Marlborough campaigns, but remained in readiness for marching when called on.

1704. The call came when the Archduke Charles of Austria induced the English Government to furnish him with an army with which to reduce Spain, so far ruled by Louis' nominee. The force which the Archduke gathered was a formidable one, for while the English regiments numbered 6,500 men, there were 2,500 Dutch troops, and a promised army of 28,000 Portuguese—36,000 men in all. Among the English troops landed on the 15th of March, 1704, the 33rd found their place, in company with the 2nd Dragoon Guards, the Royal Dragoons, and the 2nd, 9th, 11th, 13th, and 17th Foot.

The campaign was rendered abortive owing to quarrels between some of the commanders, and the failure of the Portuguese to provide an army equal to their promises. Fortescue says that the Portuguese army was ill-equipped and inefficient, the magazines empty, the fortresses in ruins, the transports not in existence. The Portuguese, moreover, seemed ready to surrender on the first demand of the French who swept over the frontier.

1705. The next campaign was altogether different in its character. The English Government, anxious to follow up the splendid success of the capture and subsequent masterly defence of Gibraltar, determined to send an Allied expedition into Catalonia, thus carrying the war into Spain. The idea of the Allies was to encourage a revolt against Philip V among the Catalonians, and capture Barcelona. The army, which was under the command of the Earl of Peterborough, was made up of 3,000 English troops, 12,000 Portuguese

and 2,000 Dutch soldiers. "To avoid friction it was arranged that the three generals should command alternately for a week at a time."<sup>1</sup>

Peterborough concentrated his attention on Barcelona, leaving the English contingent under Lord Galway considerably weakened because the Commander-in-Chief induced Galway to lend him his two regiments of Dragoons. Galway had with him the 33rd Foot, which was now commanded by its new Colonel, Robert Duncanson, who had been promoted to the Colonelcy on the 12th of February, 1705.<sup>2</sup>

When ordered to the Peninsula, the 33rd was below its strength, and instructions were consequently given that "the Company whereof Henry Smallman, Esq., is captain, be drawn out of our Regiment of Foot, commanded by our Trusty and Well-beloved Colonel Roger Elliot . . . and that the same be incorporated into our Regiment of Foot, commanded by our Trusty and Well-beloved Robert Duncanson, Esq., for the compleating of the same to their Established Numbers."

Even then Duncanson found himself in some difficulty, which throws a sidelight on the wretched management of affairs by the authorities at home. The numbers were made up, and apparently everything was ready for the embarkation of the troops; but when the Colonel applied for a ship to carry the clothing and other belongings of his regiment, there was not one forthcoming, so that the equipment of the 33rd could not go out with the convoy. Duncanson was told that he would have to wait in the hope that a ship would be found in time. Yet it was known, and the State Papers show it, that the regiment was to be quartered nearest to the enemy when they arrived, and expected to be among the first to advance. Consequently there was a very real need of clothing and other necessities. In some way, more or less

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue: "History of the Army."

<sup>2</sup> A statement is made that Huntingdon was succeeded by Colonel Leigh, but there is no evidence to prove this.

hurriedly, the demand was complied with, and Duncanson found himself and his regiment under Lord Galway's command.

The first thing done in the way of effective war service was to march to the city of Valencia, "a walled town of 15,000 inhabitants, amply defensive against any force unaccompanied by guns." The hope of the Allies was, that since so many of the inhabitants warmly espoused the cause of the Austrian, they might be served from within; but the Viceroy, the nobles, and the upper classes, were wholly for Philip V.<sup>1</sup>

The force employed in the assault, which was delivered on the 10th of May, consisted of a small body of Portuguese Foot, 700 in all, two Dutch regiments, and the 33rd. The account of the engagement is thus given in the "London Gazette," dated May 28th, 1705 :

"From the Camp before Valencia d'Alcantara, May 10th, N.S.

"On the 2nd we arrived before this place and the next day we broke ground.

"On the 8th we stormed the Breach in the following manner: upon a signal given by a general discharge of all our guns and Mortars, a detachment of 200 English and Dutch Grenadiers commanded by Captain de Bourgay advanced towards the Breach from a hollow way lying near our Battery. They were supported by two Portuguese Regiments, one commanded by Don Francisco Nappar, the other by the Conde de Corcolain, by the English Regiment commanded by Colonel Duncanson, and by the Dutch Regiment of Count Noyelles.

"They mounted the Breach very gallantly, but meeting with greater resistance than was expected, the Grenadiers began to give ground, and the Portuguese, having lost their Colonel,

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue.

Don Francisco Nappar, who was killed in the Breach, were put to some disorder when Colonel Duncanson advanced with some courage and conduct, restored all things, and bravely pushed with colours flying into the Breach, which was not only undermined but defended by a new Intrenchment. The Enemy who had hitherto made a vigorous resistance, not being able to stand any longer, fled towards the Castle, and our men pursued them with sword in hand, and had entered pell-mell had not the Enemy immediately held out the White Flag, and surrendered at Discretion."

Fortescue, in his "History of the Army," referring to the engagement, adds the significant note: "It is somewhat singular that the first regiment which signally distinguished itself in this first Peninsular War was the 33rd (Duke of Wellington's), which covered itself with honour at the storm of Valenza."

There is no mention in the foregoing that Colonel Duncanson fell in the fight, but the 33rd had lost its leader, and a splendid soldier.

Duncanson's successor in the Colonelcy of the 33rd was George Wade, one of the most distinguished soldiers of his time, and ultimately promoted to the rank of Field Marshal.

So far as fighting went, the 33rd had little to do after the storming of Valencia d'Alcantara. Peterborough, in Catalonia, concentrated his attention on Barcelona. The garrison after some hard fighting capitulated, and the Archduke Charles, who was acknowledged as Charles III by the Allies, entered the city. With this and the success at Valencia d'Alcantara the campaign ended, nothing further being possible owing to the lack of money and supplies.

The army in Portugal was busy in the following year. At first the Spaniards were disposed to welcome the Austrian prince as king, but when it was found

1706.



that the invading army consisted so largely of English heretics and the hated Portuguese, the Spanish pride was aroused. The Spaniards threw in their lot with Philip V and the French, and the country round the Allied Army swarmed with guerilla bands, with Bracamonte and Vallejo as their leaders. Situated thus, with supplies failing, and no money coming, the condition of the 33rd and their comrades was far from enviable.

Lord Galway proposed that his army should advance on Madrid. His idea was to effect a conjunction with Peterborough, and to this the English Government assented readily; but the Portuguese so demurred that a compromise was agreed to, namely, that Galway's army should march as far as possible towards the capital. Marquis Das Minas was Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army on the Portuguese side of the Peninsula, but Galway was the real leader.

The English force was not a large one, numbering 200 horse and 2,000 foot, and ten field pieces. Wade's, Brudenel's, Blood's, Portmore's, and Stewart's Foot, with Harvey's Horse, constituted this contingent which marched to Elvas, where the whole army encamped.

On March 31st, the army was on the move, and crossed the frontier, soon coming up with the Duke of Berwick, who was in command of the French and Spanish forces. Berwick retreated, but his rear-guard came into action and was disastrously beaten. Still going north, Galway came to Alcantara, garrisoned by 4,000 men. On the 10th of April, the 33rd and Blood's (17th), drove the Spaniards out of the convent of St. Francis, in Estramadura, after a fierce fight in which the two regiments lost fifty killed and wounded, Colonel Wade being seriously hurt. On the 13th the investment of Alcantara was complete, and the Governor was called on to surrender. He did not do so until the next day, when he saw the breach made ready for the assault.

The capture of the fortress is spoken of as one of the most important successes gained by the Allies during the war, for not only were 4,000 Bourbon troops made prisoners, but the spoils were 70 guns and mortars, 5,000 muskets, a great quantity of ammunition, 200 horses, 22,000 pounds of corn, 200 pipes of wine, 150 pipes of oil, and 12,000 new suits of clothing.<sup>1</sup>

After further fighting at Moraliya, the Allies crossed the Tagus. Place after place fell into Galway's hands, and meanwhile Berwick, having crossed the river at Canaveral, marched in a line parallel with the Allies. The Bourbon general's conduct is inexplicable, for he was superior to Galway in artillery and numbers. He had, moreover, the friendship of the people of the country to rely on ; but when it was seen how he was in constant retreat, doing nothing effective to retard the march of the enemy, there was a sudden change in the attitude of the inhabitants around Placentia. They repudiated Philip, and submitted to the Allies.

In spite of this Galway found the Portuguese unwilling to advance beyond Placentia, and it was only after much persuasion and the loss of valuable time that they agreed to go as far as Almaraz, to fight Berwick, if he could be forced to an engagement.

When the Allies advanced, after this unfortunate delay, Berwick continued his retreat as far as Las Ventas Massonga, where, finding himself strongly placed behind a river, he surprised Galway by accepting the offer of battle.

Galway's army was formed into three columns. The third, containing the English of Portmore's, Wade's, Blood's and Stewart's, with Harvey's Dragoons, marched on the left of the second column, and by the road leading from Santa Teresa to Malpartida. The attack was commenced by the artillery. "Then the infantry, after wading the river up to the middle in water, carried the entrenchments with great spirit,

<sup>1</sup> Parnell : " War of the Succession in Spain."

and caused Berwick to retire in confusion." The dispatch which gives an account of the fight, says: "We pursued them for a considerable time, and at last, seeing that there was no probability of overtaking them, we returned to the banks of the Massagona, where we encamped in the same camp the enemy had quitted, which is five leagues from Placentia on the direct road to Madrid."

The result of this engagement was disappointing to Galway, for although the Bourbon general was defeated, and retreated in such disorder, the Portuguese flatly refused to enter Castile. Rarely has a commander had such an army to deal with, for it was nothing better than a heterogeneous mass of no less than five nationalities, Neapolitan, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and only a small proportion of English. There was, moreover, an astounding want of enterprise in his chief colleague, Das Minas. Again there was a compromise—to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. Here the Allies were successful, capturing the place on the 26th of May, Berwick doing nothing to relieve it, but falling back on Salamanca.

Galway's hopes of reaching Madrid seemed likely to be frustrated, for Das Minas refused to go in that direction until two things compelled him to change his mind. First, peremptory orders were sent from Lisbon on the demand of the British ambassador there, that Das Minas was to act on all occasions in concert with Galway, and in the second place news came that Tessé had been defeated at Barcelona, so that Peterborough was free to move. Galway accordingly began to advance on the 3rd of June, captured Salamanca, secured other places, and then sought to bring Berwick into action; but nothing would serve to bring the French Marshal into an engagement in spite of his reinforcements.

Galway pursued his daring march, always keeping the enemy on the move, and on June the 27th, after a three months' campaign, entered Madrid, where the

Archduke Charles was proclaimed King of Spain. It was a fine achievement in face of the fact that Galway's colleagues were a hindrance at every turn. But for the splendid response to his calls from the 33rd and the other English troops, the march would either have been impossible, or disastrous, whereas it stands out as one of the brilliant campaigns in all the Peninsular Wars. The achievement was the more wonderful when Parnell reminds us that "personally Galway was infirm from age and gout; his right arm had been recently torn off by a cannon shot, and he had to be lifted on horseback like a child." Yet he went on with his men through the dark and perilous passes in the bosom of the mountains, taking all the risks of the difficult country, always a menace to the enemy who seemed to be paralysed by the daring of his march to Madrid.

Hearing that Berwick was at Guadalaxara, 35 miles from the capital, Galway took his army there, and by some fine manœuvring, outwitted the French general, and secured a position so strong that the enemy, with his 26,000 troops, would not venture to attack him, although through desertions and sickness, and losses from fighting, his numbers had dwindled to less than 14,000 men, a considerable diminution from the 19,000 which the army numbered when the march began three months before.

This movement enabled Berwick to get between Galway's army and Madrid, where the Bourbons got the upper hand once more, and again proclaimed Philip V.

In spite of his army dwindling like this, Galway marched from his positions to meet Berwick, determined to compel him to fight. He knew he could rely on his English troops, and his trust in them was amply deserved. Whatever he set them to effect was accomplished with matchless enthusiasm; but unfortunately the pusillanimity of the Allies rendered his endeavours abortive, and he had no alternative but to

fall back on Guadalaxara again, where Berwick, in spite of his superiority in numbers, feared to attack him.

The whole country was in arms against Galway now. The guerillas were out, urged into activity by the lying statements of the priests that King Charles was dead, and that they had seen his dead body.

Finding it impossible to retreat to Portugal, Galway decided to pursue his march eastward and join Peterborough. Berwick was in his rear, and the 33rd, with their English comrades, had incessant rear-guard fighting. But on no occasion was there any great engagement. There was a race for the first possession of Valdecana, but Galway outmarched the French, and when Berwick came up, he found the Allies so strongly entrenched that he drew back and actually watched Galway cross the river without attempting to hinder him. Tired with being so frequently foiled, Berwick turned away, and Galway pursued his march to Valencia, where he went into winter quarters. Fortescue's comment is, "So closed the year 1706, memorable for two of the most brilliant, even in some respects disappointing, campaigns ever fought simultaneously by two English generals." It was a tremendous testing time for the 33rd in their early days, but they did much by the display of endurance and unflinching courage to give the promise of a career of which any regiment might be proud. It may safely be said that never in after days did they disappoint those expectations which these early achievements aroused.

Their losses had been severe, and before the campaign of 1706 was ended, the total number of effective men in the regiment had shrunk to 538, whereas the original strength was 698. A large proportion of them had been killed or were disabled by wounds or sickness.

## CHAPTER III

### THE DISASTER AT ALMANZA

IN view of the campaign of the following year the English Government sent forward 8,200 troops to reinforce Galway, these landing at Alicant. With them came six field pieces, six mortars, sixty cohorns, and thirty-four heavy guns, together with three Spanish battalions. 1707.

In the meantime Peterborough had gone back to England. He was found to be impossible among his colleagues because of what Fortescue calls "his endless squabbles" with them, and "his military conduct generally," which had been called in question at home. This left the army in the capable hands of Galway, who was still hampered by having to share his command with Das Minas.

Marlborough had suggested an advance on Madrid, the forces combining to make a united army; but Noyelles, one of the Allies' generals, was forever intriguing against Galway, and persuaded Charles to scatter his troops in order to defend various towns in Valencia and Catalonia, adopting a purely defensive policy. The king, after a heated interview, marched out of the camp with all the Spanish troops, who numbered 10,300 men, leaving Galway with a force altogether inadequate for the task which confronted him.

He was advised to retreat, since his total command after the defection did not amount to more than 15,500, but he was determined to follow out an offensive policy, to march northwards into Aragon,

and then sweep round for an advance on Madrid. To pursue such a course with diminished numbers, without any prospect of the people rising to co-operate with him, was a discouragement so intense that it would have been small matter for wonder if Galway had refused the risks, and embarked his troops, leaving Charles to the brunt of the conflict. The general, however, was not a man of that stamp. He knew that if he were well supported by the Dutch and Germans and Portuguese, he could win his way. He was equally aware that disaster was certain if these failed him.

The march began on the 10th of April, and Berwick as before, fell back, pursuing the Fabian policy, and foiling all Galway's endeavours to force a fight. Moving on through Murcia, the Allies captured various magazines, but the whole province was intensely hostile, adding to the general's difficulty in feeding his troops.

On the 24th of April news was brought in that Berwick was marching on Almanza, and that Orleans was hurrying up to join him. Galway saw the necessity for preventing this junction. Already Berwick's army numbered 25,400 men, and he was strong in artillery. He was equally well provided with cavalry, for he had as many as 76 squadrons, against which Galway could not show more than 4,500 horse. Only 4,800 of his men were English, and more than half his whole force, which numbered less than 16,000, were ill-disciplined and miserably equipped Portuguese levies whose conduct on the battlefield was purely problematic. They were as likely to run as fight. On his own men Galway placed absolute reliance, but even thus it was not to be wondered at that he heard of Berwick's advance on Almanza with misgiving. It became with him a serious question as to whether he should go forward or retreat. Yet he saw a chance. If he moved forward rapidly, before Orleans could join Berwick, he might force on a fight. Das Minas and the other

generals approved his suggestion, and the order was given to advance.

At day-dawn, on the 25th of April, after a march in four columns for eight miles, the Allies saw Berwick's army at a distance of a mile, and in a formation of two lines. Almanza was behind the French general, who had so placed himself as to give his cavalry every possible advantage. His left was high ground near the road to Valencia; his right was on rising country in the direction of Montalegre. A ravine was in front of his centre, while in front of all was a great plain which he was able to sweep with his artillery.

Das Minas was in nominal command of the army for that day, but it was left to Galway to form the line of battle. He was hampered at the outset when the Portuguese claimed the place of honour, and while he yielded his position with reluctance, he went to the left.

It was noon before the two armies confronted each other, and then Galway realised the nature of the task which awaited him. So far as his English troops were concerned he had no fears. The question was as to how much reliance he could place on the 1,500 Dutch, the 1,000 Huguenots, the handful of Germans; but mainly, he was in doubt as to the conduct of the 8,000 Portuguese, the men for whom Das Minas claimed the post of honour in the field.

Halting for a rest after an eight miles' march, Galway was startled to discover his inferiority in cavalry. He had expected the enemy to be superior in this respect, but not to such an extent. He employed the resting-time in an endeavour to make up for his weakness in the all-important arm by introducing what Parnell has called "a novelty in the recognised mode of fighting," but what Fortescue points out as being after the manner of Gustavus Adolphus, namely to interline a brigade of foot with each wing of horse. In that manner the 33rd had the 8th Dragoons on their immediate right, the 6th Foot on their left,



and Dragoons beyond them again. These two regiments of infantry numbered less than a thousand men, Wade's (33rd) counting not more than 458, and the 6th having 505.

Three hours' rest having been allowed—practically none at all because the soldiers were on the move the whole of the time to find their places in the order of battle, Galway began the engagement at three o'clock by leading on the English Dragoons and attacking Berwick's Horse on the right wing. He moved with such rapidity that the enemy were unable to use their artillery to any purpose, and when Colonel Dormer rode down to attack the battery, it beat a hasty retreat, and was for the time being out of the fighting.

Galway's horse were met by the French squadrons, and a fierce struggle followed. But in spite of the resolution of the English cavalry they were driven back by overwhelming numbers, and with great loss. They advanced again, this time the 6th and 33rd coming up, and opening a fire on the enemy's flank so destructively that his cavalry were driven back with slaughter right on their reserves. The rout in this part of the field was so complete that the flying cavalry were pursued up to the walls of the town. The same success followed the onslaught of the Dutch and English foot in the centre, but Galway had failed to provide support for these. Berwick, seeing this, ordered several squadrons of his second line to assail their flank, and they fell back with heavy loss. They were saved from annihilation by Hill's and Kerr's regiments, which went to their relief from the second line.

Victory seemed assured for the Allies if the Portuguese would do what was expected of them. Their cavalry were to come into action and engage the enemy on his left, thus preventing Berwick's left from going to the support of his beaten centre and right. Their unaccountable inaction was observed by Berwick, who sent down all the horse in his left wing with such fury that the Portuguese, both cavalry and infantry,

were swept away with terrific slaughter. Whether in panic or cowardice it is impossible to say, but the majority of their horse, when Berwick's came thundering on, turned without waiting for the onslaught, and galloped off the field. The panic extended to the cavalry of their second line, which also fled, while the artillery left their guns and sought for safety.

The only Portuguese who fought well in this disastrous phase of the battle were the few squadrons around Das Minas, and his eleven battalions of infantry in the first line. The fight in which these engaged did not last long. The square they formed was broken in, and confusion and panic followed.

On the left and in the centre alone was there any honour in the fatal fight. Here the 33rd played their part with magnificent courage, shared with the horse and foot in that portion of the field. Neither artillery fire nor cavalry charge, again and again repeated, could shake them, and had the Portuguese but held their own, instead of displaying such incapacity and cowardice, a splendid victory would have been won. As it was, Berwick, having swept away the right wing of the Allies, brought his infantry to bear on Galway, where the cavalry had hopelessly failed. Between the English infantry and his own front line of horse he threw in nine battalions of foot who had done neither fighting nor marching as yet. Coming on from Berwick's left, they swept against Galway's five English regiments, Mountjoy's, Stewart's (9th), Southwell's (6th), Blood's (17th), and Wade's 33rd.

The English regiments were doomed the moment Berwick's infantry advance began. The men were tired with the long march of the morning; they had already become worn with the strenuous part they played in beating back Berwick's cavalry; many of their officers were killed or disabled by wounds, while, the enemy's infantry came sweeping on, fresh, and overwhelming in point of numbers, encircling them. It was impossible for the Allied cavalry to go to their

support, for Berwick drove against them every fresh squadron he had at his disposal.

The fighting, however, was heroic, assailed though Galway's men were by a withering fire on every side. For a few moments after the battle had been waging murderously, the French looked like losing, and that was when Tyrawley, seeing his chance, hurled what English Dragoons he could gather against two French battalions of infantry, and broke them up so completely that they scattered and cried for quarter. But it was unavailing. The cowardice of the Portuguese had made defeat certain. There was a time when the fight developed into slaughter, and Berwick's men refused to give quarter. Galway, who was disabled early in the battle by a sabre cut above the eyes, succeeded in making a fighting retreat with what remained of the Allied left, saving his guns, his camp equipment, his baggage, the commissariat stores, his wounded and sick, and with these he reached Outmiente, on the Catalonian frontier, twenty-two miles away from Almanza.

But the 33rd, the four other English regiments, and the Dutch infantry, which barely escaped annihilation, were left behind. They did not surrender until all their ammunition was exhausted. Cannon, in the History of the 17th Foot, shows how the remains of the English regiments were collected into a body, and were united to some Dutch and Portuguese troops; the whole retreating to the woody hills of Candete. The men were so exhausted with fatigue that they were unable to proceed, and they passed the night in the wood without food. On the following morning they were surrounded by the enemy, and being without ammunition, ignorant of the country, and destitute of provisions, they had no alternative but to surrender.

In this disastrous engagement the 33rd had Captains Barraton and Degoine, Lieutenant Boot and Ensigns Erwine and Ferron killed. Seventeen officers were taken prisoners, of whom only Captains Latour,

Howard, Edwards, and Owens, and Ensign Reynolds were not wounded. The wounded were Captains Reading and Hautclair, Lieutenants Physwyck, Struggle, Clapham, McCabe, Nichols, and Gore, Ensigns Lamilliere, Bromingham, Wheeler, and Hayes. What the losses among the men were it is impossible to say. To all intents and purposes the regiment was all but destroyed.

The terrific character of the fighting at Almanza, which did not last more than two hours, may be judged from the fact that "the British alone lost 88 officers killed, and 286 captured, of whom 92 were wounded." Of the Allies, 4,000 were killed, 3,000 made prisoners, and the Portuguese abandoned all their guns in their mad flight. Among the consequences of the defeat the Allies completely lost Murcia, Valencia, and Aragon, and so absolutely was Galway crippled that he was unable to do more than stand on the defensive in Catalonia.

So far as the 33rd were concerned, they played no further part in the war in the Spanish Peninsula. With the other prisoners of Almanza they were marched to Bayonne and Bordeaux, and detained there until orders came for their release.

NOTE.—The "Postboy," dated 5th-7th June, 1707, has set forth the Order of Battle as follows, but only for the left wing, which concerns the troops under Lord Galway's command:

## ORDER OF BATTLE: ALMANZA.

(Left Wing only)

LEFT		RIGHT
1st Line		
	Wade's Brigade	Macartney's Brigade
<div> <div> <div>Guidescard's Dragoon</div> <div>Essex's Dragoons (4th Hussars)</div> <div>7th Dragoons (Hussars)</div> <div>1st Royal Dragoons</div> </div> </div>	<div> <div>Mountjoy's Foot</div> <div>17th Foot</div> <div>Peterborough's Dragoons</div> <div>8th Dragoons (Hussars)</div> <div>33rd Foot</div> <div>6th Foot</div> </div>	<div> <div>Two Dutch Brigades</div> <div>Mordaunt's Foot</div> <div>Macartney's Foot</div> <div>35th Foot</div> <div>1st Batt. English Guards</div> </div>
2nd Line	Hill's Brigade	
<div> <div>Four Squadrons</div> <div>Portuguese Dragoons</div> </div>	<div> <div>11th Foot</div> <div>Mark Kerr's Foot</div> <div>Three Portuguese Squadrons</div> <div>36th Foot</div> <div>9th Foot</div> </div>	<div> <div>Bowles's</div> <div>Nassau's</div> <div>Bretton's</div> <div>2nd Foot</div> </div>
		Four Portuguese Squadrons.

## CHAPTER IV

### REHABILITATION

1708. AFTER the disaster at Almanza the 33rd Regiment was practically non-existent. Some of the men contrived to escape into the mountains while on the march to Bayonne, and these, after undergoing great privations, and facing incredible dangers, found their way to Galway's army, which had been re-formed, and through the general's wonderful energy was already 14,600 strong, "well-equipped, supported by a good train, provided with transport, and ready to take the field."

But as a regiment the 33rd did not exist until an order was issued on the 8th of March, 1708, for re-raising it in England. There is considerable confusion, in what information is to hand, whether, when the prisoners of war were released they found their way back to England, and were incorporated in the new 33rd, or sought out Galway, and were assigned places in other regiments, altogether ceasing to have further connection with the regiment for whose glory they had fought with such distinction.

The second explanation is the more probable, for it is expressly stated that in April, 1708, the veterans were transferred to other regiments in Spain. Fortescue explicitly names the 33rd as part of General Stanhope's force of 4,200 men who joined Staremburg in his campaign in 1710, when he took the offensive, and carried the war into Aragon. This must obviously refer to the re-forming of the remnants of Mordaunt's

and Wade's shattered regiments which succeeded in reaching Galway's camp.

They were so few, however, that the following statements was made at the time: "We cannot yet give any certain account of our forces, but these we have are the finest in the world; such are the regiment of Southwell, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Hunt; that of Blood, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel de Bourget; that of Mordaunt, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Dalzell, which we have completed out of the reduced regiments of Bowles, Montandre, Portmore, Wade, Alnut, Macartney, Mountjoy, Hill, Gorges. Mark Kerr, Stewart, Briton and Magney, which regiments were broke, and for the most part taken prisoners at Almanza."

This note must refer to the men who contrived to escape, and to them only, for even as late as July, 1712, the Almanza prisoners were still in the hands of the enemy, as the following order to Brigadier Wade shows:

WHITEHALL,  
28th July, 1712.

SIR,

His Majesty having ordered the Regiments of Foot Brigade of Brigadr Munsden, Brigadr Gore and Brigadr Dalzell, now prisoners in Spain, to be disbanded, and that the Non-Commission Officers and Soldiers (Portuguese excepted) shall be incorporated (as soon as released) proportionably into yours and other Regiments of Foot taken prisoners at the same time, Which are ordered to be placed on the Irish Establishment from the 23rd of December last, and be looked upon as belonging thereunto from that time. I send this to acquaint you herewith, that you may govern yourself accordingly and pursuant to Her Majesty's Pleasure declared in that case.

Sir, Yours etc.,

WYNDHAM.

To Brigadier Wade.

Wade was not certain as to the numbers of men whom he might expect, and accordingly instructed his secretary to write to Head-quarters to ask the question, to which he received the following reply, which is interesting as showing how disastrously depleted the 33rd had been in the fight at Almanza.

WHITEHALL,  
3rd Oct., 1712.

SIR,

In answer to your letter to Sir Wm. Wyndham of the 30th past, I send you in his absence an abstract of the number of Prisoners coming from Spain according to the last returns from thence, which are to be carried to Ireland, as also of such others, who, after landing those in Ireland, are to be brought to England, which you will be pleased to lay before my Lord Treasurer.

Your humble Servant,  
SAM LYNN.

To Mr. Lowndes.

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An account of the number of English Prisoners in Spain belonging to and to be turned over to the Regiments lately transferred to the Irish Establishment according to the last returns ending 23rd of June, 1718.

Wade's Foot	Sergts	Corpls	Drums	Private Men
	25	18	4	123

The re-formation of the regiment did not by any means imply permanency. It seemed to be no sooner brought into shape again, after its disastrous break-up, than the authorities contemplated disbanding it. Some time in 1713 or 1714 it was ordered over to Ireland, to complete the Establishment in that country, but there was nothing there to cause alarm, since



Ireland was declared to be perfectly tranquil. Consequently the stay of the 33rd was altogether uneventful. An order was issued, however, which was disturbing to the Officers and men, and dated from

DUBLIN CASTLE,  
25th May, 1714.

MY LORD,

Having in pursuance of Her Majesty's commands caused the Regiments of Dragoons commanded by Colonel Kerr and Major-General Pepper, and the Regiments of Foot commanded by Colonel Churchill, Lord Mountjoy, Major-General Wade, and Brigadr Corbet to be disbanded I herewith send your Lordship a list of the Officers of the said several Regiments in order to their being placed on the Establishment of Half Pay in this Kingdom from the respective days of disbanding.

Your Lordship's  
Most Obedient Servant,  
SHREWSBURY.

To the Lord Treasurer.

This was neither pleasing to the regiments concerned, nor to others who viewed with some dismay the weakening of the military garrison in Ireland, where disastrous disturbances might occur at any moment. Undoubtedly the reduction was made in response to the cry for retrenchment after an exhausting war. Criticisms came freely, and while Colonel Wade was preparing to act according to orders a newspaper was quoted in the Commons, touching on many matters, and among the items was the following paragraph :

“ An Express is sent to Ireland for the immediate breaking of the following Regiments there, viz. Lord Mountjoy's, Col. Char. Churchill's, Col. Wade's, and Col. Corbett's, being all Foot ;

Col. Pepper's, and Col. Kerr's Dragoons. The honest people of Ireland will suffer by the ill Practices and Designs of their late Factious House of Commons, which is a pity, for these Drawbacks will be 40 or 50,000 £. per annum out of the Kingdom's way, besides the loss of the Money which the said six Regiments would spend in that Country; and another of their Regiments are to be sent to Port Mahone. Now let their Whiggish Cloathiers and Cloth-Workers (instead of Wine e'ry Night, as they had at the late Election for Parliament for your City and County, as the Scotch Ambassadors on the Comb) drink Taplash, which they may have cheap since the Additional Duty is off."

The paragraph created great anger in the House, and was stigmatised by resolution to be "a false, scandalous, and malicious Libel, highly reflecting on the Justice and Honour of the late House of Commons." That was in November, but although the proprietor of the paper was taken into custody, and the Sergeant-at-Arms brought him to the bar of the Commons, the "scandalous" statement as to the breaking of the regiments was not an untrue one, since the following Order was addressed :

WHITEHALL,  
29th Dec, 1715.

SIR,

I have received His Majesty's Commands to acquaint you that it not being thought any longer necessary to keep the troops under your command together, His Matie orders that you do according to the power you already have for this purpose to dispose the troops in Quarters in such places as you may judge best for His Majesty's Service with all the regard that will admit of for the ease of the Inhabitants in the respective towns where they

are quartered, upon which occasion I must recommend to you the relieving the town of Taunton, Mr. Smith a very honest gentleman and member for that Corporation having represented to me that the Inhabitants who are generally well affectioned to the Government earnestly desire some of the troops now there, may be removed to the adjacent towns, but this is left to your discretion.

Yours, etc., etc.,  
WM. PULTENEY.

To Major General Wade.

It was a suicidal policy to render the fighting forces of the nation so ineffective that only 9,000 men were at the disposal of the new king, George I. It was, however, in keeping with the policy of the House of Hanover. England, as Seeley points out, interfered in William III's and Queen Anne's time in Continental affairs with more decision than had been her wont under either the Tudors or the Stuarts. But when George I became king, the British nation reverted to the insular state as part of the new policy, so that the need for a large and efficient army was ignored.

Yet, while there was peace for the time being on the Continent, there was very real danger at home, the greatest concern being felt throughout the country owing to the intrigues of the Jacobites to restore the exiled Stuarts to the throne. The rising of 1715 was speedily frustrated, but the displeasure and anxiety of the nation led to the restoration of disbanded regiments, while those that had become depleted were strengthened by calling out officers and men who had been forced to resign by shameful and shabby expedients.

The 33rd was among the regiments that were thus rehabilitated. What its movements were in the years that immediately followed its restoration is not known beyond this, that it changed about between Ireland

and England frequently, and engaged in nothing more exciting than a monotonous garrison duty.

In 1717 it lost its Colonel, for Wade was appointed 1717.  
Colonel of the 3rd Dragoons. Henry Hawley was  
named as his successor to the Colonelcy of the 33rd,  
the commission being dated March 19th, 1717.

There seemed to be some prospect of active service 1719.  
before Hawley had long been the regiment's com-  
mander, for on August 6th, 1719, an order was issued  
for the 33rd and other regiments to go to the Isle of  
Wight, to be held in readiness for employment on sea  
or land, as His Majesty should determine. The expedi-  
tion in which they were to take part was destined for  
Spain. Louis XIV was dead, and the whole phase of  
European politics changed startlingly. Spain no longer  
had a strong ally in France, for the new French king  
broke away, leaving her isolated, England and France  
alike being her enemies.

The war declared by England just before Christmas  
in 1718 led to a concentration of troops in the Isle of  
Wight, and the 33rd being among these, anticipated  
an active participation in the hostilities. Doubt,  
however, is thrown on the assertion that the regiment  
took part, but Dalton says that Hawley, the Colonel  
of the 33rd, served with his regiment in the expedition  
to Vigo in 1719. Assuming this to be correct, the  
regiment, as soon as the Spanish enterprise had ended.  
returned to garrison duty, the greater portion of it  
for several years being rendered in Ireland. (1730 to  
1741.)

At the beginning of the service in Ireland a change 1730.  
in the command took place. Hawley, who had gone  
to one of the cavalry regiments, was succeeded by  
Colonel Robert Dalzell, who had already achieved  
considerable distinction as a soldier, and held rank as  
a lieutenant-general. It is said of him that he took  
part in eighteen campaigns under the greatest com-  
manders in Europe. At the time of his appointment,  
July 9th, 1730, he had undergone hard service in Spain.

When Mordaunt's regiment, like Wade's, was cut up at Almanza, Dalzell re-formed it, and it was spoken of as one of the finest regiments in the world. Had war called out the 33rd during Dalzell's command, the regiment would have had a splendid leader, of the finest ability, and one of whom the men would have been justly proud. No such good fortune befell the regiment, and Dalzell had no opportunity of seeing how the 33rd would have behaved in the field beyond what he had witnessed in that sanguinary fight at Almanza.

1739. There was again a change of Colonels in 1739. On the 7th of November Dalzell was transferred to the command of the 38th Foot, and Lieut.-Colonel John Johnson succeeded him in the command. He came to the 33rd from the 2nd Coldstream Guards, of which he was Lieut.-Colonel, by that time being counted a soldier with a fine record, and marked down for further promotion.

# War of the Austrian Succession

## CHAPTER V

### DETTINGEN

1741. WITHIN two years of Johnson's appointment as Colonel the regiment was ordered to Flanders, Europe being once more threatened with warlike operations of considerable magnitude.

The death of the Emperor, Charles VI, resulted in a quarrel as to the succession. Charles, having no male heir, had left his daughter, Maria Theresa, heiress to his hereditary dominions. The Elector of Bavaria, however, claimed succession to large portions of these, and was also, like Maria Theresa's husband, Francis of Lorraine, a candidate for the Empire.

The question which rose was a complicated one, the point of view of various European Powers being totally at variance. Great Britain and Hanover found it to their advantage to maintain the integrity of Austria; Spain and France, on the other hand, had everything to gain by its dismemberment. Prussia, moreover, now a Great Power in Europe, determined to absorb the Austrian province of Silesia, and while the various governments were disputing over claims and counter-claims, the Prussian king, Frederick II, marched a powerful army into Silesia, declaring at the time that if Maria Theresa would confirm him in the possession of that province, he would assist her in maintaining the integrity of her other dominions. He did

not fail to say in his ultimatum that if she refused this he would give his support to the Elector of Bavaria.

The claim of this latter prince, who had already won the election to the Empire, and was become Charles VII, was based on the right of his wife, the daughter of the Emperor Joseph, who was an older brother than Charles VI.

Spain, hoping to make good her claims to certain territories in Italy, intervened while France looked on ; but the French monarch realised that it was to the interest of the Bourbons to force the dismemberment of Austria. His view was that it would be to the disadvantage of the Bourbons if the new Emperor had matters all his own way.

England's attitude for the time being was one of non-interference, but Hanover wanted to engage at once. George the Second was eager for war, and restless at the thought that the Prussian king was gaining advantages over France by his swift and unexpected invasion of Silesia. Walpole, however, refused to move, although war was being waged in Germany and Italy. Knowing that the nation was not prepared for war, he argued that "by the advantages which France might win the balance of power in Europe would not be shaken, but Spain would be the chief gainer ; that in a war to be waged about the Polish Crown the English nation was in any case not inclined to take part, and it was far better that it should not ; by that means (England) would maintain its commerce with both parties undisturbed. Holland, he said, certainly could not be induced to join ; and if it alone remained neutral, it would enjoy all the commercial advantages which belong to neutrality."<sup>1</sup> Walpole yielded to the king so far, that England should arm both on land and sea.

There came a day when it was evident that France and Spain were acting to the disadvantage of England. France had obtained Lorraine ; Spain had gained

<sup>1</sup> Ranke.

enormous tracts in Italy; and so strong was the Bourbon power by the combination of the two kingdoms with their added territories, that England could no longer hope to remain neutral with safety. War was declared—"a return to the policy then abandoned of war against France and the Bourbon interest in Europe," and that at a moment when these once more had the upper hand both by land and sea.

Thus committed to war, England made extensive preparations for it. A war vote provided for an army of 62,000 men, while John, Earl of Stair, was appointed Commander-in-Chief. The 33rd were in Ireland at the time with nine other royal regiments of foot. The 33rd was brought up to its full strength in view of its being sent over to the Continent, and like the other regiments in Ireland contained twenty companies of men and 228 Officers and Non-Coms., making a total of 1,628. 1742.

Orders came on April 24th, 1742, for immediate embarkation for Flanders, and every available regiment was held in readiness; but the energy first displayed by the authorities was not maintained. It was one thing to issue orders; another to find transport and provide equipment, so that the British troops, as Fortescue puts it, "continued to arrive in dribblets from England." It was not until the end of September that the whole of the army which Stair was to command landed in Flanders.

On leaving Ireland, the 33rd proceeded to Chester, and later, having arrived in Flanders, marched with Ponsonby's (37th) and Bligh's (20th), to Mons. This was in January, and thereafter, according to orders, these regiments moved on, first to Aeth, then to Charleroy, and lastly to Bruges. By January 30th, they were at Anderlecht. 1743.

The march of the first division towards the Rhine began early in February, but the 33rd, who formed part of the ninth division, under Ponsonby's command, did not start until 10th of March.



Stair's plan of campaign was creditable in every way, and had he been allowed a free hand he might well have made a sweep down on Paris itself; but he was hampered by the so-called Council of War at home, and by the King's own unwillingness to give such an affront to France, with whom he pretended he was not at war. What with adverse criticism of his plans, counter orders from home, and jealousies in various quarters, Stair saw his opportunities vanish, the enemy had time to close up the road to Paris, the season passed, and winter arrived before anything could be done.

Austrian influence succeeded in causing the withdrawal of the English forces across the Rhine, and after a severe winter, during which the troops suffered greatly, Stair, still hampered by his instructions, prepared to advance into Bavaria. At the time a startling proportion of his officers were in England on leave, but they hurried back at his urgent call, and the march began.

Again Stair pointed the way to victory—"to repeat Marlborough's stroke of 1704, and push across to Bavaria to catch the French corps there between two fires." George II interfered, and prevented him, and another fine opportunity was gone. He had told Stair to occupy the heights of Mainz, and thus command the junction of the Rhine and Main. Fortescue's comment is, that "such a disposition was from a military point of view sufficiently obscure; and indeed it had no military object whatever, being designed simply to secure the choice of King George's nominee for the vacant Electorate of Mainz."

On the 19th of June, George II joined the army, bringing with him his son, the Duke of Cumberland. He found Stair's army on the north bank of the Main, in a narrow valley extending from Aschaffenburg to Dettingen, a village on the river. But when the English general rehearsed his plan to cross the river and take up a position between Oppenheim and Mainz, thus preventing the French Commander,

Marshal Noailles, from sending any part of his army into Bavaria, the King dissented strongly. He disregarded Stair's representations. He was equally oblivious of the fact that the army was far from well prepared for active operations.

The previous delay forced on Stair had enabled Noailles to strengthen his army to such an extent that it completely outnumbered the Allies who mustered 52,000 men as against 70,000 French.

The King now took command in person. Realising that the shortness of supplies would necessitate a retrograde movement, the order was given to fall back on Hanau. This was on 26th of June. A reinforcement was there expected of 12,000 Hessians and Hanoverians, and had arrived when the army reached the town.

George found himself in difficulties at the outset. He was made aware of the fact that Noailles had foreseen the probability of retreat, that retreat being necessarily across a narrow plain with the Main on one side and the Spessart Hills on the other.

Noailles prepared for this by bringing up five batteries which commanded the road so necessary to the retreating army. He had also thrown two bridges over the stream, intending that Count Grammont should cross with 28,000 men, and occupy the village of Dettingen. The Allies were in the gravest peril, being hemmed in between river and mountains, with Grammont in front, a great French force in the rear, and thousands of Noailles' men lining the other side of the stream. There was everything to forecast disaster, the gravest danger apparently in the rear, where on the morning of the 27th, when the retreat began, the French were known to be advancing.

Noailles had ordered Grammont to hold Dettingen, to prevent the retreat, while with his main body he came up to deal with the Allies. The idea was to assail them in the rear, and torment them by a fire in the flank; then, when broken up in confusion by over-

whelming numbers, and hemmed in on both flanks by natural obstacles, they would be cut up in their retreat by Grammont. His cavalry was in waiting for the Allies' infantry as it should make its appearance on the only road possible for it to travel.

It was a startling surprise to the King to learn that Grammont was in force at Dettingen, ready to cut off his retreat. His army was moving, the whole attention being centred on the rear where the fighting was expected. The plan had to be changed on the instant, the real danger lying where it was unsuspected.

For a time the greatest confusion prevailed. The baggage wagons that were moving towards Dettingen blocked the way, and suddenly a galling fire came across the river. The baggage horses were shot in great numbers, so that nothing could be done to clear the way.

Naturally enough the Royal Artillery were in the rear, and it took a full hour to bring them up to deal with the enemy on the opposite bank and silence their guns. This was done, however, and the wagons were ultimately got into safety.

The line of battle which could then be formed has been thus detailed by Fortescue: By noon "King George's line was formed, and on its extreme left were seen the scarlet coats of the British battalions. To the left of all, and within a furlong of the river, stood the 33rd Foot, and to its right in succession the 21st Fusiliers, 23rd Fusiliers, 12th, 11th, 8th, and 13th Foot. On the right of the 13th stood an Austrian brigade, and then in succession the Blues, Life Guards, 6th Dragoons, and Royal Dragoons. All of these were in the first line. In the second line, in rear of their comrades on the left, were posted the 20th, 32nd, 37th, 31st, and the Buffs; and in the rear of the cavalry on the right, the 7th Dragoon Guards, King's Dragoon Guards, 4th and 7th Dragoons, and the Scots Greys. Opposite to them the French were ranged in two lines with a reserve in the third line, the infantry being in the

centre, and the cavalry on the flanks, so that the famous French Household Cavalry, in its place of honour on the extreme right, stood opposed to the British battalions on the Allied left."

Had Grammont's force been well in hand, and, to put it plainly, had the officers in his command thoroughly understood their business, the results of the battle of Dettingen would have been disastrous beyond words for the Allies, in spite of their magnificent heroism. But the French were over-confident, and their officers shamefully incompetent. They saw the British battalions coming on through the morasses which added to the dangers and difficulties of the Allies, and opened an irregular fire on them without waiting for orders. They were amazed at the volleys which the 33rd and the other infantry battalions poured in on them with such splendid and destructive precision. The fire was so hot that the French foot guards fell back behind their cavalry, who advanced almost immediately against the British left, straight down on the 33rd, the 21st and 23rd regiments of Fusiliers. The 33rd especially had been suffering seriously by the fire from the French batteries across the river, but when General Clayton, commanding the Brigade, called on them, with the regiments next in line, to meet the French attack, they responded with a courage which cannot be over-praised. The French thundered on, "the flower of the French cavalry . . . sword in hand, at high speed." They were met at first by the 3rd Dragoons who rode out against them, "two weak squadrons against nine squadrons of the enemy, their depth was but of three ranks against eight ranks of the French; but they went straight at them, burst into the heart of them, and cut their way through with heavy loss."

In spite of this gallant charge the French cavalry were able to continue their movement against the British left wing. Still the 33rd, as Fortescue describes it, faced the attack as boldly as the Dragoons, never

giving way for an inch, and brought men and horses crashing down by their eternal rolling fire. The same dogged courage was displayed by the Fusiliers, in spite of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy's cavalry in that amazing charge, where, when the horsemen had fired their pistols into the solid ranks of the English infantry, and dashed their empty weapons into their faces, they came to closer quarters with the swords. Still the 33rd and their comrades did not yield, and before long the enemy fell back, demoralised.

There was yet the possibility of a second charge, and those who awaited it with such resolution, saw that their left flank was likely to be turned. It could scarcely mean less than annihilation for the 33rd, but the 3rd Dragoons, to prevent such a disaster, drove into the midst of the rallying cavalry, and cut their way through after some fearful fighting when each man had ten to contend with. By the time they rode through they were practically annihilated, but they had given the infantry time to prepare for any fresh charge. Other Dragoons rode down on the enemy, but were beaten back by the overwhelming onrush of the French Household Cavalry, who broke right through the 21st and 23rd. The French, however, found that they had ridden into a death-trap in their fury, for the two regiments, re-formed, closed in on them, and shot down men and horses with a merciless fire. The cavalry, charged, while in confusion, by the 4th and 6th Dragoons, rode back, broken beyond hope of recovery.

It was here, on the left, where the 33rd were, that the battle was so fierce. Elsewhere the French infantry, unable to endure the terrible and persistent fire, were decimated; they were swiftly surrounded by the Austrian and British cavalry, and cut to pieces. Other French infantry, when the Allies advanced turned and fled, only to be pursued in a mad race for the bridges, the Scots Greys riding in and out among them in their utter rout. Hundreds were cut down; hundreds, as well, to escape the hoofs of the pursuing

horse, plunged into the river, and were drowned ; while a great number were made prisoners.

The 33rd lost more officers in this battle than any other regiment, while the loss was great among the men. Among the killed were Captain Campbell. Lieutenants Strangways, Maxwell, and Fletcher, two sergeants, a drummer, and twenty-three privates, while the wounded among the rank and file numbered fifty. Bearing in mind the terrific nature of the struggle in which the regiment was engaged, the loss might well have been greater.

## CHAPTER VI

### DISASTER AND GLORY AT FONTENAY

1743. After the victory at Dettingen, the campaign practically ended. The army succeeded in reaching Hanau.

Operations on the left bank of the Rhine being determined on, a movement for crossing the river was begun on August 27th. This was done to prevent any French force from bringing aid to the Army of the Elector in Bohemia.

The Earl of Stair having resigned his command, General Wade, the old Colonel of the 33rd, now Field Marshal, succeeded him. His first movement was to recross the Rhine and go into winter quarters. The 6th Division of the British Army, Johnson's (33rd), Ponsonby's, Skelton's, and Handasyd's (31st), crossed the river at Aix-la-Chapelle, on November 13th, 1743, with five cannons, and pontoons, and took up their winter quarters on the plain of Maestricht.

1744. But nothing was done in the following year with the exception of wearisome marches and counter-marches, "affairs of posts and the bickerings of generals." Wade, failing to induce greater activity on the part of the Austrians, resigned the command when the quartering of the troops in Bruges and Ghent had been completed for the winter of 1744.

1745. The new Commander-in-Chief was H.R.H. the Duke of Cumberland, a startling appointment in view of the fact that at the time he was not twenty-five years old. Yet he was a seasoned soldier, and as Fortescue puts it. "it was an immense advantage that a prince

of a reigning family should preside over so motley an army as that of the Allies, since there would be the less disposition to cavil at his authority."

By the time the campaign of 1745 opened, the army was strengthened in Flanders, but not by the raising of new regiments. It was at the cost of depleting England of soldiers to such an extent that the home garrison scarcely amounted to 15,000 men.

On the 2nd of May Cumberland's army was on the move. His design was to meet the French who had passed the Scheldt, and were investing Tournay. Of this, however, he knew nothing, so effectually did Marshal Saxe mask his movements by the means of his cavalry. When news came, the Allies determined to raise the siege, although it was known that the investing army was in every way superior, and advantageously posted.

On the 9th of May the Allies encamped within a little more than a musket-shot of the advanced posts of the enemy, the left at Maubray, the right at Bougnies. The ground between the two armies was broken by underwood, hedges, and copses, which the enemy had filled with their pandours and graffins, supporting these by several small squadrons drawn up on a plain which rose by an easy ascent to the French camp which lay at the top of the rise. On the enemy's right was Antoin. In front was the village of Fontenoy. The camp extended towards their left to a large wood in the direction of a village called Vezon. The French had covered this with small squadrons, placed at intervals. Fontenoy was found to be strongly fortified with works and cannon.

The Allies' generals were somewhat divided in their councils when they saw how strongly Marshal Saxe was placed. In view of the numerical advantage of the French, 56,000 against Cumberland's less than 50,000, Königseck contended that the safer course would be to refuse battle, but to so harrass Saxe's communications that he should be compelled to raise the siege. Waldeck supported Cumberland's pro-



posal to attack Saxe the next day, and this was finally agreed on.

Waldeck was ordered to advance on Fontenoy, he occupying the centre. Cumberland was on the right with two lines of infantry. Behind these were several regiments of British cavalry. On Cumberland's right was the Forest of Barry, on the edge of which was the Redoubt d'Eu. Another redoubt was farther away in the forest. Königseck took his place on the left with a great body of cavalry, and on his extreme right were two lines of infantry. In front of him were three redoubts and French cavalry and infantry. Behind Waldeck, ready to support him or Cumberland, were three bodies of cavalry.

On the morning of the 11th of May, at two o'clock, the Allies were moving. Ingoldsby, with the 12th and 13th Foot and 42nd Highlanders and a Hanoverian battalion, was to attack the Redoubt d'Eu. The other British infantry were to cross the open ground—three-quarters of a mile—and drive the French out of their entrenchments. In Cumberland's first line was a battalion of the 1st Foot Guards. On their left the Coldstream Guards, and then in succession the Scots Guards, the 1st, 21st, 31st, 8th, 25th, 33rd, and 19th. In the second line the Buffs were on the right, then came the 23rd, 32nd, 11th, 28th, 34th, and 20th. Some Hanoverian battalions were on the extreme left.

When the advance began, the infantry, tramping up the hill in steady formation, found themselves exposed to a murderous cross-fire. There was no faltering although the losses while crossing the open space were serious. At length, with smaller front, for a converging movement had taken place in filling up the gaps made by the enemy's guns, the line of infantry attained the ridge to find in their front the breastwork defences occupied by the French defenders.

As yet the enemy had suffered nothing, for the infantry had come across that open space with shouldered arms. They covered fifty more yards until

Lord Charles Hay cried to his men: "Men of the King's company, these are the French Guards, and I hope you are going to beat them to-day." There came a cheer, and twenty more yards were covered, as though the soldiers were on parade. It was then that the French came under English fire. The men of the 33rd and those to right and left of them poured in an awful fire on the enemy; "two battalions loading while the third fired."

This effective fire occasioned severe losses amongst the French, so that Saxe was obliged to reinforce the line. One regiment was all but annihilated, and the French line was shattered. The reinforcing troops were also unable to stand such a devastating fire, and the advance of the 33rd and other regiments was rendered possible. The camp, three hundred yards beyond the crest, was reached.

There was every promise of a splendid victory. The French cavalry had come galloping through the forest on the Allies' right to sweep down on their horse, but they were shattered, like others that came on the same errand, and rode back in confusion before Cumberland's terrific fire.

Unhappily all this splendid valour was vain on two accounts. Ingoldsby failed in his endeavour to capture the Redoubt d'Eu, the reason assigned being that he misunderstood his orders. In the centre, again, Waldeck had failed to carry Fontenoy. He had to retire, so that the British infantry were left exposed to a very heavy fire, and had to fall back to the crest. Waldeck wanted to move on Fontenoy again, but the Dutch refused, even when they saw the British advance and regain what they had lost.

The cavalry went on, the cross-fire supporting them, but it was too late. With the Allies' centre broken, and Königseck unable to do anything on the left, there was only one thing for the British troops, namely, to retire to the ground between the village and the point of the wood where the enemy's guns could do them no

further damage. It was retreat, not rout, for every rank moved in splendid order, "as steadily and proudly as they had advanced."

The enemy's cavalry attempted to break them up as they retired, but they were driven back with such slaughter by our horse that Noailles' regiment was practically destroyed.

This disappointing close to the battle, in spite of the heroic efforts of Cumberland's troops, was defeat. It has been said that as "an example of the prowess of British infantry, Fontenoy stands almost without a parallel in its history," and of all the achievements of the 33rd it would be difficult to find anything finer than what they did that day when they charged right into the enemy's camp. Doubtless a contributing factor in the defeat was the scandalous behaviour of the contractors for the horsing of the guns, for Fortescue says that they ran off with the horses early in the day. Then, again, as a writer in the "Gentleman's Magazine," a month after the battle (an expert apparently) speaking of the disappointment, suggests, the defeat was due to the superiority of the French in numbers, the prodigious force of their artillery, and the advantage of the ground, which they had everywhere improved to the utmost.

The loss of the 33rd was heavy, as might be expected, considering how for more than three hours they stood "the continual fire of three terrible batteries," and for a second time advanced against the enemy although these had been reinforced by seven fresh battalions. Several of the best officers and veterans among the men were lost to the regiment that day. Yet one might almost have expected annihilation considering the overwhelming strength of the enemy, and the fearful fire from the batteries. "For eight or nine hours did Britain's infantry, inefficiently aided by the best, and deserted by the worst of its allies, struggle with the whole French army. . . . Victory, abashed by the rude violence of their efforts, had

deserted them, but the helpless, stricken ranks of their opponents showed how fully vengeance had been exacted before they retreated from a field where defeat presented no semblance of dishonour, and where their glory will infinitely overbalance their loss."

NOTES.—The casualties at Fontenoy :

Killed : Lieut.-Colonel Clements, Lieuts. Grame (or Green), J. Colley, Houghton, Ensign Nesbit, and 42 privates.

Wounded : Major Mun (? Muir), Captains Godfrey, Lacy, Eccles, Tighe, Lieuts. Gardiner, Burrough, Itway, and Gore : Ensigns Hayner, Collis, Samson (? Sampson), and Descury, with 4 sergeants and 84 privates.

Missing : 2 sergeants and 28 privates.

Among the dead was Lieut.-Colonel Henry Clements, a soldier whose capacity had marked him out for rapid promotion. It was written of him when his death was known :

Too fond of what the martial harvests yield.  
Alas ! too forward to the dang'rous field ;  
As one of old renown in battle tried,  
The glory of the dusty plain, you dyed ;  
The tongues of Dettingen your triumphs tell,  
And weeping Tournay points where Clements fell.

Clements' death made room for Major George Muir (or Mun) to step into the Lieut.-Colonelcy of the 33rd. Captain Thomas Lacy, who had fought with such signal courage at Fontenoy, attained his majority.

Extract from a letter from Lord Dillon.

" On consulting Malaguti's History of the Dillon Regiment, I find that the Count de Lowendahl led the Brigade against the right flank of the Anglo-Hanoverians with the Regiments of Normandy and Royal Vairseaux in support.

“Lowendahl in a letter to his wife, written on the evening of the battle says: ‘The battle was lost. Every one was in flight. Le Bon Dieu inspired me to place myself at the head of the Irish Brigade. . . . We took the enemy in flank. Marshal Saxe said the victory was owing to Lowendahl and the Irish.’”

Captain Malaguti adds that he thinks the best account of the battle is that in Vol. LXXXI, page 721, of the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of the 15th June, 1887, by the Duc de Broglie in his work “*Marie Therese Imperatrice.*”

## CHAPTER VII

### SERVICE IN SCOTLAND AND FLANDERS

THE 33rd, with other English regiments, were recalled 1745. to England in consequence of the news which came concerning the movements of the Young Pretender. It was affirmed in the various newspapers that the Pretender's eldest son had put out to sea on July 14th, from Bellisle in an armed ship of 60 guns, together with a frigate of 30 guns, and a great quantity of war-like stores, in order to land in Scotland. It was said that he was led to expect to find 20,000 men and 40 transport ships at his disposal, and later to be joined by 5 French warships from Brest, and 4,500 Spaniards who were embarking at Ferrol.

The startling news awakened the utmost consternation, for it was known that the army for home defence was shamefully inadequate. Orders were issued from the War Office for all officers of His Majesty's forces in England and Scotland to repair immediately to their posts, while notice was given from the Board of Ordnance at the Tower that a reward would be given to any who should discover concealed arms, the money to run at the rate of £25 for every hundred arms so found.

The numbers given of the forces in aid of the prince were grossly exaggerated, but in face of the fact that the Young Chevalier had actually landed in Scotland, and was gathering the clans in the Highlands, there was ground for alarm when it was known how weak the home forces were to cope with the Jacobites who were preparing to invade England.

The only way open to the Government was to recall some of the regiments from Flanders, and the Duke of Cumberland, there commanding, was ordered to send at once ten of his battalions. The gravity of the situation, however, compelled more decisive measures. The whole of the British battalions in Cumberland's army were called for, with the consequence that the 33rd came home in September, landing at Gravesend<sup>1</sup> on the 23rd. After encamping for a day or two in Hyde Park, they moved elsewhere. They arrived at the Duke of Cumberland's head-quarters at Stafford on December 4th, the Young Pretender threatening the north. In the same Brigade with the 33rd were the 25th, the Scotch Fusiliers, and the 32nd; but they were not detained long at Stafford, being ordered into Lancashire, where they joined Ligonier.

As they marched through the country they found it thrilling with excitement. The Government, moreover, were making frantic efforts to bring depleted regiments up to their full strength, and to raise the Militia in various counties. Marshal Wade, the old Colonel of the 33rd, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces of Great Britain, and from him the order came for the 33rd to proceed to Scotland. This they did under Ligonier's command, arriving in Edinburgh on November 19th. The magistrates of the city found quarters for the foot regiments and a great proportion of Ligonier's Horse.

1746. This movement prevented the 33rd from taking any part in arresting the progress of the Young Pretender, who evaded the army at Newcastle, and made a swift march through Lancashire, and on as far as Derby. Nor were they called on to take any part in the closing-in movement on Prince Charles. The only

<sup>1</sup> Note from the "Gentleman's Magazine," Tuesday, September 24: "Yesterday were landed at Gravesend and Blackwall, from Flanders, the three battalions belonging to his majesty's regiments of foot guards, together with ye seven regiments of foot, commanded by Majors general Pultney, Howard, Bragg, and Johnson, brigadiers general Douglas and Cholmondeley, and Colonel Sowle."

duty assigned to them while the Young Pretender was being dealt with was to remain in Edinburgh, in readiness for movement.

Two of the 33rd's companies were relieved of this monotony when they marched first of all to Glasgow, and then to Fort William, to take part in its defence when the Young Chevalier approached the place during his retreat. Running short of provisions, rebel detachments were sent out to obtain them, and to capture such places as were holding out for the King. The two companies of the 33rd had barely entered Fort William when the Camerons and Macdonalds of Glengarry appeared in force, demanding the surrender of the town and fort. Fierce fighting followed, the town was taken and burnt, but the Governor, Captain Scott, retiring into the fort, after fighting every inch of ground, made a sudden sortie, and drove away the rebels with heavy loss. At the same time he captured their artillery and two large mortars which they had taken at the battle of Prestonpans from Sir John Cope.

When the country was quiet, and the Jacobite movement was effectually quelled, after the Young Pretender's defeat at Culloden (February 16th, 1746), the regiments which had been ordered from Flanders were free to return to the seat of war, where the French had taken every advantage of their absence.

The 33rd were among the returning regiments, and they had barely arrived before they were in the thick of the fighting. On October 1st the Allies crossed the Jaar to protect Liège. Saxe sought to prevent the movement, bringing up his artillery, which opened a destructive fire. The Allies moved rapidly to get out of its reach, when the enemy's cavalry coming in pursuit were driven back with slaughter by Crauford's Horse. The 33rd played a gallant part in this fight, for according to the "London Gazette Extraordinary," Johnson's regiment petitioned to attack the enemy, and "did it with so good a countenance that they got great reputation."



Count Clermont joined Saxe immediately after this fight, and so strengthened the Grand Army that it comprised 198 battalions. The French moved on October 10th, and crossed the Jaar, but the Allies' commander sent on the heavy baggage to Maestricht. That night the troops lay in readiness, the foot with their accoutrements on, and the horses saddled. At dawn the French were seen advancing, their foot formed in three columns, at the head of each being a large train of artillery.

The Allies' right extended on the plain, and occupied three villages (Endist, Sling, and Fexhe) in their front with twelve battalions. The Hanoverian infantry had the plain in front of them which lay between Fexhe and Liers; behind this latter village the British and Hessian foot were placed, the 8th, the 19th, the 33rd, and 43rd Foot. Then came the Hanoverian cavalry, with the 6th and 7th Dragoons and Scots Greys prolonging the Allies' front as far as Roucoux. The Dutch troops took up the extreme left.

But the French commander menaced the Dutch by having entered Liège during the night, and in consequence Prince Waldeck had to post a great force, with a body of cavalry, to protect his left flank. Such a detachment of troops from the front rendered the line on the Allies' left perilously weak. All told the Allies did not number more than 80,000, whereas Saxe was advancing with 120,000 men.

The first attack was made on Waldeck's left, but his men behaved splendidly, and the enemy were driven back again and again. Meanwhile the Scots Greys, in spite of their resolute stand, were overwhelmed and had to fall back. The villages in front were attacked by 55 battalions of French, in columns, by brigades, and as soon as one brigade was repulsed another came on. The attack was so powerful that the Allies could not do other than retire, but not until several battalions were nearly cut to pieces.

Ligonier rallied the infantry, and, still holding Liers,

they advanced with such fine spirit that they drove the French out of the villages which had been previously lost. He and his men here held their own, and when word came that Waldeck, having heard that the villages were lost, had fallen back before overwhelming odds, Ligonier used his cavalry with such skill that Waldeck was able to retreat without confusion towards the Meuse. Not until he was sure that Waldeck was safe did Ligonier move out of the places his troops had recaptured, and then, with his cavalry covering his retreat, he retired on Maestricht.

Strange to say, only one-third of the Allies' army was engaged, for Saxe had confined his attack almost wholly to the left. The loss was heavy, 5,000 in all; but it was said that the French could not have lost less than ten thousand in this battle at the Jaar. The loss of the 33rd, although the fighting was of a desperate nature, was small, five being killed, and two wounded.

After this battle of Roncoux, which Fortescue speaks of as a "fortunate escape for the Allies, since it was impossible, humanly speaking, that it could have issued favourably for them," the two armies went into winter quarters.

The next campaign was more full of promise, for the Allies were stronger in numbers; but all the force of France was practically collected on the borders of Holland. The armies, after several marches and counter-marches, did not, save for some petty engagements, come in sight of each other until the 18th of June. On that day the French lay between Tongres and Bilsen, Louis XV being in the camp. Cumberland, in command of the Allies, had moved on to meet Saxe, hoping to force a fight. The Marshal, who had hitherto avoided a battle, now accepted the challenge, having unexpectedly seized the heights of Herdereen with his cavalry. Cumberland designed to occupy this himself, but was unable to do so because Ligonier's Horse had not yet come up.

Arriving just too late, Ligonier barred the further advance of the French cavalry, enabling Cumberland to form in order of battle. On the right were the Austrians; the Dutch troops were in the centre; the British took their place on the left, with the village of Val or Vlytingen, in their front, six battalions holding it with a battery of six guns. They also held Lauffeld, the line extending to Kesselt, on the extreme left.

The engagement, now known as the battle of Lauffeld, did not begin until the following morning, July 2nd, Saxe waiting for his tired infantry to come up. When morning dawned it was seen that the enemy had twelve battalions in front, and were twelve deep. On the right of the first line was Count Tallard's regiment of horse, with that of the French Cuirassiers. Behind the mass of French infantry which faced Cumberland's left, were Saxe's other cavalry in great strength. Facing the Dutch in the centre was a double line of French infantry.

The 33rd had their place in front of Lauffeld, and took their part in the fierce fighting which followed when the French infantry endeavoured to capture Lauffeld. There was not an inch that was undisputed, and while the battle swayed, now for France and now for England, and it seemed at times as though the 33rd and their comrades must fall back before the overwhelming battalions, the British troops made a final charge which was irresistible, so that the French were hurled out of the long, straggling village with tremendous slaughter.

The French concentrated their attack on this village and Vlytingen (or Val), and Cumberland, realising this, desired the Austrians, on the extreme right, to support him speedily. Marshal Bathiani returned answer that he had ordered nine battalions of the left wing, and five of the reserves to move. Some of them arrived but tardily, and the remainder too late to be of any effective service. The British

and the Hanoverians therefore had to maintain the fight in the villages, practically unassisted.

Again the French infantry advanced and drove the 33rd and their comrades from the outer defences with the fury of their charge, but they held their own inside the village, and the enemy had once more to fall back, to advance again when reinforced by two brigades. If it were possible, the fighting in this third attack eclipsed what had gone before, and the British troops were driven back to the edge of the village.

Cumberland saw what was going on in Lauffeld—the peril of the gallant fellows who were plainly overwhelmed—and he brought up the whole line of his infantry, which drove the French out of the village in fierce confusion, giving the exhausted troops time for recovery. But for an unfortunate interference the battle could not have failed to end in victory for the Allies; but just as Cumberland was driving out the last of the French battalions, the Dutch cavalry came plunging in among his men, panic-stricken, before an attack of the French squadrons. The lines were broken instantly, and before the infantry recovered the enemy returned, and driving into Lauffeld, split the Allies' army in two.

No valour sufficed to save the field after that disastrous panic of the Dutch horse. All that Cumberland, after rallying his troops, could do, was to sound the retreat to Maestricht. His own left wing retired in order, bringing with them the heavy artillery. Saxe prepared to concentrate on him and crush him, but Ligonier, with Cumberland's Dragoons, the Greys, and the Inniskillings, crashed in on the French cavalry, broke them up, and rode into the advancing mass of infantry. The carnage was awful. Cumberland, who took part in the charge, had difficulty in riding back to his troops whom he led off the field in splendid order; but Ligonier's horse was killed and himself taken prisoner.

When Cumberland got his army to Maestricht,

and counted his losses, he found that the killed and wounded amounted to 4,930 men; 1,000 were taken prisoners, and more than 1,000 horses were killed. But the loss to the French, even on Saxe's own admission, was 10,000 men, nine French colours, and five standards. Saxe had sought to cut off the Allies from Maestricht, but even in their retreat they frustrated him, and gained the place in safety.<sup>1</sup> It was unfortunate that Cumberland had to leave behind him sixteen pieces of cannon since the horses had all been killed. Every gun, however, was spiked.

The 33rd did little more in the way of fighting during the remainder of the campaign. The men of the regiment who had been taken prisoners were exchanged within a few days, but there is no record that they took any part in the fighting when Saxe attacked Bergen-op-Zoom, supposed to be an impregnable fortress. Cumberland made no attempt to relieve the place, the Governor declaring that he needed no assistance. He had, instead, so disposed his army as to cover Maestricht and Breda, glad to rest his men who suffered excessively from dysentery.

In October, the 33rd went into winter quarters, and shortly after, England, finding her allies so lukewarm, and her expenses so enormous, readily agreed to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. For the Allies the war was altogether inglorious, the only compensation being the magnificent courage and incomparable fighting quality displayed by the British soldiers who maintained the fine reputation of the army.

After the Peace was signed the 33rd returned to England, and were quartered and recruited in the West.

NOTE.—For service against the Young Pretender the Duke of Cumberland's army was thus brigaded:

<sup>1</sup> The 33rd lost ten officers wounded, Lieut.-Colonel Lockhart, Major Lacy, Captains Kerriell, and Lord Glasgow, Lieuts. Gardiner, Edmonstone, and Cope; and Ensigns Moneypenny, Francombe, and Morris. Twelve were killed, while four sergeants and sixty men were wounded or missing.

L : G : Anstruther and Brig<sup>r</sup> Bligh—Semphill's (25th), Scotch Fuzileers (21st), Johnson's (33rd), Douglas' (32nd).

M : G : Skelton and Brig<sup>r</sup> Price—How<sup>d</sup>s (3rd Buffs), Skelton's (12th).

Brig<sup>r</sup> Douglas—Sowle's (11th), Handyside's (31st),  
The Train.

[Extract from General Orders.]

For service in Flanders, Cumberland's British forces were brigaded thus :

“ Parole St. Paul and Cassell.

Duglas, Bri<sup>r</sup> —N : B : Fuzil<sup>rs</sup> (21st), Johnson's (33rd).

L : G : Howard's (3rd Buffs).

Mordaunt, Bri<sup>r</sup> —Duglas (32nd), Conway (48th).

M : G : How<sup>d</sup> (19th), Wolfe, B.M.

# The Seven Years' War

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE FAILURE AT ST. MALO

1750. FOR some years after the return from Flanders the 33rd passed the time in uneventful service. Four years were spent in Minorca on garrison duty, their presence being required there in view of a possible descent of Spanish or French troops on the place, in spite of existing treaties. Their strength on arriving in the Mediterranean was ten companies of seventy men each, the full number of the battalion being 816.

The soldiers in this distant station were well aware of the insecurity of their position as part of the army, for a struggle was proceeding between the Crown and Parliament as to the numbers which should be maintained during peace. There was a strong outcry for reduction the moment the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed, in full accordance with the custom observed on the conclusion of every war.

The first estimates brought in after the signing of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle provided for a reduction of the army on such a wholesale scale, that the 49,939 men for Great Britain, and 15,627 for the Plantations and abroad, were brought down at one sweep to 18,857 men for Great Britain, and 9,542 for the foreign stations.

Such an uncertainty was unpleasant for men who like the 33rd had covered themselves with glory in

the war. Happily the *esprit de corps* of the service did not diminish under such discouraging conditions, nor was the regiment disbanded. A welcome change came after four years' garrison duty in the Mediterranean, when the regiment was ordered home. At Reading it was reviewed by the Duke of Cumberland previous to its march to Edinburgh, where it was stationed for two years. In 1756 the regiment marched south and joined Blandford's Camp in Dorsetshire, where a large force was held in readiness for foreign service.

There had been some ominous signs of another war with France, but England was shamefully unprepared. A feverish effort was made to bring the army up to war strength, and all along the line of route, while the 33rd were marching south, the regiment was recruiting "by beat of drum" and other devices. Every other regiment on the move was doing the same. There was a sense of insecurity everywhere consequent on what the Lord Mayor and Aldermen and Commons of London expressed in their address to the king as "the want of a constitutional and well regulated Militia, the most natural and certain defence under divine providence," of his Majesty's "sacred person and government." The feeling of insecurity increased when it became known that a body of French troops commanded by Marshal Richelieu had seized the island of Minorca. It was still more pronounced when it came more clearly to the public knowledge that our American possessions were in danger.

The necessity for augmenting the army was met in some degree by the raising of second battalions for fifteen of the regiments, of which the 33rd was one. Its new second battalion, which constituted the 72nd Regiment, was disbanded in 1763, after the Peace of Fontainebleau. The senior officers of the new battalion, whose appointments bore date, August 21st, were : 1758.



<i>Major</i>	<i>Captains</i>	<i>Capt.-Lieut.</i>
Peter Daulhat	Alexander Money- penny	Charles Harvey
	Danzie Collins	
	William Morris	
	John Pollock	
	Percival Purcell	
	Robert Owen	
	Robert Gordon	

The 33rd had now another Colonel, for Johnson, who had risen to the rank of Lieut.-General, died on the 19th of November, 1753. Lord Charles Hay, the new Colonel, was gazetted ensign in 1722, and had gained conspicuous distinction at Fontenoy while in command of the 1st Foot Guards. The story is told of him that when "his men came within twenty or thirty paces of the enemy, he advanced in front of the regiment, drank to the health of the French, bantered them with more spirit than pungency on their defeat at Dettingen, and then turned and called his own men to huzzah, which they did." It was a display of coolness characteristic of the man throughout his whole career.

As soon as it was known that Richelieu had captured Minorca, the Seven Years' War began. Cumberland was on the Weser, and the immense French army on the move to meet him. The 33rd were not destined for the Rhine, but with fifteen other battalions, received orders to proceed to the Isle of Wight before the end of May, since an expedition against St. Malo was contemplated. The troops in this camp numbered 13,000 men, and were under the command of the third Duke of Marlborough, who was by no means a general to inspire confidence. Indeed, Walpole, writing to Mann about the appointment, said that Marlborough was "in reality commanded by Lord George Sackville," on whom devolved the duty of making all the preparations for the expedition. It consisted of 18 ships of

the line, 13 frigates, and 3 sloops, with 4 fireships, and 2 bomb-ketches. Marlborough had under his command 13,000 soldiers and 6,000 marines, while as volunteers it was said that he had taken with him "half of the purplest blood of England."

It was designed to attack St. Malo, and for this purpose Marlborough landed his army at Cancale Bay. Strangely enough no one opposed him. The landing force consisted of four brigades, and the 33rd formed part of the 3rd Brigade, which was under General Boscawen. Other regiments in this brigade were the Welsh Fusiliers, and Lambton's (68th). The 33rd had a new Lieut.-Colonel at the last moment, while embarking, namely, Lord George Lennox, Lieut.-Colonel James Lockhart having apparently been transferred to another regiment.

The orders issued on the third day, when the disembarkation was completed without the slightest interference on the part of the enemy, were that the 3rd Brigade should remain at the camp to throw up entrenchments to secure a retreat if necessary, and when that work was complete, to bring up the heavy guns which were not yet brought on shore. The other troops advanced on St. Malo in two columns.

Before the attack commenced, the 33rd arrived, a battalion of the Guards coming with them. It was discovered at once how incompetent and uninformed the authorities were, whose business it was to provide the machinery for war. It was the old story over again, and this time in sending forth an expedition whose orders were to assault a town with high walls which must needs be scaled. When the men came to use their scaling ladders, they were too short! The enemy came on in overwhelming numbers, so that the army had to get back to the entrenchments at the landing-place, but not before they had burnt the shipping in the harbour. In face of the oncoming French army Marlborough re-embarked, fortunately without loss, but altogether without glory.

Having failed at St. Malo, Marlborough, as soon as his army was afloat again, proceeded to Cherbourg, but he did not land. The sea was too rough to make the attempt until after long waiting, and when landing seemed practicable, it was found that the food supply was failing. Nothing was possible but a return home.

The 33rd did not long remain idle, for the Government were bent on the fall of Cherbourg, at that time a menace to England, and full of dangerous possibilities to our commerce in the Channel. But when all was ready the general who should command was not to be found. One after another asked to be excused, fearing ridicule in view of certain failure. Walpole, in one of his pungent letters, wrote this sentence: "You know of course that Lord George Sackville refused to go *a-buccaneering* again, as he called it; that my friend Lord Ancram, who loves a drain of anything from glory to brandy, is *out of order*; that just as Lord Panmure was going to take command, he missed an eye; and that at last they have routed out an old General Blighe, from the horse armoury in Ireland, who is to undertake the codicil to the expedition." Walpole was hard on Bligh, who was a capable officer, but, as he protested, too old for such arduous and responsible service. He was scarcely given the option of "Yes," or "No." He had come over from Ireland to join the army in Germany, and found himself appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Cherbourg expedition.

He set sail with three battalions of Guards, the 33rd, the 5th, 24th, 30th, 34th, 36th, 67th, 68th, and the Duke of Richmond's Foot, then numbered the 72nd, and the second battalion of the 33rd in consequence. Bligh also had with him nine troops of light dragoons.

The transports went out of harbour on the 1st of August, but did not arrive opposite Cherbourg until the 6th. Major Daulhat of the 33rd was also placed in command of the battalion of the Grenadiers, and these were ordered to land at midday on the 8th.

They did this under cover of the fire of the ships in Commodore Howe's squadron, and no sooner were they ashore than they were engaged in a fierce skirmish which ended in the rout of the French who opposed them. The loss to our troops was twenty men in killed and wounded. Their presence on shore enabled Bligh to land his army without further molestation. He lost no time, but advanced rapidly with his whole force on Cherbourg, where his coming filled the garrison with consternation, seeing that the place was not fortified on the land side. So large an army appearing so unexpectedly, the French, in a state of absolute unpreparedness, abandoned the place, which Bligh began to dismantle without delay. In quick succession he blew up the naval arsenal, and reduced the coast defences to ruin. He reported within a few days that he was sending over to England 173 iron cannon, 3 iron mortars, 22 brass cannon, 2 brass mortars, and some French colours. At the same time he had destroyed nearly 30 ships that were lying in harbour.

The appointment and the expedition appeared to be justified; but before long came the dismal tale of failure. The garrison which abandoned Cherbourg had retreated to Walloign, but Bligh did not pursue them. Doubtless following his instructions, he re-embarked and sailed for St. Malo. A storm drove him over to the English coast, but after a slight delay he made for St. Malo again, and anchored in the bay of St. Lunaire, twelve miles from the town. Here, in rough weather, he landed his troops, unfortunately losing a number of men by drowning.

The enemy were again taken unawares, and no opposition came to the landing. Bligh pursued his course of destruction of shipping, and it may be assumed that had it not been for the stormy weather, he would have repeated the success of Cherbourg. Unfortunately he failed to secure the co-operation of the fleet. Howe, because of the storm, had to run

out to sea, so that Bligh lost his support. Yet with such troops as he had he might have accomplished all that he was asked to do. Veterans like those in the 33rd only wanted a leader and fine handling. Here, however, Bligh proved his incompetency. He seemed to be paralysed, and ordered a retreat to the Bay of St. Cas, where Howe had anchored his fleet.

The order for retreat was the beginning of disaster, and as for incompetency in the commander, amounting almost to imbecility, it could scarcely be equalled. The peasants harassed the retreating army in a difficult bit of country, while news came in that the French army was behind. Bligh was appealed to, to wait and face the enemy, trusting to his men's splendid valour, but he would not listen. He squandered his effort instead in the disorderly retreat in destroying the villages in retaliation on the peasantry. Before long the army, made up of veterans, who would have felt it honourable to turn and meet tremendous odds, became a hurrying rabble, bent on reaching the bay where the fleet awaited them.

By the time the troops reached St. Cas they were worn out, hungry, angry at being so abominably led, and shamed at being called on to retreat before an enemy over whom they were so competent to triumph. They came to the shore, a mixed-up crowd, with no semblance of discipline.

The embarkation began at once. It was almost a scramble for places in the boats, while the enemy, coming within gunshot, poured a murderous fire on this huddled mass which Bligh was absolutely unable to bring to order. The place of the 33rd was among the rear-guard which General Drury handled splendidly. He had in his command the grenadiers also, and the Guards, and in spite of a withering fire, he and his men made heroic charges. Twice the French were driven back, but Drury had to give way before oncoming thousands, while his men were falling constantly.

Meanwhile there was that disgraceful scramble at the water's edge, where the French guns were working such havoc that the sailors scarcely dared to come close in. The splendid stand of the rear-guard was all in vain. So many fell that it seemed as though Drury's men would be annihilated, but in fine order, fighting all the way, they neared the boats. Then, however, it became a run for life. The men had to plunge into the sea to reach the boats, and man after man went under, shot or drowned. When the last boat reached the ships, and the roll was called it was found that a thousand men had fallen in what has been called "the massacre of St. Cas."

When the cost in human life was gone into, it was found that the grenadiers of the 33rd had been annihilated. Major Daulhat was specially mentioned for his gallantry, but among the dead was one of the regiment's finest officers, Captain Edmonstone. On September 18th, the dispirited troops, smarting under such an unmerited disgrace, landed at Cowes, and encamped at Newport, under orders to hold themselves in readiness for further service.

NOTE.—FIRST ARMY LIST: 1754. [In the British Museum.]

*33rd. Regiment.*

	Date of Commission
Colonel: Lord Charles Hay	20th Nov., 1753
Lieut.-Colonel: James Lochart	2nd Feby., 1746-7
Captains: Peter Daulhaut	12th Sept., 1746
Richard Prescott	21st May, 1746
Davis Toplady	25th June, 1747
Thomas Edmonstone	24th July, 1749
Barclay Cope	29th April, 1752
George Drummond	4th Sept., 1753
Robt. Rayner	13th Sept., 1754

## CHAPTER IX

### STRENUOUS CAMPAIGNS

1759. THE demands on the fighting resources of England were tremendous at this time. No one could have foreseen what England's interference with Continental politics would lead to in William III's day, but now she was so involved that her resources were taxed to the utmost in order to find armies adequate to meet her obligations. Confronting the French in Europe, it naturally followed that she had to face them in any part of the world where the interests of the two nations clashed. No one could suppose that war would be confined to the Continent. Hence there was menace in Canada and India also.

The course of events in these distant fields cannot be followed here. We are more immediately concerned with the doings of the regiment. It is sufficient to point out that in North America the English succeeded in gaining for their colonists the full possession of the coast, and also (by destroying the French settlements) in opening out unimpeded extension towards the west, and therewith an illimitable future. "They be masters," says Ranke, "of the West Indian Islands and of the coast of Africa." In the East Indies the English war resources proved superior to the French when the foundations of the Indian Empire were being laid.

The 33rd were being reserved for service near home. They were to take part in the thrilling experiences of the Seven Years' War, but not with the same allies as before; for Austria went over to the

side of France, while Holland dropped out of the contest since there was nothing in question seriously affecting her interests. Russia and Sweden, jealous of the growing power of Prussia, and anxious to drive her back within her old frontiers, joined with France, but neither of them was eager to measure swords with England. Yet it had to be, since Prussia and England were standing by each other against their common foe. Prussia was threatened by Russia and Sweden, and England was menaced with invasion from France on a gigantic scale.

Even thus Pitt was not making vigorous exertions in the matter of increasing the army until the year 1759 was several months old. He raised two new regiments of the line, and called for recruits to serve at home on short service only. The attitude of Pitt seems inexplicable, save in this, that he was relying almost wholly on the supremacy of the British navy.

The war ran on its course. The Allies gained some advantages, and later in the year, when Marshal de Contades had concentrated his army at Minden, the Allies forced a battle on him there, which resulted in the rout of the French.

In this campaign the 33rd played no part, being kept at home, in view of a possible invasion, but always in readiness for Continental service.

Orders came late in January, 1760, for the regiment to embark for Germany, but the departure was delayed, owing to an occurrence of a somewhat sensational nature, which ended in the appointment of a new Colonel. Lord Charles Hay had criticised the Earl of Loudoun's dilatoriness in attacking the French in Nova Scotia, and had said that "the general was keeping the courage of his majesty's troops at bay, and expending the nation's wealth in making sham sieges and planting cabbages when he ought to have been fighting." Hay was tried by court-martial on the 12th of February, "for every military crime as an officer, except cowardice and disaffection, neither of

1760.



which " was laid to his lordship's charge. What the decision was no one could discover beyond this, that the finding of the court was submitted to the king, who could not give immediate attention to the matter. By the 1st of May, Hay was dead.

On the 5th of May his successor was nominated—Major-General Griffen Griffen, afterwards Lord Howard de Walden. He came to the 33rd with a distinguished record, having served with the Allies in the Netherlands and Germany. He joined his regiment, and on the 15th of May the regiment left Gravesend. Landing at Gurtendorff a week later, the 33rd, with two other regiments, moved on at once to join Ferdinand at Fritzlar. Three days later, other English battalions arriving, the Army of the Allies marched to Diedershausen, where Ferdinand established his head-quarters on June 28th.

There was every promise of ample reinforcements from England if they were required, when the year began, for Pitt had augmented the army with splendid energy. There were no less than ninety-six regiments ready for service, and six new regiments of Light Dragoons were formed. Consequently, when the 33rd were entering the camp, nearly 10,000 additional English troops were added to those already at Ferdinand's disposal.

The prince was now sufficiently strong to challenge Broglie, whose army was advantageously placed at Wassemberg; but the French commander fell back to Frankenberg, with the Allies closely following, and taking up a position on the heights of Brannau. It was Ferdinand's design to prevent the French marshal from joining St. Germain, but he failed in this. A sharp engagement followed between an advanced corps under the Prince of Brunswick at Sachsenhausen, but although he was reinforced by Griffen, the French were in such overwhelming numbers that he had to fall back, leaving fifteen guns behind him, every horse having been shot during the fight. In spite of the

repulse the regiments engaged acquitted themselves with such remarkable courage that credit rather than stigma was their due in this retreat. How desperate the fighting was may be understood when it is recalled that the 1st Dragoon Guards who took part in one of the charges returned with only twenty-four men out of ninety!

The design of the French commander was to cut off Ferdinand from Westphalia at the line of the Hiemel, enveloping his right; but the prince was equal to the occasion, and began a movement which served to distract Broglie. It was reported that his communications were threatened by a considerable force. He sent forward six battalions by forced marches towards Ziegenhain. The Hereditary Prince, who was in command, was ordered to attack the place, and gather up any of the Allies' cavalry he might meet. On the way he met two regiments of horse, and later two bodies of irregulars, and added these to his force, but he halted when he had passed Treysa. Leaving his infantry, he advanced with his cavalry to reconnoitre, and found the enemy posted at the mouth of a gorge in the mountains, fronting to north-east, astride of the two roads that lead from Kirchain to Fritzlar and Ziegenhain. The enemy were incredibly careless, for the prince approached the camp closely through the forest, and found neither picquets nor sentries, nor so much as a main-guard.<sup>1</sup>

Bringing up his infantry with precaution, and dividing his forces in two, the Hereditary Prince executed a decisive charge, taking the French in such surprise that they were defeated with great loss, and abandoned their camp. This night attack was disastrous in the extreme for the enemy.

Ferdinand now brought up his main army to cross the river, leaving it to the Hereditary Prince and General Sporcke to turn the left of the enemy. The 33rd were with the Hereditary Prince, whose army

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue.

did not number more than 14,000 men, while De Muy had 20,000 posted on a ridge ten miles away. It meant hard marching if all that was asked of the Hereditary Prince was to fit in; but the task was essayed, scores of men falling dead on the way. The cavalry and artillery meanwhile outmarched the infantry.

It was impossible to wait for these to come up, and the fight opened with a fierce artillery fire, during which the Grenadiers appeared. Maxwell's battalion was divided into two wings, one commanded by Major Daulhat of the 33rd, made up of the Grenadier companies of the 33rd, the 5th, 11th, 24th and 50th regiments. As the battalion came on the field it was seen that some exciting work was in store. They were making for a steep hill in the rear of the French position, and De Muy sent forward a strong battalion to stay the movement. If they succeeded the whole purpose would be frustrated. Following the impulse of the moment an officer and ten grenadiers ran hard, but keeping in cover. Behind these the Hereditary Prince came with thirty men, all of whom threw every thought of fatigue aside. They reached the hill before the enemy, whom they met with a hot fire. The French were surprised, and hesitated. Daulhat was coming on as swiftly as his men could move, and breathless, like the others, defended the crest. A fight followed against fourfold odds.

The 33rd were so placed as to bear the brunt of the stubborn and desperate encounter, but neither they nor those with them gave way, although there was the prospect of annihilation. The grenadiers fell quickly, and Daulhat's men wavered before a fearful charge. By this time, however, the other wing, under Maxwell, came up, and the sound of their cheering as they made their rush, steadied the men. The fight was continued with fresh determination, but even then the troops seemed doomed; they would have been had not a battery of artillery galloped up to

take the French reinforcements in flank. Ere long the 7th Dragoons and the Royals advanced at a gallop, dashed into the midst of the French infantry, scattered them, and drove them back in confusion.

Elsewhere the fight was proceeding, with artillery and cavalry alone at Ferdinand's disposal. The infantry, urgently as they marched, were unable to come up in time. Ere long De Muy's army was broken and in wild retreat, horse and foot plunging into the river, throwing away their arms in the panic-stricken effort to get across. The battle of Warburg, fought on the 31st of July, made havoc in the ranks of the French, who lost between 7,000 and 8,000 men and twelve guns. But the loss of the Allies, while it did not amount to more than 1,200, was especially heavy among the gallant defenders of the hill which the French Bourbonnois sought to capture. Daulhat's grenadiers and Maxwell's had suffered severely, and of these the 33rd most of all. Six privates were killed and thirty-three wounded.

The full battalion of the 33rd continued the advance in pursuit of De Muy, with part of Granby's infantry, and crossed the river. They did not halt until the heights of Wilda were reached, four miles away from the Diemel. By that time the men were completely exhausted, and Granby halted at Wilda, where he saw the enemy moving on towards Wolfshagen. When his tired men were able to march, he returned to the river, where Ferdinand was camping.

What part the 33rd played in the engagements which followed is not quite clear; but the grenadiers were conspicuous in the fight with Broglie's rear-guard late in August at Zierenberg, when the enemy were driven off the field in a confusion which was enhanced by a charge of the Inniskillings and the Greys.

A fierce engagement took place on September 5th, when Ferdinand, who encamped at Buhne, despatched the 33rd and other regiments—cavalry as well as infantry—to surprise Zierenberg. The march began

before day-dawn, and not until the Hereditary Prince's force was within half a mile of the place were the French aware of their coming. The attack was an amazing one, for the record says that, rushing forward with bayonets fixed on empty muskets, the soldiers carried the town and captured the garrison. There was some fierce fighting in the streets, the Lieut.-Colonel of the 33rd, Lord George Lennox, having his horse shot under him, while Colonel Griffen received a serious bayonet wound.

Broglie was compelled to fall back because of Ferdinand's persistent advance. The Allies had crossed the Rhine below Wesel, while the Hereditary Prince arrived before the town. He invested the place, but shortly afterwards learned that a considerable body of the French was advancing to raise the siege. Ferdinand sent on reinforcements, the 33rd being one of the ten battalions which moved out of camp. When they arrived a fight was waging, and they engaged immediately in the endeavour to beat back De Castre's force. They found the French in possession of a wood, and a fight for it began, but the enemy were not dislodged. The Colonel of the regiment was again wounded, but Lord George Lennox, who commanded the grenadiers, took his place in the quarter where the fiercest fighting raged. When the day was over, the 33rd were reported as having displayed signal intrepidity. The results were, however, wholly in favour of the enemy, for the Hereditary Prince withdrew from Wesel, fighting all the way in foul weather, and marching along what Fortescue calls "almost impassable roads," until he came to the Rhine. Here he halted and repaired the bridge.

In this retreat the 33rd were in the rear-guard. Consequently they were under constant fire, for De Castres followed across the Rhine, but always held back until the prince's army arrived in Westphalia, and so strongly entrenched himself that the French general did not venture to assail him. He took up

his winter quarters here, Ferdinand making Warburg his head-quarters.

In spite of the fact that the campaign had brought no defeats to the Allies, the condition of their army was critical in the extreme. The French held Hesse and Westphalia, and the position has been thus set forth: "The right of the French formed a strong garrison at Gottingen, their left commanded the banks of the Rhine, and their whole army, formed on an immense crescent, threatened to envelope the Allies."<sup>1</sup>

In the camp itself much dissatisfaction prevailed, for the British generals felt that they were ignored, that the German troops were indifferent soldiers, only reliable when aligned with British soldiers, and that the generals were inferior in military knowledge and skill, wholly incapable of measuring their strength with the commanders in the French army. There was soreness, moreover, among the British battalions because the Hereditary Prince underrated not only their achievements but their capacity, and once, in spleen, during his retreat to the Rhine, had said that he would never again take British troops under his command. He ignored the fact when he spoke thus, that these very troops had valiantly withstood the enemy, only falling back when they had not an ounce of ammunition left.

All this occasioned considerable unrest; so that between the lack of fixed purpose and resolution among the Allies, and their being contemned by their opponents, who could treat them as between the hammer and the anvil, matters were in a highly unsatisfactory condition.

George III meanwhile, had come to the throne, and the English people would gladly have retired from the contest, since the cause of Hanover was increasingly unpopular. The army, however, was considerably increased. According to Fortescue this was effected by the raising of an indefinite number of companies, 1761.

<sup>1</sup> "Army and Navy Gazette."

and not by the creation of new battalions or regiments. At this time the British Establishment reached the great strength of more than 140,000 men when the Irish and the Militia (27,000) were included. It meant that 104,000 men were in readiness for immediate active service.

Before any reinforcements reached Ferdinand, he had left his winter quarters on the 11th of February, intent on capturing Hesse. Three columns moved out in silence, the French being in complete ignorance. The left column was commanded by Sporcke, who was to cut off Gottingen, and if possible get in touch with the Prussians, and his part of the scheme was successfully accomplished. Ferdinand commanded the centre column, and marched upon Cassel. The 33rd were with the right column under the Hereditary Prince, who had changed his mind as to the command of British troops. The advance on Mengerhausen was assigned to him.

When Ferdinand was well on his way the French heard the amazing news, and in panic the army in Cassel fled in confusion. So also did the troops evacuate Gottingen. Broglie, however, had time to rally because Ferdinand's progress was hindered through the difficulty of his transport. His men would have starved had he gone ahead of his supplies. By the time he reached the Ohm he was menaced by the French general so seriously that he was compelled to fall back to the Eder.

Meanwhile the column to which the 33rd were attached was encountering disasters. The Hereditary Prince had got as far as Grunberg, there to discover that the enemy's force was so formidable as to compel retreat. The Allies fell back with the loss of 2,000 in prisoners alone. The winter campaign thus ended in failure, the force on arriving at their old quarters being so reduced that out of eight British battalions only 700 effective men were counted, even as early as the 23rd of March.

Nourishment and rest were much needed, but Broglie, who knew this, would not allow time for it. He ordered the Prince of Soubise to keep Ferdinand on the move. Soubise was in such superior force that Ferdinand was compelled to retreat or fight. If Soubise had followed out his instructions without delay, the Allies army might well have been reduced to a body of men weakened by disease and sickness; but he remained inactive while he arranged to effect a junction with Broglie. Fortescue suggests that he shrank from engaging so formidable an adversary as Ferdinand without a colleague to share the risk and responsibility; and yet he had 100,000 men, while all told, Ferdinand had not more than 93,000. If Broglie's army had joined on to Soubise, the prince would have had 160,000 Frenchmen to contend with.

Soubise began to move in the middle of June, crossing the Rhine at Wesel. Ferdinand, however, by splendid endeavour, had his army ready to take the field, and was in a position to move more rapidly than Soubise, who was encumbered with an enormous train of baggage. He committed himself to a startlingly daring scheme, namely, to leave Sporcke with 20,000 men on the Diemel, to watch Broglie, and having first concentrated at Paderborn, to move westward and encamp within sight of Soubise.

A frontal attack on Soubise was too great a risk, but by a movement effected at night, via Dortmund, Ferdinand caused the retirement of the French commander, who moved towards Broglie. This, says Fortescue, was "rather an advantage to Ferdinand than otherwise, since the two commanders being on bad terms might neutralise each other, whereas each of them independently was at the head of a stronger army than Ferdinand's." Broglie, hearing that Soubise was moving in his direction at once went out to join him, effecting a junction at Soest. Ferdinand took up a strong position on the heights of Wamboln. The 33rd were with the Hereditary Prince on the



extreme right, near the village of Buderich. Lord Granby was on the heights of Kirk Denkerh, his pickets extending to the river Aast.

The French commanders sought in various ways to draw Ferdinand away from his strong position, but he remained obdurate, determined not to abandon Lippstadt, which he was defending.

Soubise drove in Granby's pickets on the evening of July 15th, but he was beaten back in turn with considerable loss. The French, however, began the attack early on the following morning, Granby having to sustain a tremendous artillery fire, but without giving way. Meanwhile, Ferdinand and the Hereditary Prince, so far from retiring before Broglie's furious attack, routed the French right with slaughter.

Broglie again advanced, purposing to capture a height opposite Dunckerberg. The possession of this would enable him to dominate Granby's position. Ferdinand, aware of this, determined to resist the attempt; the movement was foiled, and the battalions sent to the attack by Broglie, recoiled in a defeat resembling a rout.

Meanwhile, the 33rd were engaged in desperate fighting, for Soubise was attacking Schiedingen, defended by the Hereditary Prince. Again and again the French advanced, only to be driven back. The last attack of all was almost overwhelming, but the British battalions stood so resolutely that the enemy retreated, beaten, in spite of their immense superiority in numbers. Considering the fact that the fighting was so keen, and the men engaged were not less than 150,000, the losses were small on the side of the Allies, while the 33rd, as hotly engaged as any, had as casualties Ensign Ward killed, a sergeant and six rank and file wounded, and one man taken prisoner. The French loss was heavy—6,000 men, 8 colours, and 19 guns.

After the battle Soubise left Broglie, marching towards Wesel, and designing to threaten Westphalia. The Hereditary Prince followed him, and the 33rd

took part in the operations against the rear-guard of the French army. When he saw that Soubise might be let alone, the Hereditary Prince turned back to the Rhine, where he meant to deal with Broglie from the south. The French Marshal, however, evaded action and crossed the Weser. On a report reaching him that Soubise was moving towards Hanover, the Hereditary Prince manœuvred to drive the French to the Rhine; but no decisive engagement took place, and Soubise retired to winter quarters.

The Allied army was worn out by this time. The marches had told on the men to such an extent that out of 95,000 soldiers as many as 25,000 represented the wastage, one-half dying of disease and hardship. But "the campaign remains memorable in the annals of war for the consummate skill with which Ferdinand kept two armies, jointly double his strength, continually in motion for six months, without permitting them to reap the slightest advantage of their operations."<sup>1</sup>

When the new campaign began, the British army had been so augmented that it comprised 115 regiments of the line, while the total amounted to 150,000. The British Government not only maintained these but subsidised 65,000 Germans as well, so that 215,000 men could be put into the field. 1762.

Broglie was no longer in command of the French army in Germany, having been superseded by Marshal d'Estrees. The French policy had changed. The movements of the army were to be defensive rather than aggressive, and the generals were instructed to hold Cassel and Gottingen, and do all in their power to deprive Ferdinand of forage between the Diemel and the Eder. The idea being that Ferdinand would thus be unable to harass their flanks and rear.<sup>2</sup>

A campaign so devised was not likely to be fruitful in result, and as the event proved, this was the case.

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue.    <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

Strangely enough, in spite of the enormous army which Britain was maintaining, Ferdinand had no more troops than in the previous year at his disposal. The French commanders seem to have held this comparatively small army in contempt, for when they made Grobenstein their head-quarters, after moving on from Cassel, they were so careless that Ferdinand swept through the forest by stealth, and before the French were aware of his approach, he made a concealed and vigorous movement, and captured Zappaburg. The enemy failed to learn anything by this, and Ferdinand again seized the opportunity which offered. It was a daring stroke, but he made it in spite of the fact that Soubise had 70,000 men in hand, while he, on his part, could not bring more than 50,000 to the spot. His object was to sweep down on De Castres, who had a corps absolutely isolated near Carlsdorff. He planned a night march, surprising De Castres soon after day-break, on June 24th. The French general, however, managed to get away in some confusion, his retreat being made possible owing to Kilmansegge neglecting orders, and failing in consequence to cut him off.

Even thus the main body of the French army was imperilled, and before the day had ended Ferdinand had inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. Had Sporcke and Kilmansegge been more prompt in action, and had the latter followed out his instructions, instead of acting on his own initiative, the French army might well have met with a grave disaster at Wilhelmstahl.

The grenadiers of the 33rd were engaged in this fight, and were under the personal command of Ferdinand. They made part of a battalion consisting of the grenadier companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers, the 8th (King's), 11th (Devons), 24th (South Wales Borderers) and the 50th (Royal West Kent), commanded by Major Welsh of the Devons. The losses of this battalion were three killed and forty-one wounded. "They behaved with a bravery not to be paralleled in history."

Under the command of the Hereditary Prince, after this remarkable engagement at Wilhelmstahl, the 33rd marched towards Frankfort, keeping Condé's army always in sight. Condé strove to shake off his pursuer, yet vainly, but as he drew near to Friedberg, the French commander joined Soubise, whose presence the Hereditary Prince did not suspect. This was on the 30th of August. The prince, imagining that he had no one to deal with but Condé, attacked him. As the fight developed he found himself confronted by Soubise in overwhelming numbers. The troops stood their ground heroically, and later, by some skilful movements, the Hereditary Prince drew away his men to a safe position, but not until Soubise had inflicted on him some heavy losses. The loss to the 33rd is not given. It was the last serious fight in which the regiment was engaged in the Seven Years' War. A few days later Ferdinand fought a well-contested action at Brückmühle, in which the French lost heavily. The Hereditary Prince took no part in this engagement.

The end of the war was near. The French had been forced out of Hanover. They had been defeated in spite of their overwhelming numbers, and took shelter under the cannon of Cassel. Ferdinand drove them from that position, and captured the fortress on November 1st, unaware at the time that Bute had ousted Pitt from office, and had arranged the preliminaries for peace, which he seems to have desired at any price. On the 3rd of November, the Peace of Fontainebleau was signed. Pitt would have demanded greater consideration for English interests, but Bute failed to obtain complete recognition of the efforts expended in the Seven Years' War. Still, the gains were considerable.

All the French claims on the American Continent were withdrawn. In the Pacific no check was imposed to further British expansion. The whole of Canada came to us. In India the French occupation was to

be confined to trading stations solely. Some conquests were assured to us in the West Indies. In Europe the French were to evacuate Hesse and Hanover ; and even Wesel and Gueldres, the retention of which had always been held a point of honour to retain by France, were given up.

When the 33rd returned to England, a battered and wayworn regiment, with a record for bravery and distinguished service of which they might well be proud, they found England seething with discontent because of Bute's concessions.

NOTE.—The second battalions of the regiments undermentioned were formed into distinct corps in April, 1758, and numbered from 61st to 75th regiments, namely :

2nd Batt. 3rd Foot constituted 61st regiment

4th	62nd
8th	63rd
11th	64th
12th	65th
19th	66th
20th	67th
23rd	68th
24th	69th
31st	70th
32nd	71st
33rd	72nd
34th	73rd
36th	74th
37th	75th

# The American War of Independence

## CHAPTER X

### FIRST EXPERIENCES IN AMERICA

WHEN the Treaty of Fontainebleau was signed the question of the reduction of the army was brought up for consideration. When the estimates for 1753 were presented the numbers were reduced to 17,536 men for Great Britain, and 28,406 men for the Plantations and garrisons abroad.<sup>1</sup> The whole military force for a vastly increased empire, and with foes in various quarters, was less than 46,000. At any moment Spain and France, smarting under their humiliation, might spring a surprise on the nation, and it was no secret that these Powers waited the opportunity for a revenge, which should be ample at whatever cost. 1763.

Yet the reduction came.

To begin with, several of the second battalions that were called into being in 1758 were disbanded, so that the 33rd was no longer a two-battalion regiment. At one stroke of the pen the 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th and 75th ceased to exist, and seasoned soldiers who had done splendid work were sent adrift.

The regiment came back to England, still strong; for its numbers, in spite of losses in the field, and through disease, were maintained, by recruiting, at a total of 20 officers and 706 men.

After landing at Gravesend, the regiment proceeded

<sup>1</sup> Clode: "Military Forces of the Crown."

to Ipswich and later was quartered in Colchester. In the barrack life which they experienced the officers and men were in no way to be envied, since, in spite of much pretence in the matter of official regulations, the accommodation was deplorable. The Master-General of Ordnance, some time before, found things so bad that the mildest representation he could make to the War Office was, "that by a general survey taken of the several Barracks in this kingdom, they find them in a bad condition, and that for want of proper regulations not only the buildings have been very much damaged, but also the bedding, furniture, and utensils very much abused, embezzled, and destroyed." The report was followed by further regulations; but as for their recognition that was another matter, and it was doubtful whether the soldiers were any better off.

Anything was preferable to barrack life, with its discomfort, its monotony, and such numberless disabilities; yet the receipt of orders in 1764, that the regiment should embark for Minorca was not altogether pleasing to the 33rd. After the usual grave discomforts of life on a transport ship the regiment landed its sick men and horses.

There was probably a feeling that in an island of which many had had previous experience there would be compensations in a finer climate, and, it was to be hoped, better food and less exaction in the way of useless duty. But there was the natural wonder as to how long this shelving as a Minorca garrison was to last. The Government had a way of sending a regiment to some distant station and apparently forgetting its existence until war compelled the authorities to look up the reliable battalions. There was no system of periodic reliefs, and when news came that the 33rd were to go to Minorca, the natural question was, "For how long?" Englishmen, says Fortescue, in some trenchant sentences, when commenting on this absence of periodic reliefs, "did not accept exile so readily in those days as in these. Ordinary soldiers did not con-

ceive that they enlisted for service in foreign garrisons ; that duty was for men especially recruited, as they thought, and they constantly deserted in sheer despair of ever returning home. A distinguished officer, the Duke of Argyll, went the length of saying that a long term of duty at Mahon was equivalent to a punishment, and that his only surprise was that the troops had not mutinied both at Minorca and at Gibraltar."

All this was assuredly common knowledge to the men of the 33rd. Cases were known of regiments that had been sent to Gibraltar or to the West Indies, who had not been relieved for fifty years. It was well known that in the contracts for the foreign stations the most obvious necessities were overlooked ; that " though Minorca was supplied with brandy, oil, bread, salt, and tobacco, the item of meat was entirely omitted, and it was actually necessary for the Governor to explain that the five articles mentioned were insufficient for the nourishment of the British soldier."

Garrison life in Minorca was deadly dull at the best, and it was an immense relief when the 33rd were called back to England in 1770, after an absence of six years. During that absence there had been a change in the command. The Colonel, now Sir J. G. Griffen, had been appointed to the Colonelcy of the 1st troop of the Grenadier Guards in 1766. Under the command of his successor, Earl Cornwallis, the 33rd were destined to see some service of the most strenuous nature which left all their previous experiences in comparative shade.

Cornwallis was only twenty-eight when he was so promoted, yet he had seen some hard service. He had been aide-de-camp to Granby, who played such an active part in the German campaigns. He was present at Minden, and his regiment, when he was captain, was hotly engaged in the battle of Vellinghausen, not to mention many minor actions. His further service involved hard fighting in the battles at Wilhelmstadt and Lutterberg. He was therefore a veteran in spite



of his youth, and an accomplished soldier, when the king made him one of his aides-de-camp, the year before he was appointed Colonel of the 33rd. When not actively campaigning he took an active part in Parliamentary affairs, but he was a soldier before all else, and destined not only to high rank but to marked distinction. Trevelyan refers to him as an English aristocrat of the finest type, who, both now, and later, served the state in war, in politics, in diplomacy, and in high administration, enlightened, tolerant, and humane. The unbiased judgment concerning him was, that "if not a man of startling genius, he was a clear-sighted statesman, and an able general, as well as an upright English gentleman."<sup>1</sup>

1770. The regiment was eventually detailed for garrison duty at Cork. War was in the air, and the men, like their officers, were keen in marking the progress of events. Unhappily the conflict which seemed so imminent was to be one in which the forces of the Mother Country were to be arrayed against the New England Colonies.

It can scarcely be disputed that the Home Government had designs against American liberty. With the increase of colonial wealth came schemes for a colonial revenue. Duties were laid on certain imports, and, as a result, the Colonists resorted to an organised system of smuggling. To correct this evil, orders were issued to the naval officers at the American stations "to detain and libel all vessels violating any provision of the Navigation Acts." Search warrants were issued to the officers in the American waters, and they were authorised "to break into stores, and even private houses if suspected of containing smuggled goods, violating a principle long dear to the English people, that 'Every man's house is his castle.'"

The levying of a direct tax on America was the final act on the part of the British Government which led to a sanguinary war, and provided for the 33rd some of

<sup>1</sup> "Dictionary of Nat. Biography."

their most thrilling experiences. To look into the causes of the struggle a little more closely, various offences aroused discontent among the Colonists. Among them were "the dullness and rigidity of British soldiery"; the wish of Episcopalians of New England and their friends in the Mother Country "to place the Anglican Churches of the Colonies under a Bishop," was another cause of discontent to many. The exaction of legal fees and official corruption were a third; but the greatest offence of all was the project for taxing the Colonies. The passing of the American Stamp Act in 1765 brought matters to a head. The Act had been proposed before, in Walpole's days, but it was felt to be unjust, and was not proceeded with. In 1765, however, when Lord Grenville was in power, a tax was imposed by Act of Parliament requiring that stamped paper should be used for newspapers, all law papers, all ships' papers, property transfers, college diplomas, and marriage licences. Wherever there was non-compliance with the Act a fine of ten pounds was to be imposed, "the enforcement of which was not to be left to the ordinary courts and juries, but to Courts of Admiralty without juries, the officers of which were appointed by the Crown, and paid fees out of the fines they imposed, the informer receiving one half."<sup>1</sup>

The measure was resisted, and so intense was the opposition in the Colonies that the Government repealed the Stamp Act the following year. A sting was left, however, by the insertion of the clause in the Repeal that Parliament reserved the right "to bind the Colonies in all cases whatsoever." The people of America were too pleased to be once more on friendly terms with the Mother Country to take formal notice of this, and they received the news of the repeal of the Stamp Act with rejoicing, resuming their commercial intercourse with England.

The first outburst of satisfaction gave place to

<sup>1</sup> Ryerson: "Loyalists of America."

irritation when some of the leading Colonists called for closer attention to that reserving clause. At first there was a desire to let matters take their course, but there was a demand in some quarters for its removal. Then, to add to the irritation, there came an unhappy conflict between the British troops in Boston when there was some rioting, and the soldiers, receiving orders to fire, killed three of the rioters. That was in 1770, so that the relations were intensely strained at the time when the 33rd returned to England from Minorca.

Three years passed, and in this state of unrest it seemed that but a spark was needed, and explosion would follow. That spark fired the mine in 1773, when the Home Government levied a tax of three-pence per pound on tea. The Colonists protested that taxation without representation was intolerable; that it was tyranny to which submission was impossible. New York and Philadelphia would not allow the tea to be landed, but in Boston a number of men, disguised as Mohocks, boarded three tea ships, and threw the cargoes into the harbour.

From that moment things passed from bad to worse. "Relentless intimidation of the Loyalists continued; the insurgents began to collect ammunition, and military stores, and the young men to assemble to learn their drill." General Gage, the Commander-in-Chief, warned the people of Rhode Island against obedience to the Revolutionary Government, but the response was a defiant one. Within a few hours forty cannons were seized, and a small fort with all its stores, invaluable to Gage in this extremity, was surprised and taken.

The king was of opinion that four regiments would be a sufficient force to supplement the existing one in America. He was not alone in this, even after the receipt of Gage's dispatches showed that such an additional reinforcement would be wholly inadequate, and that even 20,000 troops would barely suffice, to reduce the Colonists to submission. As for conciliation, the

Government would have none of it. They scoffed at the news that the New England States were arming, and were indignant with General Gage, who was loth to move lest, by displaying military force, he might precipitate hostilities. Lord Chatham, who protested against the Government policy, said, when speaking in the House of Lords, "I find a report creeping abroad that Ministers censure General Gage's inactivity. . . . It is a prudent and necessary inaction. . . . This tameness, however contemptible, cannot be censured ; for the first drop of blood shed in civil and unnatural war might be *immedicabile vulnus*."<sup>1</sup>

War came at last. The War of Independence became a reality when some English troops were attacked at Lexington, on the 19th of April, 1775. Amazement followed that the Colonies should venture to measure their puny strength against the veterans of the Mother Country.

The war proceeded, but for some time no intimation came that the 33rd were to take any part in it. The king still had the idea that the small force then in New England would be able to cope with the rebels. It was useless at first to show his Majesty and his Ministers that the Colonists, within a few days of Lexington, had 20,000 armed men in the field, and that Gage, with all his energy, could only call in from every quarter eleven battalions. The truth was driven home when the real character of the fighting displayed itself ; when it became known that George Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the American forces, was gathering together a well-equipped army of 30,000 men. It was evident that if America was not to be lost the Government at home must supply an army adequate to the emergency. 1775.

In October, 1775, orders came to the 33rd to be in readiness for immediate embarkation for America. A significant intimation of the seriousness of the situation is indicated by the fact, that while a large force 1776.

<sup>1</sup> See my "History of the Tenth Foot."

had been deemed essential for maintaining peace and order in Ireland, the Government had to take the risks, and call on the following regiments in that country to prepare for service in the New England Colonies :

15th Cavan's	37th Coote's
17th Monkton's	46th Vaughan's
27th Massey's	54th Frederick's
33rd Cornwallis's	55th James Grant's
57th Irwin's	

The instructions issued were that the marching regiments for the American service were to consist of 12 companies of 56 effective rank and file each company. In addition to these and so many other regiments of horse and foot, 22,000 Foreign Auxiliaries' were provided, and it became necessary to secure transports amounting to 90,000 tons.

Embarking at Cork, the regiment set sail for America on the 12th of February, 1776, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Webster; yet orders for the dispatch of all these troops had come in the preceding October, in full knowledge of Howe's pressing need for men. The whole of the reinforcements so convoyed by Admiral Sir Peter Parker, were commanded by the Colonel of the 33rd—Cornwallis.

The voyage was a stormy one, and wearisome beyond description, for it lasted three whole months. Not until the middle of June did the regiment disembark at Charlestown, and the news that greeted them when they landed was of disaster. Sir William Howe, who had succeeded Gage as Commander-in-Chief, and to whom the task was assigned of reducing the Colonists with an inadequate force, had evacuated Boston in March, 1776, leaving behind him many guns, all spiked, huge piles of shot and shell, and vast stores which he could not carry away. The evacuation was due to the fact that Washington, holding the Dorchester Heights, rendered the place untenable.

Howe had gone first to Nova Scotia, but Cornwallis received orders to join him at Staten Island, where the Commander-in-Chief was in reality helpless for want of promised but delayed supplies. Clinton had been sent to Cape Fear to await Cornwallis's coming, but since he was five months late, Clinton had to sweep through South Carolina with what troops he had in order to frustrate the movements of the Colonists there. He had failed, and was compelled to retire to New York.

When the 33rd and the other reinforcements arrived from Cape Fear, Howe prepared to move, organising his army into seven brigades, thus :

Reserve :	Four battalions of Grenadiers, 33rd, 42nd.
First Brigade :	4th, 15th, 27th, 45th.
Second Brigade :	5th, 28th, 35th, 49th.
Third Brigade :	10th, 37th, 38th, 52nd, 55th.
Fourth Brigade :	17th, 40th, 46th, 55th.
Fifth Brigade :	22nd, 43rd, 54th, 63rd.
Sixth Brigade :	23rd, 44th, 57th, 64th.
Seventh Brigade :	Fraser's Highlanders, New York Companies, Hessian troops.
Light Troops :	Three battalions of Light Infantry, 16th, and 17th Light Dragoons.

This force amounted to 25,000 men, but Howe was deficient in camp equipment which should have come out months before, and certainly when the 33rd left Ireland. Yet he displayed such inactivity that he has been charged with being too sympathetic with the Colonists to prosecute the war with a vigour which might well have changed its aspect. His slackness lent colour to the contention that if Cornwallis had been Commander-in-Chief instead of Howe or Clinton, British strategy would have been far less halting and desultory.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Trevelyan : " American Revolution."

With Cornwallis at hand, Howe determined to capture New York, and with it the command of the Hudson. There was every reason why he should expect success, for Washington had only 18,000 men, 10,000 of these entrenched on the wooded Brooklyn Heights, and the remainder garrisoning the city and the forts.

On August 22nd the 33rd, under Cornwallis's command, landed on Long Island, as did the whole of Howe's army, and marching with the Grenadiers, the 42nd, and the Light Infantry, moved on to Flatbush, a village three miles from the landing-place. But Howe's inactivity again displayed itself, for he spent four precious days in reconnoitring, while Washington made use of every hour in strengthening his defences. The road which ran through Flatbush led among the mountains, where Washington awaited attack. Cornwallis found that Sullivan was holding this road with a strong force. Clinton moved on the right flank, thinking to get to Sullivan's rear, but he anticipated that Putnam's force might contest his advance. He was surprised to find the road altogether unguarded, so that he succeeded in gaining Washington's rear without a shot having been fired. A fierce assault on Americans in their flank and rear followed.

General Grant, meanwhile, had advanced on the left with ten guns and nine battalions, to deal with Stirling, who held the heights on the Americans' right. After vigorously contesting the position for four hours, Stirling was compelled to retreat, leaving Grant in possession of his strongly entrenched heights.

In Sullivan's front desperate fighting took place. Under Cornwallis was Von Heister, whom he sent forward with his two battalions of Germans. When it became known that Clinton had succeeded in his turning movement, Von Heister advanced his infantry to find that Sullivan, surprised at Clinton's attack, was falling back. At this point the turn of the 33rd came. The Reserve Brigade, of which they were a part, with the Light Infantry and Light Dragoons, were

rapidly advanced to cut off Sullivan's retreat. The struggle, "within musket shot of the fortified lines in the rear of the hills" was desperate, but Sullivan held his own where he made his stand until the Hessians of the 7th Brigade enabled the 33rd and 42nd to overcome any resistance he could offer. This final charge routed the Americans who, in their flight, met with severe loss, some fighting their way through the British troops, others plunging into a morass where they were engulfed, while the remainder were taken prisoners.

The Americans fought like veterans in the so-called Battle of Brooklyn, and lost terribly. "Almost a whole regiment from Maryland, consisting altogether of young men of the best families in the country, was cut to pieces," and among the prisoners were Major-General Sullivan, Brigadiers-General Lord Sterling and Udell, with ten other field officers.

The conduct of the 33rd in a part of the field where the contest was most severe was beyond praise. Howe, when he made his report, said, concerning the doings of the 26th of August: "The Grenadiers and 33rd regiment being in front of the column, soon approached within musket-shot of the enemy's lines at Brooklyn, from whence these battalions, without regarding the fire of cannon and small arms upon them, pursued numbers of the rebels that were retiring from the heights so close to their principal redoubt, and with such eagerness to attack it by storm that it required repeated orders to prevail upon them to desist from the attempt. Had they been permitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the redoubt; but as it was apparent the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches, I would not risk the loss that might have been sustained in the assault, and ordered them back to a hollow way in front of the works, out of reach of musketry."<sup>1</sup>

At first, in spite of their rout being so complete, Howe believed that Washington would make a further stand.

<sup>1</sup> Howe's dispatch: "London Gazette, Extraordinary."



He felt, moreover, that it was the American commander's intention to lure him on to a repetition of the experiences at Bunker's Hill, for he could be seen strengthening his position with desperate energy, when the English general brought up his army in front of the works. Howe's determination was not to run the risk of a similar disaster as that of Bunker's Hill, but to carry the entrenchments by siege operations, and for this end he made his dispositions. Finding his position a precarious one, Washington summoned his generals and discussed the situation. As a result of the conference he made dispositions for the evacuation of Long Island with the greatest secrecy and dispatch. Trevelyan tells us what happened. At dusk, on the 29th, Washington ordered the regiments to be under arms for a night attack on the enemy ; but when the troops expected to be sent into action, they found instead that they were to retreat in absolute silence to the shore. They marched out of their camp in a dense fog to the spot where the boats lay, and the last to step away from the shore was Washington himself.

That retreat from Long Island has been declared by a military authority to have been the best-effected retreat he ever read or heard of. It certainly was a "master-stroke of energy, dexterity, and caution by which Washington rescued his army and his country."

Howe knew nothing of it until, when morning came, the silence in the American lines was so noticeable. Then, to his chagrin, it was discovered that Washington was gone ; that he had transported "across a wide channel of salt water a multitude of troops, with all their baggage, military stores, and cannon, from out of the enemy's mouth, in a short summer night." Howe's plan for enveloping Washington had failed, and he was compelled to follow up the American general and fight him on fresh ground.

After this reverse on Long Island the Americans were divided in their councils. Some, Washington and Greene among them, advised that the troops should

evacuate New York, and put it to the flames, but it was eventually decided to defend the city. Washington made his protest, but to no purpose. He saw that disaster was inevitable because his army was being denuded daily by desertions, especially among the Militia.

In three weeks' time, Howe, after a delay which, though incomprehensible, was characteristic of the man, was on the move. On September the 15th he crossed over to the mainland, intending to drive Washington out of New York. Then he learnt that the garrison consisted only of 5,000 men, while Washington was encamped on high ground to the west with 9,000, there prepared to hold his position against the heavy odds. Howe determined to dislodge him. He first of all directed his attention to the city. The 33rd were in the front barges which crossed the channel, and in spite of the fire from the guns they clambered up the rocks near the Newtown inlet. In a short time they were in the city, the Americans falling back with little or no resistance, since they knew that their retreat was determined on. One of the Americans told how Putnam got his regiments together as soon as the 33rd and others approached, and moved them out swiftly, scarcely waiting to take away his artillery. "Between fifty and sixty cannon, mounted or dismounted, and a vast quantity of shells and round-shot, remained in the city as a prize for the victors. In both armies together less than a score of warriors bit the dust; and among the Americans very few had so much as bitten a cartridge. Their troops never fired a gun; but as soon as the British began to land, they ran as if the devil was in them. Such was the testimony of General Cæsar Rodney.

The next morning (Sept. 16th) Howe turned his attention to the Heights of Harlem, held by Washington, where he had been joined by Putnam and his garrison. A frontal attack was dangerous, and Washington protected his flanks by strong batteries.

The 33rd, however, had some fighting that day. The 42nd Highlanders and the Light Infantry were sent out to deal with a strong body of troops in front of their entrenchments. The fight assuming greater magnitude than these could cope with unaided, the 33rd were sent to support them. The enemy retired in some confusion.

For a whole month active operations were deferred by Howe, allowing the enemy time to recover their spirits and strengthen their position. It took Howe the best part of that month to discover that he might cut off the American supplies, and threaten Washington's rear ; and in the meantime his own men were chafing at the delay, knowing that a spirited attack on Washington's lines would result in his being driven out, or compelled to capitulate. The men of Howe's army, who only wanted a capable leader to ensure them a success which would obliterate the disaster at Bunker's Hill, were to be commiserated. It is true that Howe found it difficult to get any knowledge of the country, and must needs be cautious ; for it was " everywhere hilly, and covered with wood ; intersected by ravines, creeks, and marshes ; and presenting at every quarter of a mile a post fitted for ambuscades." But to take a full month before moving—the delay was exasperating.

Meanwhile New York burst into flames, and more than four hundred houses and warehouses were burnt down.

Howe was slow to think, but he thought to some purpose in the end. His scheme was to leave behind his entrenchments on Manhattan Island a force adequate for the protection of the city. He meant to move eastwards, and place his main army in the Westchester peninsula, on the flank and rear of the Americans, directly between them and their base of supply in Connecticut. The warships were to ascend the Hudson and cut off Washington from retreat into New Jersey.<sup>1</sup> But even then he was dilatory. It took

<sup>1</sup> Trevelyan: " American Revolution."

several days for landing his stores, and by the time he moved, Washington became aware of his objective, and shifted his position.

Howe moved on towards the White Plains on the 25th of October, and Washington changed his camp. Throughout Howe's advance there were frequent skirmishes in which the 33rd played a busy part, driving the enemy from various defensive posts. Meanwhile, Washington, disconcerted by Howe's persistent advance, fell back from more than one strong position; but ultimately he was prepared to withstand Howe's attacks. Throwing one corps across the river to the westward, he placed it at Heckensac, in New Jersey, under Putnam's command. Peekskill was held by Heath, who was ordered to fortify the pass where the Hudson penetrates the gorges of the Highlands near West Point. Lee, with 7,000 men, was near White Plains, ready to co-operate with Washington when he might call.<sup>1</sup>

On the 16th of November Howe attacked, making the following disposition of the troops: The first column of 5,000 Hessians under Knyphausen, against the north front from Knightsbridge. The second (Guards, Grenadiers, Light Infantry, and 33rd) under Generals Matthews and Cornwallis, against the eastern side from Harlem Creek. A third column (the 42nd Highlanders) to make a feint attack only, against the same side, but a little further to the south. The fourth column, under Lord Percy, went down Harlem Creek, in the night, to the south of the American position (4th, 10th, 15th, 23rd, 27th, 28th, 38th, 52nd, Fraser's Highlanders, and a brigade of Hessians.)<sup>2</sup>

The column to which the 33rd belonged, having landed on the eastern shore of Manhattan Island, came at once into touch with the enemy, but pressing onwards, did all that was asked of them; for in spite of the desperate resistance offered they captured several posts. While this heavy fighting was going on,

<sup>1</sup> Trevelyan.      <sup>2</sup> Fortescue.

the 42nd Highlanders, who were expected to make a feint attack only, found some very real fighting forced on them. In spite of the hottest fire, by which they lost a hundred men, they drove away the enemy, captured a considerable number of men, and then swung round and came down on the rear of the Americans who were opposing Lord Percy. This sudden and unexpected movement broke up the Americans, and Fort Washington surrendered. Washington lost fully 3,000 men in the fight, while Howe's loss was 458 men in killed and wounded.

Howe delivered a second stroke two days later. The 33rd, two battalions of Grenadiers, two of Light Infantry, Guards, the 42nd, a detachment of the 16th Light Dragoons, and four companies of Hessians landed on the Jersey shore. The force numbered 4,500. Cornwallis, who commanded, designed to capture Fort Lee, eight miles away. The surprise failed because a deserter gave notice of the movement. But, as it was, Greene barely escaped capture. He abandoned the fort, leaving behind him 32 guns, 1,000 barrels of flour, a number of tents, a quantity of baggage, and as Trevelyan remarks, "a considerable amount of military reputation, and all that remained of the cheerfulness and confidence which had, up to a very recent period, inspired the Provincial forces." A pursuit of the enemy by Cornwallis ensued, which ended in their retirement from Newark. Being strengthened by nine other battalions, he continued the movement until fatigue and insufficiency of supplies caused him to halt. Some of the more arduous experiences had no doubt fallen to the lot of the 33rd. As soon, however, as the troops had rested, the regiment was once more in the field, following up Washington's dwindling army, neither resting themselves, nor allowing the enemy any ease. Brunswick was captured after a forced march—twenty miles over exceedingly bad roads—the Americans falling back, more like an undisciplined rabble than an army.

Cornwallis now had to act on his own initiative. Howe's orders had been not to proceed farther than Brunswick, but when he saw that there was a chance of capturing Philadelphia, that the American army, starving and demoralised, could offer no effectual resistance, and that Clinton was within call with the 4th Brigade, he moved on as far as the Delaware. The want of boats ended the chase, and he returned to winter quarters, the 33rd going to Bonham Town, between Amboy and Brunswick.

They were not allowed to pass the winter months in quietness. The German troops acted so shamefully towards the inhabitants, who had been assured of immunity from outrage, that the population retaliated. Again and again marauders who caused them extreme annoyance, shot down the pickets. The 33rd lost many men by reason of this winter activity on the part of the enemy.

## CHAPTER XI

### A BRILLIANT BUT FRUITLESS CAMPAIGN

1777. BUT for these annoyances the 33rd were comfortably placed ; for Howe was keen on the well-being of his troops. Their Colonel obtained leave to go home for a flying visit to his wife and children, but he did not go without being assured that his regiment had what was needed. Food was plentiful, and amusement was provided to remove the tedium of the idle months. But the cessation from active operations became irksome in the extreme.

If Howe had but moved earlier he might have frustrated Washington's schemes for rehabilitating his army. And this the American general found himself able to effect since Congress gave him a free hand—"full power to order and direct all things relative to the department and to the operations of war." He accordingly looked well to the equipment in his army, and reorganized it thoroughly. Yet one is filled with a sense of amazement at the supineness of the Colonists who had committed themselves so wholly to a war for independence. The army at Washington's disposal when he was considering the campaign of 1777 was altogether inadequate and reflected seriously on the loyalty of those who clamoured for a policy of armed opposition to England. Howe had at his disposal some 20,000 men. The return of the forces encamped on the banks of the Delaware under Washington's command gave 4,704 rank and file present for duty ! There were, it is true, some of the regiments of the Northern Army, the large body of Philadelphia

militia, and possibly a few other small contingents not included in that return; but what were they, all told, compared with the British force! Possibly the total would reach 8,000 men, who were distributed over a front of thirty miles along the river.<sup>1</sup> Even these were miserably equipped, for Trevelyan tells us that Washington had to send round to the villages "to beg or buy old clothes and blankets for his freezing soldiers." But under Washington's sole command, with no interference to follow from Congress, the fine spirit of loyalty and enterprise returned. His men meant to succeed.

Howe, who must have known something of this, did not move as quickly as he could have done. It was possible to crush Washington on equipment and numbers alone, but the weeks went by, and he did not move. The Americans chose their positions and practically challenged Howe to dislodge them if he could, while every day they added to their own efficiency, and strengthened their posts. Washington, moreover, had found means for knowing every movement, and almost every intention in Howe's lines. To test the fighting capacity of his men he made a sudden dash on Trenton just as the new year set in—January 2nd. There was some hard fighting, the Americans were successful, and Howe suffered considerably, his losses including the Hessian Brigade, with their guns, as prisoners. Washington at once recrossed the Delaware, taking with him the captured colours, the artillery, and the prisoners, deeming it well to avoid the certain approach of Howe's main army.

The effect on the Americans was electric. Washington was reinforced by several regiments from Virginia and Maryland, while new bodies of the Pennsylvania Militia hurried to his camp.

On the other hand Howe had to reorganise his forces. Cornwallis, who had been on the point of leaving for England, returned to his command, and

<sup>1</sup> Trevelyan.



took part in the fighting which followed. But with all his acumen the British Commander-in-Chief could not prevent Washington from overrunning Jersey, east and west, and becoming master of the coast opposite to Staten Island, where he made himself so strong that it was not possible without great loss to drive him from his posts. Washington was able practically to dictate his own method of warfare now, and he was careful to render the war one of posts, surprises, and skirmishes, rather than one of battles.<sup>1</sup>

The 33rd were so stationed as to feel all the hardships of winter skirmishes which thinned their ranks, and forced on them severe and unremitting duty. Whatever supplies they obtained in the country-side had to be fought for; "purchased at the price of blood," so the chronicler says.

Howe did not move, although the winter passed. He was apparently content with this desultory warfare, while Washington was gathering immense supplies of provisions, forage, and stores of all sorts in magazines in the mountains. One of these Howe attempted to capture in March, but rather than allow it to fall into his hands Washington destroyed it. An attempt on the magazine at Danbury was successful, but having ensured its destruction, Howe was obliged to fall back to avoid being surrounded by the enemy.

Meanwhile the 33rd were posted between Brunswick and Amboy. Cornwallis was unable to move from that place with his division because tents and field equipage had not been supplied from England, although it was nearly June. Howe had lost the advantages of an early campaign, and Washington had become proportionally stronger. In June the American commander had moved towards Brunswick, and took possession of the hills which he strongly fortified. By that time the tents and field equipage had arrived, together with a number of recruits, so that Howe was enabled to advance. He passed over to the Jerseys, and sought

<sup>1</sup> "Annual Register."

to draw Washington into a pitched battle by every possible device, but in vain. Again and again the 33rd were exposed, but Washington would not be drawn. "He had too much temper to be provoked or surprised into a dereliction of his advantages : so he had too much penetration to lose them by circumvention or sleight," says a writer in the "Annual Register."

Then came an amazing decision on Howe's part. On the 19th of June, after a week's endeavour to entice Washington, he withdrew his army first to Brunswick, then to Amboy, and after that to Staten Island, with the idea of going to Philadelphia. At the first sign of retreat, which was nothing more than a feint, Washington who had followed assumed the defensive. Cornwallis vigorously assailed him, compelling him to retreat to his previous position.

Finding that Washington was bent on a defensive plan, Howe withdrew finally to Staten Island. On July 23rd the fleet and transports left Sandy Hook and sailed to the Chesapeake ; but the voyage was prolonged to an unwonted degree, owing to contrary winds. Twenty-four days elapsed before the 350 miles of voyage were accomplished, and the army, after all the discomforts of transport in bad weather, disembarked in Chesapeake Bay. The Royal Army, as Walpole put it, had "carried the American war with them." Washington could not imagine where the troops had gone, but when it seemed certain that Howe was bound for Philadelphia, he crossed the country to be ready to defend it. By the time Howe was in a state to advance he found that the enemy had moved from the Brandywine to the Red Clay Creek, and with less than 15,000 men, was strongly posted, confronting the British Army. Washington had a wonderful genius in selecting strong positions, and he had made the most of his opportunity. The stream, which at the point he chose was a torrent, was pent in "between high steep cliffs, which effectually forbade any attempt on his left." Here he placed his militia. He commanded the

centre at Chad's Ford, and Sullivan was with the right, "two miles up the stream, in broken, wooded, and difficult country."

Howe formed his army in two columns. Cornwallis commanded the right; Knyphausen was with the left, the columns being thus composed :

#### THE RIGHT (Cornwallis) :

3rd Brigade, 15th, 33rd, 44th, 55th, Major-Gen. Grey.

4th Brigade, 17th, 37th, 46th, 64th, Major-Gen. Agnew.

Two battalions Guards.

Two battalions Light Infantry, formed of the Light Co. of each Regiment in the Brigade.

Two battalions Grenadiers, formed of the Grenadier Co. of each Regiment.

Two squadrons 16th Light Dragoons.

Three battalions Hessians, mounted and dismounted chasseurs.

Four 12-pounders, and battalion-guns.

#### THE LEFT (Knyphausen).

1st Brigade, 4th, 5th, 23rd, 49th, Major-Gen. Vaughan.

2nd Brigade, 10th, 27th, 28th, 40th, Major-Gen. Grant.

Four Hessian battalions.

Three battalions Fraser's Highlanders.

Queen's Rangers (Irregulars).

One squadron 16th Light Dragoons.

Six 12-pounders.

Four howitzers, and battalion-guns.

Howe designed to turn Washington's right flank, and began his attack on September 11th, when Knyphausen advanced on Chad's Fort, the American centre. Cornwallis, by a circuitous march of sixteen miles to

the left, having crossed the Brandywine, encountered Sullivan's force, drawn up in front of a wood, and strongly situated. The 3rd Brigade were ten hours going over rough and unexplored country, but Cornwallis, without staying to rest his troops, deployed his force. In front he placed his Guards, the Grenadiers, the Light Infantry, and the Hessian chasseurs. Eight English battalions, 1,200 Germans, and two squadrons of cavalry followed in support, or in reserve. Their right flank was secured by the river.

There was no thought of fatigue in spite of the tiring march. The moment the word came the troops charged home. Soon the 33rd were in the thick of the fight, and before long Sullivan's soldiers were in disorder. Lord Stirling, who was in Sullivan's centre with some guns, fought with great determination, more than once driving back the attack. Being threatened vigorously on both flanks, to avoid capture he was compelled to retire to the stronger position afforded by the wood.

Knyphausen had meanwhile forced his way across the stream. Washington was beaten, his entrenchments were carried, and his batteries and cannon captured. Had not darkness fallen the American army might have suffered a total defeat. Yet the English losses were not great considering the character of the fighting. The American loss was 300 killed, 600 wounded, and 400 prisoners; but Howe's casualties did not amount to 500, of which the slain did not amount to a fifth. The loss of the 33rd was small. Its light company had Captain Dansey, wounded; the grenadier company had two officers wounded, Lieutenants Harris and Drummond; the battalion companies lost one rank and file killed, a sergeant and eleven men wounded, and a private was missing.

The following day the army advanced on Philadelphia, coming to Concord. On the 25th [of September the troops were at Germantown, and the morning following Cornwallis entered Philadelphia.

Trevelyan speaks of the British army as entering the city in sober triumph, and marching through its heart. "The vanguard was commanded by Lord Cornwallis who then, and always . . . never failed to display a humanity and a generosity worthy of the great nation to which he and his soldiers belonged. The regimental colours remained in their cases ; but the bands struck up the tune of "God Save the King" amidst the acclamations of several thousands of inhabitants, who (as an English officer observed) were mostly women and children. . . . Men occasionally dropped out of the line and asked for milk or cider ; but in case of houses where these applications became too frequent, a sentinel was stationed at the door, and relieved hour by hour until the whole army had filed past."

Washington, knowing that Howe's garrison was weakened by the dispatch of three regiments to serve as escort to a large convoy of provisions, determined to attack Germantown. He brought up his army during the night of October 3rd, and when morning came his movements were covered by a dense fog. He thought he had taken Howe completely by surprise, but the English commander had been warned of Washington's approach, and was on the alert, having recalled the 33rd from Philadelphia.

Germantown was a village which "formed for two miles one continuous street." At its centre it was crossed at right angles by Howe's encampment, but Howe had placed the 40th and the 2nd battalion of Light Infantry as an advanced corps. The light company of the 33rd was with this latter battalion.

Even thus there was an inevitable surprise because of the fog. No one in the advanced corps could tell from which side Washington might come ; but suddenly the Americans appeared out of the mist in overwhelming numbers, so that the outposts were compelled to fall back. The first to withstand the enemy were the Light Infantry, who dropped back, fighting all the way ; then, when they were level with the 40th,

both battalions were endeavouring to check the advance, and for a time they were successful. Presently the fog lifted, and the front of the attacking forces was visible. A retirement was effected to the Chief Justice's house, where a stand was made, the British being surrounded by 3,000 Americans.

The 3rd Brigade, including the 33rd, were brought up in support, and these being followed by the 4th Brigade, the American leader fell back in a haste almost amounting to disorder. Greene's column, in retreat, did not halt until a distance of twenty miles from Germantown had been covered. Washington's surprise was great that pursuit was not attempted, and Howe's attitude remains inexplicable.

The loss of the enemy was heavy. The killed numbered over 200; eight times that number were wounded, and 400 were taken prisoners. Considering the severity of the fighting, the losses of the British were surprisingly small; 100 were killed, and 400 wounded. The 33rd battalion losses were two sergeants and two privates killed. The men of the 33rd who served in the Light Infantry suffered severely, but there is no return of their losses in detail. It was reported that the men distinguished themselves highly. Of the British regiments Howe spoke in warm terms when he wrote home: "The fatigues of the march exceeding 100 miles, supported with the utmost cheerfulness by all ranks, without tents, and with very little baggage, will, I hope, be esteemed as convincing proofs of the noble spirit and emulation prevailing in the army to promote his Majesty's service."

There was a fight three days later when Howe was moving forward with his army after a short rest. He encountered a large body of Americans barring the road at Edge Hill, and the 33rd, with the remainder of the 3rd Brigade, drove them out, and the army once more approached Philadelphia. Apparently the regiment took no part in the heavy fighting when Howe drove the enemy out of Mud Island and Red Bank.

Washington, subsequently handicapped by the shortage of troops, pursued a Fabian policy, and refused to be drawn into a general engagement until December, when he was known to be strongly posted in the forest fourteen miles away from the city. Howe determined to expel him, but although Cornwallis was entrusted with the task, Washington was elusive. Nothing more serious than harassing skirmishes followed until the Light Infantry, supported by the 33rd, made a desperate onslaught, forced an engagement, and caused the retirement of the Americans in great disorder. The loss to the regiment was slight, three rank and file wounded. The outcome of the fight, however, showed Howe that it was a waste of effort to make further attempts now that the winter had set in with great severity, and he accordingly withdrew to Philadelphia to wait for a fresh campaign.

So far as fighting was concerned, the 33rd had, as usual, played a vigorous part in a brilliant campaign. Yet, as the writer of the "Annual Register" says, when surveying the situation, "with all this tide of success, all the fruit derived from our victories at the close of the campaign, amounted to no more than simply a good winter lodging for our army in the city of Philadelphia; whilst the troops possessed no more of the adjacent country than what they immediately commanded with their arms."

## CHAPTER XII

### IN THE VICINITY OF NEW YORK

Howe's weary troops had every opportunity for rest during the winter in Philadelphia. There were full amends for the privations of the officers and men while following the elusive general of the American forces, for "abundance reigned" in the city. There was unmeasured kindness on the part of the citizens, the great majority of whom disapproved of the rebellion, and desired the return of peace, so that the troops spent the winter in thoroughgoing ease, free from anything like disability. 1778.

Something akin to dismay prevailed in the army when it was known that Howe, having asked to be relieved, was to be superseded by Sir Henry Clinton. Whatever faults Howe had as a general, his men loved him as "an indulgent commander, and a hearty companion, who lived and let live, and who, when off duty, was as genial to his followers, high and low, as on the actual day of battle he was formidable to the enemy." Disquietude at the thought of Howe's departure was accentuated when the name of the new commander was made known. Had it been Cornwallis, the army would have received the news with acclamation, for it was said of the Colonel of the 33rd that he "inspired the energies, and kept the conscience of the British army, and was then, as always, the incarnation of chivalry and humanity."

It was Sir Henry Clinton whom the officers did not care for. They felt that under his leadership they



would gain no laurels. He was classed at the time among those

“Generals who will not conquer when they may,  
Firm friends to peace, to pleasure, and good pay;”

and, as one declared, he was accounted the most notorious of these. No one thought of disputing his gallantry; no one denied that he was a capable officer; but none the less, scarcely an officer or man in the army but shrugged his shoulders at the appointment. As for Clinton himself, he was singularly uncomfortable because he was privately told, while he was moving on to Philadelphia to supersede Howe, that Cornwallis, his second in command, “held a dormant commission to succeed him, a circumstance which always arouses distrust.” Clinton, knowing the Colonel of the 33rd well, was assured in his mind that he would “form large military plans which were repugnant to the instincts” of the new Commander-in-Chief.

He arrived in Philadelphia on the 8th of May, 1778, and Howe pointed out to him the exact state of affairs. The American army was posted strongly a few miles away, at Valley Forge, Washington’s idea being to restrict the foraging area of the British general. From that point he was able to curtail supplies, threatening to starve the Royal Army out, and do considerable harm, while avoiding anything like collision on a large scale. Yet Howe’s army, although he had clamoured for reinforcements which were freely promised and did not come, was disciplined and healthy. Clinton had brought with him instructions which left no choice even when he saw that Howe had acted wisely in deciding on Philadelphia. The orders were to abandon that city and retreat on New York. It was a “tough and ungrateful task” of “extricating King George’s troops from Philadelphia, and replacing them on Manhattan Island.”

Clinton lost several weeks before he definitely decided on his method of evacuation. He was uncer-

tain as to whether he should go by sea or march overland to his destination. By that time the troops were feeling the pinch of hunger, for Washington had been tireless in his endeavour to sweep the more remote townships clear of food and fodder, and left a bare larder for the British commissariat. He prevented the farmers from taking food into the city, and when cattle-ships and flour-barges attempted to go up the river, Washington's guns sank them in the day-time, and in the night his men in boats captured them. When war stores came and were taken, they found their way into Washington's camp.<sup>1</sup>

Clinton's decision was to send away his sick and wounded to the fleet which was to carry his baggage, and the army began to march at day-dawn on the 18th of June, while the fleet went on its way.

Crossing the river in boats, and landing on the New Jersey shore, Clinton's men, 17,000 in number, with 46 field pieces, commenced their march in serious earnest; but before many hours had passed the soldiers were drenched with rain which poured incessantly for fourteen hours, soaking through their clothing, and ruining their ammunition and food. This storm was followed by a spell of intolerable heat, "the most terrible heat which had afflicted the province within the range of human memory." In a letter to Germain, the Secretary for the Colonies, Clinton said that "many died of sunstroke; the features of the men were swollen past recognition by mosquito bites; and at the end of a short day's march—short in distance, though long in time—one Hessian out of every three had been left panting and prostrate on the roadside. The infantry, burdened like pack-horses, and clothed and accoutred as if for a birthday parade in a European capital, were kept stationary, hour after hour, in the blazing sun; for the train of carts was a dozen miles in length, and frequently travelled on a single causeway."

<sup>1</sup> See my "History of the Tenth Foot."

The enemy took every advantage of Clinton's disabilities, breaking down bridges, cutting up roads, driving away the cattle, and carrying off everything in the way of food, while La Fayette, with his riflemen, was picking off the men continuously.

Washington at last made a determined effort to stop Clinton's advance, and a battle was inevitable when the army arrived at Monmouth Court House. Clinton divided his army into two divisions—the van under Knyphausen; the rear under Cornwallis. Knyphausen was to guard the baggage, but Cornwallis was free to deal with the enemy, and force a passage through Washington's army.

On Sunday morning, June 28th, a day "long remembered all over the United States as the most sultry day which had ever been endured since mankind learned to read the thermometer," Knyphausen moved away, necessarily going slowly because of the baggage, through some high country. Cornwallis, with the 33rd in his division, moved to the plain just below Freehold, and found himself threatened on three sides, large bodies being on his flanks, and Washington's main army in his rear. He saw that the baggage was threatened, and in order to draw away the forces from Knyphausen, and receiving some reinforcements from the vanguard, he assailed Washington's centre. Clinton, in his dispatch after the fight, says that "the British Grenadiers with their left to the village of Freehold, and the Guards on the right of the Grenadiers, began the attack with such spirit that the enemy gave way immediately. The second line of the enemy stood the attack with greater obstinacy, but were likewise completely routed. They then took a third position, with a marshy hollow in front, over which it would have been scarcely possible to have attacked them. However, part of the second line made a movement to the front, occupied some ground on the enemy's left flank, and the Light Infantry and Queen's Rangers turned their left. By this time our men were

so overpowered with fatigue that I could press the affair no further, especially as I was confident the end was gained for which the attack had been made. I ordered the Light Infantry to rejoin me ; but a strong detachment of the enemy having possessed themselves of a post which could have annoyed them in their retreat, the 33rd Regiment made a movement towards the enemy which with a similar one made by the 1st Grenadiers, immediately dispersed them."

Washington had been so severely beaten in this fight that he abandoned the pursuit, leaving Clinton free to move on to Sandy Hook, where, fortunately, he found the fleet. The Admiral set his men to work at once to make a bridge of boats, so that the army was able to march over. By the 5th of July Clinton was moving on to New York, and shortly afterwards entered the city.

For the remainder of the year there is little to record regarding actual fighting. Clinton made a number of raids on "sundry little ports which harboured American privateers, destroying large quantities of shipping and stores," and the 33rd took part in these attacks. Notably was this the case when on September 4th they sailed from New London with the design of destroying Fairhaven and Bedford. They were told to "burn, ravage, and destroy," as well as gather in stores. The record runs that they accomplished the object in view, "though perhaps with a superabundance of zeal. Seventy sail of shipping was destroyed in the raid, the magazines, wharfs, stores, rope walks, and vessels on the stocks were ravaged, and what was left committed to the flames." From Fairhaven they proceeded to the island called Martha's Vineyard, and brought away immense numbers of sheep and 300 oxen, "for the public service at New York."

On their return the 33rd proceeded with Lord Cornwallis's division to New Jersey, where a position was taken up, with Newbridge on the left, and the North River to the right. Knyphausen, at the same

time, occupied the West Chester side in a parallel position, his left reaching to the North River. Washington was similarly placed, but his two divisions were not in such close touch with each other; and whereas Cornwallis and Knyphausen could have joined each other this or that side of the river, in twenty-four hours, the American forces were so dispersed that ten days would have been required for concentration. Clinton was thus enabled to secure sufficient forage and provisions without trouble. There was a further advantage, that the army was in touch with the fleet. By ceaseless activity the generals did endless damage to the enemy, who seemed careless, and were caught frequently in a state of unpreparedness.

1779. Clinton carried the war into Georgia and elsewhere, but the 33rd were reserved for taking part in an expedition up the Hudson River, where Washington was constructing exceptionally strong works at Verplank's Neck, on the eastern bank, and at Stoney Point on the opposite side of the river, with the idea of keeping his communications open between the colonies to the east and west. It was Clinton's design to capture those posts and use them for his own purposes.

The regiment formed a part of the force designed to make a rush on the forts before Washington could possibly come up for their defence. Major-General Vaughan, who was given the command of the expedition, landed a half of his force, including the 33rd, on the east bank of the river, at a point eight miles below Verplank's Neck, while the remaining portion, under Pattison's command, and accompanied by Clinton, did not go ashore until within three miles of the fortifications. The Americans at Verplank's, surprised to see a large force appear, abandoned the place, only stopping to set fire to a block-house. Those who were at Stoney Point quitted their position in haste, but made a stand on the hills until the British troops charged, and drove them off in confusion.

The new works which thus fell into Clinton's hands gave him an immense advantage. He found, however, that there was a small but strong and complete work which was defended by four guns and a small garrison. It was necessary to capture this fort, La Fayette, and the 33rd were to assist in the task. It meant a difficult climb among the hills, especially with artillery, which had to be dragged from a bad landing-place up a precipitous slope, but it was done during the night. When morning came General Pattison was able to pour in a destructive fire from the rocks of Stoney Point on to La Fayette.

Some boats were in the river to cut off the garrison if an attempt to escape by that way were made, while Vaughan, with the regiment and other troops made a long circuit among the hills, and came close up on the land side. Even thus the little garrison held on bravely until they saw that further resistance was impossible. They accordingly surrendered to Vaughan. This was in the month of May, 1779. The loss of these forts to Washington was serious in the extreme, since it compelled him to cover more than ninety miles when he wished to communicate with the districts east of Hudson's River. As soon as Clinton gained the forts he put them into a strong state of defence, regarding them as of great value.

Clinton's further design in making these captures was to draw Washington away from the Jerseys, and in this he was successful. Washington, however, did not come down to the plains, but placed himself in the high, strong, and mountainous country.

The 33rd, with the 71st, a detachment of the Royal Artillery, and some of the Loyalists, were left to garrison Verplanks, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Webster of the 33rd, while Stoney Point was occupied by the 17th, and the Grenadier companies of the 71st. None suspected what followed, that Washington would send Wayne with a strong detachment of infantry to surprise Stoney Point, and if possible capture Verplanks.

The Americans would have to march fourteen miles "over high mountains, through deep morasses, difficult defiles, and roads exceedingly bad and narrow, so that they could only move in single files during the greatest part of the way." But this they did, and late in the evening were within a mile and a half of the fort, their presence being undiscovered. At midnight they advanced in two columns with fixed bayonets, and unloaded muskets, with orders not to fire a shot on any account. A detachment engaged the attention of the garrison by a feint in the front, and the rush was made. The garrison was taken completely by surprise, and the attacking columns, meeting in the works, captured the place.

Once in Stoney Point the Americans turned the guns on Verplanks with effect. The shipping, also assailed, had to drop down the river, so that Lieut.-Colonel Webster and the troops under his command were isolated; but they prepared for a stubborn defence in case they should be attacked on the land side. Clinton, on being informed of what had happened, moved up the main army to Dobb's Ferry, pushed forward his cavalry to the banks of the Croton River, "to awe the enemy on that side in their attempts to land against Verplanks," while a number of frigates and transports full of infantry moved up the river.

Webster did not return the fire, and the enemy, concluding that he was without artillery, brought down a galley with the intention of carrying off the guns from Stoney Point, and all the stores, since Wayne knew that he could not hope to hold the place for any length of time. Things went as Webster thought they would, and his guns which he trained in anticipation, poured in shot on the galley, and compelled the enemy to draw off. Webster not only held Verplanks, but saved the guns of Stoney Point. Two days later Clinton drove Wayne out, and made the posts still stronger.<sup>1</sup>

Nothing of any importance took place in the

<sup>1</sup> Trevelyan.

campaign of 1779 in that part of the American continent where the 33rd were serving until the year drew to its close. Washington stood on the defensive, and would not hazard a battle, while Clinton, harassed by orders from the Colonial Secretary, was unable to move because Germain did no more in the way of strengthening him than by promising troops which only came in dribbling numbers, and barely made up for the wastage of his army. Yet Germain was urging Clinton to carry the war into Carolina.

"Give me troops and I will do it," was Clinton's retort, and meanwhile the army was kept in New York or its neighbourhood, restless concerning an enforced inactivity, which was only broken by petty engagements.

Clinton was unable, moreover, to risk a voyage along the coast to land his army in Carolina, for the reason that the French Admiral, D'Estaing, had joined the Americans in an attack on Savannah. The Allies, however, had met with such a reverse that the Colonists withdrew, and the French fleet sailed out of New England waters. The way was made clear for Clinton, who accordingly did as Germain desired. Late in December he discovered that Washington's army, for the winter, had practically ceased to exist, so that there was nothing to be apprehended in that quarter.



## CHAPTER XIII

### THE CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

1779. CLINTON moved as soon as D'Estaing's departure gave the opportunity. Benjamin Lincoln, the Commander of the American forces beyond the Potomac, had retreated from Savannah after the defeat which led the French Admiral to withdraw, and had gone to his old quarters in Charleston. Germain urged, and Clinton concurred, that the conquest of South Carolina would be a disastrous blow to the enemy. Germain, moreover, in consequence of Clinton's repeated protests against the non-arrival of the necessary supplies and reinforcements to enable him to carry out the orders sent to him, had at length furnished sufficient for the Commander-in-Chief's requirements, so that when he prepared to evacuate Rhode Island at the end of 1779, his army was in excellent condition ; the reinforcements from England had not been impaired by any service ; and it was abundantly provided with artillery, and with all other engines, furniture, and provision of war. Nor was the naval force less competent for its purpose ; there being nothing then in the American seas which could even venture to look at it. On the other hand, the distance of South Carolina from the centre of force and action, cut it off from all means of prompt support ; while the present state of the American army, along with many circumstances in the situation of their public affairs, rendered the prospect of any timely or effectual relief extremely faint.<sup>1</sup>

The 33rd embarked for this great enterprise on

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue.

December 26th, but before the fleet had gone far out to sea it was scattered by a storm which sank some of the transports, and among them one laden with cannon. Others were captured by the enemy's privateers, while owing to the horrors of the voyage, nearly every horse was lost. The 33rd were among the fortunate but weather-beaten ones who finally concentrated in front of Charleston early in February of 1780.

Clinton's force when he left Rhode Island, numbered 7,600 men, the army being composed of one battalion of Light Infantry; two battalions of Grenadiers, 7th, 23rd, 33rd, 42nd, 63rd, 64th, Queen's Rangers, and six battalions of Hessians.<sup>1</sup> He was also joined by the troops in Savannah, by some of the Loyalists, and later on, during the siege, by 3,000 men from New York, so that the whole force at his disposal numbered 13,572 men.<sup>2</sup> 1780.

The Commander-in-Chief made no delay in landing his army. Lincoln, who was in Charleston, seems to have done nothing to prevent the disembarkation. In quick succession Clinton took John's Island, and James's Island. At first he was weak in numbers, for the other troops had not yet joined him. Accordingly he strengthened his communications with the sea, taking no risks, since he had failed in his previous attempt on Charleston. Having thrown a bridge over the Wappoo Cut, he extended his posts to the mainland, established himself on the banks of the Ashley River, and erected some batteries of great strength.

It was not long before the 33rd were engaged. Cooper's River was held by Lincoln, and it provided a line of communication with Charleston which Clinton determined to cut. Lieut.-Colonel Webster was to undertake the task, and he took with him his own regiment, the 33rd, also the 64th, and some cavalry, which brought up his force to 1,400 men. His orders were to strike at a corps which was forming at Cooper's River, break in on their communications, and seize the

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue.

<sup>2</sup> "Royal Gazette."

principal passes in the neighbourhood. Webster's force was apparently absolutely inadequate, for the enemy were strongly placed, and in greatly superior numbers; but his men responded with such spirit that he not only surprised the Americans, and defeated them, but almost totally cut them off. Webster then occupied the passes, and by his skilful movements completed the investment of Charleston. This was on April 13th, 1780.

Webster was greatly strengthened by reinforcements and held in readiness for any important service which might be called for, but later in the month the 33rd's colonel, Cornwallis, took over the command of this and a still more augmented force, in order to press the siege on that side of the town. From that day the trenches were pushed forward persistently, and in the fighting which followed, the regiment and Tarleton's cavalry decisively defeated Lincoln's horse. Every device conceivable was resorted to in order to distress the garrison, both from the army and the fleet; yet so skilfully did Webster conduct his share in the siege, that when Charleston, hard pressed, and hopeless, surrendered, on the 12th of May, the 33rd had only lost one man killed and two wounded, and Lieutenant Bevor, of the grenadier company, somewhat seriously hurt. The garrison, which numbered 5,000 soldiers, and 1,000 seamen, were made prisoners, and 400 guns fell into Clinton's hands. The Commander-in-Chief realised the worth of the service rendered by the 33rd, for in his despatch he said, "I have especially to express my obligation to Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, and the corps which acted under him."

The 33rd were not allowed any leisure after the fall of Charleston, news having been received that the enemy were concentrating in North Carolina. Tarleton's cavalry, sent after them, made such a sudden and unexpected onslaught on their camp, that the Americans scattered in panic, leaving their artillery, baggage, colours, and camp in Tarleton's hands. But since the

enemy still remained in South Carolina, Cornwallis took his regiment and other infantry—2,500 men and 5 guns—by forced marches to the point where the Americans were collecting after their disastrous fight with Tarleton. Cornwallis, however, missed the enemy who had fled on the report of the English advance, so that he had to be content with clearing the Americans out of South Carolina. The 33rd and 23rd were left at Camden, well up the Wateree River, to hold the district, while Cornwallis returned to Clinton, who was preparing to leave for New York.

No sooner had Cornwallis gone than Gates cast longing eyes at Camden. Lord Rawdon had been left in command, and he called the 33rd and 23rd away to Lynche's Creek, where he had other battalions, as being a more advantageous post from whence he could punish Gates, and bar the enemy's advance on Camden if he ventured back into South Carolina. Rawdon's force was 2,000 men, but Gates was actually on the way with 6,000. Cornwallis moved instantly with reinforcements, and proceeded to Camden.

By this time Gates was pushing his light infantry forward, shortly reaching Rugeley's Mills. On the morning of the 15th of August, Cornwallis left Camden, to meet the Americans. "Lieutenant-Colonel Webster commanded the front division of the army. He composed his advance guard of cavalry and mounted infantry, supported by four companies of light infantry, and followed by the 23rd and 33rd regiments of foot."

Cornwallis's idea was to strike first. Webster presently found the enemy in force, and scarcely waited for Rawdon's coming up. The order of battle, formed with surprising swiftness, was as follows: On the left were Rawdon's troops. This front line was extended to the right, the 23rd in the centre, the 33rd on its right, and the Light Infantry on the extreme right. The second line was composed of two weak battalions of Fraser's Highlanders, and behind these were the Legion Cavalry. Tarleton commanded these last.

There were two 6-pounder guns, and two 3-pounders, together with two guns with Fraser's. Gates' army was in two lines, with seven guns.

Gates gave the order to advance, which his soldiers responded to uncertainly, but Webster led off with such boldness and rapidity that the militia immediately in front of the 33rd threw away their arms and fled. Fortescue says that Webster, disdaining to pursue them at once, wheeled up his brigade and fell full upon the flank of the American regular troops. The fighting that followed was of the most desperate nature, but the troops moved with such steadiness, and were handled so skilfully that, when Tarleton appeared on the flank the Americans broke up and fled, the cavalry riding in and out among the fugitive mass, and inflicting fearful loss. Gates fled for his life, leaving his army to its fate. The loss of the British was heavy, but that of the 33rd heavier than any other regiment engaged. The regiment went into action composed of the Lieut.-Colonel, 5 captains, 4 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 adjutant, 1 surgeon's mate, 13 sergeants, 1 drummer, 209 rank and file; but while the total loss of the whole British force was 2 officers and 66 men killed, and 18 officers and 238 men wounded, the 33rd lost Captain Allan Malcolm, and 17 rank and file killed, Lieut.-Colonel Webster (slightly), Captain Richard Cotton, Lieutenants George Wynyard, James Leigh Harvey, Ensign John Wheeler Collington, 4 sergeants, and 72 rank and file wounded, and 1 man missing.

Lord Cornwallis desired to invade North Carolina, but recognised the danger unless Clinton could create a diversion in the north. He lost some time waiting for Clinton's assent to the proposal, which was to the effect "that any such movement must be contingent on British supremacy on the sea." Lord Rawdon was in command at Camden, where the 33rd remained after the battle. Cornwallis found it an advantageous situation, as affording an easy communication with remote parts of the country. On Rawdon's suggestion,

it was made a place of arms, and a general storehouse for the army. In spite of the intense heat supplies were hurried up, and Rawdon armed and embodied the militia of the province, encouraging the enlistment of Loyalists.

By the middle of September, Cornwallis, once more active, determined to invade North Carolina. The 33rd, the 23rd, the 7th, and 71st regiments, with other corps, moved on to Charlotte Town which was the centre of disaffection ; but so great was his danger, so serious were his difficulties, and so frequently were his communications threatened, while so many of his men were on the sick list, that he fell back to South Carolina, making Winnesborough his winter quarters.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE CLOSING CAMPAIGN—DISASTER AT YORK TOWN

1781. WHILE Cornwallis was falling back to his winter quarters, he was startled by the news of the crushing defeat and death of Colonel Patrick Ferguson, who had been instructed to organise an irregular force among the Loyalists on the western frontier of the two Carolinas. This and the enforced retreat of Cornwallis induced Clinton to send a reinforcement of 1,500 men to Charleston.

Cornwallis further heard that Greene, next to Washington, the most capable among the American generals, had superseded Gates in the Carolinas, and was forming a considerable army. Cornwallis, leaving his camp shortly after the commencement of the new year, advanced towards the borders, "keeping his course between the rivers, until he arrived at a water called Turkey Creek." Leslie was bringing up the reinforcements from New York to join Cornwallis, who was now given a command independent of Clinton.

The force with which Cornwallis moved numbered at first 2,000 men, but when Leslie joined him later, he had 4,000, composed of the Brigade of Guards, 7th Fusiliers, three companies of the 16th, the 23rd, 33rd, 2nd battalion of Fraser's Highlanders, 450 Germans, 700 Provincials, and Tarleton's Legion. The strength of the 33rd when the march began was 328 rank and file fit for duty.

Greene began to take the offensive. He sent a strong force under Morgan to cut off supplies and interrupt communications, threatening Post Ninety-

Six, and Augusta. Greene at the same time barred the way to Cornwallis who dared not weaken himself too greatly when dealing with Morgan, lest Greene should force his way through to Charleston. Cornwallis sent Tarleton with the Legion (300 horse), and as many infantry, the 1st battalion of the 71st, and the 7th, with orders to relieve Ninety-Six, and drive Greene back over Broad River. A collision occurred on January 17th, and Tarleton sustained a crushing defeat. Nearly the whole of his force were taken prisoners, and the loss of the light troops crippled Cornwallis through the rest of his campaign.<sup>1</sup> Even thus, however, Tarleton, rallying what troops remained, charged and drove back Greene's horse, retook his lost baggage, and being unable to carry it away, burnt it.

When news of the disaster came, Cornwallis sought to retrieve it by cutting off Morgan, but that general had dropped back with such celerity that the force sent out was too late, the troops being detained by torrents of rain which made the creeks almost impassable. Not waiting for the rains to cease, Cornwallis moved to the Catawba, with the idea of distracting the enemy's attention. The rain shortly after this ceased, and the river was not in such a swollen state when Webster, with all the remaining baggage, advanced to Beattysford.

This move was really in the nature of a feint, for Webster was ordered to make every possible demonstration which would lead the enemy to believe that he intended to force a passage, and distract their attention from Cornwallis's own movements. Webster expected to find Davison there with 500 militia, but when he reached the ford he found it abandoned. Davison supposed that the passage of the swollen stream would be impossible, but the 33rd and the other troops crossed, not without danger, and marched along the further bank to join Cornwallis, whom they confidently expected to have forced a passage of the river. They

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge History."



found that he had done so, although the stream was five hundred yards wide, "with a strong current, a rocky bottom, water up to the middle," and the enemy assailing them with a continual fire. The landing had been fiercely opposed, but the Light Infantry, the first to cross, quickly formed, and drove away all who essayed to hinder the passage. The success of the day was a splendid tribute to the discipline and valour of the troops, and the skill of the Commander-in-Chief.

The next news of importance carried to Cornwallis was that Greene was intending to join Morgan at Guildford. He determined to outmarch him and prevent the junction. On the way Tarleton's dragoons and 150 of Webster's brigade, commanded by Captain Ingram of the 33rd, encountered 800 of the enemy, and compelled their retreat. From the prisoners who were taken, Cornwallis learnt that Greene was not far distant. On the 6th of March he encountered him at Wetzell's Mill. The fight that followed resulted in an easy victory for Cornwallis's right, but on the left, where the 33rd were, the contest was of a sanguinary nature, the Americans being strongly entrenched. Even thus, however, "the ardent bravery of the 33rd and the light company of the Guards soon dislodged them from their strong position. The infantry mounted the hill above the creek and dispersed the Americans so effectually that the cavalry could only collect a few stragglers from the woods in front."

Cornwallis's failure to advance and deal effectively with Greene's force while it was discouraged and broken is inexplicable. He retreated, resting for nine whole days; and took up a position at Guildford, where he was joined by reinforcements. It is assumed by some that Cornwallis took this course in order to give the Loyalists time to assemble, and join his army. They came so slowly that Cornwallis could not wait when he heard that reinforcements were pouring into Greene's camp rapidly. He decided to strike at once, before the enemy became too strong, and, moving his

army forward, arrived at a spot within four miles of Guildford on the 15th of March.

Here Tarleton's cavalry met the horse and some light infantry which he drove back with heavy loss, and then sent word that Greene's army was near, drawn up in order of battle. When Cornwallis rode up he saw little to be of service to him in a wooded and difficult country. As far as he could tell, Greene's first line consisted of the Carolina Militia which strode across the road from Salisbury to Guildford. On Greene's left were Lee's Horse; Washington's cavalry occupied the right of this great line. Behind the first line came the Virginia Militia, on either side of the road, Lawson on the right, Stevens on the left. Apparently the American force was double in numbers; for after detaching 350 men to guard the baggage, the English general had to meet Greene with an army "reduced by fatigue, sickness, constant skirmishes, and desertion to about nineteen hundred soldiers."

These were thus disposed: The right wing, under Major-General Leslie, consisting of Bose's Hessian regiment, and Fraser's Highlanders in the first line, with the 1st battalion of the Guards in support; the left wing of the 23rd and 33rd under Colonel Webster in first line, with the Grenadiers and 2nd battalion of the Guards under Brigadier O'Hara in support. In the wood to the left of the guns the Light Infantry and a small corps of German Jägers were stationed. Tarleton's cavalry were in the rear of the road.<sup>1</sup>

The fight began early in the afternoon. Fraser, finding himself outflanked on his right, brought his first Guards into the line, with Bose on the extreme right, while Webster advanced simultaneously on Leslie's left. These men were fatigued with hard marching, and had endured great privation; yet they went forward with steadiness and composure, to act as became tried soldiers. The general, later, when writing his dispatch, said, "The order and coolness

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue.

of that part of Webster's brigade, which advanced across the open ground, exposed to the enemy's fire, cannot be sufficiently extolled." Webster's men fired a volley, and then charged home with the bayonet in such determination that the first line was broken ; but it closed again. Thrice Webster led his brigade, and at the third charge he cleared his front. But the 33rd were exposed to the enemy's fire so severely that Webster changed his front, and now, supported by the Jägers and the Light Infantry, the 33rd attacked again, and routed Greene's right. The Carolina Militia had practically bolted at the first onslaught, but the Virginians resisted stubbornly. They were compelled, however, to fall back at the bayonet's point all along the line. Leslie's brigade was irresistible, and Webster swinging round from the left, drove Lawson's Militia back in the greatest disorder. Greene's horse, however, protected their retreat, and stayed the pursuit of the 33rd.

Without loss of time, despite fatigue, Webster took his brigade through the woods to break up Greene, who was making a stand on a hill not far from the town to which he had fallen back. This stand could not have been made, so complete was Greene's defeat, had it not been for the character of the ground he had chosen. It was indeed an action of almost infinite diversity. The excessive thickness of the woods had rendered the bayonet in a great measure useless ; had enabled the enemy, however broken, to rally, to fight in detachment, and to make repeated and obstinate stands ; it had necessarily and entirely broken the order of battle, and separated and disjoined the British corps, who could know no more of each other than what they gathered from the greatness, the continuance, or the course of firing, in different quarters. Thus the battle degenerated into a number of irregular but hard-fought and bloody skirmishes.<sup>1</sup>

Cornwallis's men were fighting with magnificent

<sup>1</sup> "Annual Register."

courage and skill all along the line, but taking tremendous risks. The Guards on the right penetrated into the woods, but were met with a destructive fire, followed immediately by a charge of Washington's horse, which not only broke them in confusion, but compelled them to fall back, leaving two 6-pounders they had captured. Cornwallis saved them by ordering up his artillery, which repulsed the enemy's cavalry, and gave the Guards time to re-form. Meanwhile Webster led on the 33rd, the Jägers and the Light Infantry against the wavering left of the enemy, only to find himself facing what Fortescue calls "the finest battalion in the American army, the first Maryland." These came on with the bayonet, driving him back with heavy loss. Webster was severely wounded; but even thus, he rallied his men, and while Tarleton charged the enemy's left, Webster, bleeding, and his own regiment shattered, but still ready to respond, went forward again with the Jägers and Light Infantry with such ardour that the opposing corps was utterly routed. Greene retreated in disorder, leaving his guns and ammunition on the field. Cornwallis's troops were too exhausted to pursue.

What Fortescue says concerning the battle ought to be recorded. "Never perhaps has the prowess of the British soldier been seen to greater advantage than in this obstinate and bloody combat. Starting half starved on a march of twelve miles, the troops attacked an enemy, fresh and strong, which not only outnumbered them by two to one, but which was so posted, by Greene's excellent judgment, as to afford every possible advantage to its natural superiority in bush-craft, armament, and marksmanship. Yet, though heavily punished, they forced the Americans from the shelter of the forest, and drove them from the field; while the Thirty-Third and Guards, though at one moment absolutely shattered—the latter indeed rent to pieces by Washington's well-timed charge—rallied at once and came forward again to the attack. American writers point with just pride to the fine behaviour of

the First Maryland Regiment, and the still finer performance of Stevens's Militia; but while doing justice to the valour of the British, they forgot that the Guards and the Thirty-Third had already broken through two lines of Americans before they reached the Marylanders." The bloody nature of the fight is shown in the casualties. Cornwallis took 1,900 men into the battle; 93 were killed, and 439 wounded. "Want of food—for not a man received a morsel until the following afternoon—and pouring rain during the night increased the sufferings of the injured, of whom no fewer than fifty expired before the morning came."<sup>1</sup> No regiment suffered more heavily than the gallant 33rd. On the 1st of March they were 322 strong. On the 1st of April, when mustered again, the numbers were only 229. In the Battle of Guildford Ensign Talbot, a sergeant, and nine rank and file were killed. Lieut.-Colonel Webster was wounded; so also Lieutenants Salvin, Wynyard, Ensigns Kelly, Gore, Hughes, Adjutant Fox, a sergeant and fifty-five rank and file.

To the 33rd, their greatest loss was that of their Lieut.-Colonel, who died a fortnight after the battle. There was no man in the whole of Cornwallis's army who proved more soldierly, more brave, more gallant, or more capable than Webster. It was acknowledged that "his skill as a commander and his bravery as a soldier were scarcely equalled among his contemporaries."

As for the success of Cornwallis at Guildford, it has been styled a "Pyrrhic victory." It so reduced his army that another victory won with corresponding losses, would have brought him perilously near to annihilation. As it was, the army was "so weakened . . . that it became almost valueless as a weapon for offensive operations. From the day of Guildford the British invasion of the Carolinas was practically at an end."<sup>2</sup>

Cornwallis now had no alternative but to fall back to Wilmington, on the River Fear, in North Carolina,

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue.

<sup>2</sup> "Annual Register."

leaving Rawdon at Camden to hold South Carolina ; but while this officer acted with energy, and maintained his post, he could not prevent Greene from controlling the Carolinas. At most he could only hold Camden and Fort Ninety-Six. All the other posts fell into Greene's hands. Later Rawdon had to abandon Camden, because of the hostility of the province, and fall back on Nelson's Ferry, where he passed the Santee.

The condition of the British army was a strange one. It was broken into small divisions and placed in such distant situations as to be little capable of concert and mutual support.<sup>1</sup> Scattered through three great provinces, Cornwallis's troops were able to do endless damage to the enemy's country, but as might be expected with such numerical weakness, wholly "inadequate to the main purpose and incapable of bringing matters to any decisive conclusion." It was scarcely an army which Cornwallis commanded when he arrived at Wilmington on the 7th of April. It did not number much more than 1,500 men. When bad news came as to Rawdon's difficulties, he was unable to do anything in the way of succour. He determined, when his men were rested, to march into Virginia, and form a junction with General Philips, a perilous undertaking since the distance to be traversed was great, and the difficulties almost insurmountable. The country was hostile ; it might prove to be desert, and affording nothing in the way of subsistence. Yet he could do nothing where he was. It was even possible that Greene, by some swift movements, and with everything in his favour, might so isolate him that surrender would become inevitable.

He did not, however, neglect precautions. He called for transport and provisions, and with these in hand, Cornwallis began his march on April 25th. It was a hard one, but the troops bore the fatigue without complaint, reaching Petersburg, far up the James River, in Virginia, 300 miles distant. The force which

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge History." Vol. VII.

undertook this perilous march, when every day's experience was almost a matter of "touch and go," was composed of Guards, the 23rd, 33rd, the 2nd battalion of Fraser's Highlanders, Bose's Hessians, Light Infantry companies of Maclean's (82nd), and of Hamilton's Provincials, and the Royal Artillery with 4 guns.<sup>1</sup> The march took up rather more than three weeks, a fine performance, considering the distance covered. The junction with Philips' force was effected. That commander, however, had just succumbed to fever, and Arnold was temporarily in command.

Welcome news came, that Clinton had dispatched nearly 2,000 men to the Chesapeake, and Cornwallis, with these at his disposal, was considerably strengthened. Even thus, however, the situation was menacing. The Marquis de La Fayette was on the north side of the James River, not in great force, but strong enough to prevent the collection of supplies from that quarter.

It was Cornwallis's plan to reduce Virginia, but he was aware that he was not sufficiently equipped for the task. His men were too few; his resources in every way inadequate. When he applied to Clinton, the answer he received was an order to retire to York Town or Williamsburg, and send to New York every man he could spare since Clinton feared an overwhelming attack on that city. Clinton asked for two or three thousand men. Germain, the Colonial Secretary, however, sent orders to Clinton that Cornwallis was not to be weakened, but was to make his base at York Town, and push on his conquests to the north. Consequently Cornwallis did not part with his men, and having arrived by rapid marches at York Town, began to strengthen the defences. There had been some hard fighting on the way, especially at Williamsburg, in which the Americans were beaten and abandoned their guns.

Disappointment awaited Cornwallis on his arrival at York Town. He had expected to see the English

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue.

fleet, but this, while on its way had been met by a strong French squadron commanded by Admiral de Grasse, who defeated it, and was then at liberty to land French soldiers to join La Fayette. With the aid of the French fleet, Washington transported his army to Virginia, with the consequence that La Fayette's force, with Washington's, made up an army of 16,000, while all told Cornwallis now had rather less than 7,000 men. They were troops of the finest quality, so that he reckoned on making a successful defence of York Town, provided he were allowed time to entrench himself on the peninsula between the York and James rivers. By September 28th he was completely invested. When Cornwallis heard of the composition of Washington's combined force, he knew that the soldiers under Roch-Ambeau were the flower of the French army, and that Washington would have the advice of some of the best officers, all men inured to war.

The French investing force extended from the river to the north of the town to a great morass. The Americans continued from thence on the river on the south of York Town. Between them was a great park of French artillery, and not far distant the artillery of the Americans. Cornwallis, when the investment was complete, realised that with all his toil in preparing for defence he could only succeed in converting York Town into an entrenched camp; and as for his works, the moment he saw what powerful guns the French brought to bear against him, he knew that they would crumble under their heavy fire. Before long he contracted his posts and defences, since, in view of the strength of the enemy, they were too extended. Tarleton occupied Gloucester Point, his cavalry being augmented by 600 infantry, confronting the Duke de Lauzen's cavalry, and a strong body of Virginia Militia. Before Cornwallis had completed his defences the attack began, and so fierce was the fire of the enemy that many of the defences were destroyed. Corn-



wallis's guns were here silenced, while Washington's fire was so effective that the shells actually reached the harbour and destroyed the shipping.

Clinton realised the peril in which Cornwallis was placed, and sought to aid him with 7,000 men, but meanwhile the investing army pushed on operations with incessant activity. Cornwallis was apprised of Clinton's coming; yet there was no sign of his appearance on the sea. Meanwhile, Washington, knowing that Clinton's army was already embarked on the ships of war in New York harbour, was even more determined in his assaults on the British defences, his own guns being within 300 yards of them. Had he not been expecting daily, almost hourly, indeed, the arrival of Clinton, Cornwallis would have hazarded a retreat, but such a movement was now impracticable. All that he could do was to maintain a stubborn resistance in face of an increasing and destructive bombardment, to which he was practically incapable of making any reply, save from two redoubts on his left. One of these was singled out for a night attack by the Americans; the other by the French. On the night of the 14th of October both were captured. The resistance was desperate, but the surprise was complete, and the assault so overwhelming that the defenders were either driven out, or made prisoners.

Cornwallis was in a hopeless condition; more so than ever after the loss of those two redoubts. But he endeavoured to fight against time, knowing that if Clinton came York Town would be saved. Everything went against the defenders. The invested force was devastated by sickness, and so reduced by starvation, that the men were scarcely capable of sustaining the fatigue of duty, much less that of strenuous fighting. Cornwallis was faced with the alternatives of surrender, or of escape at all events with a part of his troops. The retreat, since Clinton did not come, was decided upon. It seemed as though a withdrawal could be effected during the night. The intention was to

abandon the baggage, and leave a detachment in York Town with orders to capitulate on terms for the sick and themselves. Some of the troops, the Light Infantry and the 23rd, had actually got as far as Gloucester Point, but the others were unable to move owing to a sudden storm of rain and wind so violent that the boats broke away, and drifted down the river. There was thus a divided army, each part incapable of helping the other. When day dawned the situation was disclosed to Washington, who opened a vigorous cannonade; but happily the boats were recovered, and the troops at Gloucester Point were brought back.

Cornwallis inspected the works with his principal officers, only to find how absolutely impossible defence had become. There was no sign of Clinton's appearance, and no news of his coming. Meanwhile the works were crumbling under the enemy's fire, and the gallant men who were fighting were enduring great privations. Nearly every gun had been silenced, the ammunition was exhausted, there was no food in the stores, and the men were dropping with fatigue.

It was the 17th of October. Before the day ended an officer went out under a white flag, carrying a letter to Washington, proposing a cessation of arms for twenty-four hours, and that commissioners should be appointed to draw up the terms of capitulation. On the 19th the army surrendered. Cornwallis's strength had been so reduced that only 3,800 laid down their arms, the remainder being too ill to move. The land forces became prisoners to Washington; the seamen, 1,500 in number, were handed over to the French Admiral.

The bitterness of the surrender was accentuated when a fleet appeared before York Town, flying the British flag. Clinton and his 7,000 men had come too late! The French ships of war, not sufficiently strong to challenge a fight, made no attempt to hinder the convoy. The soldiers, already feeling their returning strength, after being supplied with food by Washington,

stood and watched Clinton's ships turn round and sail away. By night-time the reinforcements had gone out of sight, bound again for New York.

On the day of surrender the 33rd consisted of a lieut.-colonel (J. Yorke), 3 captains, 5 lieutenants, an ensign, a surgeon, 25 sergeants, 9 drummers and 225 rank and file, including sick, wounded, and effective men.

So far as fighting was concerned, the war was over. The surrender of York Town ended the struggle, and in due course the independence of the United States was acknowledged by treaty, which bore date, November 30th, 1782.

NOTE.—The numbers given for the surrender at York Town are officially given as follows :

Officers	363
Non-Com. rank and file	4,541
Sick and wounded	2,089
	<hr/>
Total	6,993
	<hr/>

## CHAPTER XV

### BETWEEN THE WARS

WHAT the experiences of the 33rd were while the officers and men were prisoners of war it is impossible to say. The officers were at liberty to go on parole either to England or New York, and it may be assumed that the majority availed themselves of the privilege, with the exception of those who were told off in the proportion of one to fifty soldiers, to look after the men while they were detained as prisoners. Lord Cornwallis, still Colonel of the regiment, returned to England, but while a prisoner on parole he was invited to accept the post of Governor-General of India, and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there—a proof that “neither the Government nor the English people blamed him” for the disaster at York Town. The odium of that catastrophe was fixed on Germain, who, as Fortescue suggests, was blind to facts, and deaf to wise counsel, jealous of the commanders in the field, and appallingly ignorant of the elements of war, which he had the audacity to direct. Cornwallis declined the tempting offer. 1782.

The troops who surrendered at York Town were divided into their regiments, and detained within Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, but where the 33rd were quartered is not exactly determined. Probably they went to Lancaster. When Peace was signed the depleted regiment marched to New York. Several of the non-commissioned officers and privates, when they were no longer prisoners of war, requested their discharge on the plea that they had fulfilled the terms

1783-91. of enlistment, but in a letter written from the Adjutant-General's Office in New York, on the 13th of June, 1783, the officer commanding the 33rd was informed that although the Preliminaries of Peace had been signed, his men would have to wait until news came of the completion of the Definitive Treaty. A month later Orders came from Head-quarters, in New York, dated July 29th, 1783, that the Quarter-Masters and camp Colour men, with their Camp Colours, of the British Grenadiers, 23rd, 33rd, 38th, 3rd, 60th, 4th, 71st, British Legion, Queen's Rangers, King's Own Regiment, New York Volunteers, and others were to meet Captain Gilfillan, Deputy Quarter-Master-General at Franklin's House, at the head of Newtown Creek, at eight o'clock on Friday morning, the 1st of August, in order to mark out ground for those corps to encamp on. Then on the Saturday, the 33rd were with the others to march and encamp on the ground so marked out. This affords information as to the location of the regiment when the soldiers were no longer prisoners of war.

One important question exercised the minds of the soldiers of the 33rd. What had become of their colours? It was suggested that they were destroyed to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands. As for the Hessian regiments, it is asserted that Madame Riedesel secreted the colours in her mattress, and so saved them, while it was given out that they had been destroyed when it was known that Cornwallis was about to surrender. This rumour was spread concerning the colours of the 33rd, and for a long time this was held to be the case. The anxious inquiries were answered when James Savage wrote the "History of Taunton" in 1822. In that book he said, "The old tattered colours of the 33rd regiment of foot, under which the men were engaged in several actions during the revolutionary war with North America, are hung up in the chancel of this church (St. Mary Magdalen). On the arrival of that regiment

in this town, after the peace of 1783, they had new colours presented to them, which were consecrated here, and the old ones deposited in the vestry."

In 1832 the old colours of the 33rd were removed from the church, the authorities apparently not caring to preserve them there. They were presented to Colonel Kemys-Tynte, whose grandfather, General Johnson, was Colonel of the 33rd at the Battle of Dettingen. On hearing that the colours had been taken from the church, Major Dansey remonstrated, and requested their restoration to St. Mary's. Colonel Kemys-Tynte, after some negotiation, learning that the old Dettingen colours of the 33rd were in Halifax (Nova Scotia), said he would hand over the colours brought from Taunton church into Major Dansey's possession. Major Dansey replied that he had in his possession a very old pair of colours of the 33rd which he would bring to Colonel Kemys-Tynte, and the exchange was accordingly made.<sup>1</sup>

The 33rd remained at Taunton so long that they received the local name of the Taunton Regiment, and it can reasonably be conceived that the colours would thus get to Hallswell, near Taunton.

When the 33rd returned to England they were so depleted as not to number more than 162 rank and file. The officer in command received the following communication, which will go some way towards showing what quarters were assigned to the regiment on their arrival:

"It is His majesty's Pleasure that you cause the 33rd Regiment of Foot under your command lately arrived from North America to proceed in the Transports to Deptford, where they are to disembark, and be quartered at Greenwich, until such time as you shall judge necessary to proceed to Taunton, to which place they are to

<sup>1</sup> The above information was furnished by St. David M. Kemys-Tynte, Esq.

march from Greenwich by the shortest and most convenient Route, and remain until further Order. You will also acknowledge the receipt of this Order. Wherein the Civil Magistrates and all others concerned are to be assisting in providing Quarters, impressing Carriages, and otherwise as there shall be occasion.

Given at the War Office this 7th Day of September, 1786.

By His Majesty's Command.

G. W. YONGE.

Officer Commanding the 33rd  
Regiment of Foot on board the  
Mulgrave and Three Brothers  
Transports off Deal.

It is said that the 33rd marched later on to Halifax, in Yorkshire. Their stay in that county nearly coincided with a change in the title of the regiment; for in 1782 county titles were given to all British regiments except those that were Royal. The idea behind this Order, issued on the 31st of July, 1782, was, that a connection between the regiments and the counties should exist, in order to assist in recruiting. The 33rd were designated the "1st West Riding of Yorkshire Regiment."

This county connection was given because nearly all the men serving with the regiment during the American War had been recruited about Leeds and Halifax. The soldiers of the regiment at the same time became popularly known as the "Havercake Lads," the recruiting sergeants resorting to the humorous practice of sticking an oat cake, called a "Havercake," on the points of their swords, and going through the West Riding towns and villages thus. The call for recruits was liberally responded to. Yet there were times when even such a popular regiment as this found a difficulty in maintaining its establishment. Recruiting was, on the whole, in a far from satisfactory condi-

tion, and the dépôts received but a desultory supply of recruits. In too many cases men were secured by foul means. They deserted almost immediately, so that the regiments scarcely ever reached full strength. There came a time when each man who entered the ranks had his price, for the nation was faced with such possibilities of war that the raising of the army to war strength was vital.

Although the recruiting parties were constantly active, as in 1787, recruits could not be had until a bounty of three guineas was offered. It cost the Government two guineas more for each man obtained, that being the sum paid to the recruiting sergeant. Even then there was a disinclination to enlist, and it was stated officially that "The whole country is overrun with recruiting officers and their crimps, and the price of men has risen to fifteen guineas a head at least."

The reason was not far to seek. The bounty was large, but the men regarded the pay as wholly inadequate. The would-be recruit, moreover, had heard of the various stoppages from his pay, and saw at a glance that what was left for himself was practically *nil*. Take the figures as they actually were. What with pay at 6d. a day, and 12s. 2d. a year poundage, and bread allowance at the rate of 10½d. a week, the soldier's money for a year was £12 9s. 3½d. But there were deductions for food to the amount of £7 16s. od. a year, and stoppages for various articles of clothing which the soldier was obliged to possess, amounting to £3 5s. 5d. £11 1s. 5d. was the sum taken from the soldier yearly, so that only 18s. 10½d. was left to him for spending money. The wonder is that under such circumstances we had an army at all.

The Navy was in a like difficulty, and when it was realised that whatever branch of the Public Service suffered it must not be the Navy, several battalions were sent to the ships for service in the fleet. As a consequence the home force was seriously depleted.



At the time when the 33rd were at Taunton, the following was copied into the Secretary's Common Letter Book, coming from Nepean to Hobart on October 19th, 1790: "South Britain will shortly be left in a very defenceless state. Three battalions of Guards are now under orders for foreign service. Exclusive of the remainder of the Guards and a few dragoons, the Thirty-Third will really be the only regiment left."

The regiment contrived to recruit, however, for there were in camp on the 6th of November, 1788, 22 sergeants, 10 drummers, and 318 rank and file towards completing its establishment of 400. Early in 1792 orders came for the 33rd to proceed to Ireland, where the Whiteboys were giving such trouble that troops were required to put an end to their lawless depredations. Many detachments were engaged in something like patrol and police duty, so as to deal with these disorders. Lecky shows how the Whiteboys traversed the country, often in the daylight, wearing white cockades, with all the audacity of open insurgents, breaking into gaols and releasing prisoners, burning houses, and intercepting provisions until some towns were actually threatened with famine. The call for extra troops in Ireland was imperative, and the 33rd were sent to Dublin in 1792.

1793. In August, 1793, affairs were so critical in the West Indies that a force was collected for service there, under the command of General Grey. Its strength was to be 14 regiments, and the flank companies of 14 more, and some artillery. Eight of the regiments at the last moment were diverted for Lord Moira's operations in La Vendée, and the denuded force set sail. The flank companies of the 33rd were with
1794. Grey, and reached Barbados on the 6th of January, 1794. The army, although numbering 7,000 men, was by no means adequate to the task assigned to it. The force at the General's disposal was brigaded thus :

First Brigade : Sir C. Gordon, 15th, 39th, 43rd.

Second Brigade : Thomas Dundas, 56th, 63rd,  
64th.

Third Brigade : John White, 6th, 58th, 70th.

#### GRENADIER GUARDS—Colonel Campbell.

1st Battalion : Grenadier Companies of the 6th,  
8th, 12th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd,  
31st, 41st, 56th.

2nd Battalion : Grenadier Companies of 9th, 33rd,  
34th, 38th, 40th, 44th, 55th,  
68th.

3rd Battalion : Grenadier Companies of 15th,  
21st, 39th, 43rd, 60th, 64th,  
and 70th.

#### LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALIONS—Colonel Myers.

1st Battalion : Light Companies of 6th, 8th, 12th,  
17th, 22nd, 23rd, 31st, 68th.

2nd Battalion : Light Companies of 15th, 33rd,  
34th, 35th, 38th, 40th, 41st,  
44th, 55th.

3rd Battalion : Light Companies of 21st, 39th,  
43rd, 56th, 58th, 60th, 64th,  
and 65th.<sup>1</sup>

Grey was successful in whatsoever he attempted, the flank companies of the 33rd taking part in some desperately hard marching. But the mortality among the troops was fearful, fever raging to such an extent that battalions were sometimes incapable of taking duty, because so many of the men were down in sickness. The authorities at home seem to have forsaken this army utterly, as if leaving it to its fate. It must have been so when Fortescue was able to write thus of the troops : " Since they had left England not one

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue's List.

scrap of stores had been sent to them ; their clothes were in rags, and they had no shoes to their feet."

Grey determined to make a night attack with some of his woefully depleted battalions on Fort Fleur d'Épée, which he had bombarded incessantly for days. The attack failed, the men being in such an exhausted state, and when the force retreated the flank company of the 33rd, like others, had been practically wiped out.

# Netherlands Campaigns

## CHAPTER XVI

### A DISASTROUS NETHERLANDS CAMPAIGN

THE French Revolution resulted in something more than anarchy for France, for when she declared herself a republic, her Government, such as it was, proclaimed itself "the enemy of monarchies at large." France was at war, even while the Reign of Terror was in full operation, with various Powers in Europe. Pitt, the great War Minister, determined if it were possible that England should remain neutral. He was anxious for "peaceful recuperation, and commercial development" after such an exhausting period of war, as of late. The French Convention, however, forced his hand by its revolutionary intrigues. When news came that Louis XVI had been executed, the French Ambassador was ordered to leave the country. The response was instant and expected, for the French Convention declared war against England and Holland on February 1st, 1793.

The British army was immediately augmented by 25,000 men, a great number of whom were raised by forming one hundred independent companies of one hundred men each, and drafting them into separate battalions.<sup>1</sup> Troops were at once sent over to Holland, but, before long, in spite of the first disasters to French arms, the patriotism of France rose to so high a level

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue.

that an army of a million men was in the field. When the campaign of 1793 came to an end the achievements of the Allies were by no means satisfactory.

1794. The campaign of 1794 brought the 33rd into the fighting. It was memorable, moreover, because it brought a young officer into the regiment, who added lustre to the English army, and ultimately became Duke of Wellington. The rapidity of Arthur Wellesley's promotion was remarkable. He was an ensign in the 41st when he was seventeen years old, joining the regiment on the 7th of March, 1787. On the 26th of that same month he was a lieutenant; on the 30th of June, 1791, he was promoted to a captaincy; on the 30th of April, 1793, he joined the 33rd as Major; that same year, on September 30th, he was Lieut.-Colonel of the regiment, and remained in his command (as Colonel on May 3rd, 1796) until the year 1802, when he was advanced to the rank of Major-General.

Yet up to the time when the 33rd were sent to Flanders Wellesley had seen no active service, and his qualities as a soldier in war time had to be proved. It has even been said that his habits just then were scarcely such as to give much promise of future greatness.

The 33rd had been detailed for the expedition which the English Government had contemplated sending to Brittany under the command of the Earl of Moira, to create a diversion for the French Royalists; but the serious aspect of affairs in the Netherlands brought about the abandonment of that enterprise, and the regiment was sent over to reinforce the Duke of York.

The 33rd were then at Cork, but Wellesley, now their Lieut.-Colonel, embarked towards the end of May, and sailed to Ostend, but not in time to take part in the opening of the campaign. Matters were more serious than any of the newly-arriving regiments anticipated, for the situation of the Allies was deplorable in the extreme. "The incapacity of their leaders—the absence of all good understanding among them—

selves—the inadequacy of their resources in men, money, and material—and last, though not least, the slender support afforded by the Belgians, among whom revolutionary principles had already struck root, entirely cripples them in their operations.”<sup>1</sup> The news which came was gloomy in the extreme. The Duke of York had been driven back from Oudenarde, and was retiring along the Scheldt.

The prospect before the 33rd, when landing at Ostend on the 25th of June with a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, was anything but assuring, for in addition to this news of the Duke's retreat came the startling tidings that a French army of several thousands was within four miles of Ostend, and that the garrison of the place was actually embarking, thus abandoning the town to the enemy. Wellesley, pursuant to his orders, disembarked, and the Earl of Moira arrived the following morning with his command, namely, the 3rd, 19th, 37th, 28th, 40th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th, 63rd, 87th, and 89th. It was no surprise that the Commandant had decided to withdraw his garrison in view of the worthless state of the defences, and seek to make junction with York's army.

The march was undertaken in torrential rains, with the French troops in the rear. There was fighting at Alost, where the troops beat off their pursuers. Moira had relied on the support of the Austrians, but these would not face the enemy, and he was left to find his way alone. By a skilful march he reached Ghent.

When Moira's force joined the Duke he was continuing his retreat. The Austrians had practically abandoned him in face of the approach of the French army under Jourdan. The Duke of York, with his left uncovered in consequence, crossed the river at Malines. Fighting was going on when the 33rd arrived with Moira, and the timely reinforcements enabled the Duke to defeat Jourdan. There was an army of 150,000 Frenchmen almost within striking

<sup>1</sup> “Memoirs of the Duke of Wellington” (Gleig).

distance, and the Duke accordingly retreated to Antwerp, which he intended to hold against the enemy. His plans, however, were shamefully frustrated for, giving no warning, the Austrians retreated, leaving the English and Dutch exposed on their left flank.

The composition of the English army was an amazing one at the time. Among the veterans of the various regiments raw recruits were intermixed, who were absolutely ignorant of a soldier's duties ; so ignorant, indeed, that Fortescue quotes one of the generals as saying, " Many of them do not know one end of a firelock from the other, and will never know it." To make matters worse, the 33rd and five other battalions had been deprived of their flank companies, who were serving with Grey in the West Indies.<sup>1</sup> Two of the most capable commanders, Moira and Crosbie, had returned to England.

The army was brigaded as follows :

#### INFANTRY

First Brigade :	3rd, 88th, 63rd.
Second Brigade :	8th, 44th, 33rd.
Third Brigade :	12th, 55th, 36th.
Fourth Brigade :	14th, 53rd, 37th.
Fifth Brigade :	19th, 54th, 42nd.
Sixth Brigade :	27th, 89th, 38th.
Seventh Brigade :	40th, 59th, 67th, 87th.

York's whole army, with cavalry, and artillery, Hanoverians, and Hessians, together with the other foreign troops, namely Loyal Emigrants, York Rangers, and Rohan's Regiment, numbered 1,300 officers and 40,000 N.C.O.'s and men. But, to quote Fortescue on this point, " The commanders of the new Battalions who had been juggled into seniority by the Government and the army-brokers, were not fit to command a company, much less a brigade." Had they all been Wellesleys, well and good ; but

<sup>1</sup> Fortescue. See, also, Chapter XV.

there was only one such as he, and the others were a long way behind. The state of the army was highly unsatisfactory. There were a want of discipline, deficiency of equipment, and incapable Brigade commanders. What, then, could the Duke of York do with such an army when the enemy were within striking distance in the proportion of three to one? One of the most fortunate things going was, that the Committee in Paris hampered the French generals with endless restrictions, and constantly-recurring countermanding orders, interfering with the swift decision necessary at the moment.

York felt it necessary to retire from Antwerp into Holland. This was in September. The Duke was informed of a movement of the French on Bortel, which would seriously interfere with his retirement. An action ensued, memorable as the first occasion on which Wellesley, commanding the 33rd, found himself under fire.

On a close reconnaissance being made early on the 15th of September, the French appeared so formidably posted as to induce the English commander to suspend his order for attack until the receipt of further instructions from the Duke, who returned answer that he was to move forward immediately, but at the same time he left all ulterior operations to Abercromby's discretion.

On the clearing village of Schyndel, the mounted pickets of the enemy could be seen, drawn up on a plain of considerable extent, skirted by a thick grove of fir trees. The English cavalry were ordered to advance and drive them back, being supported by the second battalion of Guards, the 33rd and 44th, the two remaining regiments being held in reserve. The enemy's horse retired leisurely, whereupon Abercromby advanced boldly, until the opening of a heavy fire from a masked battery in the fir wood betrayed the immediate presence of the enemy in force. The British regiments were compelled, in consequence, to fall back on their reserve.



At first this retrograde movement was steadily effected, but as the ground became more difficult, and the road narrowed, the cavalry became mixed up with one of the Guards' battalions, the whole being thrown into confusion. The French cavalry saw their opportunity and advanced to charge. Colonel Wellesley grasped the consequences; whereupon he deployed the 33rd into line immediately in rear of the Guards, and opening his centre files, allowed the broken cavalry and disordered infantry to retire. Closing up his ranks he again occupied the road, and held the enemy in check.

The French advanced with their usual confidence, and the 33rd, reserving their fire, waited with coolness until the enemy were forming for a charge. At that moment the 33rd were ordered to fire, and delivered a close and searching volley with murderous effect on the crowded ranks of the attackers. Unable to withstand the well-directed fusilade which the regiment maintained, the enemy fell back in confusion. The regiment lost a sergeant and a private in this fine stand which undoubtedly saved Abercromby's force from disaster. That day's fight at Bostel secured for Wellesley the command of a brigade.<sup>1</sup>

The campaign proceeded, generally in favour of the enemy, who secured several fortresses in quick succession. The Duke of York, indifferently seconded by the Austrians and the Dutch, was compelled to retire, and by the end of September he occupied one bank of the Maas, the French being on the other. So serious was the position on the approach of winter that at the end of November the Duke of York left the army for London, in order to confer with the Ministry. The bad faith of his allies had filled him with such concern that suspecting treachery on the part of the Austrians and Dutch alike, he contemplated advising the Ministry to withdraw the English troops.

The condition of the army was deplorable in the

<sup>1</sup> Collected Notes.

extreme, due to the reprehensible neglect of Dundas, who, anxious to economise, reduced the supplies to the lowest limit. The winter was bitterly cold; yet the men were barely clothed. "Sheer nakedness" is the term which has been used to describe a ragged, almost barefooted, half-starved army, who in the fiercest winter known within living memory, were housed in open barns. The sick list assumed such alarming proportions that on the day when the Duke left for London, November the 20th, the number was returned at 11,000, and for these the barest necessities were wanting.

The only redeeming feature in the situation was, that the French had gone into winter quarters, and thus the Allies might expect to be able to recuperate in readiness for the spring campaign. The cold was so intense that the river froze so hard that it would bear the passage of an army of its artillery. Unexpectedly the enemy crossed the frozen river, and surprising the Dutch, drove them off in confusion, almost amounting to panic, and threatened Tuil. The Commander-in-Chief ordered ten battalions and six squadrons to oppose the French. The 33rd were in the fight, losing two men, but the enemy were driven back across the river with heavy loss, four of their guns being abandoned. This was on December the 30th. To check the further advance of the French, a wing of the 33rd, a squadron of Hussars, and two field pieces were posted under the command of Wellesley at Meteren.

On the afternoon of the 4th of January, 1795, the enemy advanced on Meteren in such force that Wellesley decided to retire instead of giving battle. He had, however, to fight, for the French came on with such impetuosity that he lost his guns. The 33rd charged with such gallantry against overwhelming odds that the guns were recaptured, and a fighting retreat maintained. At Geldermalsen a stand was made; the 42nd and 78th Highlanders reinforced the hard-pressed little force, and in spite of persistent

1795.

efforts to capture the place, the enemy were repulsed with heavy loss, just as darkness set in.

General Walmoden, the Commander-in-Chief during York's absence, found it necessary to retire behind Leck, taking a position there from Wageningen to Cuylenberg. The rear-guard, consisting of the 33rd and two other regiments, was in contact with the enemy through that arduous retreat, when the snow was thick on the ground, and the enemy resolute in pursuit. The march was commenced on the 16th of January, and "the days that followed are amongst the most tragical in the history of the army." Oppressed with cold, almost unexampled in Central Europe, the army made long and rapid marches, going on through the dark nights, on broken roads, with an unfriendly population along the line of route, and almost destitute both of *matériel* and provisions. Fortescue pictures the scene in words that go far to tell the horror of that retreat.

"Far as the eye could reach over the whitened plain were scattered gun-limbers, waggons full of baggage, stores, or sick men, sutlers : carts and private carriages. Beside them lay the horses, dead ; around them scores and hundreds of soldiers, dead ; here a straggler who had staggered on towards the bivouac and dropped to sleep in the arms of the frost ; there a group of British and Germans round an empty rum cask ; here forty Englishmen huddled about a plundered waggon ; there a packhorse with a woman lying alongside it, a baby, swaddled in rags, peeping out of the pack, with its mother's milk turned to ice upon its lips—one and all stark, frozen dead. Had the retreat lasted but three or four days longer, not a man would have escaped ; and the catastrophe would have found a place in history side by side with the destruction of the Army of Sennacherib, and with the still more terrible disaster of the retreat from Moscow."

The Allies reached Devinter on the 27th, and a halt was found to be absolutely necessary. But the French were coming on by forced marches, 50,000 strong, so

that only two days could be allowed for rest. During the whole of the retreat the French clung to the wasting columns with the fiercest pertinacity, eagerly seizing every opportunity to bring them into action. The task for the 33rd and the other regiments of the rear-guard was an arduous one. They suffered as much as any, and yet with Wellesley to command them, they "always presented a steady attitude when overtaken that averted an attack, or ended in the repulse of the assailants."<sup>1</sup>

The fearful losses of that retreat can be conceived when one recalls what Walmoden wrote to the Duke of York: "Your army is destroyed; the officers and their carriages, and a large train are safe, but the men are destroyed. The army has now no more than six thousand fighting men, but it has all the drawbacks of thirty-three battalions, and consumes a vast quantity of forage." One can imagine the condition of the 33rd—the soldiers who had to tramp day and night through snow that was ankle-deep, fighting all the way.

With the knowledge of this disastrous march and the Duke of York's representations, the Ministers in England were slow to come to a decision. It was finally resolved to withdraw the army, and on March the 11th, Harcourt, who commanded the British troops, was informed that transports were on the way to enable him to withdraw from the Netherlands. Thousands of the sick had fallen into the hands of the enemy; some, however, were recovered, so that when Harcourt took his troops to Bremen, to which place the transports had been ordered, the total of the men who embarked barely numbered 15,000.

It was early in May when the 33rd landed at Harwich, going into camp at Warley. Wellesley lost no time in recruiting his regiment, and before long he reported it as being again effective. The regiment, however, was likely to lose its Colonel, for in this interim

<sup>1</sup> "Army and Navy," Notes.

Wellesley seriously contemplated leaving the army. He had asked for an appointment either at the Revenue or the Treasury Offices. What happened we do not know ; but in the following October Wellesley received orders to join an expedition which the Government was preparing to send against some of the French settlements in the West Indies.

The 33rd accordingly proceeded to Southampton, and embarked at Gosport with their Colonel, joining the fleet under the command of Admiral Christian. This was in October. Before the fleet had been long at sea the gales were so fierce that the Admiral had to put back, and it was found that the transports, when they reached Spithead, were in a disabled state, and the troops prostrated with seasickness. The 33rd  
1796. were disembarked at Lymington in February, 1796. The regiment, however, was still under orders for the West Indies, but eventually the Government, changing its plans, directed the regiment to march to Poole, and recruit in readiness for embarkation for the East Indies.

NOTE.—The recruiting of the depleted 33rd was a serious matter. Many of its junior subalterns received commissions without purchase.

# Seringapatam

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE ADVANCE ON SERINGAPATAM

**TIPPOO SAHIB**, Sultan of Mysore, who had succeeded his father, Hyder Ali, was inveterately hostile to the British Government in India. No prince in the East Indies was so formidable an enemy, for he was not only possessed of boundless wealth, but was able to bring an immense army into the field. 1796.

The spirit of the warlike Tippoo, combined with his implacable hatred for the English, would not brook a long-continued cessation of hostilities after he had lost nearly all that his father had acquired on the Malabar coast, and had been compelled to sign a humiliating treaty. Some suspected him of treachery, and looked forward to the day when he would once more measure his strength with the British in India. In time it became known that he was strengthening Seringapatam, his principal stronghold, while he was displaying the utmost activity in bringing his army up to full fighting strength. There was information which led the Government of India to believe that Tippoo had resolved to recover his lost dominions by force of arms. He was proceeding with the utmost secrecy, but the news filtered through, that he was equipped for war more formidably than at any previous time. It became known, moreover, that Napoleon was contemplating an invasion of India, and was negotiating with the Sultan. If any regarded this as mere surmise, all

doubt was dispelled when a letter was intercepted which ran in the following terms:

## FRENCH REPUBLIC

LIBERTY

EQUALITY

Head Quarters at Cairo, 7th Pluviso, 7th  
Year of The Republic, One and Indivisible.

Buonaparte, Member of the National  
Convention, General-in-Chief, to the Most  
Magnificent SULTAUN, our greatest Friend,  
TIPPOO SAIB,

You have already been informed of my arrival  
on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable  
and invincible army, full of the desire of  
delivering you from the iron yoke of England.

I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying  
to you the desire I have of being informed  
by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your  
political situation.

I could even wish you could send some intelligent  
Person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your  
Confidence, with whom I may confer.

May the Almighty increase your Power, and  
destroy your enemies.

BUONAPARTE.

The danger which threatened the British Empire  
in the East warranted the alarm of the Government,  
and that alarm was accentuated when the Governor-  
General awoke to the fact that the army of the  
Madras Presidency was so dispersed and ill-equipped  
that disaster might well follow if Tippoo resolved on  
an invasion. He found at the same time that it would  
take months to put the Presidency into anything like  
efficient defence. The smallness of the European  
army in India, moreover, led him to demand more

troops from England. Hence the order for the 33rd and other regiments to hold themselves in readiness for Indian service.

The 33rd embarked for the East Indies on the 12th of April, 1796, their first station being the Cape, where they would await further instructions. They started without their Colonel, for Wellesley was ill at the time. He overtook them, however, rejoining at Cape Town, having taken passage in a fast-sailing frigate. While there he assisted with the flank companies of the regiment in the capture of a Dutch East Indiaman in Saldanah Bay.

There was an inexplicable delay at Cape Town, for the regiment did not re-embark for India until November, in spite of the disquieting news which came of the movements of Tippoo, making war appear inevitable. It was known in March, before the 33rd left the Isle of Wight, that the Sultan had dispatched an embassy to Cabul, proposing to Zeman Shah to invade India, conquer Delhi, and join hands with him in destroying the British and Portuguese, as well as his inveterate enemies, the Mahrattas and the Nizam. Yet the Government at home kept the 33rd dawdling on the way, detaining them for months at this half-way station to the east.

The 33rd did not arrive at Calcutta until February, 1797. They were stronger than they had been since the regiment had gone through the disastrous war in America, for the full strength now was 985. On their arrival they found themselves detailed for an expedition to the Manillas, and the transports conveyed them as far on the way as Prince Edward's Island. Here a frigate overtook the slow-going convoy, and Wellesley, who was in command of the expedition, was ordered to return forthwith to India, where affairs had become so serious as to call for all available troops. By November the 33rd were once more in Calcutta.

The Governor-General was Lord Mornington, and Wellesley, his brother, who had seen that extraordinary



letter from Napoleon, wrote to him concerning it. "In my opinion," he said, "if it be possible to adopt a line of conduct which would not lead immediately to war, provided it can be done with honour, which I think indispensable in this government, it ought to be adopted in preference to that proposed in the conversations. . . . Let the proclamation be sent to Tippoo with a demand that he should explain it, and the landing of the troops (from Mauritius). Don't give him reason to suppose that we imagine he has concluded an alliance with the objects stated in the proclamation; and finding he has derived so little benefit from the alliance, there is every probability that he will deny the whole, and be glad of an opportunity of getting out of the scrape.<sup>1</sup> In the meantime, we shall believe as much as we please, and shall be prepared against all events."

1798. There were other troubles which induced the Colonel of the 33rd to suggest a peaceable solution if possible. A Frenchman named Raymond had taken service under the Nizam of Hyderabad, within whose territories he raised a *corps d'armée* of 14,000 men, whom he disciplined on the European model, and officered with his countrymen. He assumed the tricolour flag, hoisted the national cockade, and called himself a Republican. He died, but the army existed, and the question arose as to whether the Nizam would enter an alliance with Tippoo. To keep him friendly with the English he would have to be assured that he would be safe from Tippoo, whose dominions almost encircled his own, and he must receive adequate reward for his fidelity.<sup>2</sup>

The 33rd were kept waiting while these matters were being seriously attended to, and Wellesley, meanwhile, was making suggestions to the Council which were recognised as of supreme value. War in face of such fearful possibilities could not be entered on lightly,

<sup>1</sup> The French had only sent 150 men to Tippoo.

<sup>2</sup> Brialmont: "Life of Wellington."

for what could be expected in view of a possible upheaval of a hundred million Asiatics, when Lord Mornington could only bring some 30,000 European troops into the field, to deal with disturbances over an enormous area ? Yet it was realised that it would be disastrous to display anything like a wavering and indecisive policy, where a prince like Tippoo was concerned. The Nizam was quietly secured on Wellesley's proposal ; for five or six thousand men with artillery were lent to him to enable him, while he got rid of the French, to hold his dominions against his enemies.

When this had been effected, the Governor-General was in a position to deal with Tippoo. The Sultan was challenged. Lord Mornington demanded an explanation of Napoleon's letter, but no answer came. The 33rd at this time had proceeded to Madras, arriving at the end of September, being quartered at Fort St. George. While Wellesley was there with his regiment, Lord Mornington proposed that he should proceed to Tippoo's court as envoy, but when the Sultan refused to entertain the idea of receiving an English ambassador, Wellesley remained at Fort St. George, spending his time in bringing the 33rd up to the finest point of efficiency. He also mapped out a campaign, and superintended the preparations for war if it were proved unavoidable. He urged upon Lord Mornington, by a series of letters, that the contest ought to be one of a single campaign ; that the army, strengthened from every available quarter, should march direct upon Seringapatam ; and that to ensure success in so bold an enterprise, it should be ready to take the field on the 20th of January, at the latest. He showed how troops might be drawn from Ceylon ; how the Bengal Marine battalion might be converted into a regiment 2,000 strong ; how a second Marine regiment might be created "by changing the Calcutta militia into that description of force" ; and how brigades and divisions might be posted, so as at once to guard against molestation from without, and

to be in readiness, should the occasion arise, to move concentrically on Mysore.<sup>1</sup> Nothing was passed by ; and all other details were carefully provided for in his scheme.

1799. Tippoo became insolent. He also made enemies, for he so grossly offended the Nizam by claiming some of his territory, and one of his forts, that the prince became hostile, and declared his readiness to co-operate with the English. The Mahrattas, by judicious overtures, threw in their lot with the Government. War was inevitable, and since Wellesley's senior was killed in a duel, the young Colonel assumed the temporary command until the general should arrive at Madras. When Harris came in February, 1799, he found "one of the best organised and disciplined armies ready to receive him that had ever taken the field in India."

The Nizam's contingent joined the Army of the Carnatic. This comprised 6,000 men of the English subsidiary force, and 10,000 sepoys enlisted out of the corps which Raymond had trained with such assiduity. This alone was a fine fighting force, and a splendid addition to Harris's army of 20,000 men. The command was given to Wellesley, who asked for his own regiment, the 33rd, to serve with him. Major Shee took the direct command of the regiment.

An army under the command of General Stuart was ordered to move on from Bombay—the Army of the West ; and the marches were so timed that Stuart should move on to Sedaseer, a post which overlooks Mysore, and advance to meet Harris at Seringapatam. Stuart's care, while at Sedaseer, was to protect the large supplies of grain and other necessities which had been collected at Verajunderpet, in the Coorga district. Stuart's force was made up of 1,600 Europeans, and 4,800 native troops ; 4,000 men under Colonel Read were to move up from the Southern Carnatic to support this corps, and 5,000, commanded by Colonel Brown, from Barramahl, for the support of Harris.

<sup>1</sup> Brialmont : "Wellington."

Tippoo was taken by surprise. He had no idea that Harris was moving until he heard that the army was actually in Mysore, and had seized some forts on the frontier, on the 5th and 6th of March. He had been anticipating the arrival of troops from France and from Scindia, but was left without this aid. But even thus he had an army of 70,000 troops which fell back to concentrate at Seringapatam. Shah Zeman had advanced with a large army to co-operate with him, and he meant to wait for it, but the Shah had suddenly to retreat, news having come to him that his territories were being invaded by Persia.

On the 10th of March, Harris moved on from Kelamungalum, the enemy still in sight, but always falling back as the English advanced. Tippoo, finding that Seringapatam was Harris's objective, left some of the troops to harass the advance, and with the bulk of his army, encamped at his great stronghold, there to receive the oncoming forces. Here, however, he turned his attention to Stuart, and took with him 11,000 men to oppose his advance; but he was badly defeated, losing 1,500 men, while Stuart's losses amounted to 143 killed and wounded. This defeat so startled Tippoo, that he retreated to his camp, from whence, for several days, he seemed reluctant to move.

Meanwhile Harris was moving on, more slowly than he hoped for, owing to an alarming mortality among the baggage bullocks. Fortunately Tippoo kept within his camp, so that Harris suffered no molestation while contending with his baggage difficulties beyond having to beat off large bodies of Mysorean horse which dealt with the advance corps of his army.

On the 21st of March Harris encamped at Cankanelli. The progress for the last five days had been through country confined by hills and forest, so that the army had marched and encamped in three divisions. The cavalry and left wing were in advance. The right wing formed the centre. The division under Wellesley's command was in the rear. "This arrange-

ment became necessary on account of several defiles which it would have been impossible to pass in one day with so numerous an army, including cattle and followers, if the whole had marched at the same time ; but as it was now ascertained that Tippoo Sultan had approached within fifteen miles, the Commander-in-Chief judged it proper to make an alteration in the order of march and encampment. The several columns were therefore united ; the whole army, with the battering train, took up its position at Cankanelli, and Colonel Wellesley, with the Nizam's contingent, encamped at a little distance in the rear."<sup>1</sup>

On the 27th of March the army moved from its left flank on the great road leading to Mallavelly. Colonel Wellesley's division with the Nizam's contingent marched parallel at some distance to the left, covering the baggage, and ready for whatever might occur.\* Before long the enemy were discovered, the infantry on the heights beyond Mallavelly, and a great body of cavalry on the right flank. Guns were seen moving towards Tippoo's right where a ridge flanked the low ground. These guns would sweep it ; consequently, the general decided on an instant attack. Wellesley's division was to engage the enemy's right flank, five regiments of Floyd's cavalry were ordered to form on the left to support him, and the picquets, supported by the right wing of the army, were to penetrate the village towards the enemy's centre. The left wing and the rear-guard were to remain at the fort and village to protect the baggage and the battering train.

As Wellesley advanced the enemy's guns were withdrawn to another ridge, and there was every indication that the Sultan's army was falling back, and declining action. Wellesley, however, did not halt, and then it was seen that Tippoo meant to fight. He attacked both flanks simultaneously, but personally he delivered his main attack on Wellesley with his cavalry. The

<sup>1</sup> Beatson : " War in Mysore."    <sup>2</sup> Ibid.

charge was so fierce that many of the cavalymen fell on the bayonets. Wellesley continued to advance, but before long the enemy came on resolutely, 10,000 strong, against the 33rd, until, when they were but sixty yards distant, the regiment poured in some volleys, then charged with the bayonet and threw them into confusion. Floyd, seeing his opportunity, charged with the 19th Dragoons, and the 1st and 3rd regiments of Native Cavalry, with such impetuosity that scarcely a man escaped. The advance of our army continuing, Tippoo showed signs of making a stand, but his lines being driven in, he retreated, in fear of a pursuit, which Harris decided against since no advantage was to be gained.

Tippoo was obsessed with the idea that Harris would take the same road which Cornwallis took in 1791, and accordingly he moved towards it to bar the path. Harris, however, did not advance in that direction, and Tippoo waited in vain, only to hear later that the Commander-in-Chief had taken quite another road, had crossed the Cauvery at Sosilay, fifteen miles east of Seringapatam, and was marching on the stronghold with nothing to hinder him. Arriving at the fort of Sosilay, Harris gained possession of 15,000 head of cattle and a great number of sheep and goats, so that the provisioning of the army was assured.

The right wing of Harris's army, Wellesley's division, and the cavalry encamped on the north side of the Cauvery, while the left wing crossed the river at one of the fords. On the 5th of April Harris was only two miles away from Seringapatam, on its western side. His army had marched by the left, keeping under the ridges to the south and westward of Sultanpettah, in order to avoid the topes (or groves) which afforded cover for the enemy's rocket-men, and from whence a number of rockets were thrown without effect. After a short march the army took position opposite the west face of the fort at a distance of 3,500 yards. The left of the line was placed near the Cauvery ; on

the right was encamped, *en potence*, the Nizam's contingent, and in the rear of both were the cavalry and the Nizam's horse facing westward.<sup>1</sup> In their front was a chain of advanced posts on high ground, occupied chiefly by the Nizam's infantry, commanded by British officers. This position of the army before Seringapatam was an exceedingly strong one. Fronting the east, the right of the camp was on high commanding ground, whence it gradually descended to the left flank, which was doubly secured by an aqueduct, and by the river Cauvery.<sup>2</sup> The aqueduct afforded the army good water, and at the same time served as a strong entrenchment.

Some hard fighting began for the 33rd on the night of April 5th. The Sultan had established an entrenched line of defence in front of the north-east angle of Seringapatam. This line ran off for about two miles from a woody hollow close to the river, known as the Sultan's Pettah. It formed the key of the position, and was held by 20,000 of the enemy. Orders were given to the 12th and 33rd to make a combined attack in the night. The 12th were to capture the posts at the aqueduct, the 33rd were to clear the Sultanpettah tope in order to create a diversion.

The difficulties were great owing to the intense darkness of the night, but the 12th succeeded in capturing a village close to the aqueduct, and holding it. The 33rd, however, were met by a murderous fire the moment they entered the Sultanpettah tope, and an officer—Lieutenant FitzGerald—was killed at the outset, and several men fell. Confusion followed in the darkness, none knowing which way to turn, nor anything of the enemy's position. All that Wellesley and the 33rd could do was to retire, but reaching an embankment which afforded shelter, they remained there for the night. Unfortunately twelve men lost their

<sup>1</sup> See Biddulph : "The XIXth and their Times."

<sup>2</sup> Beatson.

way, and fell into the hands of the enemy. They were taken into Seringapatam, and after being kept prisoners for several days, were foully murdered. The account given of their death shows a fearful ingenuity in cruelty. Some were killed by twisting their heads and thus breaking their necks, their bodies at the same time being held fast ; others had nails driven into their skulls.

One is not surprised to hear of Wellesley's mortification at his failure. He wrote concerning this, that he had come to the determination " never to suffer an attack to be made by night upon an enemy who is prepared and strongly posted, and whose posts have not been reconnoitred by daylight." He had the opportunity of wiping out his reverse the next morning. The 33rd were to advance to attack the Sultanpettah tope, the 12th were to quit the ruined village they had captured in the night, while the grenadiers of the 74th, and two companies of Sepoys were to attack a village on the enemy's right flank. Wellesley commanded in this engagement, and the attack was made with such irresistible impulse that the enemy retired in something approaching panic. By this success, wherein the 33rd so gallantly retrieved the reverse of the preceding night, the English army secured a strong connected line of posts, extending from the river to Sultanpettah, a distance of two miles.<sup>1</sup>

A memorandum was made of the attack in the wood of Sultanpettah by Captain John Chetwood of the 33rd, which gives an interesting account of what proved to be such a sanguinary fight. It runs as follows :

" On the morning of this day (April 5th, 1799), the 33rd Regiment was paraded as usual, soon after dismissed, and ordered to be in readiness to fall in again at the shortest notice. At about seven the same evening we again stood to our arms and proceeded with Colonel Wellesley in the utmost silence towards a wood close to the village of Sultanpettah. As soon as the

<sup>1</sup> Beatson. Wilson. Brialmont.



33rd Regiment arrived near the post to be attacked, Colonel Wellesley called the officers together and informed them of his intention to proceed immediately with five companies, to attack the enemy, whilst the remaining five were to remain outside the wood to sustain the attack, should their assistance be thought requisite. He gave orders to the officers in command of companies, to warn their men, not on any account to prime and load, but to use their bayonets. The grenadiers, however, were excepted. They were to commence a running fire in order to draw off the attention of the enemy. He then concluded by saying that the countersign was 'India.'

"Our little party proceeded very quietly along the bank of a deep and dry ditch which bounded the wood on our side, not imagining that the enemy was drawn up in great force on the opposite side, waiting our arrival, and screened from our view by a very thick aloe hedge. There was also a body of the enemy posted in our front, behind some houses, and we got into the midst of them without knowing it, and exposed to their cross-fire, which commenced by signal, as we perceived a light held up high; upon which signal 2,000 of Tippoo's best troops received us with a warm but ill-directed fire of musketry.

"A momentary confusion arose, but the officers encouraged the men both by word and action, for with three hurrahs we leaped into the ditch, got through the hedge, and drove the enemy before us.

"At this time we lost our commander, Colonel Wellesley, who with many others, missed their way in the extreme darkness of the night, owing in a great measure to the necessity of dividing our force as much as possible in order the more effectually to clear the wood of the enemy. We soon after met Captain Cosby, D.A.G. to the Nizam's Detachment, to whom a representation was made of our situation, and the great improbability there was of our being able to keep possession of the position against such numbers, who

would no doubt face about and re-occupy their position—which they did before morning.

“Captain Cosby requested that the men should form outside the wood, and wait till circumstances should determine our future movements; he, in the meantime, sent out men in various directions, to find, if possible, what direction Colonel Wellesley had taken. Those men fell in with our reserve, consisting of five companies of the 33rd under Colonel Shee, and one battalion of Sepoys with two light guns, the whole under the immediate command of Colonel Grant.

“We wandered about before meeting our friends, and directing our steps towards the flashes of musketry, by which the whole horizon was illumined. Colonel Grant ordered the whole party to move to their left, and join Colonel Shaw, who commanded a different attack. We shortly met Colonel Shaw with the 12th Regiment and a Sepoy Corps. They had not suffered much loss.

“It may not be uninteresting to mention the misfortune of two officers of the 12th Regiment. Captain Nixon and his brother, a lieutenant, were both in this affair, and as the regiment was moving along in column of sections, a fatal rocket was thrown by the enemy which struck Captain Nixon on both legs, and killed his brother almost instantly. He expired soon after he was put into his bed. The action was now suspended till break of day.

“In the meantime Colonel Shaw ordered the 33rd to return to camp, and at daylight Colonel Wellesley was sent down with a fresh detachment to occupy the wood from which we drove the enemy the night before. He carried the post without much opposition or losing any men. Tippoo lost one of his best generals who, on seeing Colonel Wellesley advancing to the attack, instantly charged with a party of cavalry, who but ill supported their intrepid commander. He fell, pierced with several musket balls. Our loss was trifling; one officer, Lieutenant Fitzgerald, killed, and fourteen

wounded, some of whom were taken prisoners and afterwards hanged by Tippoo, because they refused to work at his artillery while pointed towards their brother soldiers."

After this unfortunate experience the 33rd had a short and needed rest; but in the meantime the Commander-in-Chief was anxiously turning his attention to the coming of Stuart. General Floyd marched out that morning (April 6th) with the greater part of the left wing of Harris's army, and four regiments of cavalry to gain touch with Stuart's Bombay Army, and accompany them to Seringapatam. Stuart was at Peripatam, strong and competent, but encumbered with baggage, unable to move forward quickly, owing to the mortality among his bullocks. Tippoo sent out a force to drive Floyd back, but the attempt failed, for Floyd continued his advance, and joined Stuart on April 8th. On the 10th the two forces were united and in the evening of the 14th the Bombay Army was in front of Seringapatam, able to co-operate with Harris in his determination to inflict a deadly blow on Tippoo Sahib.

So far as numbers were concerned Harris was in a strong position; but he was alarmed two days later to discover a serious shortage of food. In a letter to the Governor-General he said: "On measuring the bags to ascertain what rice they really contained, they were found so much diminished by loss or fraud, that 18 days' provision for the fighting men, at half allowance, is all that remains in camp. Our supplies must, therefore, arrive before the 6th of May, to save us from extreme distress." The cavalry were, however, constantly active, and brought in convoys, and by the 6th of May the subsistence of the army for some time to come was assured.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE CAPTURE OF SERINGAPATAM

**STRENGTHENED** by the arrival of Stuart's army, Harris 1799.  
felt himself able to deliver his attack on Seringapatam. Alarmed at the growing strength of the besieging army round his stronghold, Tippoo sued for peace, but the terms offered were such that he rejected them with disdain, since they included the cession of half his dominions, and the payment of £200,000 towards the expenses of the war.

Meanwhile, in spite of Tippoo's endeavour to gain time, the siege operations were pursued vigorously, and the approaches constantly advanced. On the 25th of April a strong battery was constructed to destroy the defences of some works causing great damage to the troops, and on the following day the battery opened fire and silenced the enemy's guns. That evening (the 26th), Wellesley directed some attacks on the enemy's entrenchments, and carried them. By the morning of the 27th, after a night's fighting, the ground was gained for the breaching batteries. During the night of the 28th another breaching battery was traced, to be used with disastrous effect against the enemy a day or two later. There was not a day and scarcely an hour, in which something was not done to show Tippoo how completely he was doomed. Batteries were erected unceasingly, the soldiers working night and day. By the 2nd of May the Nizam's last battery was completed, and all was in readiness for a simultaneous fire.

When the batteries opened with 26 cannon and 6 howitzers, a practicable breach was made in the

*fausse braye*, and the main rampart shattered. At the outset of this terrific bombardment an explosion occurred in a magazine of rockets in the fort. A daring feat was performed by Lieutenant Lalor, of the 73rd. In the night he crossed the river to examine the retaining wall. On his return he reported the height of it to be "seven feet, including 12 inches of water, and that there was no impediment of any kind to the passage of troops."

At noon on the 3rd of May, the breach being practicable, every preparation was made for the assault. Major-General Baird was chosen to command the troops composing the assaulting columns. Long before daylight the troops were in the trenches, waiting for the order to advance; but the hours passed without a forward movement. The men had been sent to their posts early, so that the movement should not be observed. Harris had determined to wait until the heat of the day, when "the people of the East, having taken their midday repast, give themselves up to a season of repose, and when it was expected that their troops would be least prepared to resist."

The assaulting columns were thus composed :

**LEFT COLUMN**—to assault the northern rampart—  
Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop.

12th, 33rd, 6 companies of European Flankers from the Bombay Army, 10 companies of Bengal Sepoy Flankers, and 50 Artillerymen.

**RIGHT COLUMN**—to attack the southern rampart—  
Commander, Colonel Sherbrook.

73rd, 74th, 8 companies Coast Sepoy Flankers, 6 companies Bombay Sepoy Flankers and 50 Artillerymen.

**RESERVE**—Commander, Colonel Wellesley.

The Regiment de Meuron, and 4 battalions Madras Sepoys.

The two columns were to advance simultaneously, the hour chosen being one o'clock, and on coming to the top of the breach they were to wheel, Dunlop to the left, and Sherbrook to the right, respectively. They numbered in all 2,494 Europeans and 1,882 natives, not counting sergeants, havildars, or officers. These being added made the total Europeans 2,862 and 2,003 natives. The 33rd's contribution to this storming party was a lieutenant-colonel, a major, 3 captains, a captain-lieutenant, 11 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, an adjutant, a surgeon, 2 assistant surgeons, 36 sergeants, 13 drummers, and 413 rank and file.

The moment so impatiently waited for, arrived, and Baird gave the order to advance. Every man sprang forward, regardless of the excessive heat, and heedless of the prospect of deadly combat, all burning to avenge the cruelties which Tippoo Sultan had shown their comrades who had recently fallen into his hands. Before them lay a broad river, waist deep, which must be crossed before the fort could be reached. As they plunged into it they were beset by a formidable fire from the walls. As the men climbed the bank the fire from the walls and the breach grew hotter, and the storm of shot which swept the ground between the river and the fort at this point was sufficient to appal the bravest troops. Yet they did not falter when Baird led the way across the ditch. Men fell at every step, but their comrades continued to advance, eager to cover the space which intervened, and to reach the breach where they could come into close fighting with the defenders.

The breach itself, a hundred feet wide, was held by Tippoo's troops, ready to hurl back this small force which ventured to force its way into a stronghold swarming with thousands of Tippoo's warriors. In six minutes from the time Baird called to his men he struck down his first man, and a moment later the soldiers were clearing the breach at the point of the bayonet. The attacking force was stayed in their

pursuit of the defenders who fell back by a wide and deep ditch filled with water, with a high cavalier at its angle for defence.

For a few moments it seemed as though the attack must fail because of this unexpected obstacle. There was no means of crossing until Captain Woodhall, of the 12th, caught up a plank, and threw it across the space ; then, passing over, he was followed by his men in single file. Yet it was so narrow and so dangerous that when the men saw it the next day they wondered that any soldier had ventured. But it was done, and the moment they reached the other end they were engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with Tippoo's men. None thought of things like these when, in the blazing fury of the moment, courage was called for, and honour was to be won, and comrades were to be avenged. Where the 33rd and 12th were opposed nothing could withstand their onslaught as they massed on the other side of the ditch. Led on by Dunlop, they wheeled to the left, as had been arranged, traversing the northern rampart, while Baird's Right Column turned in the opposite direction.

Seringapatam was stormed, but not yet won. Tippoo had been sitting at his midday meal when word was brought to him that the enemy were through the breach. He went at once to join in, just as the 33rd and their comrades gained the ramparts, taking part in the fight himself like a common soldier. The progress of the attackers was continuous, despite outnumbering masses of defenders. The advance was resolutely made good until terror on the part of Tippoo's troops developed into panic, when some one cried out that the Sultan was among the dead in the dark archway. Then these turned and fled, and Seringapatam was won. The fugitives, however, met with a fearful fate. "Hemmed in between the outer and inner ditches, both of them broad and deep," they were slaughtered in the mass, shot down by soldiers who remembered how their comrades had

been done to death. It was the hour of vengeance, and none would hear of quarter.

The story told by an eye-witness, an officer who took part in the fight, runs to the effect that General Baird sent Major Allan to the palace with a flag of truce to promise protection to the Sultan in the reckless looting which followed, and over which the officers had little or no control, on condition of his surrender. On arriving at the palace, not knowing of Tippoo's death, "he found Major Shee, with part of His Majesty's 33rd regiment drawn up on the outside, and opposite to the gate; and several of Tippoo's people were in a front balcony, apparently in great consternation. In a short time, however, the Killedar, with an officer of consequence, and a confidential servant of the Sultan, descended by an unfinished part of the wall, and got into the palace; where, after some delays, they were received by two of the younger princes, to whom Major Allan gave the strongest assurances of protection; and to quiet their fears he promised to remain with them."

General Baird was loth to believe that the Sultan was not hidden away somewhere in the palace, but he went with the Killedar to the gateway where the Sultan was last seen. The place was filled with the dead, but the Sultan's body was found, and the assurance gained that the English were rid of their most formidable and implacable foe. The Sultan's sons were escorted to the camp by the light company of the 33rd.

The fall of Seringapatam brought immense booty to the victors; for all the treasure of the Sultan and his military stores were gathered there. General Harris found an arsenal with 451 brass guns in it, also 478 of iron, 520,000 pounds of gunpowder, 424,000 shot, and other war material in enormous quantity. There was booty in the way of jewels and gold to the value of 45,580,350 star pagodas, to say nothing of the plunder which fell into the hands of the soldiers who



entered the houses within the walls. Wellesley's view of this was the view, undoubtedly, of his contemporaries, for in a letter to his brother, the Governor-General, he said: "It was impossible to expect that after the labour which the troops had undergone in working up to the stronghold, and the various successes which they had had in six different affairs with Tippoo's troops, in all of which they had come to the bayonet with them, they should not have looked to the plunder of the place. Nothing, therefore, could have exceeded what was done on the night of the 4th. Scarcely a house in the town was left un plundered; and I understand that in the camp jewels of the greatest value, bars of gold, etc., etc., have been offered for sale in the bazaars of the army, by our soldiers, sepoy, and followers."

The prize money distributed amounted to £1,100,000, and in a document written at Cawnpore, and dated July 6th, 1799, the following occurs:

"I have this instant received a copy of the Distribution of the Seringapatam Prize Money. General Harris has something better than three lack of Pajodas, about £125,000. Floyd, 36,999 Paj. Other Generals, 25,000. Colonels a little more than 10,000. This is, however, only a first division; they are now in expectation of near as much more:

" Lieut.-Colonels	6,480
Majors	4,320
Captains	2,160
Subalterns	1,080
Sergeants	36
Privates, etc.	18
Sepoys, etc.	12 "

With all this came the estimate of the conduct of the troops, who merited the praise bestowed on them. It was realised that by their splendid courage and fine persistency they had achieved something "which has

never been surpassed in splendour, by any event recorded in the history of military transactions of the British nation in India. The fall of this capital placed the whole kingdom of Mysore, with all its resources, at the disposal of the British Government, and extinguished the only power in India, which was deemed formidable, or in any wise disposed to second the dangerous views of the French." When the news of the gallant conduct of the 33rd reached Lord Cornwallis, their Colonel, he wrote to Wellesley the following letter :

DUBLIN CASTLE,  
21st Sept., 1799.

DEAR SIR,

It has given me the greatest satisfaction to observe the distinguished share which you and Colonel Sherbrooke and the 33rd Regiment have had in the late glorious war against Tippoo Sultan, which reflects so much honour on our Councils and our Arms, and has secured on a permanent basis the British interests in India. I request that you will accept my sincere congratulations on this happy occasion, and that you will likewise convey them to Colonel Sherbrooke, and to the Officers and Soldiers of the Regiment, and assure the latter that I am happy to find that the same spirit exists in the Corps which I have so often witnessed when I had the honour to command them in the Field.

I am, with great regards,

Dear Sir, your most obedient  
and faithful servant,

CORNWALLIS.

The loss of the British in the march on Seringapatam and in the final assault was not a heavy one, Fortescue giving the numbers as follows :—Officers : killed, 22 ; 45 wounded. Europeans : killed, 181 ; missing, 22 ; wounded, 622. Natives : killed, 119 ; missing, 100 ; wounded, 420. The casualties in the

assault were 69 Europeans and 32 sepoy wounded, 4 Europeans and 2 sepoy missing. The loss of the 33rd was surprisingly small, for not merely in the assault on Seringapatam, in which they took so prominent a part, but in the days of the siege preceding, the casualties amounted to not more than 6 killed, and 28 wounded.

The utmost confusion reigned in Seringapatam after its capture, owing to the excesses of the troops. The Commander-in-Chief, realising that this must be ended, lest the city should be destroyed, or something like massacre might develop, appointed Wellesley Commandant of Seringapatam in the morning, and not an hour too soon. "The scent of a rich booty had for a time subverted discipline. Sepoy and soldiers thronged in from the camp, plundering was vigorously carried on, fires broke out, and the terrified inhabitants fled. Rule appeared to be at an end, unbridled license was seemingly triumphant, but Colonel Wellesley at once made strenuous efforts in the cause of order." He quartered the 33rd and 73rd Regiments within the palace, and furnished strong guards over the most important places in the city. Four men were executed before the iron will of the Commandant restored order. In doing so, however, he had so taxed the energies of his troops that on the 6th he wrote to General Harris :

"I shall be obliged if you will order an extra dram and biscuit for the 12th, 33rd, and 73rd, who got nothing to eat yesterday, and were wet last night."

Wellesley's vigorous action, seconded so ably by the three regiments, secured order, but only after hanging and flogging. By the end of the day he was able to send a message to the General in the following words : "Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be completed this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers." By the third day all

the shops and bazaars were opened, and the city resumed its normal appearance. Beatson says that the main street of Seringapatam, three days after the fort was taken, was so much crowded as to be almost impassable, and exhibited more the appearance of a fair than that of a town just taken by assault. But during those days all doubt as to the end of the twelve unfortunate prisoners from the ranks of the 33rd, who were missing after the fight at Sultanpettah, was removed, for a peon showed Wellesley where the men were buried.

The 33rd, the Scotch Brigade, afterwards the 94th Regiment, and three native battalions remained in Seringapatam with Wellesley, while the army proceeded to reduce the smaller fortresses in Mysore which held out against the British in spite of Tippoo's death. Later on the invading army dispersed, Mysore having been effectually reduced, and the conquered country settled. This was effected by the Partition Treaty.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE MAHRATTA WAR

1799. For their splendid service in this assault on Tippoo Sultan's capital, the 33rd received permission to emblazon the word "Seringapatam" on their colours; but the Government were in no hurry to show their appreciation of what this regiment and others had done towards maintaining the military splendour of the Empire. Seringapatam was taken in 1799; but not until the regiment was quartered at Nottingham did the intimation come, and that was *nineteen years later*; the Order bearing date, June 21st, 1818! By that time nearly the whole of the men who had played their part in that glorious effort which overwhelmed Tippoo with ruin were either dead or had left the 33rd, for when the Order from the Prince Regent was read on parade, there were only two soldiers in the regiment's ranks who wore the Seringapatam medal!

The close of active service in India found the 33rd with three battle honours—Dettingen, Hindostan, and Seringapatam; but the question might well have been asked—Why not something more than "Dettingen" for the honourable and thrilling experiences in Flanders?

Reverting to the service which followed during and after garrison duty at Seringapatam, the 33rd had much strenuous work to add to their record. Yet when one recalls these apparently petty services, it is well to read what Fortescue says regarding them when

detailing much that occurred in the years which followed the fall of Tippoo's capital. He says that "many such petty campaigns, of which no army has fought so many as the British, tax the nerve and ability of officers and the courage and endurance of their men as heavily as the high-sounding wars of which alone history takes notice. To ignore them would be to ignore some of the finest work ever done by British soldiers, and some of the grandest acts of individual heroism in the British or any other army."

The 33rd came from this so-called "petty" service into something more telling in the world's estimation. Harris had withdrawn his army into the Carnatic, and Wellesley was left in command in Mysore, keeping his regiment always with him. There was trouble, however, with an adventurer named Dhoondiah, who had been liberated when Tippoo's prisoners were set free. He lost no time in collecting the soldiers of the dead Sultan's disbanded army, and began to plunder some of the districts until Colonels Stevenson and Dalrymple drove him over the Mahratta frontier. The Mahrattas did not expel him. Perhaps being jealous of the increasing power of Tippoo's conquerors, they not only sheltered but abetted the freebooter. Dhoondiah gathered an immense army, and styling himself "King of the Two Worlds," declared his intention of driving the English out of India. This was in the spring of 1800.

Realising the necessity of crushing this chieftain at all hazards, Wellesley, having obtained the Governor-General's permission to march against him, gathered all his forces at Chitteldroog, on the Toombadra River, not far from Hurryhur. To the intense disappointment of the 33rd, they were held in reserve, while a large force was dispatched to crush the freebooter. If in any case Dhoondiah should come within reach, the 33rd were to head him off, or deal with him and his army of 40,000 men. The chieftain, however, gave the 33rd no chance of fighting, for he was caught up, 1800.

after a tremendous chase, at Conagul, his army beaten, himself killed, and his camp captured. The King of the Two Worlds was no longer a menace to the British.

It was not long before a greater trouble threatened. The Mahratta chiefs were a growing power in India, their influence extending over an enormous area north and west of the Nizam's Dominions, and along a great length of the frontier of Mysore, as far as the western shore of the Deccan. There were several of these chieftains, but some of them were powerful in themselves, apart from their association with the Mahratta Confederacy. One was Holkar, at Indore; others were the Gaekwar of Baroda, the Rajah of Kolapore, Scindia, the Rajah of Satara, and the Peishwa, whose enormous territory stretched westward from the frontier of the Nizam's Dominions to the Malabar Coast.

These chieftains were a formidable danger, inasmuch as they were within easy striking distance of Madras, Bombay, Hyderabad, Benares, and Calcutta. None were so formidable as Scindia, whose supremacy in the Confederacy was unquestioned; for he not only drew great revenues from his own territories, but received tribute from the Rajput States, "held Delhi with its pensioner monarch in the north," and "had a predominant voice in the Councils of the Poona Court"—that is to say, the Peishwa's capital—in the Deccan. Scindia, moreover, had a finely disciplined army commanded by Europeans. Holkar was scarcely less powerful, either in wealth or in fighting force.

In 1800 the interests of some of these chieftains conflicted seriously; with the result that Holkar, who had never been friendly with Scindia, invaded his territory at a time when he was distracted with his quarrels with others. Success fluctuated in the fighting which followed, until Holkar defeated both Scindia and the Peishwa. The latter had to fly and threw himself on the protection of the British Government,

with whom he made alliance for offence and defence 1802.  
in the so-called Treaty of Bassein, on the 31st of December.

This treaty filled Scindia with wrath, and he prepared for war, at the same time settling his differences with Holkar and the Rajah of Berar. Yet, when Wellesley, on behalf of the British Government, sent a copy to Scindia, and asked him whether he considered it hostile to his interests, and inimical to his rights, he told Colonel Collins, the British Resident, that the treaty contained no clause against which he could justly object, and that he would not obstruct the completion of its arrangements. In a few days, however, his army was marching towards the Nizam's frontier.

The English had no alternative but to move at once, in fulfilment of their treaty engagements. At the time—in February—the 33rd were in camp near French Rocks, under the command of Colonel Elliott. 1803.  
Scindia offered to break up his army if the British army withdrew, but Wellesley would not trust him, and Collins was told to leave Scindia's camp. That meant war.

Five companies of the 33rd were called to Hurryhur, where Wellesley was collecting his army of invasion. Next day the whole regiment assembled in camp, arriving on the 8th of March, and anticipating an active part in the invasion of Scindia's dominions. Wellesley was to lead the way, and he had earnestly proposed that his own regiment, to which he was much attached, should accompany the advancing division under his command, but circumstances prevented the desired arrangement. To their great disappointment they were left behind when Wellesley moved out of camp on the following day.

Included in a body of reserve under Major-General Campbell, five companies of the 33rd moved on to Moodgul, on the Kistnah River, about fourteen marches from Hyderabad, the force being thus made up :



	Euro- peans	Natives	Total
CAVALRY : 25th Dragoons, 1st and 2nd Regt. Native Cavalry	431	846	1,277
INFANTRY : 5 Companies 33rd and 7 Companies 80th Regt.	823	1,932	2,755
		<hr/> Total	<hr/> 4,032

The position chosen for this Reserve force enabled it to keep the Southern Mahratta Jagheerdars in check, and also to cover the British territories, while suppressing any disturbances that might be excited in consequence of what had just occurred, namely, the death of the Nizam.

While Wellesley was pursuing a victorious campaign, which resulted in Scindia suing for peace, the 33rd were left unemployed. Major-General Campbell received information in December that a large body of Pindarees, numbering 10,000 horsemen and peons, had crossed the Kistna at the Daroor Gaut, and were proceeding towards the Toombudra and the British frontier, intending to ravage the country and capture our convoys. Campbell at once moved out of camp with the cavalry and flank companies of the infantry. He surprised a party of predatory horse at daybreak, then resumed his march in the evening, taking the Pindarees wholly by surprise the following morning. His cavalry drove right into the centre of their camp almost before they were aware, with the result that in the fight 2,000 of the enemy were killed, 1,000 were wounded or taken prisoners, while the remainder threw down their arms and fled. The whole of the baggage and the bazaars, with 20,000 Brinjarry bullocks, fell into the victor's hands, a success attended with the loss of two killed and fifteen wounded. The fatigue which the troops underwent was great, but the

flank companies of the 33rd, after marching thirty miles, were up with the cavalry, and had their full share in the destruction of this formidable band.<sup>1</sup> This fight took place on the day when Scindia signed the treaty of peace.

The campaign had been a striking one, and up to that time one of the shortest on record ; for "thus the seat of war, extending over the continent of India, exhibited in the short space of four months as many general battles, eight regular sieges, and storming of fortresses, without including that of Gwalior . . . in all of which British valour prevailed over accumulated obstacles, the combination of formidable powers, and every advantage arising from local position, military means, and numerical strength."<sup>2</sup>

When peace was signed the 33rd went to Vellore, 1804.  
a strong fortress in the North Arcot district of Madras, and where the family of Tippoo Sultan were confined. The princes had considerable liberty, and were generously treated, but a garrison was kept in the place to prevent intrigue, and any sudden incursion which would militate against peace. The 33rd do not seem to have been at Vellore when the sepoys mutinied at the instigation of the princes. They had left the fortress, 1805.  
and moved on to Hyderabad, in June, 1805, to join the subsidiary forces of the Nizam.

<sup>1</sup> Thora : " Lord Lake's Campaign in India."

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER XX

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, COLONEL OF THE 33RD

1805. AT this point something may be said relative to the feeling which existed between the 33rd and their commander, and the deep attachment on Major-General Wellesley's part for the regiment "with which so much of his rising celebrity was connected."

Wellesley, suffering from fever after the short but arduous campaign against the Mahrattas, asked for leave to return to Europe. He was anxious to see some Continental service, and take an active part against Napoleon. When the day for departure came no manifestation of esteem moved him so much as that from his old regiment, when officers and men alike expressed their affection for him. The Order of the Day, issued the evening before his departure, contained one paragraph which may be quoted: "The Major-General earnestly recommends to the officers never to lose sight of the great principles of military service, viz:—to maintain discipline among the troops, and to encourage in their own body the spirit and opinions which are becoming in gentlemen. This is the only way to accomplish all that is noble and great in their profession." It was a sentiment worth recording.

1806. In June, 1806, Lord Cornwallis died, shortly after his arrival in India as Governor-General, in succession to Lord Mornington, who, being wearied with the perpetual opposition of the Court of Directors in Calcutta, had requested permission to retire. By Lord Cornwallis's death the Colonelcy of the 33rd became vacant, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had

served for thirteen years as its Lieut.-Colonel, was appointed to succeed. The news was received with enthusiasm by officers and men of the regiment. They felt that they gained prestige in having as their chief a soldier whose achievements gave promise of a brilliant career. It has been said of him that during the period of his command he was "the leader, the protector, and friend of every member of his corps."

He never omitted to press the claims of officers who served under him whenever he considered them worthy of recognition. Thus, when the Lieut.-Colonelcy of the 33rd fell vacant, he wrote to General Lake as follows: "I beg leave to recommend to your attention, Lieut.-Colonel Elliott, the major of the 33rd Regiment. This officer served in the 33rd above twenty years, and has been major for above seven years." The letter was ignored, but Wellesley did not lose sight of Elliott, and urged his appointment to the 80th Regiment. It was an instance of his care for the advancement of capable men who had proved their worth, but were likely to be passed over through lack of influence. If he considered a man not suited for a particular post, he spoke against his appointment without hesitation. He urged others belonging to the 33rd not to allow their capable officers to be drafted into other regiments; "not to lose the services of useful men so long as you can keep them." As for the regiment, he was eager to bring it to prominent notice. One reads in one of his letters, "I shall be happy to have the regiment with me always"; but even thus there were times in his campaigns when he felt that it might be of more use elsewhere, and he acted accordingly. There was an instance of this in the Mahratta war. He wanted the 33rd with him at first, but, afterwards, realising the necessity for its being with the Reserve, he wrote: "The 33rd could not join me. I should have lost the campaign if I had attempted to have drawn troops from General Campbell's division."

Whenever Wellesley, as Lieut.-Colonel of the 33rd,

was absent from the regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Elliott commanded. Elliott's place was taken in 1803 by Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Gore, who exchanged from the 73rd.

The news that Wellesley was returning to England came to the regiment when at Vellore, and it called forth the following letter to him :

HEAD QUARTERS, 33RD REGIMENT, VELLORE,  
*February 28th, 1805.*

SIR,

On hearing that you are about to quit this country, the officers of the 33rd Regiment cannot allow you to depart without endeavouring to impress on you how sensible they are of the very friendly and paternal attention you have ever paid to the interests of the corps, while it had the honour of being under your immediate command, as well as of the unremitting manner in which you have continued your vigilance for its welfare since you have removed to a higher station.

Although by the changes in the service, many of the officers have not individually experienced the peculiar advantages of having served under your personal superintendence, yet the benefits which have resulted to the whole corps, by having you at its head, will long be felt ; and it must ever remain a source of pride to the 33rd Regiment, that the person who has so eminently distinguished himself in every branch of the public service entrusted to him, and who has been so deservedly honoured by our most gracious Sovereign, was the commanding officer of the 33rd Regiment.

In the absence of half the corps, whose signatures cannot be obtained, I am requested by the whole to convey to you their unanimous sentiments ; and to add their most earnest wishes that you may long enjoy every honour, prosperity, and health that your country can offer.

Allow me to add the satisfaction it affords  
me to have this opportunity of subscribing my-  
self, with much respect and esteem,

Sir,

Your very obedient, and much-  
attached humble servant,

ARTHUR GORE,

Lieut.-Colonel, 33rd Regiment.

Major-General Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.

The honour referred to in this letter as conferred by the King on Wellesley was, that he had been nominated an extra Knight of the Order of the Bath. The Order composed at the time twenty-four knights only, and since it was impossible to add to the number, His Majesty, by special favour, decided that Sir Arthur's creation and investiture should not wait for succession to a regular vacancy.<sup>1</sup>

Wellesley's response to the greeting from the Regiment is worth recording, as coming from one whose words were already weighty in army matters, and "furnishes a lesson to every soldier, which shall always form the groundwork of all military education."

To Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Gore,  
commanding H.M.'s 33rd Regiment.

SIR,

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th February. Nearly twelve years have elapsed since His Majesty was pleased to appoint me Lieut.-Colonel of the 33rd Regiment, and in the whole course of that period I have been either in the exercise of the command of the regiment, or in constant communication with the actual commanding officer, and I have had every reason to be satisfied with their conduct.

It has been my uniform object to maintain the system of discipline, subordination, and interior

<sup>1</sup> Brialmont: "Life of Wellington."

economy, which I found established in the regiment by the Marquis Cornwallis, our Colonel; and by the influence of this system, the foundation of which is vigilance on the part of the officers to prevent the commission of military crimes; and by the support and assistance I have uniformly received from Colonel Sherbrooke, Lieut.-Colonel Elliott, and yourself, and the officers of the regiment, my duties as Lieut.-Colonel have always been a pleasing occupation.

It is most gratifying to me to receive this mark of approbation, conveyed by your letter from officers with whose conduct I have so much reason to be pleased, and with whom I have been so long and intimately acquainted. I beg that you will assure them that I shall never forget their services, and that I shall always be happy to forward their views.

I have only to recommend them to adhere to the system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy which they have found established in the regiment; and above all, to cherish and encourage among themselves the spirit of gentlemen and soldiers.

With the most anxious wishes for the prosperity of yourself and the 33rd Regiment,

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

FORT ST. GEORGE,

*March 2nd, 1805.*

The 33rd did nothing beyond garrison duty for the next few years, during which time they were stationed at Hyderabad. (1805 to 1809.)

1809. In the autumn of 1809, however, the flank companies were ordered to join the expedition which was proceeding to the Ile de Bourbon. Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was placed in command of these.

The object of the expedition was to wrest the Island of Mauritius from the French, whose warships did so much damage to British shipping as almost to ruin our commerce with India. These islands formed the base, moreover, for privateering and other descents on the Indian coasts. Lord Minto, then Governor-General of India, determined on their capture, thus to put an end to such depredations, and clear the Indian Ocean of elements so detrimental to British interests.

The expedition promised to be an arduous one for the troops engaged in it, since the reduction of Mauritius, either by blockade or force, had been considered a most difficult task. A strong force was sent from Madras on the 20th of June, consisting of 1,800 Europeans and 1,850 sepoys. These were ultimately augmented by a thousand men of the garrison of the Ile de Rodriguez, Lieut.-Colonel Keating being in command. The rendezvous of the transports and warships was 50 miles to the windward of the Ile de Bourbon, and later it was determined to land the troops. The Ile de Bourbon was captured with ease, but the landing proved to be an exceedingly dangerous undertaking, so high was the surf. About 300 men of the 33rd and 69th regiments in boats, and the light infantry of the 12th in a small schooner, approached the shore, and effected a landing with the loss of a few men drowned. The schooner and boats were dashed to pieces, the soldiers' ammunition damaged, and many of their arms lost. It was seen that it would be disastrous to land more here, but a lieutenant of the 69th swam out to the fleet, pointed out the danger, and took orders for other troops to attack St. Marie.<sup>1</sup> The town, however, surrendered on demand. Campbell, with his men of the 33rd and others, marched on St. Paul, another town on the island, captured it, and found a large quantity of ordnance and ammunition there.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cannon : "Records of 12th Foot."

<sup>2</sup> "Annual Register."



At the end of October Major-General John Abercromby arrived with a force of 10,000 men, some from the Cape of Good Hope, and others from India, to assist in the conquest of Mauritius. The fleet with the transports numbered 70 sail, and these proceeded to the island, where a landing was effected under cover of fire-ships. This was on the 29th of November. Skirmishes followed while the artillery were being brought on shore. Abercromby has described the most serious of the fighting in his dispatch as follows :

The main body of the army soon after it had moved off its ground, was attacked by a corps of the enemy, who with several field pieces had taken up a strong position very favourable for attempting to make an impression on the head of the column as it showed itself at the end of a narrow road with a thick wood on each flank. The European flank battalions forming the advanced guard under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Campbell of the 33rd Regiment, and under the general direction of General Warde, formed with as much regularity as the bad and broken ground would admit of, charged the enemy with the greatest spirit, and compelled him to retire with the loss of his guns, and many killed and wounded. This advantage was gained by the fall of Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, a most excellent and valuable officer, as well as Major O'Keefe, 12th Regiment, whom I have also every reason sincerely to regret.

The French, having seen how Abercromby had made his arrangements for the attack on the forts, realised the futility of resistance, and proposals for capitulation followed. The Isle of France, as Mauritius was then called, thus fell into our hands after a resistance of only four days. The army had landed

on November 29th. On December 3rd the capitulation was signed. "An immense quantity of stores, and valuable merchandise, five large frigates, some smaller ships of war, and twenty-eight merchantmen, with two British East Indiamen that had been captured, were surrendered to his Majesty's arms." Considering the difficulty of the undertaking, the loss on our side was not great, not exceeding 150 men in killed and wounded, the 33rd losing Campbell, a sergeant and a private killed, and one sergeant and 12 rank and file wounded. The loss of Campbell was a serious one. Wellesley held him in such esteem that he had expressed his keen pleasure when that officer exchanged into the 33rd.

While the flank companies of the 33rd were thus engaged, the regiment received orders to proceed from Hyderabad to Bangalore.

The following dispatch was received from Lord Minto, the Governor-General, as having come to him from Captain T. Sydenham, Resident at Hyderabad, and it is valuable as describing the tone and conduct of the Regiment. 1810.

My LORD,

I do myself the honour to report to your Lordship that Lieut.-Colonel Gore with H.M.'s 33rd Regiment has moved out of the cantonment of Hyderabad for the purpose of prosecuting his march towards Bangalore. On this occasion I consider it my duty to draw your Lordship's attention to the exemplary conduct of H.M.'s 33rd during the period it has been stationed at Hyderabad.

The regiment has been stationed at Hyderabad during a period of four years, and during that period I have not on any occasion received from the Court or city of Hyderabad the slightest complaint of the irregularity or misconduct of any man in the regiment.

At the time when the subsidiary treaty with this State was enlarged and modified, great jealousy and fear were felt at this Court at the prospect of so large a body of European soldiers being stationed in the immediate vicinity of the capital; it was of much importance, therefore, both to the harmony of our connection with this Court, and to our national character, that the conduct of the regiment first stationed near Hyderabad should be such as to dispel the jealousies and prejudices of the Court, and to prove to the inhabitants of these territories that the peaceable, orderly, and regular behaviour of our European soldiers in quarters was equal to the activity, spirit, and courage which they always display in the field.

“I am happy to assure your Lordship that these desirable objects have been obtained by the deportment and behaviour of H.M.’s 33rd Regiment, whose conduct for a period of four years has been uniformly calculated to inspire the inhabitants of these territories with perfect confidence, and with the most favourable opinion of the discipline, regularity, and subordination of British soldiers.

I have the honour to be,  
my Lord, etc., etc.,

THOMAS SYDENHAM,  
Resident.

HYDERABAD,  
18th, *April*, 1810.

1811-12. The term of service of the 33rd in India was now nearing its close. The regiment was warned to be in readiness to leave Bangalore and proceed to Fort St. George, in 1811. This was recognised by the officers and men as preliminary to an immediate return to England. Yet it was not until early in the following year that the welcome order was received. In July, 1812, after an absence of nearly seventeen years from England, the 33rd landed at Gravesend.

# The Struggle with Napoleon

## CHAPTER XXI

### FIGHTING IN THE NETHERLANDS

FOR some time after the arrival of the regiment in England the service was merely garrison work, but the experiences of the 33rd were by no means devoid of interest. At first they proceeded to Hull, where the regimental depôts had been stationed under the command of Lieut.-Colonel West. That able officer had been busy constantly collecting recruits in the West Riding, and forwarding them to India, to make up for the inevitable wastage of active service ; but on the arrival of the 33rd at Hull recruiting was carried on with still more vigour, so that the regiment was brought up to full strength by the end of the year. 1812.

At this time occurred a change which caused considerable regret, namely, the removal of the Colonel from the regiment. Wellesley's distinguished services in the Peninsula, against the French Marshals of Napoleon, had been rewarded with a peerage, and he was now known as the Marquis of Wellington. He had been nominated to the Colonelcy of the Royal Horse Guards, and his acceptance involved the resignation of the Colonelcy of the 33rd Regiment, after a close connection with it lasting over twenty years. 1813.

The 33rd were at Windsor, doing "King's Duty," when the following was published in Regimental Orders, and dated March 7th, 1813.

Colonel Gore has much satisfaction in publishing to the Regiment the following copy of a letter which he had the honour to receive from the Marquis of Wellington, late Colonel of the Regiment.

*"February 2nd, 1813.*

"MY DEAR COLONEL,

"Before you receive this letter you will have heard that H.R.H. the Prince Regent has been pleased to appoint me to be Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards, an honour entirely unexpected by me. I do not know who is to be my successor in the 33rd Regiment.

"Although highly gratified by the honour which has been conferred upon me, as well as the manner in which it has been conferred, I cannot avoid to feel a regret at one of its circumstances, viz., that I should be separated from the 33rd Regiment to which I have belonged with so much satisfaction for more than twenty years. I beg that you will take an opportunity of informing the regiment of the sentiments with which I quit them, and that though no longer belonging to them, I shall ever feel an anxiety for their interest and honour, and shall hear whatever conduces to the latter with the most lively satisfaction.

"Ever, my dear Colonel,

"Yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"To Colonel Gore, 33rd Regiment."

With the publication of this letter Colonel Gore added his assurance that "the sentiments of regard which his Lordship has expressed for the 33rd Regiment must be felt by every soldier as a stimulus to render, not only himself worthy of the consideration of so great a man, but must also be an additional motive for every person connected with the 33rd Regiment to

exert himself for the general credit of the Corps in order that it may ensure the continued attention of the greatest Military Commander of the present Age."

The keenest anxiety was felt as to Wellington's successor, but on the same date as his appointment to the Royal Horse Guards—January 1st, 1813—the new Colonel's name was announced, namely, Lieutenant-General Sir John Coape Sherbrooke, as transferred from the Colonelcy of the 68th Regiment. Bunbury has described him as "a short, square, hardy little man, with a countenance that told at once the determined fortitude of his nature." Wellington very candidly spoke of him to Lord Stanhope as "a very good officer, but the most passionate man, I think, I ever knew." Stanhope goes on to say in his "Conversations," that Wellington, when he was Wellesley, wrote to Sherbrooke to impress upon him that "he must not abuse the Commissariat officers, however much he might think they deserved it."

Beyond question Sherbrooke was a brilliant soldier. He had learned much when a captain in the 33rd. Wherever he served he proved his worth and fine capacity, and the Regiment had reason to be proud of the man who succeeded Wellington as Colonel.

In the summer of 1813, orders came for the Regiment to be in readiness for foreign service. The destination was not divulged, but was certain to be one which implied active service against Napoleon. Hopes of being sent to Spain to fight under Wellington were doomed to disappointment, for in July it transpired that the corps was to join Major-General Gibbs at Harwich, where 3,000 British troops were being assembled, namely, the 33rd, 4th battalion Royals, 2nd battalion of the 25th, 2nd battalion 54th, 2nd battalion 73rd, and 2nd battalion 91st. The force was destined for service in the Netherlands, orders being given for disembarkation at Stralsund. The transports left Harwich on July 10th, but so many

delays ensued that the 33rd had not disembarked until the 14th of August.

The service called for in the Netherlands was due to the formation of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon, who, in spite of his disastrous expedition to Moscow, had gathered a fresh army of 300,000 men for service beyond the Rhine. This Coalition consisted of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England; Sweden joining later on. Great Britain had hesitated at first to acquiesce in the schemes of the Coalition, for her wish was so to constitute Hanover that it should extend from the Scheldt to the Elbe. Once committed wholly to the Allies, preparations were made for the dispatch of troops to co-operate in hostilities, making Germany once more the battlefield.

The design of the Allies was to throw their main army into France by way of Basle, and thus turn the line of frowning fortresses behind the Rhine, as well as the Vosges mountains. Blücher was to cross the Middle Rhine, and Bülow, with 30,000 men, was to co-operate with the English troops under Graham in the Netherlands.<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon was defeated at the battle of Leipsic, fought on October 16th-19th, and had been compelled to retreat with enormous loss. But although he "felt the foundations of his greatness quivering," he would not abate any of his ambitious schemes, and consequently the war proceeded; hence there was every promise of hard fighting for the 33rd. To their chagrin, inexplicable movements followed which kept them out of the zone of hostilities. They left Stralsund after a month of inaction, and marched to Barth. A week later they proceeded to Rostock, and to the general amazement embarked after a five months stay in the place. The transports remained in the German Ocean from November the 2nd until the 29th, when they anchored in Yarmouth Roads. Here the women were sent on shore, the heavy baggage was also landed,

<sup>1</sup> Sloane: "Life of Napoleon."

but the troops were kept on board for a full fortnight, when they sailed to Holland, to join Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, who had quitted the army of Spain on account of illness, and was now to take the command of the British troops in Holland, and co-operate with Bülow's Prussians against Antwerp.

Lieutenant-Colonel West had retired from the command of the 33rd, which was in the interim commanded by Major John Harty ; but on the 19th of December Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone, transferred from the 6th Dragoon Guards, assumed the command.

As a part of Sir Thomas Graham's force, the 33rd had the prospect of some fighting. In January, 1814, Graham was advised by Bülow, Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Corps of the Prussian army, that he intended to drive the enemy from their position, at Hoogstraten, and Worgel, on the Merk, in order to make a reconnaissance on Antwerp. Graham was to cover the right flank of the corps. He accordingly moved such parts of the two divisions under his command as were disposable from Rosendael, and reached Calmpthout on the 11th of January, drove the enemy back with heavy loss, from the places named, and prepared for a further advance on the following day. During the night the enemy retired, taking up a strong position at Merxem, near Antwerp. Graham moved on the 12th to Capelle, on the road from Bergen-op-Zoom to Antwerp, and made his attack on Merxem. Graham, in his dispatch, says that " the rapid but orderly advance of the detachment of the 3rd battalion of the rifle corps, under Captain Fullarton's command, and of the 2nd battalion 78th, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Lindsay, supported by the 2nd battalion 25th, commanded by Major McDonnell, and by the 33rd under Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone, and an immediate charge with the bayonet by the 78th, ordered by Lieut.-Colonel Lindsay, decided the contest much sooner, and with much less loss than might have been expected from the strength of the post, and the numbers of the

1814.



enemy." The enemy, decisively beaten on the irresistible advance of Graham's troops, was driven into Antwerp with considerable loss, although the losses of the English were surprisingly small. The 33rd reported no loss at all, although they had taken such an active part in the fighting. Graham further said in his dispatch: "I have the greatest satisfaction in expressing my warmest approbation of the conduct of all these troops; no veterans ever behaved better than these men, who then met the enemy for the first time."

When the object of the attack had been attained, the 33rd were ordered to fall back to Rosendael, where their quarters were established, and where they experienced weather excessively severe; so severe, indeed, that Graham in a later dispatch said that it not only prevented his receiving the supplies of ordnance and ordnance stores from England, but made it impossible to land much of what was on board the transports near Williamstadt, the ice preventing all communication.

There was further fighting at Merxem on the 2nd of February, when the village was again attacked. The brigade retired after the first attack, the object, namely a reconnaissance of Antwerp, having been attained, and the enemy re-occupied the place. They were driven out again, and Graham turned his guns on the shipping in the harbour of the city. The idea was to inflict all the damage possible in the short time available. Graham did not dare to stay long, as Bülow had received orders to march southward and act in concert with the Grand Army. The cannonade continued for four days, and the 33rd were the last in the trenches where they were employed in removing the artillery.

After remaining a few days at Loenhout, the 33rd marched to Groot Tembert, the head-quarters of Graham's army, and then with the main body moved on to Calmont. The account of what followed is given

in Graham's dispatch, when he had to admit what was tantamount to disaster. The General conceived the idea of capturing by surprise and escalade Bergen-op-Zoom, an admittedly impregnable fortress. Preliminary dispositions were made with secrecy, the force employed being as follows :

- 1st Column : Brigade of Guards (1,000 men).  
Col. Lord Proby.
- 2nd Column : 55th (250 men) ; 69th (350) ; 33rd (600).  
Total, 1,200 men. Lieut.-Colonel Morrice, 69th Foot.
- 3rd Column : 91st (400) ; 21st (100) ; 37th (150).  
Total, 650 men. Lieut.-Colonel Henry, 21st Foot.
- 4th Column : 44th (3,000) ; flank companies of the 21st and 37th (200) ; Royals (600).  
Total, 1,100 men. Brigadier-General Gore, and Lieut.-Colonel Carleton.

Total force, 3,950 men.

It was to be a night attack. No. 1, the left column, attacked between Antwerp and Water Port Gates. No. 2 attacked to the right of the New Gate. The 33rd were here. No. 1 was intended only to draw attention, by a false attack near the Steenberg Gate, and be afterwards disposable according to circumstances. No. 4, right column, attacked at the entrance of the harbour, which could be forded at low water, and the hour was fixed accordingly at half-past ten on March 8th. Major-General Cooke accompanied the left column. Major-General Skerrett and Brigadier-General Gore accompanied the right, which was the first to force its way into the body of the place.

Graham describes the fight in full detail in his dispatch. These two columns, the left and right,

were directed to move along the rampart, and assist the centre column, or to force open the Antwerp Gate. An unexpected difficulty about passing the ditch on the ice having obliged Major-General Cooke to change the point of attack, a considerable delay ensued, and that column did not gain the rampart until 11.30. Gore and Carleton, who commanded the right column, were deprived of a leader, and fell into disorder, besides meeting with heavy loss.<sup>1</sup>

The centre column was received with a destructive fire of round- and grapeshot while on the ice, and met with heavy loss; but gained the cover of the glacis where it had to wait for the advanced guard, which had the scaling ladders. By taking a different direction from the main body, and cutting its way through the palisades, the advanced guard reached the counterscarp of the ditch opposite the face of the bastion it was intended to escalade. The scaling-ladders, however, did not reach this point. The obstacles encountered in the approach, together with the loss of men from the heavy fire of grape and musketry, caused much confusion. The advanced guard was consequently obliged to retire from the counterscarp, having suffered heavy loss.<sup>2</sup>

Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone, of the 33rd, was severely wounded; as also was Lieut.-Colonel Morrice, who commanded the column; but Major Muttlebury, when the column was forced to retire, re-formed it, and marched round to rejoin Cooke. It was Cooke's intention to attempt to carry certain points, but in view of what had happened, he knew that he could neither maintain them, nor could he hope to penetrate through the streets without incurring grave risks. News came to him that the troops at the Water Port Gate were seriously opposed and required reinforcing, and the 33rd, under the command of Brevet-Major Parkinson, were sent to Lieut.-Colonel Muller

<sup>1</sup> Bulletin from "London Gazette."

<sup>2</sup> Bulletin.

who was in command there. Meanwhile Muller had been compelled to surrender. Some desperate fighting followed for the 33rd, and when Parkinson heard of Muller's disaster, he withdrew, lest the 33rd should be made prisoners. The whole of the attacking force retired. Disaster, however, befell the 69th, and the right wing of the 55th, which, under Major-General Cooke's immediate command, protected the retreat of the columns. Graham says that Cooke found it impossible to withdraw these weak battalions, and consequently surrendered to save the lives of so many gallant men.

Among the killed were Brigadier-General Gore of the 33rd, while Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone, Captain Guthrie, Lieutenants McQuarrie, Kerr, Buck, and Pode, and Ensigns Bannatyne, Canning, Howard, and Adjutant Priestley, were wounded. Among the missing were Captain G. Colclough of the 33rd. Two sergeants of the 33rd, and 26 rank and file were killed; 3 sergeants and 55 rank and file wounded; and 56 rank and file prisoners and missing. The prisoners were exchanged on the 10th of March, and sent to England.<sup>1</sup>

There was of necessity a call for explanation as to the retreat of various battalions in this unfortunate failure, and it may be of interest therefore to insert here the correspondence which ensued. One letter was written by Brevet-Major Parkinson, who commanded the 33rd subsequent to the first attack, and runs as follows :

SIR, CALMPHOUT, 11th *March*, 1814.

As it is possible that opinions may be formed prejudicial to the troops employed in the late affair against Bergen-op-Zoom, I feel it a duty I owe to the gallantry and good conduct of the 33rd Regiment to state the following particulars for the information of his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

<sup>1</sup> Bulletin.

Upon Lieutenant-Colonel Elphinstone being wounded at the first attack on the night of the 8th instant, I succeeded to the command of the regiment. This attack having failed, the regiment retired and formed in column on the Wouw Road in the rear of the 69th. Shortly afterwards I received orders from Major Muttlebury, commanding 69th Regiment, to move on in his rear, and was informed that we were destined to support the Guards, who made a lodgment on the works of the place. We accordingly marched and got into the place between 1 and 2 a.m. of the 9th. At this time, from the loss we had sustained in the first attack, our actual strength was under 300 men. About 4 o'clock I was ordered by Major-General Cooke to proceed with the regiment to the Lower Water Gate, then in possession of the Royal Regiment, and to place myself under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Muller, the commanding officer. This order was immediately obeyed, and we remained in a very exposed situation from that time, the 1st Royals having occupied the passage of the bridge and the bridge itself, at the Water Gate. About 9 o'clock General Cooke came to our position, and we discovered the enemy in pursuit of a party of the 91st, which had been cut off. General Cooke ordered the 33rd to advance to their relief. This was immediately done, but as there was a wide, deep, and impracticable ditch between us and the enemy, the situation of the 91st became endangered by our fire, which it was impossible altogether to prevent. We were accordingly withdrawn, and resumed our former position.

The enemy's fire from this moment increased upon us. I observed he was approaching the Water Gate along the ramparts : but, as I supposed the gate and bridge to be occupied by the Royals (General Cooke and Colonel Muller having gone there only a short time before), I felt secure on

that point, and continued to defend our front, until I discovered the enemy getting round our right flank towards our rear, and likewise busily getting guns to bear on us from the ramparts.

I then sent to Colonel Muller to inform him of these particulars and request his orders, when to my astonishment it was reported to me that he had withdrawn through the gate, and not a man of the Royals was to be seen! My next object was to effect a junction with the Guards, if possible, and with this in view, I retired to the rampart, where I could see what I considered to be their post, but as there was no appearance whatever of our troops towards that point, and the enemy collecting in considerable force on our right, there was no doubt left in my mind that the Guards had also retired.

Thus situated, with the regiment reduced to little more than 200 men, and attacked by a very superior force with cannon and musketry on front and flanks, deprived of any point of communication or support, and without orders, I considered my duty was to make every possible effort to save the remnant of the regiment and colours from falling into the hands of the enemy, and immediately took the resolution of retiring over the works and ditch of the place to the river and inundation, trusting to the ice for a passage along that face of the works towards the point where we first entered. This has been fortunately accomplished, not without loss, it is true, both in killed and drowned, but without suffering a single prisoner to be taken that was not previously wounded.

E. PARKINSON.

P.S.—Since writing the above, it has been ascertained that a portion of those men who were covering the retreat of the regiment were cut off. The loss of the regiment amounts, therefore, to

fifty, including the wounded, and one officer who was also wounded.

The matter did not end there. Some conflicting statements regarding Parkinson's action called forth another letter, addressed this time to General Cooke.

CALMPHOUT, 23rd *March*, 1814.

SIR,

Having this moment seen in the public papers the dispatch of his Excellency, the Commander of the Forces, relative to the attack on Bergen-op-Zoom, wherein it is stated in his Excellency's letter that the "Royal Scots" retired from the Water Gate followed by the 33rd; and in your report "that Colonel Jones shortly after daybreak informed you that Lieutenant-Colonel Muller and the troops at the Water Gate had been obliged to surrender, and were marched prisoners into the town," I do myself the honour to enclose you a copy of the Report which I considered it my duty to make on that affair. I beg leave to observe that my Report being made direct to head-quarters was in consequence of Lieutenant-Colonel Muller having been taken prisoner, under whose immediate orders the 33rd was placed, as well as yourself being in a similar situation.

By this Report it will be seen that so far from the 33rd having followed the Royals from or through the Water Gate, it remained a considerable time defending the position it had first occupied near the gate after the Royals had retired from it, without my knowing anything of their retreat, or having received any instructions whatever from Lieutenant-Colonel Muller, under whose immediate orders I had been placed by yourself.

The 33rd did not retire through the Water Port Gate, nor even had for a moment possession of it. The regiment did not retire until turned on both flanks, without the least appearance of support, or

point of communication, and not until it became evident to my mind as well as to that of all the officers present that every point had been given up, and that we were left alone.

With respect to Lieutenant-Colonel Jones having reported shortly after daybreak that "Lieutenant-Colonel Muller and the troops at the Water Port Gate (which of course included the 33rd Regiment) had been obliged to surrender, and were marched prisoners of war into the town, I beg leave to observe that you yourself visited our position at the Water Port Gate long after daybreak, and before the Royals had withdrawn from the gate, and that the returns will show the number of prisoners the enemy took from us, in the whole fifty, including the wounded and one officer. Even this number is greater than I calculated at the time, as will appear by my Report, which I have concluded by an explanatory note at the end. I trust, therefore, sir, that you will see the necessity of explaining these particulars to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, being well assured that you will be most anxious to place every proceeding connected with the operations in question in the clearest point of view.

E. PARKINSON,

Brevet-Major.

General Cooke's reply to Parkinson was written on the following day.

ROSENDAEL, 24th *March*, 1814.

SIR,

I had the honour to receive your letter with its enclosure yesterday evening, and you may be assured that I shall be anxious to meet your wishes in placing every proceeding connected with the operation in question, on the morning of the 9th instant, in as clear a point of view as I possibly can. At the same time I beg leave to say that I



think the Commander of the Forces is so well informed of everything concerning the 33rd Regiment by your Report of the 11th instant (at which time I had left Bergen-op-Zoom), that it seems to me scarcely necessary to make any fresh statement to him, as he must have seen that the communication made to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Jones was unconnected with any particular corps ; that officer merely stating the fact of the enemy's success as far as it had come to his knowledge in his situation as prisoner since an early hour ; and connected as that communication was with his information relative to the reverses which had occurred to other detachments of our troops, Lieut.-Colonel Jones could not then know anything of the 33rd Regiment, having never been near the Water Port Gate, or even in the place at all. I mention this to exonerate him from any blame.

Your report of the 11th instant is so explanatory of what has occurred to the 33rd, as to render unquestionable the fact of your not having followed the battalion of the "Royal Scots" ; and as I have before implied, Lieut.-Colonel Jones's communication was, in substance, the information sufficient to convince me of the inutility of prolonging the contest on the ramparts, when I say in my report that he, soon after daylight, came to me, I am convinced that I ought not to have said eight o'clock. In this you will observe my ideas of the time of the morning differ from yours. I am now well convinced that in the hurry of writing my report, to send it out to the general, I erroneously stated the time too early, and I think in the same way you bring it too late, an hour. The whole of this, however, appears to me immaterial as relating to the purport of your letter, and you may probably think what I have just said on the time irrelevant to the subject.

I was extremely glad to find that the 33rd

had effected its retreat. I was not witness to the impression made by the enemy at the Water Port Gate, which ultimately obliged the Royal Scots to retreat from it, as I returned as quickly as I could to the post from whence I came, with the view of directing an attack to be made from it, in order to call the enemy's attention and relieve the troops at the Water Port Gate from their presence. I, however, found it would be useless to attempt such an operation across that part of the town.

Before I close this, I must add that I saw every readiness and exertion in the battalion under your command to charge the enemy, but I had little expectation of its ultimately succeeding when I observed the impediments described in your report. I shall be at Calmpthout to-morrow, when I will call at your quarters as I pass.

I have the honour to be, sir,  
your most obedient servant,  
G. COOKE, Major-General.

In considering this correspondence, concerning, as it does, the behaviour of the 33rd Regiment, it may be interesting to quote from General Cooke's report, which has been referred to. It ran as follows :

Bergen-op-Zoom, *March 10, 1814.*

SIR,

I have now the honour of reporting to your Excellency that the column which made the attack on the Antwerp side got into the place about eleven o'clock on the night of the 8th, by the clock of this town ; but at about half-past eleven, by the time we were regulated by, a delay having occurred at Bourgbliet, occasioned by my finding it necessary to change the point of attack, on account of the state of the ice at the first intended spot. Every exertion was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth and Captain Sir G. Hoste, of the Royal Engineers, in getting on the

ladders and planks requisite for effecting the enterprise, and in directing the placing them for the descent into the ditch, the passing the feet in the ice, and ascending the ramparts of the body of the place ; during which operation several men were lost by a fire from the rampart. After we were established on the rampart, and had occupied some houses, from whence we might have been much annoyed, and had sent a strong patrol towards the point at which Major-General Skerrett and Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton had entered, I detached Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton with part of the 1st Guards, to secure the Antwerp Gate, and to see if he could get any information of the column under Lieutenant-Colonel Morrice. Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton reached the gate, but found that it could not be opened by his men, the enemy throwing a very heavy fire up a street leading to it. It was also found that they occupied an outwork, commanding the bridge, which would effectually render that outlet useless to us. I heard nothing more of this detachment, but considered it as lost, the communication having been interrupted by the enemy.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rooke, with part of the 3rd Guards, was afterwards sent in that direction, drove the enemy from the intermediate rampart, and reached the gate, when he found it useless to attempt anything, and ascertained that the outwork was still occupied. We were joined in the course of the night by the 33rd, 55th, and 2nd battalion of the 69th regiment, but the state of uncertainty as to what had passed at other points, determined me not to weaken the force now collected, by attempting to carry points which we could not maintain, or penetrate through the streets with the certain loss of a great number of men, particularly as I heard that the troops at the Water Port Gate, under Lieutenant-Colonel

Muller, were very seriously opposed. I sent the 33rd to reinforce him.

The enemy continued a galling fire upon us, and at one time the adjoining bastion, from the angle at which they completely commanded our communication with the exterior, and brought their guns at that angle to bear against us. They were charged and driven away by Majors Muttlebury and Hog, with the 69th and 55th, in a very spirited and gallant style.

Finding that matters were becoming more serious, and being still without any information from other points, excepting that of the failure of Lieutenant-Colonel Morrice's column near the Nourid Gate, I determined, at the suggestion of Colonel Lord Proby, to let part of the troops withdraw, which was done at the ladders where they entered.

By daylight the enemy having again possessed themselves of the aforementioned bastion, they were again driven from it by Majors Muttlebury and Hog, with their weak battalions, in the same gallant manner. I soon after began sending off some more men, when Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, who had been taken prisoner in the night, came to me (accompanied by a French officer who summoned me to surrender) and informed me that Lieutenant-Colonel Muller and the troops at the Water Port Gate had been obliged to surrender, and were marched prisoners into the town, when I also learnt the fate of Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton's detachment, and of Major-General Skerrett, Major-General Gore, and Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton, and that the troops which had followed them had suffered very much, and had been repulsed from the advanced points along the rampart where they had penetrated to. I was convinced that a longer continuance of the contest would be an useless loss of lives, and without a prospect of relief as we were situated. I there-

fore consented to adopt the mortifying alternative of laying down our arms.

I have now to perform the just and satisfactory duty of conveying to your Excellency my sense of the merits and good conduct of officers and soldiers in this bold and arduous enterprise ; I have only a knowledge of what passed under my own observation, and I lament the loss of Major-General Skerrett, from his dangerous wounds, and of the other superior officers employed at the other points of attack, since it prevents me from giving such detailed praise of the merits of the officers and soldiers, as I have no doubt they deserve.<sup>1</sup>

It will be seen from the correspondence between Parkinson and General Cooke, that the 33rd returned to the camp at Calmpthout immediately after the attempt. There they remained for a month, no fighting of importance following.

But the endeavour to capture Antwerp was not foregone in any degree by this failure at Bergen-op-Zoom. The famous city of the Netherlands was regarded by the English ministers as the commercial key to Central Europe, and its possession was esteemed by Britain as one of the chief ends of this renewed war with Napoleon. Under no consideration would Napoleon consent to give up the city, and hence the stubborn defence of the great garrison he had thrown into the place. Napoleon, however, was now engaged in what has been described as "the struggles of exhaustion." His enemies were closing in upon him. Successes here and there could not do more than retard the oncoming of the Allies, before whom he was compelled to retreat. From all parts in the vast field of his operations news came in which convinced him that his day was ending. In Germany, where he was in personal command, the Allies were getting the upper hand. Added to this came bad news from

<sup>1</sup> See Note at end of chapter for further account of the fight.

Southern France. The English had entered Bordeaux, and so far did his enemies regard his power as waning, that there had been a public proclamation of Louis XVIII as King of France !

Nothing was left for Napoleon but concentration ; and this in turn meant the abandonment of places which had been held by the French with magnificent persistency. More distant fortresses in the Netherlands were abandoned, one by one, reluctantly, since Napoleon's retreat rendered their defence impossible. He needed the soldiers, moreover, which made up their garrisons. While, therefore, the 33rd were moving from place to place, first from Calmpthout to Starbrock, then to West Wesel, and later on to West Mal, news came that Napoleon was deposed. That same day the garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom mounted the white cockade, and threw open the gates which the 33rd and their comrades had so vainly assailed. This was on March 31st, 1814.

Antwerp was not yet won. The writer of the Chronicle in the "Annual Register" says that the Crown Prince of Sweden having written to General Carnot, Governor of Antwerp, acquainting him with the deposition of the Emperor, and proposing to him to surrender the fortress, and join the Allied troops, "that distinguished person, who can only be paralleled by the republican officers who served under Cromwell, returned for answer that he commanded at Antwerp in the name of the French Government, which alone had the right to fix the duration of his office, and the orders of which he should obey when incontestibly established on its new base. On April 18th he published a proclamation to his soldiers, informing them that the wishes of the nation being fully declared in favour of the restoration of the Bourbons, it became their duty to acknowledge them ; and he concluded by an oath in his name, and those of other commanders, to defend Antwerp to the last extremity in the name of Louis XVIII."

The attitude of Carnot was the extremity of absurdity. Louis was in every way bound up with the Allies, and must be identified with the demand for the surrender of Antwerp, as of any other fortress or city which held out against those who had placed him on the throne. Graham's army shifted its quarters and drew more closely about Antwerp, but there was no need for fighting. Carnot received his orders from the king, and on the 5th of May the 33rd marched with the other British regiments into the city. Graham, now become Lord Lynedoch, sent the following dispatch to Earl Bathurst :

ANTWERP, *May 5th, 1814.*

MY LORD,

I have the honour to state to your Lordship, that agreeable to the terms of the Convention of Paris of the 23rd ultimo, this fortress, with the different forts depending on it, was finally evacuated by the remaining French troops this morning.

Major-General Königl, the Commissioner of the Allied Powers, having signified to me his wish that, according to his instructions, British troops should occupy it, the 2nd division, under the command of Major-General Cooke, and the 1st brigade of the 1st division, were marched in ; and after the different guards were relieved, the new garrison received the Commissioner with military honours.

The magistrates then assembled on the parade, and the Mayor, recommending Antwerp to the protection, and its future fate to the favour of the Allies, presented the keys of the town to General Königl, who received them in the name of the Allied Sovereigns.

It is impossible to describe with what demonstrations of enthusiastic joy the inhabitants expressed their approbation of this interesting scene.

All the marine establishments remain in the hands of the French. I have the most satisfactory

communications with the French Admiral commanding; and I have no doubt of the utmost harmony prevailing between the French and English of all descriptions during the time the town shall continue to be occupied by a British garrison.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

NOTE 1.—So much importance was attached to the failure at Bergen-op-Zoom that it may be well to quote from the diary of Major Thain, a young officer of the 33rd at the time. The entry runs thus:

“It was just dusk, and we had already marched 10 miles, when we now set out on Bergen-op-Zoom road. This was a thing we never once had thought at all probable. Some snow was on the ground; otherwise it was very dark, and we had a very bad road over some sand-hills. After marching 6 or 8 miles we were halted, and the Commander of the Forces ordered the officers commanding Corps to make known to their officers and men that we were within a few minutes’ walk of Bergen, which we were going to attempt to take by surprise! The Grenadiers were then called to the head of the column; ours being senior, took the lead. Ladders supported by our 7th and 8th Companies were placed 4 deep, in front of the Grenadiers; a Sergeant and 6 of our Grenadiers preceded the whole.

“In the meantime the feint attack commenced on our right. Colonel Morris was ordered not to move until he heard the firing from the attack on our left. As soon as he heard this—which was to commence precisely at  $\frac{1}{4}$ -past 10—he was to advance and surprise a subaltern’s piquet of 15 men which was in the covert way, which done, he was to scale where the guide would show him, and direct that the 55th and 69th should move along the rampart, one to the right, and the other to the left. If they met an armed body they were to challenge by ‘Oranje boven!’ and if answered by ‘God save the king!’ they were to be considered as friends.



"It was some minutes more than  $\frac{1}{2}$ -past 10 o'clock when Colonel Morris gave the word to advance, but we had not heard a single shot on the left. As we went up the glacis the sentries fired at us and retired. We darted across the palisades. After this I am unable to tell what parts of the fortification we passed, for it was as dark as possible. However, we ran to our left, then turned at a right angle to the right, when we met with high palisades. It was in getting over these that our Grenadiers in their ardour would not wait long enough for the ladders to move on before them, as they ought to have done, but rushed on. Some confusion ensued in consequence, and the ladders were deserted and left.

"Colonel Morris, Capt. Mitchell, the Guide and myself got over these palisades first, and running on, we were challenged by the French sentries on the rampart above us by 'Qui vive la !' The Guide, instead of being as still as death, roared out 'Oranje boven !' This made the troops in our rear give a cheer of three times three ! After this, of course, our intentions were no longer concealed, and the enemy threw up an abundance of blue lights to discover exactly where we were. Then followed a tremendous fire of grape and musketry upon the spot.

"Colonel Morris, Capt. Mitchell, the Guide and myself pressed on to the piquet house, followed by the 33rd Grenadiers, who had so imprudently left the ladders in their rear. But the piquet had retired within the works ; in fact, it was absurd to expect that they would be there after the noise we had just been making, and we kept pressing forward to our right. We met with another row of palisades, having passed which we came to the place where we ought to scale. Here we discovered that there was not a single ladder with us, and only one company of Grenadiers !! I was instantly dispatched to the rear to bring them up.

"The firing was now dreadful from the rampart. I found the ladders at the palisades where they had

been left, some on one side and some on the other, and the head of the column had moved down into the outer ditch on the right, where they were stopping. I collected as many men as I could, and made them follow me with some of the ladders.

“When I got back to the place where I left Col. Morris, I found that he had been wounded and carried off, as had Capt. Guthrie, commanding our Grenadier Company, the whole of which had been obliged to fall back for shelter. Whilst I was telling Capt. Mitchell that I had brought up some of the ladders, he received a second severe wound which obliged him to be carried off also. It now became my duty to tell Col. Elphinstone what had happened, but he no sooner had assumed the command than he was wounded and taken off. Major Muttletbury was the next senior officer, but, having no orders, or not knowing from whom to get any, ordered the whole to retire; but it was in such a direction that we were entirely enfiladed by a heavy fire of every description, which threw the troops into confusion. We were, however, soon formed again on the road from which we had advanced.

“About 1 o'clock in the morning we were ordered round to the left to support the Guards who had effected an entrance. We got in by the ladders which they had planted. Here, instead of pushing forward and taking possession, we were ordered to lie down on the snow, where we remained for two hours, exposed to occasional shots from the town. The Guards met with no opposition, for Brig.-Genl. Gore, with a handful of men, had taken possession of all that part of the rampart, so that they were received at the top of their ladders by their friends. Genl. Gore was killed, and his small force driven back by superior numbers on the head of the column of Guards, who did not advance in the same direction to support them. It was past 3 o'clock a.m. when Genl. Cooke ordered the 33rd to proceed to the left and support the Royals under Colonel Muller at the Water Port Gate.

We accordingly left the 69th and Guards in the bastion when we had entered, and took up a position on the inside of the gate, where we remained until daybreak.

"At daybreak I could perceive that we were behind a house which was filled with wounded officers and men. In our front was a canal which ran up into the heart of the town. Over this to the right was a stone bridge, beyond which was an arsenal, from the windows of which we were a good deal annoyed. On the east end of this arsenal was a work in possession of the enemy, with a ditch round it. From this they fired two guns all the night upon some of our artillery in the place. On our left was the Water Port Gate, in the gorge of which was the head of the column of the Royals. The flank companies were in the town, and under the bridge.

"When daylight appeared, the 91st came scrambling over one end of the work in our front, pursued by the enemy at the point of the bayonet. We were ordered first of all to charge and save them, upon which the Grenadiers and first company darted through the enemy's fire, and along the bridge. We were surprised to find that the regiment had been counter-ordered, and were again in their former position.

"We were now close under the windows of the arsenal, but screened from the fire by some heaps of wood, past the end of which we kept up a smart fire on the enemy at the guns. For want of support our flanks were threatened. We therefore thought it prudent to retire, and we did so through showers of shot, with the loss of only two men wounded. We did not join the regiment, but kept behind a house on their right, and rather to the rear. It was a most providential thing that we did so, for this house would have prevented the regiment from seeing the force which came to turn our right flank, which became unsupported by the retreat of the Guards from the position in which we had left them.

"We, being there, gave timely notice to Major Parkinson, who immediately fell back behind the parapet, having previously ascertained that the Royals had quitted their position without Colonel Muller having given the slightest intimation, although we were placed under his orders. The Guards had left our right, as the Royals had our left, unprotected; consequently both were in imminent danger. We, notwithstanding, kept up a smart fire for more than half an hour. Then, seeing that the enemy were turning their guns on us, Major Parkinson withdrew the men by degrees from behind the parapet across the ditch. We then got upon an inundated country, which luckily, as the tide had ebbed, had not much water upon it, but was covered with large sheets of ice. We had to walk over this for almost a mile and a half before we were at all sheltered from a cross-fire, and had to wade through several streams up to the shoulders. We were soon formed, and dispositions having been made for the retreat of the force, we were ordered to take up our old quarters in Calmpthout, where we arrived about 5 o'clock in the evening, quite faint with fatigue and hunger."

NOTE 2.—Napoleon, when at St. Helena, in 1817, is reported to have observed that the storming of Bergen-op-Zoom was a most daring attempt, but that it ought not, or could not have succeeded, the number of the garrison being greater than that of the assailants. He added that the idea that the failure of the attack was in part to be attributed to one of the British generals not having taken the precaution to communicate the orders which had been given him to anyone else, so that when he was mortally wounded the troops did not know how to act, made no difference, as an attempt of that kind ought never to succeed unless the party attacked becomes panic-stricken, which sometimes happens.—"Records of the 91st," by Capt. Goff.

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE 33RD AT QUATRE BRAS

1814. THE 33rd remained at Antwerp until the 19th of August, when orders came to march to Dendermond. The regiment during the stay in the great city had suffered much from sickness, but the change that followed went far towards enabling the sick soldiers to recruit their health. After staying at Dendermond for ten days the men marched to Tournai, and thence to Menin, where they settled down to quiet garrison life, until March, 1815; but in no sense did they lapse into carelessness, for when Sir H. Clinton  
1815. inspected them on January 16th, he paid a splendid tribute to their efficiency, his report being :

*“ Upon the whole I consider this battalion to be in the most advanced state of any in the army.”*

Clinton's report served as a stimulus to men and officers alike, with the result that when Sir J. O. Vandeleur inspected the regiment on the 4th of March, just before orders came to quit Menin, he wrote in equally high terms, his report running thus :

*“ considers it in a very high state of discipline, and that the high order of the men's appointments and their precision in moving do great credit to the officers of the corps.”*

During this time the Great Powers had reason to fear the return of Napoleon, and the renewal of the

struggle to crush him. Colonel Campbell and Lord John Russell, who visited Elba at odd times, came away with the conviction that Napoleon contemplated some enterprise, and warned the Ministers at home.<sup>1</sup> Campbell reported what the exile said, and among the quoted words were these: "Every man in France considers the Rhine to be the natural frontier of France, and nothing can alter this opinion. If the spirit of the nation is roused into action nothing can oppose it. It is like a torrent. . . . The present Government of France is too feeble; the Bourbons should make war as soon as possible so as to establish themselves on the throne. It would not be difficult to recover Belgium. It is only for the British troops there that the French army has the smallest awe."

There were some who ignored these warnings, refusing to recognise their serious import; but as time went on mere rumours and fears and inferences began to crystallise. There came a day when Europe discovered that the exile in Elba was no more a negligible quantity, but a very real danger to the peace of the world. The exiled Emperor was in receipt of private information through his devoted friends from all parts of the Continent, and hence he learned of unrest in Italy, and of the discords among the Powers. He knew, moreover, of a plot of malcontents in the French army, the end in view being the overthrow of Louis XVIII.<sup>2</sup> Consequently he made his resolve, and being essentially a man of action, he so moved that Europe was again plunged into war. As Creasy puts it: "The Congress of Emperors, Kings, Princes, Generals, and Statesmen, who had assembled at Vienna to remodel the world after the overthrow of the mighty conqueror, and who thought that Napoleon had passed away for ever from the great drama of European politics, had not yet completed their triumphant festivities, and their diplomatic toils, when Talleyrand,

<sup>1</sup> Rose: "Life of Napoleon."

<sup>2</sup> Rose: "Napoleon."

on the 11th of March, 1815, rose up amongst them and announced that the Ex-Emperor had escaped from Elba, and was Emperor of France once more."

It was a startling surprise, for only that day "it had been irrevocably determined by the Allied Sovereigns that they would no longer either recognise Napoleon as a crowned head, or suffer him to remain in Europe; and that his residence, wherever it was, should be under such restrictions as should effectually prevent his breaking loose to devastate the world."<sup>1</sup> Equally as startling was the welcome Napoleon received in France after he had landed at Cannes, and moving on by way of Grenoble and Lyons, was joined by soldiers everywhere, who marched with him to the Tuileries, which he entered on the 20th of March.

The Seventh Coalition against him was immediately formed, and before long the armies of Europe, a million of men, were moving on France to crush him. Wellington was present at the Congress, and its members appealed to him to prepare a plan of campaign. Almost immediately he left Vienna for Belgium, which he realised must be the battle-ground.

The news set every regiment in the Netherlands on the move, and accordingly orders came for the 33rd to proceed to Oudenarde. The following day, March 23rd, the regiment arrived at Courtrai. Its place was assigned by the Commander-in-Chief in the 5th Brigade, under the command of Major-General Sir Colin Halkett, the other regiments in the Brigade being the 2nd battalion 30th, 2nd battalion 69th, and 2nd battalion 73rd. The Brigade was in the Third Division, which was under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Alten, this Division forming part of the First Corps under the command of General H.R.H. the Prince of Orange.

While the 33rd were moving from place to place—from Courtrai to Tournai, thence to Ath, where they made a prolonged stay before proceeding to

<sup>1</sup> Alison: "History of Europe."

Soignies, a small town on the Brussels Road, twelve miles from Mons—Wellington was arranging the plan of campaign, which has thus been set forth by Brialmont:

“Schwartzenberg was to pass the Rhine in two columns; the right at Mannheim and Germersheim; the left at Basle and Rhein-felden. The one was to move upon Chalons by Marne, the other by St. Deziers. The right column was to connect itself with the Russian army, which had orders to pass the Sarre, above the part where Schwartzenberg passed it; the Moselle between Thionville and Metz, the Meuse near to Verdun. The points of direction for the Russians were, Chalons-sur-Marne, and Rheims. Kliest's corps was to observe and attack the forts of the Meuse in the direction of Sedan. Finally, Wellington and Blücher were to regulate their movements according to the progress of the Russians and the Austrians, and to take the road towards Laon, debouching by Mauberge and Auvergne. As to the Austro-Sardinians, they were instructed to march upon Lyons, to ascend for a while the course of the Loire, and to fall in upon the left of Schwartzenberg.”

Wellington had his head-quarters at Brussels. The Prince of Orange, commanding the 1st corps, occupied Enghien, Brain le Conte and Nivelles, and formed a reserve to Ziethen, who commanded the Prussian division at Charleroi. This 1st Corps comprised two divisions of Belgians, two of Hanoverians, and two of British. Lord Hill was in command of the second Corps which was cantoned at Halle, Oudenarde, and Grammont. It consisted of two British divisions, a Belgian, and two Hanoverian. The reserve, which was quartered at Brussels and Ghent, was made up of two British divisions, and three Hanoverian divisions. The cavalry occupied Nineve and Grammont.<sup>1</sup>

Wellington's chief concern lay in the small numbers of his English troops. The army at his disposal round about Brussels did not include more than 24,000

<sup>1</sup> Bisset: “History of George III's Reign.”



English soldiers. His whole force numbered 49,608 infantry, 12,402 cavalry, and 5,645 artillery, with 156 guns.<sup>1</sup> The total was but 67,655 men. It was known that Napoleon was advancing with a larger army, the full strength of which was as yet unknown to Wellington. The Allies were advancing but slowly, in overwhelming numbers, it is true ; but on the other hand, Napoleon was certain to take immediate action, hoping to strike at Wellington before he was strengthened by Blücher.

Blücher had assembled his army at a point from whence he could advance across the lower Rhine. He had not more than 117,000 men, nearly a half of them irregular reserves, but thoroughly drilled, and animated with a "passion of hatred" for the French. Sloane, in regard to the Prussian army's commanders, is worth quoting. "Such was the reverence for routine among the Prussian officers, and so bitter were the jealousies of the petty aristocracy from which they sprang, that the king dared not promote on any basis except that of seniority. In order to make Gneisenau second in command, York, Kliest, and Tanenzien were stationed elsewhere, and Bülow was put in command of a reserve to hold Belgium when Blücher should advance to Paris. . . . The three division generals, Ziethen, Perch and Thielmann, were capable men of local renown. Gneisenau and Bülow were the only first-rate men among the Prussian commanders, but for rousing enthusiasm Blücher's name was a word to conjure with." As to the location in general of Blücher's army, it may be noted that Ziethen's posts before Charleroi saw the French camp-fires in the early hours of June 14th ; that evening they began to withdraw towards Fleurus, whither the remainder of the Prussian army was gradually set in motion.

The 33rd remained at Soignies from the 10th of May until the 16th of June. There was the uncertainty as to what Napoleon would do, now that he had resolved on taking the offensive by crossing the

<sup>1</sup> Montholon's "Memoirs"

frontier, to carry the war into the enemy's country. The Emperor had a choice among three lines of operations: 1st, to attack by the Meuse and cut the Prussians from their base; 2nd, to approach by Mons, and thrust Wellington back on Antwerp, which the English general had strengthened in view of that contingency; 3rd, to advance by the Sambre upon the point of junction between the two armies. The comment is, that "the two former lines were subject to this defect, that they rendered possible the concentration of the Prussians and the English; on this account the Emperor gave the preference to the third line."

Napoleon was over the frontier at the time when he was supposed to be in Paris, "entirely occupied with *fêtes* and spectacles," and the army which Wellington had in hand was dispersed over a considerable area, not yet concentrated. This daring move of Napoleon was a surprise. All the generals, save Wellington, expected the Emperor to remain on the defensive, and even Wellington felt that Napoleon would have done better to pursue that course. Nevertheless he had taken precautions, so that the surprise was rather in the reception of the news of Napoleon's near approach, than in being found unprepared. Indeed, General Jomini said, later, "If the Allied generals were taken by surprise at the moment of the irruption, it must be acknowledged that they were, in the main, well prepared for that event—happen when it might."<sup>1</sup>

Right on from the 9th of June Wellington's army was alert. The divisions were ready for marching, and orders had then been issued to the 1st Corps, in which the 33rd had place, "to assemble the troops by battalions near their cantonments every morning, and not to allow them to return at night to their quarters till it was ascertained that all was quiet."

Extraordinary care was taken against surprise, for it was impossible to tell whether Napoleon would

<sup>1</sup> Jomini: "*Precis sur le Campagne.*"

elect to strike first at Blücher, or Wellington. It has been presumed that when he decided to deal with the former, he did so "because he imagined that Blücher, with his hussar-like habits, would be the most prompt to concentrate." The French attack on the Prussian posts on the Sambre, was made at daybreak on the 15th of June, and they were driven in. Ziethen, who was at Charleroi, was also compelled to fall back to Fleurus, while an advanced small force of Belgians retired from Frasnes to Quatre Bras, a hamlet where two roads intersected—hence the name.

It was midnight when Wellington received word at Brussels of Napoleon's successful forward movement. Orders were given for an advance on Quatre Bras. This brought the 1st division from Soignies at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 16th. By 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the 33rd had passed through Nivelles, and then halted with the division for a cooked meal. The halt, however, was a short one, for the sound of heavy firing was heard in the direction of Quatre Bras.

Meanwhile Blücher had been attacked by Napoleon with his full force, with the exception of two corps which Ney led against Wellington, and a reserve corps at Marchiennes. Blücher, however, had effected the concentration of his troops, certainly in the case of three out of his four divisions. Even thus, however, while Blücher went far to achieve success, he had to fall back on Tilly, which he did in splendid order, Napoleon having brought up his reserve. It was Wellington's purpose to succour Blücher if attacked at Ligny, but the attack delivered at Quatre Bras compelled him to defend himself. Ney had advanced and assailed the Prince of Orange before his corps was fully concentrated. At the time—early in the afternoon—he had but nine battalions, or 7,312 men, and 16 guns. Other troops, like the 33rd, were still on the march.

When the 5th Brigade came up, the 1st Hanoverian Brigade was being attacked by the French light troops,

near the skirts of the Bois de Bossu. The 33rd had to move off the road, and traverse a cornfield to gain position. Advancing in open column of companies, French cavalry were seen, and the order to form square was given. The cavalry, seeing this, swept past on the 33rd's left, and charged the 69th, who were still in open formation, causing much confusion and loss, and pursuing the retreating regiment as far as Quatre Bras. The 33rd now had to retire, for the enemy turned on them and two battalions of the Brunswick contingent such a destructive fire as to threaten their annihilation. The regiments fell back to the wood to avoid attack from the French cavalry. It was necessary there to readjust companies, but to do so the regiment was compelled to traverse the wood, and debouch on the Nivelles road. More than a hundred casualties had already taken place, including not less than ten officers.

Just as they emerged from the wood General Cook came on the scene with 4,000 Guards, and dashing through, took the place of the brigade which had been compelled to retire. The brigade retraced their steps through the wood to support the Guards, and found that they had cleared it of Ney's troops, and were pursuing them in the open ground.

Ney, by his bold attack, had broken Wellington's centre, but the coming up of Cook's Guards and the two remaining battalions of the Brunswickers restored the situation. Ney saw that in spite of his success defeat was certain unless the reserve under D'Erlon came up. He fought on desperately, hoping for that officer's arrival, but hearing that he had been called away by Napoleon, to help him against Blücher, he fell back, leaving the victory of Quatre Bras with the English commander.

The fighting of that day proved a tremendous gain for Wellington. The victory he won "relieved his mind of all doubt as to the concentration of his army, and the working out of his contemplated plans."

Creasy says that when night set in the French had been driven back on all points towards Frasné; but they still held the farm of Gemiancourt in front of the Duke's centre. As Wellington was unaware of Blücher's retreat, he expected that the battle would be renewed in the morning by the two Allied armies. He therefore attacked Gemiancourt with some of his English troops during the late evening, and captured it.

The officer whom Blücher sent to tell Wellington that he was falling back from Ligny was shot, and consequently it was not until the following morning—the 17th of June—that word came to the English Commander-in-chief. Wellington saw at once that his plans must undergo a change. Finding that Blücher had fallen back upon Wavre, not as a beaten army, but “with perfect regularity and steadiness,” the Duke determined to follow out the scheme he had resolved on in such a contingency, namely to retire towards Brussels, “to cover that city, and to halt at a point in a line with Wavre, and there restore his communication with Blücher.”

On the morning of the 17th the army was on the move. The 5th Brigade got under arms at 11 o'clock, and left their bivouac near the Bois de Bossu. An officer of the 33rd,<sup>1</sup> in one of his letters, describes the movements of the day. “Movin got our left, apparently in a direct line towards Marshal Ney's right wing, the general impression among the officers was that Wellington contemplated an attack on that part of his position, and that shortly we should be again in action. This speculation, however, was soon found to be incorrect, the manœuvre having been intended to mask our retreat, and it succeeded admirably. On reaching a woody covert, our right shoulders were brought forward, and diving into a by-road, we passed the defiles and bridge of Genappe without molestation from the enemy. This was, as usual with ‘The Duke,’ an admirable piece of generalship—Marshal Ney's eyes not

<sup>1</sup> Lieut. F. H. Pattison.

having been opened till too late to attempt to frustrate his design.

"The protection of our rear was committed to our cavalry (under Lord Uxbridge), light infantry, and flying field artillery, with whom the enemy kept up a ceaseless running fight, until we arrived and took up our position in front of Waterloo."

The retreat of Wellington has been spoken of as a move of greatest daring, since the line was over a broken country almost destitute of roads ; and yet every regiment did its part with the precision of troops on parade, and with none of the depression that would indicate falling back before the enemy. The men had the assurance that they were being dealt with by Wellington, and in him they had unbounded confidence.<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon thought the fight engaged in during this movement of Wellington's army was with a beaten enemy, but he was mistaken, and what fighting there was, was of the most gallant character.

The French cavalry were superior in numbers, but Lord Uxbridge was determined to beat them off when they began to attack the rear of the retiring army at Genappe. He ordered the 7th Hussars to charge Napoleon's Polish Lancers, but while the charge was being made heroically, it was a task beyond their powers, for the Lancers "were well secured on each flank, and supported by a mass of cavalry in the rear." Determined, however, to drive the enemy off, Lord Uxbridge called on the 1st Life Guards, powerful men, with their long swords and strong horses. They made their charge, which was truly splendid. "Its rapid rush into the enemy's mass was as terrific in appearance as it was destructive in effect ; for although the French met the attack with firmness, they were utterly unable to hold their ground a single moment, were overthrown with great slaughter, and literally ridden in such a manner that the road was

<sup>1</sup> Sloane : "Life of Napoleon."

instantaneously covered with men and horses scattered in all directions. The Life Guards, pursuing their victorious course, dashed into Genappe, and drove all before them as far as the opposite outlet of the town."<sup>1</sup>

This masterly retreat, with Napoleon personally taking part in the pursuit, was undertaken in torrents of rain, which turned the country into mire, and fortunately added to the difficulties encountered by the French artillery. Wellington halted on ground near to the village of Waterloo. The position scarcely deserves the name of valley, but is generally termed such, between two and three miles long, and of varying breadth, being in one place little more than half a mile. Low hills run parallel with each other on either side of this so-called valley. Half-way across is an undulation which Wellington felt would afford good cover to the enemy if he attacked La Haye Sainte, but he remedied that defect by additional precaution. The village of Mont St Jean was a little behind the northern rise, towards the centre. On the southern ridge, and opposite to it, was another village, La Belle Alliance. The main road ran right through the position, the high road from Brussels to Charleroi. Cutting across this was a country road with banks and hedges on both sides, forming a line of separation between the opposing armies.

In front of Wellington's left centre was a farm known as La Haye Sainte. On Wellington's right centre, in front, were the chateau and farm of Hougomont, with a large garden. Far on to the left of Wellington, a dozen miles away, was Blücher, who had retreated from Ligny to Wavre. Napoleon regarded Blücher as hopelessly beaten and demoralised, and considering it sufficient to send Grouchy to hold him in check, he felt that he had only Wellington to deal with, and was confident of his ability to beat him. He knew nothing of Blücher's junction with Bülow's

<sup>1</sup> Captain Siberne's account, written on the battlefield.

division, and that he had sent Thielman with 17,000 men to block Grouchy's advance on Wavre, while he himself with the remainder of his army moved on towards Waterloo to join Wellington.

At two o'clock in the morning of the 18th, Wellington heard from Blücher that he was on his way to join him. By that time Napoleon had occupied the southern ridge and was planning his battle.

NOTE.—In the fight at Quatre Bras, on the 16th of June, the 33rd lost Captain John Haigh, Lieutenants John Boyce, and Arthur Gore, one sergeant, and fifteen rank and file killed; Major E. Parkinson, Captain W. MacIntire, Lieutenants James Markland, J. G. Ogle, James Furlong, John Anderson, J. A. Howard, three sergeants, three drummers, and sixty-four rank and file wounded; one sergeant and eight rank and file missing.

A sergeant was taken prisoner on the 17th of June, and three men were wounded.



## CHAPTER XXIII

### WATERLOO

1815. AFTER a night under arms, and "exposed to a tempest of lightning, thunder, and rain," the British army found itself face to face with Napoleon. The 33rd had bivouacked in a field adjacent to the Brussels and Charleroi Road, somewhat in advance of the army, and almost within speaking distance of the enemy.

Wellington drew up his army into two lines; the second composed of those regiments which had suffered most severely at Quatre Bras on the 16th, and of troops which had not seen service to such an extent as the others. The first line consisted of the second and fourth English divisions, the 3rd and 6th Hanoverians, and the first Belgians, under Lord Hill. General Picton commanded the left, which was made up of his own (5th) division, namely, Lambert's and Kempt's brigades. The centre was commanded by the Prince of Orange, who had with him the troops of Nassau and the Brunswickers in the centre of all, but on his right the Guards under General Cooke, and on his left General Alten's division. The cavalry, under Lord Uxbridge's command, were distributed throughout the line, the greater number in the left of the centre, to the east of the road to Charleroi. The Hanoverians garrisoned La Haye Sainte, an advanced post in front of the centre. A detachment of the Guards, commanded by Lord Saltoun and Colonel Macdonald, held the house and garden of Hougomont, while the sharpshooters of Nassau occupied the park.<sup>1</sup>

Behind Wellington lay the forest of Soignies. At

<sup>1</sup> Bisset; Brialmont.

St. Helena Napoleon was severe in his criticism of the English commander for choosing to have it so. His words were these : " Wellington could have done nothing more averse to the interests of his country, to the general plan of the campaign, on the most obvious principles of the art of war, than to remain in the position which he had taken up. He had the defiles of the Forest of Soignies behind him ; had he been beaten there was no retreat for him.

But Wellington had in mind much of which Napoleon was in ignorance. The author of " *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre* " points out what Wellington realised with his more ample knowledge of the position. " The Allied Army had behind its centre the Great Waterloo road ; and behind its right that of the two Braines ; and behind its left that of Hulpe ; three trunk roads all converging upon Antwerp, the base of their operations. There were, besides, many smaller alleys which traversed the forest itself, which, consisting of trees of large bulk, offered endless facilities for the cover of troops. The Allied Army was, therefore, better disposed for effecting a retreat than if it had been required to cross a huge open plain." Napoleon seems to have held Wellington in some contempt, for on the morning of Waterloo he had said to Ney, " Because you have been beaten by Wellington you think him a great General. And I tell you that Wellington is a bad general, that the English are bad troops, and that this will be the affair of a *déjeuner*."

Napoleon's army was deployed in three lines. The front, extending from the mansion of Frischermont to the Nivelles road, consisted of two infantry corps, one on each side of Belle Alliance, and of two corps of cavalry, one on the extreme right wing, one on the left ; of this line Ney had command. The second was shorter, its wings being cavalry, and its centre in two divisions of cavalry and infantry respectively. The third, or reserve, was the Guards. Each of the lines had its due proportion of artillery, stationed in each

case along the road. This disposition, says Sloane, who has thus set forth Napoleon's Order of Battle, "gave the French array, as seen from beyond, a fan-like appearance, the sticks, or columns, converging toward the rear."

As to the numbers in the two armies on the morning of the 18th of June, accounts vary, but comparing these, it would appear, on the authority of Creasy, that they were as follows :

WELLINGTON : 49,608 infantry  
12,402 cavalry  
5,645 artillery  
156 guns

This shows a total of 67,655. The British troops, however, did not number more than 23,990, and of these a large proportion were recruits or drafts from militia battalions.

NAPOLEON : 48,950 infantry  
15,765 cavalry  
7,232 artillery  
246 guns

A total of 71,947 men.

The 33rd were in Sir Colin Halkett's 5th Brigade, as before. This Brigade was composed of the 2nd battalion 30th, the 33rd, 2nd battalion 69th, and the 2nd battalion of the 73rd British regiments. The Brigade was on the right centre of the army, having Maitland's Guards to the right, and Kielmansegge's Hanoverian Brigade to the left. The Brigade was divided when it had left its bivouac and crossed the Brussels road to the position assigned. The 73rd and 30th formed contiguous columns of companies at quarter distance, the former right and the latter left in front. The 33rd and 69th also formed in contiguous columns of companies at quarter distance in second line to the right of the 73rd and 30th, they being at an intermediate distance to the rear of from eighty to a hundred paces intersected by the Wavre road, each

Brigade preserving its relative interval, so as to deploy into line, in case of a simultaneous advance.<sup>1</sup> The position of the 33rd was on slightly elevated ground, near to La Haye Sainte, where, as Napoleon said, later, it was his intention "to direct two divisions of the first corps and two of the sixth, supported by 129 pieces of cannon . . . while the two remaining divisions of the 6th corps should advance against La Haye."

It was evident from what followed that Napoleon's plan was to capture Hougoumont, and gain La Haye Sainte, thus piercing the centre of the English army. He did not anticipate such an obstinate resistance as was met with at these points.

The French attack, in pursuance of this purpose, began on Hougoumont, on the right of the British centre, about eleven o'clock, and in such overwhelming numbers that the capture of the post seemed certain. The sharpshooters of Nassau were driven out of the wood, but from the courtyard, orchard, and garden, the Guards could not be dislodged. The carnage in this fiercely contested struggle was fearful, for before long some two thousand men lay dead, or desperately wounded. Even when the French were reinforced in such strength that they almost surrounded the chateau and farm, they were unable to drive out the defenders until the out-buildings were fired. But the struggle on the part of those who hurried away from the flames was carried on in the yard and garden.

Simultaneously with the attack on Hougoumont a vigorous effort had been made against Wellington's right front. The rest of Jerome Bonaparte's division, lancers and cuirassiers, being sent forward, supported by close columns of infantry ready to deploy into line when the desired impression should have been made, the advance took place under cover of the tirailleurs and a furious cannonade.<sup>2</sup>

Wellington formed his infantry into squares, and

<sup>1</sup> Pattison's Letters.

<sup>2</sup> Bisset.

these, to avoid the destructive fire, lay down until the cavalry made their charges, when they repulsed the enemy in dire confusion. The French, thus held back, Wellington was enabled to pour reinforcements into Hougoumont, where the Guards were assailed by ten times their number.

Failing here, Napoleon turned to Wellington's centre and left wing. What he had fruitlessly attempted at Hougoumont he now essayed at La Haye Sainte, on which he threw four columns of infantry and Kellerman's cavalry. This brought the 33rd into some of the heaviest fighting of the day. La Haye Sainte was held by the Hanoverians, who drove back the French infantry again and again, while the cavalry swept on and were met by Halkett's Brigade who stood on the defensive, and beat the enemy back with heavy loss. The idea of these cavalry attacks was to prevent the place from being supported while the infantry were effecting its capture, dealing only with now-isolated Hanoverians. But the stand was as heroic as at Hougoumont, and not until the Hanoverians had exhausted their ammunition was La Haye Sainte captured. The Hanoverians had fought until they were literally exterminated.<sup>1</sup>

Creasy says of this crisis of the battle, that "on no point of the British line was the pressure more severe than on Halkett's brigade in the right centre." The magnificent stand here against the French cavalry served to hold back the enemy at the centre. The 33rd were again and again assailed by the French light troops who were set at liberty when La Haye Sainte was captured, for these continually debouched from the farm. There was yet sterner work in store. When not fighting, the 33rd and the other battalions in the Brigade were exposed to the fire of the French artillery, and Halkett, to save his men as much as possible,

<sup>1</sup> It was impossible for the Hanoverians to replenish the supply of ammunition since access could not be gained to the defenders. For this no provision had been made—a door had not been made in the north wall.

ordered them to lie down, allowing the shot to pass over them.

It seemed as though the centre would be broken when the Dutch troops, suddenly assailed, were cut down before they could get into a square. But General Picton's charge saved the situation. He brought from the second line Kempt's Brigade, composed of the 28th, 32nd, 79th, and 95th; also Pack's Brigade, side by side, in a thin, two-deep line. The latter halted at Picton's command, but with Kempt's, he advanced against a mass of troops three times their number. Within thirty yards he ordered a volley, and then a bayonet charge. The rush of cold steel was so terrible that the French fell back in confusion. It was Picton's last fight, for he was killed in the advance. To complete the French defeat Ponsonby brought up his brigade of heavy cavalry, and charged with irresistible force, driving the enemy back in inextricable rout.

"On went the horsemen, amid the wrecks of the French columns, capturing two eagles, and two thousand prisoners; onwards still they galloped, and sabred the artillerymen of Ney's seventy-four advanced guns; then severing the traces, and cutting the throats of the artillery horses, they rendered these guns totally useless to the French throughout the remainder of the day." The charge ended when the British cavalry, riding too far, were met by the enemy's lancers, who did them considerable damage, until in turn Vandeleur's light cavalry came on and rode them down.

Meanwhile, Blücher, for whom Wellington was waiting with intense anxiety, was drawing near. Wellington was aware that his powers for resistance were nearly come to an end. Napoleon was equally convinced that his own defeat was a certainty. Ney urgently requested reinforcements, but there were none to send him with which he could break the centre. He had one chance, but did not take it—to go forward at the head of the Guard infantry that remained to

him. A personal advance with these to Ney's support, it is thought, would have saved the French army, but he neither moved himself, nor sent these forward. The Prussians were appearing, and it would seem that Napoleon was paralysed. He could make no successful impression on Hougoumont, on his left ; he had failed to break the centre ; and away to his right there were sounds which told him that Grouchy was fighting. In reality Grouchy was held by Thielman's Prussian corps, while Blücher, who had come on slowly in spite of his utmost effort because of the badness of the swampy road, was moving to join Wellington.

Blücher and Bülow at once began to press on Napoleon's right, and with growing strength as brigade after brigade came on the field. Napoleon had thought himself secure from this side, relying on Grouchy holding what he considered a beaten and demoralised army of Prussians at Wavre. But Bülow, making a circling movement, was endeavouring to take Planchenoit, in the rear of the French right, to cut off Napoleon's retreat. At the moment when Napoleon had need of every man he could find to strengthen the attack on Wellington's centre, he had to save Planchenoit, for to lose it meant ruin. He was compelled to send his Young Guard—a third of his reserve—there, and the fighting which followed was of the most sanguinary nature. Planchenoit changed hands again and again. Further demand for reinforcements led to more men being sent, and two battalions of the Old Guard helped to drive Bülow back.

Meanwhile Wellington used his opportunity. He brought up reinforcements all along the line. Where Ney had done so much but was now exhausted, the centre was made good again. Ziethen, who was on Wellington's left, but had dropped back before Durette, losing Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain, retrieved his loss. Then Pirch's corps came to Bülow's aid at Planchenoit, where he overcame all resistance, causing the French troops to fall back in something approaching

panic: "all except the Guard, who stood in the churchyard . . . until surrounded and reduced in number to about two hundred and fifty men; then, under Pelet's command, they formed a square, placed the eagle in the midst, drove off the cavalry which blocked their path, and reached the main line of retreat with scarcely enough men to keep their formation."

If anything, the battle was raging more fiercely than at any time since the fight began, for it was Napoleon's last effort. He was pressing Wellington everywhere. The crisis of Waterloo was approaching, and on either side the losses had been enormous. But there was to come the most fearful experience of the day, and the full force of it was to be felt by those in Wellington's line between Hougomont and La Haye Sainte—the British right centre, where the 33rd were. What was going on in the French line no one could tell; yet there was the presentiment that there was something which would prove decisive—a supreme effort on Napoleon's part, where success meant victory, where failure spelt disaster.

At length a movement where Napoleon was became discernible. Even above the din of battle rose the cry of the Old Guard, "Vive l'Empereur!" and the advance began. But Wellington prepared for it, and knowing the need of the line in the rear of La Haye Sainte, he ordered Maitland's brigade to take up a position there, while he himself, with Napier's battery, moved away to Maitland's right.

Halkett understood the meaning of the movement of the Old Guard. The 73rd, which had taken its position with a full staff of officers, was so reduced as to be commanded by a junior lieutenant. The 69th, which had suffered so terribly from French sabres at Quatre Bras, had endured grievous casualties. The 30th had likewise come in for its full share in loss of officers and men; and the 33rd had by this time been reduced more than one-third.<sup>1</sup> Halkett's orders were,

<sup>1</sup> Pattison's Letters.



each regiment to form "four deep, right wing in front," and the general himself went to the centre of his brigade, where he gave the order to advance. The movement was designed to meet the desperate charge of Donzelot, who was coming out from La Haye Sainte, bringing field pieces with him. When the two bodies of soldiers were within a hundred paces of each other, Donzelot fired grape from these guns right into the midst of Halkett's Brigade.

Men fell rapidly, Halkett among them, shot through the cheeks. Lieutenants Buck and Cameron, of the 33rd, the latter carrying the regimental colours, were killed. The 33rd suffered heavily. Lieutenants Bain, Meikland, Westmore, and Ogle were shot down, Lieutenant Haigh was shot through the neck, and died next day, Adjutant Thain was also killed, while Captains McIntyre and Harsty were wounded, besides thirty to forty of the rank and file. As Halkett was carried to the rear, Colonel Elphinstone took command, and led the Brigade on, in spite of the fire of grape; but suddenly the enemy's fire relaxed, then ceased, and "when the smoke had disappeared, not a man was to be seen except those who were retreating in great disorder and consternation." The explanation of Donzelot's retreat is not satisfactorily forthcoming, but may be attributed to what transpired on the advance of the Old Guard.

Maitland's brigade were lying down under cover behind the crest of the hill, waiting for the word which was to surprise Napoleon's Guard. They were 4,000 strong, forming at first one column, some seventy men in width. "The front battalions headed for a point a little to the west of the present monument, while for some unexplained reason the rear portion diverged to the left, and breasted the slope later than the others and nearer Hougoumont. Flanked by light guns that opened a brisk fire, and most gallantly supported by Donzelot's division close to their right, the leading column struggled on, despite the grape and canister

which poured from the batteries of Bolton and Bean, making it wave 'like corn blown by the wind.' " But while they wavered for a brief space in such a furious storm of shot, they moved on at Ney's call, mounted the slope, unconscious of the British Guard in waiting over the crest. It seemed to them that when they mounted so far they would see the Allies' army in retreat, for beyond that awful fire which assailed them there was no sign of anything in front. They had but to move onward, and the day was theirs.

When they reached the crest they were appalled. Maitland's men at Wellington's word, "Stand up, Guard, and make ready!" sprang into sight within sixty paces. Their volleys followed, laying the brave French Guardsmen low by hundreds; then, before they could recover from their surprise, Maitland's brigade charged with loud "hurrahs." Their onrush was irresistible. The Guard turned and fled in fearful confusion, and but for the recall of Maitland's men, might well have been annihilated. They were brought back because a second column of the Imperial Guard was approaching, hard by the eastern wall of Hougoumont, but making for the same crest where the first column had been so disastrously beaten back.

If anything, they were assailed more terribly than those who had gone before. Adams's brigade was formed on their left flank, and poured in a destructive fire, while in front of them Maitland's men were firing volley after volley at the same time with the heaviest possible cannonade from the batteries. To move on under such conditions was impossible, even for such veterans. Then, to crown all, Colborne, with the 52nd Light Infantry, charged the left flank of the Old Guard. It was this charge with bayonets and the devastating fire which broke them up, and they fled in wild confusion, getting among Donzelot's infantry. The thought that the Old Guard were routed made these waver, and when Adams's brigade came up with their bayonets, and swept in among them, they fell back in panic.

Wellington now determined no longer to stand on the defensive, lest Napoleon should bring up his reserve battalions from La Belle Alliance. The generals were ordered to concentrate their brigades, each regiment to be formed four deep, right wing in front on a collateral line, preserving their relative intervals. The 33rd, in this disposition, had Maitland's brigade on their immediate right. The intermediate ground between them and Byng's Guards was occupied by Lord Hill's light brigade, namely six companies of the 95th Rifles, and the 52nd and 71st Regiments.

The flight of the Old Guard opened out a road for the advance, and the Duke's army moved forward rapidly. But Napoleon did not wait. His army began a retreat which "became a rout that surged wildly around the last squares of the Guard." Rose, in his "Life of Napoleon," says that the flight was ignominious. "Wellington's weary troops, after mistaking friends for foes in the dusk, halted south of Rossomme, and handed over the pursuit to the Prussians, many of whom had fought but little, and now drank deep the draught of revenge. By the light of the rising moon Gneisenau led on his horsemen in a pursuit compared with which that of Jena was tame. At Genappe Napoleon hoped to make a stand: but the place was packed with wagons, and thronged with men struggling to get at the narrow bridge. At the blare of the Prussian trumpets the panic became general; the Emperor left his carriage and took to horse as the hurrahs drew near. Seven times did the French form bivouacs, and seven times were they driven out and away. At Quatre Bras Napoleon once more sought to gather a few troops; but ere he could do so the Uhlans came on." It was all in vain. Napoleon's loss of Waterloo meant ruin for him, a ruin beyond retrieval.

NOTES.—I. The loss of the Allies at Waterloo was

immense. Alison, in his "History of Europe," says that that of the British and Hanoverians alone amounted to 10,686, of whom 2,047 were killed, exclusive of the Prussians, who had lost 6,000 more. The Prussians lost on the 16th and 18th, including the action at Wavre, on the latter of these days, 33,132. Of the French army's loss it is difficult to speak decisively. At the least it has been put down at 40,000, but in effect the army was totally destroyed, and scarcely any of the men who fought at Waterloo ever again appeared in arms.

2. The effective strength of Sir Colin Halkett's brigade on entering the field of Quatre Bras on the 16th of June, 1815, was as follows :

#### 5TH BRITISH BRIGADE :

2nd Batt. 30th Regt.—Lieut.-Col. Hamilton	615
33rd Regt.—Lieut.-Col. W. Elphinstone	561
2nd Batt. 69th Regt.—Col. C. Morrice	516
2nd Batt. 73rd Regt.—Col. G. Harris	562
	<hr/>
Total	2,254

#### Casualties at Quatre Bras and Waterloo :

	Killed	Wounded	Unhurt
Officers : 30th Regt. 36	7	13	16
33rd Regt. 36	7	15	14
69th Regt. 29	5	8	16
73rd Regt. 27	6	16	5
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
128	25	52	51

Casualties of rank and file, including non-com. officers, drummers, and those missing :

Quatre Bras	304
Waterloo	679
	<hr/>
	983

Add officers killed and wounded, 77, the total casualties were 1,060, not far from half of the whole brigade.

3. The 33rd lost Lieutenants H. R. Buck, James Hart, Thomas Haigh, and John Cameron, one sergeant, and 33 rank and file killed ; Captains C. Knight, Harty, Lieutenants Read, S. Pagan, R. Westmore ; Ensigns William Bain, George Drury ; Ensign and Adjutant W. Thain ; 8 sergeants and 84 rank and file wounded ; 4 drummers and 48 rank and file missing. Its heavy list of missing was unequalled by that of any infantry regiment in the action, and was only approached by its companion regiment, the 73rd, which had 41.

4. Formation of the 33rd at Waterloo.

Contiguous Column of Companies at Quarter distance, 33rd Right, 69th Left in Front, these in rear of 73rd and 30th similarly formed.

5. The command of the Brigade having devolved on Lieut.-Col. Elphinstone towards the close of the action, that of the 33rd fell to Captain Knight, the officers superior to him having been obliged to quit the field in consequence of wounds.

6. The following Order was issued a few weeks after the Battle of Waterloo :

WAR OFFICE, 25th *July*, 1815.

His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, has been pleased, in the name of, and on behalf of His Majesty, to approve of all the British Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry which were engaged in the Battle of Waterloo being permitted to bear on their Colours and Appointments, in addition to any other Badges or Devices that have been heretofore granted to those Regiments, the word "Waterloo" in commemoration of their distinguished services on the 18th of June, 1815.

7. The following were the casualties in the 33rd during the Waterloo campaign :

Quatre Bras : Officers killed	3	Men killed	16
„ wounded	7	„ wounded	67
June 17th : 3 men wounded			
Waterloo : Officers killed	2	Men killed	33
„ wounded	8	„ wounded	92
	<hr/>		<hr/>
Total	20		208

The following letter, written by Ensign James Arnot Howard, of the 33rd, immediately after the Battle of Waterloo, is of special interest, and, as the Editor of the "Army and Navy Gazette," who inserted the letter in his columns, says, is of equal interest as showing the outlook of a young subaltern of a century ago.

IN THE BIVOUAC CLOSE TO THE GATES OF PARIS,  
*July 8, 1815.*

We have been so actively engaged that we have not had time to write, supposing that we could procure utensils, which was impossible.

Most likely my name has by this time appeared in the "Gazette" among the wounded on the 16th. This, I am happy to say, was but slight.

It would be ridiculous in me to think of entering into any detail of the business of that day at all events, for the newspapers have given such a correct account of everything ; but on the evening of June 16, while in our bivouac, and not far from the village of Quatre Bras, we heard the most terrible thundering of cannon and our division was put in motion. This foretold sport—true enough ; in about two hours after that—six o'clock—the balls were buzzing about our ears in the most delightful manner.

All the Lights were formed on the left, the Battalion for skirmishing ; upon the whole we got off very well, some 7 or 8 men wounded, until near dark in the evening, when I got a clink on the

outside of my left thigh which knocked me down, and obliged me to quit the field. This was nine o'clock. Although very seriously bruised, but finding nothing more than a little flesh disconcerted, I got the blood washed off, and joined the company the same night in advance of the whole. We kept our ground ; in the morning our picquets commenced a little skirmishing, but our position they would not attempt to wrest from us. We were now relieved and went to join our regiments, but I am very sorry to add I found they had suffered severely, 3 officers killed, and 7 wounded and about 100 men ; and my poor friend Furlong was one of the number, and wounded dangerously ; he sent for me repeatedly but no one could find me, being so far in advance ; he said he must die, and therefore sent his watch to me. In the morning I went to see if I could find him, but they had sent him to Brussels. I therefore could not see the poor fellow, but I have heard from several people who say that they think he will do well ; the ball entered his right side and remains either in his lungs or shoulder blade ; it never can be extracted.

On the 17th of June we retired in the best possible order to the heights of Mount St. Jean or Waterloo ; here we took up our good and never-to-be-forgotten position and fought our battle. Our regiment was placed on the first hill of our position, where we could see the French buffers manœuvre before us. I rather think they would have attacked us the same evening but we saluted them so prettily when they made their appearance on the hill opposite. The next morning, the 18th (my birthday), the French began their movements by daylight ; we of course were ordered by the noble Wellington to move accordingly. About ten o'clock the sport began by an attack on our right, but here they were

repulsed with immense loss. This they repeated several times and as often failed ; they then tried the left and were very warmly received, and did not gain much ground. Our Brigade and Regiment was in the centre, and during this time was exposed to nothing more than cannon shot which frequently missed us. Towards the latter part of the day the enemy made a most desperate and furious attack on our centre. Here we had our share of bloody work. I shall never forget the scene and carnage ; really the French cavalry (who behaved admirably) charged so repeatedly and so furiously that we could scarcely send our wounded officers to the rear, and much less men : just this moment pointed out to me the meaning of being warmly engaged. Our Brigade and a Brigade of Guards were the only soldiers we could see, and we were so much reduced that I thought that things were going badly, and we made up our minds to send our colours to the rear ; still determined to stay while we had a man left. Here we were—could just maintain our ground, when to our delight came up lots of reinforcements. Indeed Lord Wellington had been with us in very hot fire and said that we should be immediately supported. Just at this moment he brought up all the cavalry, artillery and infantry from the reserve, and advanced. The French gave way in every quarter, and in fact were so panic-struck that they could not form them again. Our Brigade halted, having had a sufficiency, for the general, and every field officer but two of the Brigade, were either killed or wounded, and our whole strength reduced to about 300 out of 1,500. The 73rd Regt. was commanded by a young lieutenant. Things were so bad that I was acting Brigademajor for some time, but Capt. Harty of the Light Company being only slightly wounded, he took it and I did the Adjutant's duty, who was wounded ;



and telling the men off after the action, there were only 72 men on the parade and 5 officers ; having lost 4 killed and 30 wounded together with 1,500 men in the two days ; we had in casualties 24 officers and 250 men. I have often expressed a wish to see a general engagement. I have—and am perfectly satisfied. I should never have forgiven myself if I had not been in the action of the 18th in consequence of my wound. Thank God, I am safe. I had a very narrow escape that day ; a ball passed through my cap and must have been within the eighth of an inch of my head. I intend bringing the cap to England.

I can scarcely fancy myself alive and writing to you, after what I have seen. We may almost say that England conquered France in one battle. Now for the most melancholy part of my tale ; so great was the confusion, and so certain were they in Brussels that the battle was lost, that they fled to Antwerp in thousands ; the consequence was that our baggage, which had been sent there for safety, was plundered and destroyed, they say, by Belgian troops ; but so it was in our regiment ; we had not a second shirt or blanket to cover us from the very wet weather. Think of a man being wet and dry in the same clothes for 10 days, and no halting days. We had but one halting day between Brussels and Paris, and therefore we had no time whatever to write or change our linen.

We took possession of the heights of Montmartre on the 5th of July, and Paris the 6th. Montmartre is a tremendous place, and from that you have the most magnificent view of Paris perhaps that was ever seen anywhere. To-day the Parisians have hoisted the white flag, but not in any way unanimously. We have guns planted in every street to give them a brush if they attempt to stir.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE VICTORS IN FRANCE

**AFTER** Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, the Allies 1815.  
advanced on Paris by two different routes. Wellington  
took the northern road, while Blücher moved on to  
Avesnes, and thence to Laon. Wellington's dispatch,  
dated the 22nd of June, shows the course he took after  
quitting the field of Waterloo. He says :

We have continued in march on the left of  
the Sambre since I wrote you. Marshal Blücher  
crossed that river on the 19th in pursuit of the  
enemy, and both armies entered the French  
territory yesterday ; the Prussians by Beaumont,  
and the Allied army, under my command, by  
Bavay.

The remains of the French army have retired  
upon Laon. All accounts agree in stating that it  
is in a very wretched state ; and that in addition  
to its losses in battle and in prisoners, it is losing  
vast numbers of men by desertion.

The soldiers quit their regiments in parties,  
and return to their homes ; those of the cavalry  
and artillery selling their horses to the people of  
the country.

The 3rd corps, which in my dispatch of 19th  
I informed your Lordship had been detached to  
observe the Prussian army, remained in the  
neighbourhood of Wavre till the 20th ; it then  
made good its retreat by Namur and Dinant.  
This corps is the only one remaining entire.

This dispatch from the Duke displays the absolute wreck of Napoleon's army of 150,000 men. Owing to the desertions of which Wellington speaks, it diminished daily, so that had Napoleon done as he proposed, held Paris against the Allies, he would have been without an army to deal with the oncoming of the victorious troops.

The 33rd were with the army marching into France, its objective being Paris. Still in the 5th Brigade, they formed a part of the 3rd Division, but took no part in the desultory fighting which followed at places where the scattered remnants of the French army essayed to make a stand. These were either carried by escalade, or surrendered when it was realised how hopeless resistance was. No serious stand was made against Wellington's army, but a determined fight occurred wherein the Prussians captured some guns, and scattered the enemy.

Wellington closed the dispatch referred to just now with the sentence: "All accounts concur in stating that it is impossible for the enemy to collect an army to make head against us." Yet Napoleon, while conscious of the disastrous blow at Waterloo, did not seem to realise that his cause was lost. He wrote within twenty-four hours of Waterloo to his brother Joseph, declaring that he "would speedily have 300,000 men ready to defend France; he would harness his guns with carriage horses, raise 100,000 conscripts, and arm them with muskets taken from the Royalists and malcontent National Guards; he would arouse Dauphine, Lyonnais, and Burgundy, and overwhelm the enemy."

He had, however, to contend with the deputies of the Chamber, and when he returned to Paris, they would have no more of him. He had lost his hold on France, which he declared to be "given over to *idéologues* and traitors." There seemed some hope for Napoleon when news came that Grouchy's army was practically intact, and that regiments were rallying at

Laon. He thought he might use these to crush the Chamber, but they forestalled him, and demanded his abdication as an alternative to his dethronement by them. Within a week of Waterloo he was ordered to quit Paris, and marking the attitude of the deputies and the people, he abdicated and left the capital.

The armies from the north were advancing rapidly. Wellington's idea was to be before Paris ere any plans could be made for resistance, and on the 1st of July he was within sight of the city. Two days before the advancing armies were distributed as follows: Blücher had a corps at Crespy, with detachments at Villars Coterets and La Ferté Milon; also a corps at Senlis. The 4th Corps, in Bülow's command, was on towards Paris, and it was expected that within twenty-four hours he would be at St. Denis and Gonasse. Wellington's own army, on the right, was just behind St. Just. His left was behind Taub, where the high road from Compeigne joins the high road from Roye to Paris. His reserve was at Roye.

The 33rd, still on the right, were therefore behind St. Just when the army came in sight of the French capital.

Grouchy was effectually shut off from Paris, for while he was at Soissons Blücher's army interposed between him and the capital. Unknown to Wellington, while he was writing his dispatch to Earl Bathurst, Grouchy attacked Blücher's advanced guard at Villars Coterets, but was beaten off with heavy loss, and driven across the Marne.

On the 30th the 33rd found themselves across the Oise, taking up a position on the heights of Rochebourg, where Wellington's right halted. His left were on the Bois de Boundy. Blücher meanwhile had crossed the Seine at St. Germain, and placed his right at Plessis Pique, his left at St. Cloud, and the reserve at Versailles.

The question now was—Would Paris hold out against the Allies? Napoleon was reported to have

gone ; but what would be the attitude of the Provisional Government who had forced the Emperor to abdicate and quit the capital ? Wellington prepared with his usual care for eventualities, not being certain as to what was transpiring in Paris ; whether Napoleon would rally his troops, now some 40,000 or 50,000, in addition to the National Guards, the *Federés*, and a new levy called *Les Tirailleurs de la Garde*, and fight, hoping first to surprise *Blücher* and then Wellington, in what was his last bid for power. But his proposals to do this were rejected. Even thus, however, there was some resistance, especially to *Blücher*, who drove back the enemy and established himself on the heights of *Meudon*, and in the village of *Issy*. Again the French attacked him but were driven back with such disorder and loss that, to quote Wellington's dispatch, "Paris was then open on its vulnerable side, . . . and a communication was opened between the two Allied Armies by a bridge which I had had established at *Argenteuil*, and a British corps was likewise moving upon the left of the *Seine*, towards the *Pont de Neuilly*."

Resistance on the part of the French was hopeless now, and the Provisional Government accordingly proposed that fighting should cease while negotiations should begin at the palace of *St. Cloud*—a Military Convention, indeed—with the view to the evacuation of Paris by the French army. Commissioners were chosen, the Convention was held, and the decision arrived at, purely military, touching nothing political, which provided for the evacuation of the capital in three days, while "all the fortified posts and the barriers should be given up ; that public property, with the exception of that relating to war, should be respected ; that private persons and property should be equally respected ; and that all individuals in the capital should continue to enjoy their rights and liberties without being disturbed or called to account, either as to situations held by them, or as to their conduct, or political

opinions." The Capitulation was put into force on July 7th, when "the National Guards at the several barriers of Paris delivered up their posts to the Allies, and their various forces of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, to the numbers of about 50,000 men, were distributed with all the precautions necessary to prevent insurrection in a captured town."<sup>1</sup>

On the 8th of July the troops of the Allied Army entered Paris, and later in the day Louis XVIII was once more in his capital. The Allied Army was distributed throughout the city, the 33rd bivouacking in the Bois-de-Boulogne, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone. Wellington insisted on the military occupation of France by the Allies for a fixed number of years, to afford the restored monarch "the opportunity of reorganising his own army and settling the groundwork of a new Government." He felt that it would tend to bring to the people habits of peace after a quarter of a century of war; it would, moreover, allow the collection of the money contributions levied by the Treaty, and provide other benefits and safeguards.

Wellington carried his point, and was made Commander of the Army of Occupation, which consisted of 30,000 English, 30,000 Prussians, 30,000 Russians, 30,000 Austrians, and 30,000 men furnished by the smaller states of Germany.<sup>2</sup> During the first month of the occupation the 33rd were among the troops which marched past the Czar of Russia, who reviewed the army; but on the 31st of October the regiment quitted the Bois-de-Boulogne, and went into cantonments. At neither place did they remain long, for between that date and the 4th of December they moved on from Nueilly, thence to Jessy, and finally came to Vaugirard.

The year 1817 was fixed on Wellington's suggestion for the withdrawal from France by the Allied Armies, but when he saw that the country was speedily settling down to order, and that Louis XVIII's position was

<sup>1</sup> Biset.

<sup>2</sup> Brialmont.

secure, he proposed to reduce the numbers of the Army of Occupation. During these movements of the regiment the Czar conferred the decorations of the Order of St. Anne on Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone of the 33rd, "in testimony of His Majesty's approbation of (his) services and conduct, particularly in the late battles fought in the Netherlands." On the 4th of December orders came for the 33rd to return to England. The regiment accordingly marched through Paris, under the command of Bt.-Lieut.-Colonel Parkinson, proceeded by easy stages to Calais, and embarking on the 23rd of December, landed at Ramsgate and Dover. The separation of the transports because of the rough weather accounted for this. The flank companies were more unfortunate, the transport in which they were being driven on to Ostend.

On Christmas Day the 33rd marched into Canterbury, but after a short stay proceeded to Chatham, then to Tilbury, and on to Colchester, where they arrived on New Year's Day, a terribly depleted regiment after the heavy losses in the Waterloo Campaign. The flank companies did not join them until the 11th of January, but ultimately the whole regiment left for Hull, where the Regimental Dépôt was taken on the strength.

The 33rd, shortly after their arrival at Sunderland, April 15th, received their Waterloo medals. They had reason to be proud of the part they played in that combined effort of the nations to crush Napoleon.

NOTE: *The Waterloo Medal*.—A medal was struck for this victory, which was conferred on all present in the three actions of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, 1815. In a letter from the Duke of Wellington to the Duke of York, dated Orville, June 28th, 1815, His Grace wrote, "I would likewise beg leave to suggest to your Royal Highness the expediency of giving to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers engaged in the Battle of Waterloo a medal. I am convinced it would

have the best effect in the army ; and if that battle should settle our concerns, they will well deserve it." In a letter from His Grace to Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State for the War Department, on the 17th of September, this passage occurs : " I have long intended to write to you about the medal for Waterloo. I recommended that we should all have the same medal, hung to the same ribbon as that now used with the medals."

The Waterloo medal has on the obverse the laureated head of the Prince Regent, inscribed "George P. Regent"; on the reverse is Victory, seated on a pedestal, holding a palm in the right hand, and an olive branch in the left. Above the figure of Victory is the name of the illustrious Wellington, and under it the word "Waterloo," with the date of the battle, June 18th, 1815. The figure evidently owes its origin to the ancient Greek coin. The name, rank, and regiment of the officer or soldier were engraved round the edge of the medal, which was to be suspended from the buttonhole of the uniform by the ribbon authorised for the military medals, namely, crimson with blue edges. In the "London Gazette" of the 23rd of April, 1816, was published the following official notification :

#### MEMORANDUM

HORSE GUARDS, *March* 10th, 1816.

The Prince Regent has been graciously pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to command, that in commemoration of the brilliant and decisive victory of Waterloo, a medal should be conferred on every officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier of the British Army present upon that memorable occasion.

His Royal Highness has further been pleased to command that the ribbon issued with the medal



shall never be worn but with the medal suspended to it.

By command of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent,

FREDERICK, Commander-in-Chief.

H. TORRENS, Major-General and Military Secretary.

This was the first medal ever given to all ranks by the British Government, and all who received it were permitted to count two years' service towards a pension.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>(See "British War Medals." Thos. Carter)

# West Indian and Home Service

## CHAPTER XXV

### BETWEEN THE WARS

WHAT followed these movements from place to place on arrival in England was nothing more than the ordinary barrack life and experience, with inspections from time to time, which go far to show that the 33rd were as keen as ever in maintaining the traditions of the regiment for smartness in appearance and for discipline. 1816.

A very important change came in March, 1818, while the 33rd were quartered in the citadel of Hull. The Establishment was augmented from 700 to 800 rank and file, and stood as under : 1818.

10 Companies	1 Sergeant-Major
1 Colonel	1 Quarter - Master - Sergeant
1 Lieutenant-Colonel	1 Paymaster Sergeant
2 Majors	1 Schoolmaster Sergeant
10 Captains	1 Armourer Sergeant
12 Lieutenants	10 Colour Sergeants
8 Ensigns	30 Sergeants
1 Pay Master	40 Corporals
1 Quarter-Master	1 Drum Major
1 Adjutant	21 Drummers and Fifers
1 Surgeon	760 Privates
2 Assistant Surgeons	

This change, however, was not for long. As soon as peace was ensured the strength of the 33rd was reduced from 800 rank and file to 650, while a Major and an Assistant Surgeon were placed on half pay from the 24th of the following December. The reduction took place in October.

1819. While the regiment was in Guernsey and Alderney there was an inspection, and the order which followed is worth quoting to show that the *esprit de corps* of the 33rd was as fine as ever. This was previous to the transfer of the regiment to Portsmouth.

GUERNSEY,  
11th October, 1819.

Major-General Bayly has great satisfaction in expressing how much he was pleased with the appearance of the 33rd Regiment inspected particularly by him on Saturday last. Its attention to everything prescribed by His Majesty's Regulations, the excellent system of its interior economy, as well as the steadiness of its discipline and perfect knowledge of Field Exercise, reflect the highest credit on the Commanding Officer, and also upon all the various ranks serving under him.

Major-General Sir George Cooke, who had been so honourably connected with the regiment in its Netherlands experiences, followed up the preceding recognition of the regiment's merits by an Order on the occasion of the 33rd leaving Portsmouth.

PORTSMOUTH,  
13th December, 1819.

Major-General Sir George Cooke, upon the departure of the 33rd Regiment from this station, begs leave to express the fullest approbation of their regularity and good conduct during the time they have been under his command.

He would have considered this an unnecessary compliment at the end of so short a time if he had not known the Regiment before; but having had the honour of serving with them on the Continent, he feels himself entitled in expressing his regret at their departure to add that whatever may be their destination, he feels confident they will meet with the approbation of those under whom they may serve.

It was undoubtedly the fixed resolution of the regiment not to tarnish their excellent record, for on leaving Stirling Castle on the 5th of July, 1820, Lieut.-General Graham, the Deputy Governor, issued an Order in which he said that he could not allow the regiment to depart without offering to all ranks his best thanks "for their uniform soldier-like conduct, without a fault during their short stay at this Castle." 1820.

It would become almost monotonous to quote from time to time the testimony of officers of high standing to the conduct of the 33rd, expressed mostly in the same strain of commendation, showing that there was, to quote Major-General Reynell, "just cause to admire and approve of the appearance, system, and discipline of the 33rd Regiment, and his unfeigned regret at losing so good and so distinguished a corps from under his Command." The worth of a regiment lies in its continued consistency, not in spasmodic efforts to attain excellence, and then to revert to an ordinary level; but throughout the years now under review, without exception, the fine character of the 33rd was maintained. The record was one to be proud of, and the regiment was, beyond all doubt, resolute in not allowing any deterioration.

Two companies of the regiment, while stationed at Dublin, were reduced, in August, 1821, and with 8 companies the Establishment was fixed at 650 of all ranks. 1821.

In December the regiment proceeded to Jamaica. The numbers of those embarking in the four transports were, 28 officers, 582 men, 37 women, and 53 children, a total of 700. The send-off Garrison Order at Cork is worth quoting.

CORK,  
17th *December*, 1821.

The 33rd Regiment being ordered to embark this day for a term of service in another quarter of the globe, Major-General Sir John Lambert feels it his duty to enter upon the records of the Regiment the high reputation it carries with it not less for its good order than valour in the Field. Where such a system exists, and with Soldiers so animated, there is little fear that this character can change, and hence there is nothing left to the Major-General to hope, in common with all those officers under whose command the Regiment has of late years been, but that health and happiness will attend the 33rd on every service that it may be called upon to perform.

There was some delay before the transports sailed, owing to the stormy weather, but on the 29th the voyage began; one which was to end disastrously for the Head-quarters ship, the "Ocean," which struck on a reef on the coast of Antigua. She was so badly damaged that the regiment landed while she underwent repairs, involving a delay of more than two months. The regiment ultimately arrived at Kingston, and moved on to the barracks at Up Park Camp, a notoriously unhealthy spot; yet the authorities continued to use it for the troops, regardless of past experience. Jamaica had proved for many years to be little more than "a white man's grave." There had been a time when it was such a fever den that some speakers in the House of Commons had advised the Government to send out coffins with the soldiers, since death from that fell disorder was almost inevitable. It had not

been an uncommon thing for three or four men at the Up Park Camp to be buried every day. The barracks were built on low and unhealthy ground to the ignoring of healthy sites available, but the authorities did not possess the common sense to see that it was to their interest to look to the well-being of the men. Those in power strained at inconsequential gnats, but swallowed enormous camels. As I have shown in my "History of the Tenth Foot," a regiment might starve or die off, and no effort was made to remedy the mischief; but as for the smart appearance of the regiment, or some petty detail as to uniform, that counted greatly, and could not be neglected.

The 33rd were cognisant of this, and went to their quarters with the feeling that an unhappy time was in store for them. Before they had been long in the barracks the fever got hold of the men, and three officers and forty-nine non-commissioned officers and privates died, while others were sickening. The Lieut.-Colonel demanded better quarters unless the regiment was to be wiped out, and as a result the 33rd were removed to Storm Hill, one company excepted, and there was no abnormal mortality after the change.

As time went on the services of the 33rd were required to deal with disturbances in the island, which was become a scene of conspiracy and rebellion. There were "nocturnal meetings of the corrupted slaves," and some were organising a simultaneous massacre of the white population. In the west of the island an active rebellion of the blacks broke out, and fires and murder followed. The swift and ready movements of the 33rd, in response to orders from Major-General Sir John Keane, resulted in crushing the rebellion, and restoring confidence among the whites. It was said of this commander that "his regard for the meanest soldier was ever shown in his own conduct, for the duty he imposed on his men he inflicted on himself; and while every act was measured by the inflexible rules of discipline, his troops were taught to repose implicit

1824.

confidence in their own valour, and in the wisdom of their general, without despising even the barbarian force to which it might be necessary to expose them here." General Keane did not fail to record his satisfaction at the "zeal, activity, and intelligence displayed by Captain Tench of the 33rd Regiment, as well as the cheerful assistance of the detachment under his command," since the result had been "to restore confidence and security to the district in which their services had lately been required."

On the 25th of March, 1824, an Order was issued which resulted in the augmentation of two companies to every regiment of infantry in the British Army, and the 33rd, with 6 service companies of 86 rank and file each, and 4 depôt companies of 56 rank and file, now numbered 835 officers and men. On the 4th of September rifles were issued to six men of each battalion company, and a subaltern officer appointed to command them. They were held in readiness for whatever special service might arise

In February, 1827, the regiment moved from Spanish Town to Up Park Camp. Presumably the place had been rendered more sanitary, since no record of especial sickness is made. It may be interesting to note what the weekly rations issued to the 33rd in Jamaica were : 2lbs. of salt beef, 2 lbs. fresh beef, 2½ lbs. of pork, 7 lbs. of flour, 1½ pints of rum. The commissioned officers, in lieu of rations in kind, received allowances in money : the officer, £1 12s. 6d. ; his wife, 16s. 3d. ; children under seventeen years, 8s. 4d.

1830.

General Sir J. C. Sherbrooke died, having been Colonel of the 33rd for 17 years. His successor was General Lord Charles Henry Somerset. The appointment dated February 22nd, 1830. On the 10th of September following, Major Charles Knight, "who, as captain, led the regiment out of action at Waterloo," succeeded Lieut.-Colonel Moffat in the command. The climate of Jamaica, and the hard work, entailed by frequent disturbances among the negroes in the

island and elsewhere in the West Indies, where that officer had been detailed for special service, had undermined his health, and he was compelled to retire.

Lord Charles Somerset died in the following year, and was succeeded in the Colonelcy of the regiment by Lieut.-General Sir Charles Wale, K.C.B., the appointment bearing date, February 25th, 1831. 1831.

The island of Jamaica was disturbed that year by a vicious and murderous insurrection of the negroes, who burnt the planters' estates, and pillaged generally with deplorable excesses. The 33rd, at the time, were under orders to proceed to England as soon as the 56th should arrive to relieve them. Needing soldiers of experience in West Indian service, Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, at the instance of the Commander-in-Chief, asked for volunteers from the 33rd to serve in other regiments and a bounty of 30s. was offered. As many as 139 volunteered for service in the 84th, but only three for the 22nd. These volunteers embarked at once for Montego Bay, where the negroes were burning several estates, and at the same time so pressing was the need that a captain, 2 subalterns, 3 sergeants, and 60 rank and file of the 33rd were chosen to accompany the force, the detachment of the 33rd being commanded by Captain Galloway. Another detachment was stationed in the east on the 4th of January, 1832, to turn off the negroes. There was some sharp fighting, and one man of the 33rd was killed in a skirmish with the negroes near Anchovy Bottom, where Captain Galloway's detachment was engaged. 1832.

The arrival of the 56th resulted in the recall of the detachments to head-quarters at Fort Augusta, and on inspection of the 33rd, General Cotton recorded "the very high sense he entertains of their conduct." That was on the 1st of March, 1832. On the following day the men embarked for England after ten years' service in Jamaica. The regiment only numbered 240 rank and file, so many men had died of fever, or were still in hospital, while so large a number had volunteered



for further service in the West Indies. The severity of West Indian service is seriously displayed by the fact that no less than eleven officers and 560 non-commissioned officers, drummers, and privates had died during the ten years in Jamaica.

After their return to England, where they were joined by the reserve companies, and moved on to various places, the new Colonel visited the regiment and presented new colours, on November 23rd, 1832.

The country at this time was in a state of great unrest under the pressure of taxation, and the question of Parliamentary Reform was agitating the people. Fears of riot led to the quartering of troops in or near the towns where disturbances were most to be dreaded. Consequently the 33rd were continually on the move to put down riot and maintain order. Later on it was found necessary to break up the regiment into detachments, and these were dispersed through the Midlands and Lancashire. In 1835, however, they proceeded to Newry, for another term of Irish service. Here, again, the regiment was constantly on the move, detachments doing duty in scattered districts.

On the 21st of September, 1836, the 33rd received orders to be in readiness to embark for Gibraltar. The total strength when the regiment sailed from Cork on the 24th of October was 520, with 31 women, and 70 children. At Gibraltar, where they arrived on November 5th, the garrison consisted of the 33rd, 52nd, 2nd Battalion 60th Rifles, the 81st and 82nd regiments.

One matter of special interest may here be mentioned. Prince George of Cambridge had arrived from England to do duty in the garrison, in October, 1838. He was attached to the 33rd during his stay in Gibraltar, and attended the parades, for "the purpose of perfecting himself in Drill and making himself acquainted with all points connected with Regimental Duty. His Royal Highness fell in with a Company as Subaltern, and subsequently commanded one. After-

wards he acted as Major with the Battalion, and latterly took command of the regiment at Drills and Garrison Field Days." By this time the regiment was strong again in numbers, the total being 901 of all ranks. A circular issued on the 20th of November, 1839, stated that the Establishment of the respective portions of the regiments abroad should be as follows : 6 service companies at 100 rank and file each, and 4 depôt companies, 50 rank and file each, 800 in all, and the Establishment was set forth thus :

	Staff	Drum-			
	Sergts.	Sergts.	mers.	Corpls.	Priv.
6 Service Cos.	7	24	10	24	576
4 Depôt Cos.	0	16	4	16	184
	—	—	—	—	—
	7	40	14	40	760
800 rank and file.					

In 1840 a not altogether welcome notification was received at Gibraltar to this effect : " Her Majesty's Government having decided in future that no deviation from the Rotation System should be made even in the case of regiments which had passed the whole period of their Foreign Service in a tropical climate, an order from the General Commanding-in-Chief was received on the 1st of September by the Governor of Gibraltar to hold the Service Companies of the Regiment in readiness for embarkation to the West Indies, on being relieved by the Service Companies of the 79th Regiment from Cork." 1840.

The 79th arrived, and the transports which brought them from Ireland were at the disposal of the 33rd, who sailed from Gibraltar on the 23rd of February, 1841. They had embarked on the 4th, but were wind-bound for 19 days. The 33rd proceeded to Barbados, and on being reviewed later it was recorded that they maintained their efficiency, in every regard. Unhappily Lieut.-Colonel Knight's health broke down so 1841.

completely that he obtained leave of absence to Europe, but before the vessel started he was dead, and the regiment lost an officer of whom it was deservedly proud. Sickness subsequently prevailed to such an extent that it was necessary to proceed to other quarters.

1842. The commencement of the following year, 1842, found the regiment distributed among the islands of St. Vincent, Dominica, and Saint Lucia, but when the Head-quarter Division arrived at the first-named station yellow fever was raging so grievously that the troops encamped at Loman's Bridge. Nothing of an unusual nature occurred throughout the year, and in April, 1843, the regiment was distributed afresh, Head-quarters, with the 3rd Company, going to Georgetown, in Demerara, the 1st and 4th Companies to Berbice, the Light Infantry to Port Mahaica, and the Grenadiers and 2nd Company to Barbados. From April to September the yellow fever so raged at Berbice that the Companies there were sent back to Port Mahaica, and later joined Head-quarters at Georgetown. The losses through sickness were exceedingly heavy. During the dates, March, 1841, and December, 1843, no less than 6 officers, 21 non-commissioned officers, and 135 drummers and privates of the 33rd died. The
1845. Colonel, Sir Charles, succumbed on the 19th of March, 1845, and was succeeded by Lieut.-General Sir H. Sheehy Keating, K.C.B. A year later, March 27th, 1846, the regiment was augmented, there then being 10 companies, 950 privates, and a total strength of 1,118 officers and men. The regiment was now
1846. removed from the West Indies to the healthier climate of Halifax and surrounding stations. Months of uneventful garrison duty followed; once or twice the monotony was broken by the serious disturbances which took place between the Roman Catholics and the Orange party. Sir H. Sheehy Keating died in
- 1847-8. March, 1847, and Major-General Henry D'Oyley succeeded him. Orders came in the following year, March 8th, for the various divisions to proceed to St.

John in readiness to embark for home. The country was under snow, and consequently marching was impossible, so that the concentration was effected by means of double sleighs, each division taking a proportion of the baggage, women and children, and every individual carrying two days' provisions and a blanket. They left their stations with the freely expressed good-will of the populace, who recorded a very high eulogium on the conduct of the men. For the first time since the 33rd had left Gibraltar in 1841 the companies were concentrated, and waiting in St. John for embarkation, which took place on the 12th of April, 1848. They had no sooner arrived at Portsmouth than orders came, not to land, but proceed at once to Leith, and take up quarters in Edinburgh Castle. Four days after reaching the city the Establishment was reduced to the total of 903 officers and men. The regiment went to Berwick on September 25th, 1848.

The nation suffered an irreparable loss when the Duke of Wellington died in September, 1852. It has been said of him that he was the most perfect servant of his King and Country that the world ever saw. There is no need to dilate on the career of the hero who won for himself the name of "The Iron Duke." His services as soldier in the cause of his country had gained the admiration of Europe, and the respect and affection of his fellow-countrymen. Yet when peace was established—one to which his efforts had so largely contributed—his services were not at an end, years of political life succeeding, and an arduous devotion to British interests. One of the finest eulogies in his memory was couched in the following terms: "To the unbroken splendours of his military career, to his honourable and conscientious labours as a parliamentary statesman, life unusually prolonged added an evening of impressive beauty and calm. . . . Venerated and beloved by the greatest and the lowliest, the old hero entered, as it were, into the immortality of his fame while still among his countrymen. Death came to

him at last in its gentlest form. He passed away on the 14th of September, 1852, and was buried under the dome of St. Paul's, in a manner worthy both of the nation and of the man."

The 33rd were brought from Manchester to take part in the funeral procession of their late and illustrious comrade, for such he considered himself to be among the officers and soldiers in whose midst he had gained the experience which culminated in such splendour. It was a day of mingled distress and pride for the regiment, which paraded at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 18th of November and marched in rear of the Horse Guards parade, where it took up a position with the other regiments composing the funeral escort. These were formed in contiguous columns facing the Horse Guards, the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards being on the right. At the appointed signal the escort moved off in succession from the left by sections, heading the procession, and on arriving at Temple Bar, lined both sides of the streets up to St. Paul's, the 33rd Regiment forming on the Rifle Brigade and lining the south side of Fleet Street, fronting the Royal Marines who lined the north side. While the 33rd served in this last order the soldier who had been with them so long, they were under the command for the day of the Duke of Cambridge, who had also been instructed as a soldier in the regiment.

There was something to follow which served to maintain the connection of the 33rd with the dead Duke. During the lifetime of Wellington it had often been suggested in military quarters that the Duke's name should be intimately and very definitely connected with that of the 33rd. It would have been made absolute had not the Duke requested that the honour the authorities wished to pay him might be postponed until his death. It was an honour the suggestion of which touched the Duke greatly, for it would give the corps "*the peculiar distinction of being the only British regiment named after a subject—not Royal!*"

A few months after the Duke's funeral the following General Order was received by the Officer Commanding in the 33rd Regiment, and on the Anniversary of Waterloo : 1853

HORSE GUARDS,  
18th *June*, 1853.

Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to command that the 33rd Regiment of Foot shall henceforward bear the name of THE 33RD (or THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S) REGIMENT, which honourable distinction will be inscribed on the Colours of the Regiment.

By Command of the Right Honourable General Viscount Hardinge, Commanding in Chief.

G. BROWN.

(Adjutant General.)

# The Crimean War

## CHAPTER XXVI

### LANDING IN THE CRIMEA

1853. At this time events were pointing to a war in Eastern Europe which would involve Turkey and Russia, and in all probability France and England would be brought into the conflict.

In order to understand the position it is necessary to revert to a treaty which was signed as far back as 1740. In that year France obtained the right to the custody of the sacred places in and around Jerusalem ; but in view of the French indifference to the preservation of these the Greek Christians in the city went to the expense of repairing the shrines, doing so with the consent of the Sultan.

In 1850, France expressed her intention to exercise her treaty rights, and act as Protector of Latin Christianity in the East. Anxious to maintain friendly relations with France, the Porte agreed to this. The Czar instantly entered his strong protest, declaring that while the Roman Catholics' interest would be favoured, those of the Greek Christians would suffer. Turkey was thus placed in a most difficult position, for if she satisfied one nation it was inevitable that she would give the gravest offence to the other. The situation became acute when the Czar made a peremptory demand to be recognised as the Protector of all Christians within the Turkish Empire.

It was impossible for Turkey to mistake the meaning

of the demand. It was clear that Russia was seeking to be "the mistress of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, the Isles, and even the Mediterranean itself." Turkey's inevitable answer was a direct refusal. Meanwhile the Czar, having made up his mind that Turkey was so "sick" that it would be easy to get into Constantinople, was collecting an immense army in Moldavia, close to the frontier. When the Porte definitely refused to recognise the Czar's claims, he sent his army across the Pruth, into the trans-Danubian Principalities, but there was no immediate fighting owing to the interference of France and England, with the idea of effecting an amicable settlement through negotiation. At the same time the French and English fleets were ordered to the mouths of the Dardanelles. Austria joined the two Western Powers in the endeavour to prevent hostilities, and Vienna was chosen as the place for Conference.

It was clear that France and England realised the menace if Russia should obtain Constantinople, and have the freedom of the Mediterranean. "France would have seen her moral weight in the East destroyed in an instant, and England would have been severed from her Indian Empire, and menaced in the outports of her naval power." Neither of these two nations, therefore, could tolerate the subjugation of Turkey, which would bring Russia either to the Turkish capital or beyond the Dardanelles.

Napoleon III resolved to act in concert with England in resistance to Russia. The English Foreign Secretary instructed our Ambassador in Constantinople to the effect that it was "indispensable to take measures for the protection of the Sultan, and to aid His Highness in repelling any attack that might be made upon his territory; . . . and that the use of force was to be resorted to as a last and unavoidable resource for the protection of Turkey against an unprovoked attack and in defence of her independence, which England was bound to maintain."



Efforts were made to effect an accommodation, but they failed. Strengthened by the attitude of France and England, the Porte demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Principalities by a certain date—October 23rd, 1853. The demand was ignored. Shortly after this, although the Czar protested that he was merely holding the trans-Danubian Principalities as a material guarantee, and would not take the offensive against Turkey, the Russian fleet in the Black Sea annihilated a Turkish squadron in the harbour of Sinope, on the 30th of November.<sup>1</sup>

The news of this so-called massacre, by which 4,000 Turks were killed, and every man among the remaining 400 wounded, aroused such indignation in England that the Government were compelled by public opinion to take action. The message to the Czar from England and France was hostile inasmuch as it asserted "that every Russian ship thenceforward met in the Euxine (the Black Sea) would be requested, and if necessary constrained, to return to Sebastopol, and that any act of aggression afterwards attempted against the Ottoman territory or flag would be repelled by force."

1854. The Czar did not declare war, but his response to the message was the withdrawal of his ambassadors from London and Paris, and on the 21st of February, 1854, "the diplomatic relations between Russia and the Western Powers were broken off." By that time the English and French fleets were in the Black Sea. On the 28th of March, England declared war with Russia, and the Czar responded with a counter-declaration on the 11th of April, in which he stated that "the summons addressed to him by France and England took from Russia all possibility of yielding with honour, and he threw the responsibility of the war upon the Western Powers."

Lord Raglan was chosen to command the British Army, which was to co-operate with the Allies, France

<sup>1</sup> *Ianes*: "History of the British Nation."

and Turkey. It is said of Raglan, that "though sixty-five years of age, he had the strength and vigour of a much younger man. He had never led troops in the field, but no man had served so thorough an apprenticeship in the art of leading them. His diplomatic experience, as well as his personal character and charm of manner, marked him out for an expedition in which the difficulties inherent in joint naval and military operations were superadded to those which always attend the operations of allied forces."<sup>1</sup> Wellington, whom he served as secretary, and almost constant companion, had a high opinion of Raglan, who seemed the natural leader of the British troops in this new war.

The army which was to leave England for active service in the East, was got together as quickly as circumstances would allow, but it was evident that the War Office was taken by surprise after forty years of peace. The startling mismanagement of the war, not by those in the field, but by those who were at home, and whose duty it was to provide for the army's well-being, has given the Crimean War an unenviable notoriety. The seriousness of the statement will be realised as the story of the war develops.

Among the first to start for the East were the 33rd. Orders came as early as February 5th, before war was declared, for the regiment to recruit to 1,000 rank and file, and prepare for foreign and active service in the field, so certain did war appear to be. With the negotiations still proceeding, the seven companies, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel F. R. Blake, sailed for Malta, starting on March 1st, and making a quick passage, arriving there on the 11th. On the 8th of April they were joined by the remaining companies, the strength of the regiment then being 33 officers and 912 men. Two days later the 33rd and 41st Regiments embarked in the steamer "Himalaya" for Constantinople, where, on landing, they found themselves not only the vanguard of the Army of the

<sup>1</sup> "Dictionary of Nat. Biog."

East, but the first British troops who had been seen in the Turkish capital since the days when English Crusaders were in the city.

The 33rd, as Major A. B. Wallis tells us, in one of his letters home, disembarked in a snowstorm, and proceeded to the barracks at Scutari, opposite to Constantinople. After staying there a week orders came to go into camp, in spite of the deluging rain, while the instructions were issued to the officers to procure horses immediately for the carriage of their baggage, but at their own expense!

War had now been declared, and Lord Raglan came to Constantinople within a few days of the arrival of the 33rd and 41st at their camp on the high ground outside the Turkish hospital, near the village of Kadikoi. He at once augmented the regiment, bringing up its strength to 1,553 officers and men. Other troops arriving, the 23rd, the 7th, and 88th, were encamped together behind the barracks, the 33rd camping between these and the sea. When a considerable number of troops had landed at Scutari and its vicinity, Raglan proceeded to the work of formation of the forces that were at his disposal into divisions and brigades, and the 33rd found their place in the Light Division, which was under the command of Sir George Brown, and was thus composed:

**FIRST BRIGADE, Brigadier-General R. Airey :**

7th, Royal Fusiliers

23rd, Royal Welsh Fusiliers

33rd, Duke of Wellington's Regiment

**SECOND BRIGADE, Brigadier-General Buller :**

19th Regiment

77th Regiment

88th Regiment

The 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade was attached to the Light Division on the 25th of May, also a troop of Horse Artillery, and a field battery.

Almost immediately the 33rd left Scutari, and sailed to the Bulgarian port, Varna, arriving there in the evening of the 31st of May. On the following morning they disembarked, and encamped about a mile from the town. The force assembled in this camp consisted of the Light Division, the Rifle Brigade, the 17th Lancers, the 8th Hussars, a portion of Horse and Field Artillery under Colonel Strangways, also Sappers and Engineers, with pontoons and field train. A few days later a portion of the French force under General Canrobert, arrived at Varna, consisting of a strong body of Zouaves, and some regiments of the Line.

On the 5th of June the Light Division moved on to the Shumla Gate, six miles from Varna, in what Major Wallis describes as most magnificent country, the scene resembling an English park. The camp was situated on the top of a hill with a lake on the right and left, connected by a stream. News came that the Russians were retreating across the Danube, and it was expected in the camp that instead of proceeding to Silistria, as first intended, the Allies would march to Odessa to prevent the enemy recrossing the Pruth. The alternative expectation was that an attempt would be made to capture Sebastopol.<sup>1</sup>

Various changes had been made at Varna, so that the strength of the 33rd now consisted of 3 field officers, 8 captains, 16 subalterns, 5 staff, 42 sergeants, 35 corporals, 13 drummers, 823 privates, a total of 945.

It may be noted that the British and French armies at this time had abandoned the musket for the rifle, ours being the Minie; both it and the French arm were muzzle-loaders; some Russian regiments had a rifle, but a large proportion of them were still armed with the old brass-bound musket which had served them throughout the century; the artillery also of all remained as before.<sup>2</sup>

The Allied troops had been conveyed to Varna

<sup>1</sup> Letters from Major (then Lieut.) A. B. Wallis.

<sup>2</sup> Hamley.

"in the expectation of defending the fortress of Silistria by fighting the army in the field," the Russians having at the outset crossed the Danube. But Austria had intervened, and moving up an army of 50,000 to the frontier which the Czar's army had seized, summoned the Russians to evacuate the Principalities. Not wishing to embroil himself with Austria, the Czar withdrew his army across the frontier.

Instructions came from home to Lord Raglan, under the changed circumstances, to concert measures for the siege of Sebastopol. They ran as follows: "The difficulties of the siege of Sebastopol appear to Her Majesty's Government to be more likely to increase than diminish by delay; and as there is no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress is reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed, it is on all accounts most important that nothing but insuperable impediments such as the want of ample preparation by either army, or the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it, should be allowed to prevent the early decision to undertake these operations.

"It is probable that a large part of the Russian army now retreating from the Turkish territory may be poured into the Crimea to reinforce Sebastopol. If orders to this effect have not already been given, it is further probable that such a measure would be adopted as soon as it is known that the Allied armies are in motion to commence active hostilities. As all communications by sea are now in the hands of the Allied Powers, it becomes of importance to endeavour to cut off all communication by land between the Crimea and the other parts of the Russian dominions."

Lord Raglan at once assented, but neither he nor the Government, nor France, suspected that the contemplated siege would be a prolonged one. The general expectation was that Sebastopol would fall within a fortnight of landing in the Crimea. While preparations were being made for this new departure,

cholera made its appearance, and worked fearful havoc among the soldiers. Out of three French divisions it destroyed or disabled 1,000 men, and our own regiments in Bulgaria lost between 500 and 600.<sup>1</sup> The Commander-in-Chief was eager to get away, but the fleet was now attacked by the disease, and to such an extent that many of the ships could not be moved, being so short-handed. The 33rd sailed and landed at Eupatoria, an old fort in the Crimea, on the 14th of September. Many of the officers and men, however, were too ill to land, among them being Brevet-Major Erskine, Lieutenant Parry, Ensign Thorold, and Paymaster McGrath. Lieutenant Thistlethwaite was already dead, and was buried, like so many others, at sea.

Lord Raglan chose the landing-place, and it is said that he pitched on an ideal tactical spot. "A low strip of shingly beach with a background of 200 yards, was protected by a lake nearly a mile long, and half a mile broad, while the flanks of the army were covered by the guns of the fleet." Before long the number of British soldiers landed amounted to 26,000 infantry. There were also 60 guns, and the Light Brigade of cavalry, in all about 1,000 sabres. The infantry of the French numbered 28,000, and the Turkish infantry 7,000. There were no Turkish cavalry, but 68 guns.

NOTE.—The officers of the 33rd at Shumla Gate (Varna) were as follows :

		Lieut.-Colonel Blake
		Major Johnstone
		Major Gough
No. 1, or Gr. Company	{	Captain Donovan
		Lieut. Lacy
		Lieut. Parry
No. 2, or J	{	Brevet-Major Mundy
		Lieut. Nugent
		Ensign Worthington

<sup>1</sup> Hamley.

No. 3, or F Company	{	Captain Prettyman
		Lieut. Bennett
		Ensign Thorold
No. 4, or C       ,,	{	Captain Fitzgerald
		Lieut. Vacher
		Ensign Montagu
No. 5, or E       ,,	{	Captain Quayle
		Lieut. Wallis
		Ensign Marsh
No. 6, or H       ,,	{	Captain Burke
		Lieut. Kenrick
		Ensign Greenwood
No. 7, or B       ,,	{	Captain Collings
		Lieut. Thistlethwaite
		Ensign Siree
No. 8, or Light   ,,	{	Captain Erskine
		Lieut. Corbett
		Lieut. Mansfield

Lieut. and Adj. Barrett; Paymaster McGrath;  
Quartermaster Jones; Surgeon Muir, Assistant-Sur-  
geons Ogilvy and Stanley.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA

SEBASTOPOL was twenty-five miles distant from Eupatoria, and on the 19th of September the march of the Allies began. "The four French divisions," which were on the right, next to the sea, "were ranged in lozenge form, the apex heading south for Sebastopol, the four points marked each by a division with its guns; and in the space thus enclosed were the Turks, and the convoy of provisions, ammunition and baggage. The British were formed in two columns of divisions, that next the French of the Second Division, followed by the Third; the other of the Light Division"—in which was the 33rd—"followed by the First and Fourth; the batteries on the right of their respective divisions. The formation of the divisions was that of double companies from the centre; giving them the means of forming with readiness either to the front or the left flank, which was also the object of placing three of the five divisions in the left column." 1854.

General Hamley goes on to say that if the Russians, after leaving a sufficient garrison in Sebastopol, were to keep an army in the field, it might, from its natural line of communication with Southern Russia, namely, the road thither by Bakshisarai and Simpheropol, assume a front at right angles to the front of the Allies, and advancing thus, might attack either their flank or rear without risk to its own. On this account the Cavalry Brigade was divided, two of its regiments covering the front, the other two the left flank, while



the fifth closed the rear. General Hamley further says that if the Russians were to threaten that flank, the three divisions of our left column would be the first to confront them, with the other two in second line, while the French and Turks must come up on their right, or left, or both, according to the direction of the Russian attack, and with fair chance, on those open plains, of meeting it in time, and also, if forced to retreat with their backs to the sea, they might expect effectual support from their ships. But at the best persistent attacks on this side by the Russians, with such a wide space to manœuvre on at pleasure, and with cavalry in superior force (as, with our deficiency in that arm, it was certain to be), would greatly, perhaps decisively, embarrass our advance unless we should succeed in inflicting on the enemy a crushing defeat.<sup>1</sup>

It was afternoon when the Russians were seen away to the south, some ten thousand of all arms, disposed on hilly ground. Between them and the Allies a small stream ran, but this was soon crossed, and every preparation made for an encounter. The enemy, however, retired, so that this, presumably, was but an armed reconnaissance, and nothing beyond the exchange of a few shots took place.

The Allies bivouacked by the stream, and during the night the 33rd moved on with the Light Division, to support the British cavalry, whose duty it was to prevent the numerically superior Russian cavalry surprising the Allies.

The Russian army was established on the heights upon the left bank of the Alma, and its lines were plainly visible ; indeed, it was possible from the French position to count the squadrons of their cavalry. The night, however, was undisturbed.

When the 20th of September dawned, according to the "Invalides Russe," Prince Menschikoff, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, occupied the position on the left bank of the Alma with 42 battalions, 16 squadrons,

<sup>1</sup> Hamley : "The War in the Crimea."

and 82 pieces of artillery. The centre of the order of battle was formed upon the verge of the precipitous bank of the river, opposite the village of Bourliouk; and the left wing upon a height, at about two versts from the sea. The right wing formed the weakest part of the position. In advance of the line of battle—upon the right bank of the river—the village of Bourliouk, the vineyards, the gardens and orchards were occupied by sharpshooters, who were to defend the approaches, under the protection of numerous batteries. In reserve, behind the centre, were posted three regiments of infantry of Volhynia, of Minsk, and of Moscow, with two light foot batteries. Upon their right were two regiments of Hussars, with two batteries of horse artillery, and behind the right wing a regiment of Chasseurs. A battalion of the reserve had been detached, to occupy the village of Ouloukoul, behind the left flank of the position, and very near the seashore.<sup>1</sup>

The divisions which formed the French line of battle were ranged as follows, from right to left: After Bosquet's Division that of General Canrobert; then that of Prince Napoleon; and next again the British Divisions. General Forey commanded the reserve of the French Army. The 1st and 3rd Divisions were to march when the 2nd Division should have reached the heights and become really engaged. Lord Raglan, in his dispatch after the battle, tells how his own army was disposed. "The combined Armies advanced on the same alignment. Her Majesty's troops in contiguous double columns, with the front of two divisions covered by light infantry and a troop of horse artillery, the 2nd Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir De Lacy Evans, forming the right, and touching the left of the 3rd Division of the French Army, under His Imperial Highness Prince Napoleon, and the Light Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, the left; the first being supported by

<sup>1</sup> The foregoing is also quoted by Bazancourt in his "Expedition to the Crimea."

the 3rd Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir Richard England, and the last by the 1st Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge.

"The 4th Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Cathcart, and the cavalry under Major-General the Earl of Lucan, were held in reserve to protect the left flank and rear against large bodies of the enemy's cavalry, which had been seen in those directions."

Lord Raglan estimated the strength of the enemy on the slopes of the hills as between 45,000 and 50,000 men, and showed in a few sentences in his dispatch how strongly they were placed, and how formidable was the task which awaited the combined armies. Menschikoff had taken up a position which Raglan described as follows: "The bold and almost precipitous range of heights of from 350 to 400 feet, that from the sea closely border the left bank of the river, here ceases and formed the (enemy's) left, and turning thence round a great amphitheatre or wide valley, terminates at a salient pinnacle where their right rested, and whence the descent to the plain was more gradual.

"Across the mouth of this great opening is a lower ridge at different heights, varying from 60 to 150 feet, parallel to the river, and at distances from it of from 600 to 800 yards."

The river—the Alma—was fordable generally, but "the banks were extremely rugged, and in most parts steep; the willows along it had been cut down in order to prevent them from affording cover to the attackers.

Again reverting to Lord Raglan's dispatch, "In front of the position, on the right bank, at about 200 yards from the Alma, is the village of Bouliouk, and near it a timber bridge which had been partly destroyed by the enemy. The high pinnacle and ridge before alluded to was the key to the position, and consequently, there the greatest preparations had been made for defence.

"Half-way down the height, and across its front,

was a trench of the extent of some hundred yards, to afford cover against an advance up the even, steep slope of the hill. On the right, and a little retired, was a powerful covered battery armed with heavy guns, which flanked the whole of the right of the position. Artillery, at the same time, was posted at the points that best commanded the passage of the river and its approaches generally. On the slopes of these hills (forming a sort of tableland) were placed dense masses of the enemy's infantry; whilst on the heights above was his great reserve, the whole amounting, it is supposed, to between 45,000 and 50,000 men."

The advance began at one o'clock, the French right, under Bosquet, moving first, and followed by the Turks. The French ships at the same time began a heavy fire on the forces on the plateau. The other French divisions moved on, as soon as it was known that Bosquet was engaged, each division deploying its masses, and advancing to the Alma. The 1st Zouaves drove the Russian sharpshooters out of the village of Almatack, the river was crossed, and ere long the troops were at the foot of the heights, assailed by fierce discharges from the Russian batteries.

The British divisions were in turn moving at first in column formation, "the Second Division on the right, the Light Division on the left in first line; the Second followed by the Third, the Light by the First, in second line, and the Fourth in echelon in rear of the left. Beyond the left moved four regiments of the Light Brigade, while the remaining one closed the rear." The batteries of each division marched on their inner flanks.

The leading British divisions—the 2nd, and the Light, in which was the 33rd—deployed, and after a brief pause, moved on to attack when St. Arnaud, the French Commander, sent word of his own movements to Lord Raglan. Brown's Light Division was the first to attack, the 2nd having been detained by a village to which the enemy had set fire.

The Light Division had a task before it which might well be deemed formidable. It was faced by the Great Redoubt, armed with 14 heavy guns, while Menschikoff had placed as many as 16 battalions of infantry to defend it. Kinglake makes the position seem even more difficult to carry, for he says that the Kourgané Hill, now to be assailed by the Light Division, was defended by two redoubts, by forty-two guns, and by a force of some 17,000 men.

The formation of the Light Division in this fight at the Alma was as follows :

1st Brigade : 7th, 33rd, 23rd.

2nd Brigade : 19th, 77th, 88th, Rifles.

Hence the odds seemed overwhelming.

Advancing, the brigades had two stone walls to climb, and a vineyard to cross before the river was reached, but when they came to the bank, they forded the stream, waist deep, and reached the left bank, under heavy fire. A bursting shell killed five men of one of the 33rd's companies—the first English blood spilt in this battle. No sooner had the Light Division crossed than the 1st Brigade was ordered up the hill, and the 33rd, being the centre regiment, had to direct. The orders were to march on the guns. The men moved on, "a dense armed mob of angry men," so one has put it, "striving to separate themselves from the dreadful confusion, and anxious to be led on to fight." It is again said that in the midst of this chaos one corps soon offered an example to the others. "Colonel Blake, with the 33rd, was able to make his regiment open out and form line." The line formation of the other regiments was restored, and the Division moved on up the slope, which was swept with grape from the Russian batteries in the Redoubt. Russell, in his "Expedition to the Crimea," speaking of this terrible experience in the advance up the slopes, says, "The 33rd, which had moved up with the greatest audacity

over broken ground towards the flank of the epaulement where it was exposed to a tremendous fire and heavy losses from guns and musketry from the hill above, was for the moment checked by the pitiless pelting of this iron rain. Their general, at this terrible crisis, seemed to have but one idea, right or wrong ; it was to lead them slap at the battery, into the very teeth of its hot and fiery jaws."

All order and formation were lost in that climb amid such close and deadly fire, when men were dropping constantly. They leapt into the trench, responding to Colonel Blake's call, the 33rd going forward with ringing cheers, followed closely by the 7th and 23rd, and bayoneting every man who opposed them, although the Russians were there, "four thick." When the English entered the redoubt the enemy were endeavouring to withdraw their guns, but the Russians were cut down, and the horses shot of such as had not already got away.

The 33rd suffered severely. The Colonel rode up and said there was no one to carry the colours, for three officers in succession had been shot while carrying them, namely, Greenwood, Siree, and Montagu. The latter was killed, but Lieutenant Wallis took the Regimental, while Quayle took the Queen's, and went forward, musketry and round-shot and grape being poured in with fearful fury. Wallis was wounded in the thigh, but tying a handkerchief round the limb, he kept going until the enemy were driven out of the redoubt. Sixteen sergeants who were with the colours were either killed or wounded, while one of the officers bearing the colours was killed, and four were wounded. The officer of the 7th who carried the Queen's colour was shot, and no one seemed to realise this save a man of the 33rd, who snatched it from a Russian, and gave it to an officer of the Fusiliers.

The redoubt was carried, but the famous Vladimir column had to be encountered. The Light Division was confronted with fresh foes. They were exhausted,

and had suffered so terribly that they were too weak to charge. Seeing what was transpiring, General Brown, who had come up, and was in the redoubt, called up the Guards and Highlanders to relieve the Light Division, who were ordered to retire. The Vladimir column poured in a heavy fire on them while they were doing this, but Colonel Blake, since the Guards had not yet come, gave orders to the 33rd to charge. The 7th, the 23rd, and 19th came with them, and regardless of their exhaustion, and the depletion of their companies, they advanced on the Russians with such spirit that the enemy turned and fled, leaving them in possession of the redoubt. It was then that the bugles sounded a halt.

Elsewhere the battle had been raging with unremitting fury. The French were carrying their positions in their front, while the other Divisions in Lord Raglan's army did all that was allotted to them. But it stands as an undisputed fact that the victory was really gained by the Light Division. It "retreated behind the Guards to reform, and did not again come into action on that day. In its short struggle the 33rd suffered a terrible loss, the largest of any regiment that stormed the Redoubt." Lieutenant Montagu and 59 men were killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Blake, Major Gough, Captain Fitzgerald, Lieutenants Wallis and Worthington, and Ensigns Greenwood and Siree, and 199 men were wounded. Kinglake says that "Colonel Blake would not report his wound lest the account should alarm his wife and family. His horse was struck in three places. Siree, though badly wounded, insisted on remaining out on the hillside all night, in order that men in a worse condition should be first attended to. Wallis was badly wounded, but he tied a handkerchief round the wounded limb, and remained with his regiment to the close of the battle. Worthington died from the amputation which was necessitated by the wound he received." Henry G. Donovan, brother of Captain Donovan, who accompanied the regiment

through Bulgaria, and fought with it as a volunteer, was appointed to an Ensigncy on the day of the battle for his very gallant conduct in the action.

Lord Raglan's dispatch shows how the battle really centred round the part of the position which the Light Division assailed. He says that "the heavy fire of grape and musketry . . . to which the troops were exposed, and the losses consequently sustained by the 7th, 23rd, and 33rd Regiments, obliged this brigade partially to relinquish its hold. By this time, however, the Duke of Cambridge had succeeded in crossing the river, and had moved up in support, and a brilliant advance of the brigade of Foot Guards, under Major-General Bentinck, drove the enemy back, and secured the final possession of the work."

Bazancourt's tribute to the doings of the Light Brigade, since it displays the French appreciation of their splendid endeavour, is worth quoting. "Brown's Division performs prodigies of valour. It hears the thunder of 18 heavy guns, and sees one of its regiments almost annihilated. Major Norcutt has carried a redoubt, but with his mutilated force is compelled to fall back, when the Duke of Cambridge, who has this instant succeeded in passing the river with his whole Division, presses forward to support the movement.

"Pressed at once by the Duke's Division, by that of Sir De Lacy Evans and by Brown's, which sustains the reserve, the Russians, supported by their left, bend their final efforts toward the heights which face the burning village; and three columns, which have preserved their line of battle on the right, assail at the same moment the English forces. The latter receive the shock with indomitable firmness, but without being able to gain an inch of ground. It is at this moment that the battery, directed by the Commandant La Boussinière, takes the Russian masses in flank, and throws them into disorder by his discharges of grape and shell.

"The English redouble at the same time the



exertion of both their energy and their firmness. While the brigade of Foot Guards, under the orders of Major-General Bentinck, drives back the enemy from the heights, the brigade of Highlanders, commanded by Sir Colin Campbell, advances in admirable order, which is not for one moment disturbed by the terrible and redoubled fire of the Russian musketry and artillery. One would imagine, to see this body of men, so cool and so precise in their movements, that they were manœuvring at a review, rather than under the fearful hail of the battlefield ! They march upon the left of the Russian redoubt, while the Guards climb the other side. Arrived within a hundred yards, the Highlanders pour upon the enemy one volley at point-blank range, and dash upon them with the bayonet. Heaps of dead strew the ground.

“Brown’s Light Division, after having heroically overcome obstacles seemingly insurmountable, also appears upon the brow of the heights ; thus threatening to surround the enemy.

“Marshal St Arnaud dispatches an aide-de-camp to arrest the march of the Divisions which he had ordered to move to the support of the English ; the succours which they were about to afford having become unnecessary.”

There is one characteristic expression in the pages of this animated French writer which goes far to show the estimation of others as to the conduct of English soldiers in the field. He says in relation to this battle that “the distinctive genius of the French and English nations, and the individual character of each people, were startlingly manifested on this occasion. While our soldiers and our artillery dashed forward, borne on by an irresistible impulse, surmounting all obstacles, and climbing with desperate activity the steepest precipices ; our allies, in admirable line of battle, marched with their usual step, extinguishing the fire of the formidable positions which they had to carry, without slackening or accelerating their march, and

facing every difficulty in front, rather than seeking to attack it in flank. An heroic error, which inscribes glorious names on the page of history, but inscribes them upon the records of the dead."

NOTE.—In Lord Raglan's dispatch of September 28th, 1854, his lordship spoke in high terms of several officers who distinguished themselves at the Alma, and among them was Lieutenant-Colonel Blake of the 33rd.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

### BALACLAVA

1854. THE Allied Army bivouacked on the ground from which the Russians were driven, and for two days our soldiers were busy burying their own and the enemy's dead. Some of the English regiments had lost so heavily as to bid fair to be incapacitated from action, namely, the Guards, 7th, 19th, 23rd, 30th, 33rd, 47th, 55th, 95th, and one wing of the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade. Many of these gallant fellows, who had been wounded, began to experience the misery of a ride to the sea on jolting arabas or tedious litters, whereas, says Russell, "the French had well-appointed covered hospital vans, to hold ten or twelve men, drawn by mules, and their wounded were sent in much greater comfort than our poor fellows." It was the foretaste of dire experiences because of mismanagement somewhere—certainly not with those who had to do the fighting.

On the morning of September 23rd the army resumed its march, and before it halted the troops, having passed the Katcha, were seven miles nearer to Sebastopol. It was noon when they encamped on the heights. Six miles more were covered on the following day, the halt being on some heights on the eastern side of the Belbeck. The Russians had been so demoralised by defeat at the Alma, that they did not make a stand at several points where they could have greatly delayed the progress of the Allied army, and inflicted heavy loss.

At a conference of generals, when the French proposed to force the Inkermann bridge across the

Tchernaya, and make a push at the town, it was ultimately decided that the armies should continue their march on the ridge between the Belbeck and the Tchernaya.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile the army was losing time, whereas it would have been well to have moved on rapidly in pursuit of the beaten enemy. Menschikoff was defeated on the 20th; yet by the 25th the Allies' army had not advanced more than thirteen miles!

The army was astir early on the morning of the 25th, the heavy cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, and a battalion of rifles being an advanced guard on the road which ran through some woods. The main body moved at noon, and Russell shows how the march was by different routes, the artillery proceeding by a difficult road which allowed only one horseman to ride by the side of each gun, and how the Duke of Cambridge's baggage was actually within gunshot of Sebastopol for a quarter of an hour.<sup>2</sup> During the march, while the Head-quarter Staff, with Lord Raglan, were moving through a dense wood, followed by the artillery, they came close on the baggage guard of a large detachment of the enemy. Lord Raglan sent out his cavalry—the 8th and 11th Hussars—ordered the guns to come into action and open fire on the mass of Russians who were attempting a disorderly retreat, being completely surprised. The baggage was all left behind and fell into Raglan's hands.

The march was then resumed along bad and steep roads, and not until it was dark did the cavalry reach the Tchernaya. It was night before the Light, First, Second, and Third Divisions arrived. The Fourth were left on the heights above the Belbeck, "to maintain communication with the Katcscha." The army was again on the move in the morning, crossing the valley to reach the hills behind which lay Balaclava. All through that march from the Alma men fell on the way, having succumbed to the cholera, but happily the

<sup>1</sup> Russell: "British Expedition to the Crimea."

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

enemy did nothing to stay the advance, scarcely anything, indeed, to annoy.

Seen from the heights there was nothing to show that Balaklava was occupied by the enemy ; but it was soon found that the entry to the town would be resisted. The guns from an ancient Genoese fort opened on the Rifle Brigade when they advanced, but Lord Raglan, occupying the two flanking heights with the Light Division, and a troop of horse artillery, the place was surrendered. It proved, after all, but a trifling affair, but it ended in communication being established with the fleet, thus securing a base of operations. It had been felt in the conferences between the generals that the transfer of operations to Balaklava would in every way be advantageous ; and the British army, in advance, was followed by the French, who brought with them their dying general, St Arnaud. General Canrobert, on account of the condition of the Marshal, assumed the command of the French army.

Immediately on the arrival of the French, the possibility of strained relations between the Allies displayed itself, for the desire to occupy Balaklava was keen with both. None had expected any difficulty, the smallness of the place not having been realised ; but when it was seen how diminutive the town was, it was evident that only one army could occupy it. Some readjustment was necessary if Raglan retained it, for the retaining force must act in future operations on the right. So far the British had been on the left of the Allied army. All the elements of disagreement, with serious consequences, were present, but Lord Raglan, coming in first, was on the spot, and it would mean much to request him to move away, to make room for the French army, still to occupy the right. Acting with magnanimity, however, Canrobert offered the choice to Raglan. This was not an easy one. Kinglake sets it forth in the following terms : " To take the right was to add to the toils of the siege the duty of withstanding any enterprises which might be

undertaken by the enemy's field army ; to take the left was to be sheltered from molestation on all sides except that of the town. On the other hand the privilege of occupying Balaclava seemed, at the time, to be one of great value, because the fitness and the ample advantage of the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch had not then been recognised. . . . For the sake of retaining Balaclava, Lord Raglan elected to take the right in the Allied line, with all its burthens and perils." Ere long the British force discovered how many and heavy these were.

Sebastopol was now the object on which the attention of the Allied army was concentrated ; but in order to understand what follows in the operations against the Russian stronghold some slight description of the fortress and the neighbourhood is necessary.

The south-west part of the Crimea where Sebastopol is situated, consisted of the broad Upland of the Chersonese, and this lay immediately between Balaclava and Sebastopol. The armies must needs occupy this in their operations against the fortress, with the sea immediately behind them. The Upland was a great rectangular plateau measuring approximately eight miles either way, from north to south, or east to west, and several hundreds of feet above the sea-level. Its surface was broken up by many ravines. The largest of these formed a great dividing line between the French and British armies, the French being on the western side, with Kamiesh Bay on their left constituting their naval base. The 3rd and 4th French Divisions, which formed the siege corps, were here ; but the 1st and 2nd Divisions, and some Turkish battalions, the whole under Bosquet, occupied the south-eastern and eastern cliffs "to cover the siege against an attack from the Russian field army."

The 3rd and 4th English Divisions were on the other side of this great ravine, with the Light Division behind them in another ravine. The 2nd Division on the left side of it, was not far from the eastern edge of the Uplands. The heights of Inkermann faced them.

The 1st Division encamped a hundred yards in the rear of the 2nd Division, with their right near the Upland's edge.

Facing the besieging armies was the Malakoff Tower, semicircular, built of stone "five feet thick, 50 feet in diameter, and 28 feet high, prepared for musketry," and having guns on the top, overwhelmingly superior to field artillery. Within this fortified area but further to the west was the Redan, which was "formed of two faces, each about 70 yards in length, meeting in a salient, continued to the works on either side. The parapet at the salient itself was 17 feet, and on the left 15 feet. The ditch, 11 feet deep, varied in width from 20 feet at the salient to 15 feet on the faces." The work was open at the rear, so that an enemy gaining entrance would be exposed to the guns of the Malakoff, the Barrack and the Bastion du mat.

The French were confronted with the Flagstaff Bastion, which with the Central Bastion the Russians were strengthening, working night and day under the direction of Todleben, the famous engineer. A new battery, moreover, the Barrack battery, was being formed between the Redan and the inner harbour, as well as another battery on its other flank. Each of these works was armed with heavy artillery. The Russian activity made every day an incalculable gain to themselves; each day's delay in the attack added to the difficulties of the task awaiting the Allies. But delay was inevitable since much time was needed to bring up siege guns and ammunition. By the evening of October 16th, the batteries of the besiegers were complete.

Everything was now in readiness for a combined assault on Sebastopol. The Light Division took up a position near the windmill, and in the rear of the hill which had been named Victoria Redoubt. This was the place of the brigade throughout what was to prove a long and tremendous siege; yet when the army first

came within sight of the fortress bets had been taken that the place would fall within twenty-four hours !

The Victoria Redoubt lay between the Docks and the Careenage ravines, and was armed with heavy guns. It was not less than 2,000 yards from the enemy's works, and as Hamley says, at that distance its guns were well within their own range, and almost outside that of the opposing artillery.

On the 17th of October a combined bombardment on Sebastopol was made—the “most tremendous conflict of artillery which up to that time the earth had ever witnessed.” The British artillery ruined the Malakoff Tower, dismounting its guns, and disabling the batteries below by the falling of masses of masonry ; but none of the other batteries of the fortresses were silenced. The French fire, however, so failed that no advantage could be taken of the damage done at the Malakoff. The 33rd and other regiments were ready, but were not called on to force their way in. To the amazement of the besiegers on the following morning, the Russians had restored all the damage done, and the disasters to the enemy on the preceding day had in no sense weakened the defence. It began to be asked whether the fortress could be taken by assault. Yet for days the bombardment proceeded. The 33rd during the period extending from October 13th to the 22nd of that month, lost one sergeant and seven rank and file wounded.

The Light Division were not in the fight of October 25th, which occurred when the enemy having attacked the position in front of Balaclava, were driven back by a splendid charge of the heavy cavalry. The defeated Russian horse fled in panic. But that day was made notable in history by the mistake which sent the Light Brigade into what will always be known as “The Valley of Death,” for out of 673 of all ranks who rode in that memorable charge only 195 returned. And yet, as a result, “the havoc and confusion wrought among the Russian troops,” says Evelyn Wood, “were



indescribable, and this accounts for the number of our dismounted men who escaped."

The Russians had captured three hills that day, and held them with seven guns. They knew of certain weak points in our own defences, especially between the Carenage ravine and the edge of the Upland, where "a force might sally from the town, and ascending the ravine, or the adjacent slopes, without obstacle, would then be on fair fighting terms with whatever troops it might find there." Such a sally took place on the 26th of October, when a large force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry attacked the left of the 2nd Division. The Light Division moved out in aid of General De Lacy Evans, bringing up their guns; but there was no need for the 33rd to engage the enemy, they having been promptly repulsed.

## CHAPTER XXIX

### INKERMANN

THE repulse at Balaclava, in spite of its accompanying heavy losses, did not deter the enemy from making a further and more serious attempt to gain the positions which were so weakly held by the Allies. The Russians seem to have discovered that our failure to entrench at Inkermann was caused, as Sir Evelyn Wood has put it, "by our having engaged in an enterprise entirely beyond our powers, which the reflex action of public opinion from England would not allow us to abandon, even if our leaders had been willing to do so." 1854.

Lord Raglan knew full well that the Inkermann position was weak, but he was not in a position to help himself. One can imagine the jeopardy of the Light Division here; how the men of the 33rd were daily faced with possible catastrophe, since the general of their Division reported after Balaclava in these terms: "At daylight, instead of having anyone in camp for the defence of the position, we (the Light Division) shall be short of troops to relieve the picquets." He wrote a few days after that: "I have but 600 men on this front position. The troops are completely worn out with fatigue. This is serious." It was more serious in view of the fact that reinforcements were pouring into Sebastopol, and that Menschikoff had at his disposal no less than 120,000 men. The Russians dominated not only in numbers, but in strength of position; for they had those immensely strong batteries in the fortress. The Allied army, all told, including their landed seamen, did not exceed 65,000

men, for the Ottoman soldiers, numbering 11,000, were treated as an unreliable contingent, whose fighting capacity was unknown. But even these only brought the Allied army up to 76,000 men.

Todleben felt assured, from what he saw, that a combined attack on the Flagstaff bastion was about to be made. He determined to intercept the attack by forcing a battle which would at all events draw off the English attention from the Flagstaff bastion. Accordingly a sortie in force was ordered against Inkermann.

The Russians were on the move in a drizzling rain at five o'clock in the morning of November 5th, and a fog having settled down heavily in the valleys, their movements were not observed. So much was this the case that Brigadier-General Codrington, when visiting the pickets of the Light Division, while the greater portion of the men were in the trenches, had the report made to him of "All well." He was talking to Captain Prettyman of the 33rd, who was with the outlying pickets of his own brigade, when the latter observed that the gloom of the morning favoured an attack on the position, and it would not be surprising if the Russians took advantage of it. Scarcely had the Brigadier turned his horse to the lines when the rattle of musketry on the left of the Light Division pickets was heard, and the Russians were discovered to be advancing in force, scaling the almost perpendicular heights which command the valley. The Brigadier hurried back to the lines to turn out his Division, but before he could return the pickets had all been driven in, and the surging mass of Russians were resolutely assailing the whole position. Codrington led parts of the 7th, 23rd, and 33rd, which remained in camp to cover the extreme flank of the right attack, and occupy the sloping grounds towards Sebastopol.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the enemy were discovered in the barely lifting fog at three points : on the side of the bridge of

<sup>1</sup> "Army and Navy Notes."

Inkermann, in front of the right of the English corps of observation ; in the plain of Tchernaya ; and in front of an elevated point where the Woronzoff road debouches upon the plateau.

Realising the danger on the British side, General Bosquet rode hard to see General Brown to offer him assistance, but Brown, not realising the enormous force that was advancing, said that his reserves were sufficient to guard against all contingencies, but would be glad if Bosquet would cover his right, a little in the rear of the English redoubt.<sup>1</sup>

It was plain when the fog lifted somewhat that the brunt of the attack was on Inkermann, for the enemy's cavalry were deploying on that point. "In the direction of Balaclava the attack was slight, undecided, and ill-planned ; while the artillery, mingled with a heavy fire of musketry, threatened terribly the positions of Inkermann."<sup>2</sup>

Lord Raglan's dispatch after the battle sets forth in detail the various positions occupied by the divisions, and how the Russians delivered their attack, and for that reason it may be referred to with advantage. When the advanced pickets who covered the right of our position discovered the approach of the enemy's columns, they defended the ground inch by inch against overwhelming numbers, and thus, retarding their progress, gave the 2nd Division—under Major-General Pennefather—time to get under arms, and place themselves and their guns in position.

Sir George Brown, likewise, brought the Light Division to the front immediately, the 1st Brigade—the 7th, 23rd, and 33rd—under Major-General Codrington, occupying the long slopes to the left towards Sebastopol, and protecting our right battery, as well as guarding against attack on that side. The 2nd Brigade, under Buller, formed the left of the 2nd Division, with the 88th thrown in advance.

The Duke of Cambridge and General Bentinck went

<sup>1</sup> *Besanecourt*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

to the front with the Brigade of Guards, and took up ground to the extreme right on the alignment of the 2nd Division, but separated from it by a deep and precipitous ravine, and posting its guns with those of the 2nd Division.

Cathcart brought the 4th Division to the front and right of the attack, the 1st Brigade going to the left of the Inkermann road, with the 2nd Brigade on its left, on the ridge overhanging the valley of the Tchernaya.

General England, with the 3rd Division, moved on to the ground previously occupied by the 4th, to support the Light Division with two regiments commanded by Campbell. Eyre commanded the remaining troops in the trenches.

In every part of the field the Russians advanced with overwhelming force under cover of a heavy fire of shot, shell, and grape, and so definitely did they attack at all points that it was impossible for any of the Divisions to do other than look to themselves, being unable thereby to aid the others. It was thus that the French assistance became imperative, for while the British troops were hard pressed, the Russians were continually reinforced, fresh battalions taking the places of those who were so resolutely repulsed.

The French were so little pressed that they were able to throw in their aid, and Bosquet was singularly ready with his battalions when the Guards were fighting with desperation, and Cathcart with the 4th Division and Brown with his Light Division were making incredible efforts. Bosquet, when appealed to, threw his forces on the Russians' left flank at the point of the bayonet, while he brought up his batteries. Yet, when the British Divisions were in position, they presented what Bazancourt called "an impregnable front to the Russian bayonets." Again and again the enemy were beaten back, and the fighting on either side was of a desperate and sanguinary character.

Meanwhile the British extreme left was so hard

pressed that the Russians captured four guns. Buller's men, the 88th, having been thus driven back, re-formed, and swept down again on the enemy, recapturing three of the four lost guns. Buller brought up the 77th, and with these 650 men he pushed on and regained the fourth gun. At the same moment a company of the Guards fired on the Russians, who, fearing a flank attack, turned and fled.

Simonoff's battalions, of 19,000 Russians, were still assailing the positions. One of these battalions had reached the plateau, but the 47th drove down on it, and poured in such a destructive fire as to demoralise the men. The sight of the oncoming regiment, after those fearful volleys, with bayonets fixed, made them break up in the wildest confusion. In this terrific fight Simonoff was killed. Six of his battalions which had been led against our centre were driven back with fearful loss. The other six battalions, seeing them in full retreat, almost in panic, and fearing lest in turn they should be overwhelmed, fell back in great disorder. Their chief officers had been shot down, and, to quote Sir Evelyn Wood, "the Reserves were never brought forward, and the battalions, pushed to the front, wandered about in an aimless fashion like sheep without a shepherd."

The battle, however, continued to rage. In spite of Simonoff's failure, Danneberg, on the retreat of the dead general's battalions, brought on 19,000 more Russian troops, with 90 guns, and attacked our right and centre. They were met by the 41st at the Sandbag battery, and on the Fore Ridge slopes, and held back. When the Guards hurried up to reinforce the 41st, the fighting was desperate. Every Russian charge was met, but while the British were driven out of the Sandbag battery, they recaptured it again and again against overwhelming odds. It was so captured no less than six times, the defenders growing weaker through losses. When the seventh recapture came the Russians were beaten.

At that crisis shots came from the rear, and to the amazement of the 41st and Guards it was seen that a column of Russian infantry was outflanking the position occupied by the 4th Division. Cathcart sought to create a diversion by taking the enemy in flank. A handful of the 20th Regiment—not more than 50 or 60 men, it has been said—were told to charge this column. Undaunted by the odds, they broke through, but being short of ammunition they had to take their choice of surrender or die. They maintained the fight gloriously against the surrounding Russians. Cathcart was with these men, and fell, wounded mortally; so also did his aide-de-camp, Colonel Seymour. The troops sought to fight their way home, but Bosquet's arrival with two battalions of French infantry enabled them to join in a charge which drove the Russians down the hill with immense loss.

The battle was not yet over. The Sandbag battery was now once more in the hands of the Allies—a French battalion and a part of the Rifle Brigade, but the Russians again assailed our left. The attack was “pushed home in echelon from the Russian Right against our Left, and up the main road against our Centre.” At first it was successful. The left was penetrated in the fog, some of our guns were taken, and the Russians got upon the crest—6,000 of them. The defenders here numbered 5,000, but the Russian supporting columns were advancing. Lord Raglan, realising the danger, asked for French assistance. Their left was being attacked by a powerful column of the enemy, but the British positions were practically surrounded. There was some strange delay, but at last the French battalions came. The enemy were driven off by a simultaneous advance of French and British, and so disastrously to the Russians, that Danneberg, realising the hopelessness of his task, drew off his troops. His main body was attacked furiously by the Allies who re-established themselves across the head of the Quarry ravine. The French troops, who had defended a

portion of the centre which, strangely enough, had been either forgotten or neglected, and had been occupied at Bosquet's orders, lest it should result in the Russians getting through, and bring disaster, found themselves assailed by the retreating enemy, who thought it possible after all to redeem what they were losing. The fierce fighting which followed was carried on with varying fortune until reinforcements came to the defenders. The Russians then retreated towards Sebastopol.

The part played in this battle was important, inasmuch as the troops had to hold a position which, if taken, would have resulted in catastrophe for the Allies. The 2nd Brigade of the Light Division had been called on to recapture the lost guns, but the 33rd, the 7th, and the 23rd had the hard task of watchful inaction, ever alert against a flank menace from the Russians.

After a final advance of the French and English battalions the defeat of the enemy was assured. The troops that had issued from Sebastopol returned in disorder, and decimated. They had lost six generals, 256 other officers, and 10,708 men. The vivid description given by the French historian, Bazancourt, shows how at the bottom of the valley, where the fighting had been the fiercest, the mangled corpses were heaped together, as others had been erewhile upon the plateau. The spot where this dreadful carnage took place, and where the Battle of Inkermann was ended, has since received the terrible name of The Slaughter House. The losses of the Allies were great, also ; for of the officers of the British and French forces engaged, 52 were killed, and 127 wounded. In either ranks, 558 British were killed, and 1,670 wounded, while of the French the killed amounted to 130, and the wounded to 750.

The battle has been described as "extraordinary," and it was so, inasmuch as it closed "with no final charge nor victorious advance on the one side, no desperate stand nor tumultuous flight on the other."



Hamley says that the Russians, when hopeless of success, seemed to melt from the lost field—a very different but more probably correct version than the French. The British were too few and too exhausted, the French too little confident in the advantage gained, to convert the repulse into a rout.

NOTE: Lord Raglan, in his returns of casualties from November 2 to November 7, gave the following for the 33rd: 1 officer, 1 sergeant, 9 rank and file, killed; 2 officers, 2 sergeants, 51 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file, missing. The officer killed was Ensign Thorold. There is some discrepancy in the figures given, for another return fixes the number of casualties for Inkermann alone in the 33rd at one officer and 13 men killed; 2 officers and 60 men wounded.

## CHAPTER XXX

### THE PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL

A FEW days after Inkermann was fought, a hurricane swept the coasts of the Crimea with such awful fury as to threaten the very existence of the Allied army. In the midst of snow and sleet and pitiless rain, and a wind which swept away tents and everything that was movable, the transports met with disaster which can well be described as calamitous. Apart from the appalling life at sea, no less than thirty-two of the British ships were completely wrecked, and with their loss came deprivation that is difficult to describe. The British army especially was brought to a state of destitution. 1854.

It was the commencement of a dire experience which has become historic. There is not space in this story of the 33rd to describe the horrors of the winter which followed that sweeping tempest of November 14th. It brought the army to starvation point. There was not only shortage of food and fuel in the fiercest of winters, but the loss of warm clothing which went down in enormous quantities in the transports, as well as ammunition, provisions and twenty days' forage.

The huts were at Balaclava, but there was no transport for them across the execrable roads; hence the army was under canvas in the midst of cold so "insufferably bitter, that it was . . . seriously discussed, by those exposed to it, whether a few more degrees of fall in the barometer would not suffice to destroy, to the last man, the remnant of the finest army that ever left these shores."

The French were generous in their help, but in spite of their co-operation the hospitals were crowded out, and the death-rate rose to an appalling degree. At the back of all the suffering must be placed something more than mismanagement—the failure of the calculations of those who, in planning the expedition to the Crimea, anticipated the fall of Sebastopol in a few days. The French suffered terribly in the early days, but ships came from France, bringing tents and huts, winter clothing and provisions, in a steady flow. The criticism of our Allies is worth quoting. “The losses which” the British “had experienced from the tempest of the 14th, and the improvidence, perhaps, of their military administration, which was not so minutely and regularly organised as ours, left them more exposed to the severe trials of the first and more rigorous assaults of the winter. But the courage of that valiant army remained unshaken, although with profound grief we saw it daily reduced by sickness, and but slowly advancing that part of the siege which was assigned to it.”

Shortly after the Battle of Inkermann Colonel Blake was invalided home, and Brevet-Major Mundy took the command of the 33rd. That officer was mentioned by Lord Raglan as being among those who especially distinguished themselves at Inkermann.

Throughout the severe winter the Russians were active. Again and again Lord Raglan reported endeavours on the part of the enemy to take up important positions, which added to the rough experiences of the British army, of whom at least 8,000 were in hospital, with a tendency to increase. He reported, moreover, that through those days of November and December it hardly ceased either to rain, hail or snow, so that communications were rendered more difficult, and materially retarded the movement of supplies and stores.

The 33rd suffered severely in this terrible weather, the numbers being greatly reduced by sickness brought on by the severity of the winter, and constant and

arduous duties in the trenches. The depleted regiment was, however, greatly strengthened on the 6th of December, when the companies numbered 16, the Service numbers being 1,120, the dépôt numbers 1,098, the total reaching 2,218.

On the 15th of December a General Order was issued in the following terms :

HORSE GUARDS,  
15th *December*, 1854.

The Queen having been pleased to command that a Medal, bearing the word "Crimea," with an appropriate device, shall be conferred upon all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of Her Majesty's Army, including the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, and Royal Sappers and Miners, who have been engaged in the arduous and brilliant campaign in the Crimea, and that Clasps, with the words "Alma" or "Inkermann" thereon, shall also be awarded to such as may have been engaged in either of those battles; the General Commanding-in-Chief desires that this mark of Her Majesty's gracious approbation of the services of that portion of Her forces employed under Field-Marshal Lord Raglan shall be published in the General Orders of the Army.

Field-Marshal Lord Raglan has been requested to forward lists of the individuals entitled to these honourable distinctions.

Yet all this while the winter horrors were continuous, and as Sir Evelyn Wood says, towards the end of November there were no battalions in which some private soldiers were not tainted with scurvy. He adds the startling statement that "although 20,000 lbs. of lime-juice, equal to 634,000 rations, was received on the 19th of December, 1854, at Balaclava, it was not till February, 1855, after the whole army had become so affected, that the first issue was made!" He says

yet more. "Some fresh meat was issued in January and February, but the sick were always served first, and as the whole quantity issued in sixty days amounted only to 14 lbs. per man, and as half the army was in hospital, the men who were still struggling on at duty got but little." What can be said of such a statement as this, that "there was no system, until December, capable of bringing fresh vegetables to the soldiers working in the trenches. . . . (Yet) one ship . . . arrived from Varna with her decks piled up with cabbages, but the purchaser had omitted to consign them to anyone, and no one being willing to accept the financial responsibility of signing for them, they were eventually thrown overboard?"

One does not wonder that the ranks were depleted in those awful months, while some were blundering through at home; that the hospitals were being crowded out to the doors with the gaunt forms of those who had fallen victims to the sword, to exposure, fatigue, and starvation; and for a time, still more rapidly emptied by the exchange of the narrow bed of pain and fever, for a calmer and untroubled resting-place—the grave.<sup>1</sup> That is not the whole of the scandalous story, for Brackenbury goes on to tell how the horses suffered from the lack of system as badly as the men, for when, sometimes, it was found that there was corn, or other forage, available, the authorities had never considered it necessary to send out nosebags!

The Russians suffered greatly, but they were active in keeping the Allied army constantly on the alert. On December 20th two sorties were made from Sebastopol, one, as Lord Raglan said, being conducted silently, on our right in the dead of night; the other on the left, with drums beating, and with shouting. The silent attack on the Inkermann heights was unsuspected until the enemy were close, and made a rush on the most forward parallel, coming on so fiercely that the pickets had to drop back. Some regiments came

<sup>1</sup> Brackenbury: "Campaign in the Crimea."

up with considerable rapidity, and drove back the Russians. The loss to the 33rd in this surprise attack was two privates killed, four wounded, and two missing. That same night there had been some hard fighting on the French side, our Rifle Brigade and the 42nd moving to reinforce our Allies who were closely pressed.

Happily, as the year approached its end, the transport improved, and Raglan at the close of December reported the welcome arrival of vast quantities of ammunition, warm clothing, and huts for the army. Meanwhile the Russians were withdrawing from the valley of the Tchernaya, constructing defensive works on the heights above, which, as the Commander-in-Chief suggested, "would imply a difficulty of maintaining their troops in the field." Unfortunately the weather was so bad, and the harbour at Balaclava so inconvenient, that the supplies could not readily be landed, and for days the reinforcements that arrived were unable to come ashore.

Early in January warm clothing was at hand for the men. Each soldier received a second blanket, a jersey frock, flannel drawers, socks, and some kind of winter coat, in addition to the ordinary great coat.<sup>1</sup> Public opinion was shaking up the official laggards at home, convincing them of the necessity for dealing with the more practical demands from the seat of war. The welcome arrival of these comforts may be appreciated when it is remembered that the snow at the end of the first fortnight before Sebastopol was fully a foot deep. The crying need, however, was an adequate transport, so that the huts, each of which weighed two and a half tons, might be brought up to the camp. In that case, said Lord Raglan, "there would be no other cause of suffering than the severity of a Crimean winter, and the duties imposed of carrying on a siege in such a climate at (that) season of the year." 1855.

The distribution of the 33rd in the early part of 1855 was as follows :

<sup>1</sup> Lord Raglan's Despatches.

In the Crimea : Officers	38	Rank and File	1,076
Malta	„ 19	„ „ „	536
At Home	„ 10	„ „ „	537
<hr/>		<hr/>	
67		2,149	
		Total	2,216

Throughout the bitter weather which made the first winter of the war so terrible for the troops, the fighting was of the most desultory character, entailing, however, daily casualties which, in addition to the sickness, kept the hospitals full, and laid the heaviest burdens on the medical staff, and the heroic band of nurses who worked under the instructions of Florence Nightingale. There was a tremendous fight on February 15th, when a great force of Russians attacked some of our entrenchments, but were beaten off, leaving nearly 200 dead on the field. The 33rd do not appear to have been engaged in this affair, which brought out on both sides 40,000 men of all arms, and the artillery. From that time onward there was greater activity, but in every engagement, whether of a minor or more important character, the Russians suffered heavily, and appear to have made no serious impression on our positions, which Raglan and Canrobert had made immensely strong during the terrible winter months. On the other hand the Russians had accumulated defence upon defence, and constantly held ready powerful reserves to protect their new works.<sup>1</sup> The medical report for the early months showed that the Light Division had greatly improved in health ; as March progressed the weather improved considerably, and the army experienced the benefit of the better conditions.

In March, Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone, who had gone home on sick leave, returned to the Crimea and again took over the command of the 33rd. On all hands at the time there were indications that active

<sup>1</sup> Bazancourt.

operations would shortly recommence, and in the improving condition of things the soldiers hailed the promise of change. Now that the winter was gone the huts were brought up to their places, provisions were abundant, and, as Russell puts it, the army, animated by the constant inspection of Lord Raglan, was nearly restored in all but numbers to what it had been six months before. The silence and gloom of despondency had passed away with the snows and rains and the deadly lethargy of the terrible winter.

Near to the quarters of the Light Division were some rifle pits, "simple excavations in the ground, faced round with sandbags, which were loopholed for rifles, and banked up with the earth which had been thrown up from the pit," and each capable of holding ten men. There had been a constant struggle for these "little forts or redoubts," and the Russians, having secured them, were able to annoy the Allies considerably. It became a point of honour with General Bosquet to drive the Russians out of them; but his endeavour on March 17th proved a task infinitely harder than was expected, for the Russians, when he attacked, came out in great force. The 4th Division of the British army was brought out to aid the French if necessary, while the whole of the Light Division marched under Sir George Brown near enough to be of service during the fight. They lay under arms for four hours, but after that time the French retired without calling for aid. They did not even call on their own reserve. On March 22nd the attack was renewed, and this time Bosquet drove out the enemy. In the skirmishes which took place during these efforts to capture the rifle pits three of the rank and file of the 33rd were killed, and an officer was reported wounded, as well as four of the rank and file.

That same date—March 22nd—was an unusually important one, for a furious battle raged all along the line on the occasion of the sortie of 8,000 Russians from Sebastopol. They had come out silently, going into



hiding in some hollows until night fell, when they made their rush, mainly on the French works in front of the Mamelon. The attack spread all along the front. The fight which thus developed was of a sanguinary character, and in it Lieutenant and Adjutant Marsh, of the 33rd, particularly distinguished himself. On that day he was adjutant on duty, and acting as aide-de-camp to Colonel Kelly, who commanded the troops when the Allied troops were attacked. His conduct on this occasion elicited the highest approval of Lord Raglan, Sir George Brown, and many other officers of distinction. The 34th Regiment was opposed by an enormous force of the enemy, but notwithstanding the odds, after an hour's heavy fighting the enemy was driven back. In a gallant charge made on the right, Colonel Kelly, of the 34th, and Major Gordon, R.E. were both wounded, and Colonel Kelly taken prisoner. Lieutenant March then commanded the troops, and, without losing a moment, proceeded to the support of the left of our works, where the enemy had entered in large masses. He reached the mortar battery just as the Russians entered at the opposite end, and with the co-operation of Captain Browne and Lieutenant McHenry, prevented the spiking of the pieces. Lord Raglan's dispatch states that Colonel Tylden coming up, he speedily ejected the Russians from the works and "fairly pitched them over the parapets," being well supported by the young adjutant of the 33rd, who was next morning honoured by an order to write an account of the battle.<sup>1</sup> While this was common knowledge, however, there was no special mention of the young officer's name in the dispatch. The praise seems to have gone elsewhere.

That sortie cost the Russians dearly, and it stands out as the most important they had so far made during the siege. Even Prince Gortschakoff, who now commanded the enemy during the absence of Menschikoff, who was gone to St. Petersburg on the death of the

<sup>1</sup> "Army and Navy Notes."

Czar, said that he had lost in all 8 superior officers and sub-officers, and 379 men killed, with 21 officers and sub-officers and 982 men wounded.

There were alarms every night, and new ambuscades which added to the lists of killed and wounded on either side. The operations of the besieging army throughout the spring months, far on into April, were carried on with great vigour, but the Russians were constantly, night and day, firing into our lines, and doing considerable damage. A great amount of attention was given to the Mamelon, which the Russians were fortifying with unusual energy, but our guns did an immense amount of damage to their new works.

On the 19th of April the 33rd were engaged in serious work. The Russians did a great deal of mischief from time to time by having established themselves in some capacious pits they had dug in front of the Redan. The harassment was so great that it was resolved to drive the enemy out of them, the attack being made at night. Russell has described the fight which took place.

“About eight o’clock the party of the 77th, under Lieut.-Colonel Egerton, with a wing of the 33rd in the rear in support, moved down the traverses towards the rifle pits. The night was dark and windy, but the Russian sentries perceived the approach of our men, and a brisk fire was at once opened upon them, to which our troops scarcely replied, for they rushed upon the enemy with the bayonet, and after a short struggle, drove them out of the two pits and up the slope behind them. Once in the pits the engineers, officers, and sappers and miners set to work to strengthen the defences, threw up a gabionade in front, and with great coolness and courage proceeded to connect the trench of the nearest of the rifle pits with our advanced sap. The enemy opened an exceedingly heavy fire of round, grape, and shell upon them, and the Russian sharpshooters from the parapets of the batteries, and from the broken ground behind the abattis, kept up a very severe fusillade ; but the working party continued

at their labour in defiance of the storm of shot which tore over them ; and our men remained in possession of the larger of the pits under these trying circumstances, without any decided attempt being made to turn them out. The general of the day telegraphed to head-quarters that our troops had gained the pits, and he received directions in reply from Major-General Jones to keep them at all hazards. At two o'clock in the morning a strong column of Russians, certainly double the strength of our men, advanced against the pits, and the combat was renewed. The English troops fought with that immovable stolidity for which, in the opinion of our allies, they were so celebrated. The enemy were met by courage more determined and by arms more nervous than their own ; by the bayonet they were thrust back again and again, and at its very point they were driven up to their batteries once more. It was while setting an example of conspicuous bravery to his men that Colonel Egerton fell mortally wounded. The rifle pit was left in our hands, and a smart fire kept up from it." Lieut.-Colonel Mundy, of the 33rd, who succeeded to the command of the troops engaged on the death of the Colonel, was mentioned favourably in Lord Raglan's dispatch which followed this brilliant engagement. The loss for the 77th was 2 officers and 6 rank and file killed ; 2 officers, 3 sergeants and 32 rank and file wounded. The 33rd were singularly fortunate, for they had not more than 3 rank and file wounded. The pits were completely destroyed by volunteers a day or two later.

The enemy fired on the trenches constantly, the firing being of an exceptionally serious nature during the months of April and May, but on the 1st of May the Russians were driven out of a counterguard which they had established in front of the central bastion. Sorties became frequent, but the Russians were driven back with heavy losses. Consequently the casualties were many, and the 33rd had their share of them. The cholera unfortunately returned and caused great loss

to the Light Division in April; happily it abated in May. The condition of the regiment, and, indeed, of the army generally, vastly improved when the spring had fairly asserted itself. "The authorities were straining every nerve to relieve the wants and sufferings of the army. Supplies were hurried out; a good metalled road was made from Balacava to the camp; the debilitated army was steadily reinforced; Florence Nightingale and a devoted band of ladies introduced order into the hospitals at Scutari and Kulali on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. The lengthening days and the finer weather assisted the work of administration; and the sanitary condition of the army in May, 1855, was about as creditable as it had been disgraceful in November, 1854."<sup>1</sup>

In the meantime preparations were made for a third bombardment. Many new batteries were erected, the mortars were more numerous, the quantity of ammunition accumulated was immense, and by the day appointed the French had 300 pieces of ordnance in position, and the British guns and mortars numbered 157.

The fire opened from every battery in the afternoon of the 6th of June, and the bombardment continued until evening. The mortars, however, were employed the whole night through, resulting in great loss to the enemy.<sup>2</sup>

In front of the works bombarded were the Volhynian and Selenghinsk redoubts. On their right, towards the English position came the Mamelon; in front of the British were the Quarries. This work was about 400 yards in front of the Redan, and the agreement between Raglan and Pelissier was, that as soon as the French had secured the Mamelon the British should attack the Quarries, and establish themselves. Lord Raglan's plan was that of a three hours' cannonade, and then attack, but Pelissier dissuaded him, and

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History."

<sup>2</sup> Brackenbury: "Campaign in the Crimea."

by many this was deemed unfortunate, for it was felt that a cannonade and then a vigorous attack would have enabled Raglan to carry the place.

On the morning of the 7th the bombardment was renewed, the Mamelon was reduced to silence, the parapet of its right face was almost levelled, and after two hours the Malakoff was unable to support it. By six o'clock in the evening the White Works and the auxiliary battery were ruined, and the parapets thrown into the ditch.<sup>1</sup> At that hour the French made a magnificent charge and got into the Mamelon. The Russians, however, coming on in overwhelming force, expelled them with heavy loss.

The troops selected by Lord Raglan for storming the Quarries were detachments of the Light and 2nd Divisions, a detachment of the 33rd among them. The immediate assault was to be made by 700 men; 600 were in close support; the 62nd Regiment was in reserve, and in readiness, if called for, was a strong detachment of the 55th. The command was entrusted to Colonel Shirley, of the 88th, who was acting as general officer of the trenches. He was assisted in the arrangements and guided as to the points of attack and distribution of troops, Lord Raglan says in his dispatch, by Lieut.-Colonel Tylden, of the Royal Engineers, the directing engineer officer of the night attack.

The 33rd and their comrades had to cover a considerable distance when they left their trenches, and that space of ground was swept by grape. They went on in spite of all, and got in; but the night which followed was full of thrilling experience. These troops had possession of the Quarries, but again and again the Russians came on in fierce endeavour to expel them. "More than once," says Russell, "there was a fierce hand-to-hand fight in the position itself, and our fellows had frequently to dash out in front and take their assailants in flank. The most murderous sortie of the

<sup>1</sup> Evelyn Wood.

enemy took place about three in the morning, when the whole ravine was lighted up with a blaze of fire, and a storm of shot was thrown in from the Strand battery, and every other spot within range." The outcome, said Raglan, was "most triumphant." Lieut.-Colonel Johnstone and Lieutenant Marsh of the 33rd greatly distinguished themselves.

## CHAPTER XXXI

### THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL

1855. THE capture of the Quarries was a costly affair, for on our side no less than 35 officers and 365 rank and file were killed. But the French loss was much greater, being in officers double that of ours, while the men who fell numbered 1,500.

The capture of the Redan was now deemed imperative. For days the Quarries were held under constant fire, as also was the Mamelon, which had been taken by the French ; but it was felt that every effort must now be put forth for reducing the Redan, and preparations were accordingly made. When new batteries had been completed, and the Allies were able to resume the offensive, the assault was fixed for June 18th. There was to be a cannonade from the whole of the Allied batteries, to begin on the morning of the 17th. The fire was so effective that the French attacked the Malakoff on the following morning. The plan determined on was, that the British assault on the Redan should follow at a given interval succeeding the French attack. This attack, however, began three hours before the proposed time. Lord Raglan had been anxious for a three hours' heavy cannonade to destroy any works that may have been constructed during the night by the enemy, but the French were restless, and moved on at daybreak. They found the Russians everywhere alert, and were met by a terrible fire. In spite of magnificent behaviour the French failed in their attack, meeting with enormous losses. Their left column passed the advanced works of the enemy, and threatened

the gorge of the Malakoff Tower, but their other two columns found the defence so stubborn, and the difficulties so great, as to compel retreat.

The troops for the British attack on the Redan were in three columns, namely, the Light Division on the left, the 2nd Division in the centre, and the 4th on the right. The 4th were to attack the left front of the Redan; the left were to throw themselves against the receding angle formed by the right front and flank of the work, while the centre were to wait until the two wings had made their decided movements before advancing against the salient.

The assaulting columns consisted of detachments only from the divisions named, and the 33rd accordingly contributed its quota to the Light Division. The whole of the attacking party numbered not more than 1,200 men, but the troops held in reserve were as many as 10,000. Lord Raglan forcibly describes the early movement in this desperate assault. "The flank columns at once obeyed the signal to advance, preceded by covering parties of the Rifle Brigade, and by sailors carrying ladders, and soldiers carrying woolbags; but they had no sooner shown themselves beyond the trenches than they were assailed by a most murderous fire of grape and musketry. Those in advance were either killed or wounded, and the remainder found it impossible to proceed. I never before witnessed such musketry from the enemy's works, which appeared to be fully manned."

It had been arranged that the French should first secure a foothold before the British attack began, but when Lord Raglan saw the difficulties of the French he ordered his columns to advance at once, under the command of General Sir George Brown. But almost simultaneous with the advance of Brown's columns was that of one which numbered 2,000 and was under the command of General Eyre. It was on the extreme British left, and moved down the ravine which "separated the right of the French on their Western Attack."



Eyre was to seize the works in the cemetery. The brigade carried the cemetery, but advanced too far. It moved on to the houses "at the foot of the enemy's main line of works in the Garden batteries." The valour displayed was beyond all praise; the persistent grip on what Eyre's men had seized was amazing, for while they had advanced at daybreak they held the place till sunset, when it was handed over to the French. General Eyre was severely wounded in this fight.

One of the clearest accounts of the attack on the Redan is given by Sir Evelyn Wood, who describes tersely the ground over which the 33rd had to travel when taking their part in this desperate undertaking. "The glacis of the Redan was the natural surface of the ground, which met in a ridge on the line of the capital. . . . Every part of this ridge was seen to some degree, from the adjoining flanks, but they were on a lower level than the Salient. Nevertheless the ridge itself was exposed to fire from the Barrack and Garden batteries, and from the Gervais, and other Malakoff batteries. The slope up which the stormers were to pass was covered by long rank grass, and seamed with holes made by the explosion of mortar shells, by innumerable rifle trenches, and by some disused gravel-pits."

The storming party furnished by the Light Division was made up of detachments of the 33rd, the 23rd Welsh Fusiliers, and the 7th Fusiliers. A detachment of the 34th was added to this party during the night. Colonel Lysons of the 23rd was in command of other detachments who were to act as a support to the stormers.

In the grey dawn of the morning, after the French were fairly engaged with the Malakoff, the storming party moved forward. Captain Basil Fanshawe, who had joined the 33rd only the night before, on arrival from England, wrote home later, and his letter is vivid and interesting as coming from one who took part in the assault. "We had to cross, on leaving the trenches, 150 yards of open ground, exposed to a very

heavy fire of grape-shot from the enemy. . . . Our loss, I regret to say, was very considerable, having had 50 men killed and wounded. Lieut.-Colonel Johnstone has lost his left arm, Mundy is hit in the leg with a bullet ; Bennett, I am sorry to say, is killed ; Quayle shot in the elbow and arm. Wickham is so hit in the foot that he is likely to be disabled for some time to come ; Collings was stunned by a blow for a moment. I have had a bruise in the shoulder from a stone or spent ball which has made it stiff. The rest of our fellows have escaped unhurt. The loss our Division has sustained is frightful. The Rifle Brigade are almost annihilated ! Out of 130 men, 35 only survive. The 23rd nearly cease to exist ! Poor Sir John Campbell, in rushing out of the trenches, fell in the act of cheering on his men. . . . It seems the general opinion we shall never take the place by assault, and therefore we are going to attack the Redan and Malakoff by sap."

The criticism of so many writers who deal with this assault was borne out in Fanshawe's next letter. Russell says that when the 33rd and others crossed the trench, instead of coming upon the open in a firm body, they were broken in twos and threes. Fanshawe says the same thing, and adds that " many lives would have been saved had a temporary step been raised, which would have enabled the troops to have crossed the parapet with regularity ; instead of which they had to scramble over it as well as they could ; and, as the top of the trench was of an unequal height, their line was quite broken the moment they came out of the trenches. The well-aimed fire of the Russians on our men increased the want of order and unsteadiness caused by their mode of advance. Poor Colonel Yea of the 7th Fusiliers saw the consequences, and did all he could to obviate the evil, and called for a bugler to recall the men, but none was to be found. . . . In a gallant attempt to restore order amongst the troops he fell by a grape-shot."

It was failure for every column in that attempt

on the Redan, and when the shattered detachments returned it was seen how terribly they had suffered. Yet there had been ample reason to justify the assault, as Lord Raglan intimated in his dispatch. "The superiority of our fire on the day we opened, led both General Pelissier and myself, and the officers of the Artillery and Engineers of the two services, and the armies in general, to conclude that the Russian artillery fire was in a great measure subdued, and that the operation we projected could be undertaken with every prospect of success. The result has shown that the resources of the enemy were not exhausted, and that they had still the power, either from their ships or from their batteries, to bring an overwhelming fire upon their assailants."

While these direct attacks were proceeding, and Eyre was advancing on the cemetery and threatening the works at the head of the Dockyard Creek, another brigade of the 3rd Division moved down the Woronzow ravine, under the command of Major-General Barnard. This came into position on the right of the ravine, ready to co-operate with the columns of attack on the right.

Lord Raglan, in a later dispatch, spoke of the distinguished conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Johnstone of the 33rd, as well as of Lieutenant Donovan of the same regiment. When the return came of killed and wounded, it was found that in addition to those already named, Lieutenant J. T. Rogers was wounded, and Lieutenant Heyland was killed. The loss to the 33rd in the attack on the Redan was two officers and 21 men killed, 3 officers and 46 men wounded—a heavy loss, considering that detachments only of the regiment were engaged.

The death of Heyland recalls an incident which deserves to be recorded. It has been told in these words: "When the British Division had retired, after having suffered severely both in officers and men, from the unsuccessful attack, Richard Worrell, a soldier of

the 33rd Regiment, having heard that Lieutenant Heyland had not returned with the regiment, but was supposed to be lying wounded on the scene of action, regardless of every impulse but that of honour and affection, was heard to say, 'I will go and seek him and bring him back if he lives, or die with him if he has been killed.' To aid and relieve this youthful officer, whom he fondly thought was suffering under the wall of the Redan, this noble-hearted man (notwithstanding the continued firing from Sebastopol), determined on returning to the spot where he and the young officer had stood side by side that morning for the last time on earth. He braved death and met it, for his body, pierced with wounds, was found close to that of Lieutenant Langford Heyland's, so nearly had he reached him. Richard Worrell has left a lasting memorial of a soldier's fidelity and affection, thus manifesting to all the strong bond of union that exists between British soldiers and those who lead and guide them. Lieutenant Heyland had received six wounds."

The losses in the unsuccessful assault were more than severe, and as Russell says, "they were not alleviated by the consolations of victory," for 22 officers and 247 men were killed; as many as 78 officers and 1,207 men were wounded. The loss of the French was still heavier, for 39 officers were killed, and 93 wounded, while nearly 1,600 rank and file were killed or taken prisoners, and the same number wounded.

One of the severest losses to the regiment occurred by the death of Lieutenant Hans Marsh, who was shot in the head while in the trenches on the 24th of June. Again and again this officer had been mentioned for his distinguished conduct, and now, alas! a career of splendid promise was ended. He had been five times hit in the Alma fight, and while Captain Wallis was struck down, seriously wounded, at the taking of the battery, Marsh came forward, caught up the colours, and carried them off the field. Lord Raglan, in what was almost his last dispatch, said, "Among the killed

I lament to announce the loss of Lieutenant H. Marsh, 33rd Regiment, who was killed in the trenches on the 24th instant. This young officer had served throughout the campaign, and was distinguished for his gallantry and devotion to the service ; and his conduct on a former occasion I had the honour to bring under your Lordship's notice."

The death of Lord Raglan, whose loss was deplored by the army and the navy, took place on the 28th of June. From this time onwards every effort was expended in strengthening the batteries so as to render the Russian works untenable, and thus compel surrender. Failing this, the long-expected assault was to be made which should ensure the fall of Sebastopol. In the opinion of Pelissier and General Simpson, who succeeded Lord Raglan, the Russians were preparing to force the Allies to raise the siege by a vigorous attack by the field army.

The outcome of this battle of Tchernaya was disastrous for the Russians in every way. It was plain from papers which were found on the commanding general, that—to quote General Simpson's dispatch—"it was a most determined attempt to force us to raise the siege. Had they succeeded, Balaclava was to be attacked by one portion of their army, whilst the heights on which we now are, were to have been stormed with the other ; at the same time a vigorous sortie was to have been made from the town on the French works, on our extreme left, from the Quarantine and another on the works on our extreme right on Mount Sapouné." General Simpson points out that the battle was almost wholly sustained by the French and Sardinians, the Russians leaving the English troops severely alone. The British cavalry were placed in the plain of Balaclava, "prepared to take advantage of any circumstance that might present itself"; but no occasion arose, so gallantly did the French troops repel the enemy. The subordinate part which the British army was playing in the siege during the later months

was due to the reprehensible neglect of those at home to send out adequate reinforcements. Yet in the meantime men and war *materiel* were being poured in from France, so that naturally the British army became, as one writer puts it, "a mere contingent." A sample of this was found in a report which reached the 33rd that they were to be reinforced. When the "reinforcements came," they numbered a subaltern and twelve men !

The tension which succeeded the battle of Tchernaya is almost indescribable. There was the hourly expectation of another Russian attack by day or night, and the officers and men were becoming worn out. From various sources, said the British Commander, it became known that the Russians on the right bank of the Tchernaya were held in perfect readiness for an offensive movement. Meanwhile the siege operations proceeded, but while in Sebastopol the fire from the British and French batteries worked enormous damage, and caused much loss of life among the defenders, the casualties of the besieging force were heavy. By the beginning of September the head of the sap was not more than 150 yards from the salient of the Redan, in spite of the Russians' endeavour to hamper the work.

The end, however, was approaching. The tenacity of the Russians was amazing, for it is computed that the daily loss of the garrison was from 800 to 900 ; yet Gortschakoff refused to give in, his declaration being, when he wrote to St. Petersburg, "I am resolved to defend the south side to the last extremity, for it is the only honourable course which remains to us."

The Allies came to the point beyond which their siege works could be carried no farther. Hamley says that the "English trenches before the Redan had been stopped by solid rock ; the French approaches to the Little Redan, now only forty yards from it, had also got into soil so stony as to no longer afford cover. The most advanced approach to the Malakoff was only

separated from it by twenty-five yards. It was therefore deemed that the time for assault had come, and it only remained to determine the details."

These were defined in the Council of War, and on the 5th of September the last stage in the siege was reached. At daybreak every battery opened fire which lasted almost incessantly throughout the day. The harbour was shelled and some of the shipping fired. It was seen by the glare of light how greatly the defences of Sebastopol had suffered. Gortschakoff declared, when telling the story of the end, that "the assailants augmented, in an incredible manner, their cannonade and bombardment, breaking down our works along our whole line of defence, sometimes by sudden salvos from all their batteries, sometimes by a continuous rolling fire of artillery. This infernal fire, directed against our embrasures and merlons, clearly showed the enemy's intention to dismount our guns and destroy our works, and then to assault the town."

The bombardment was continued for three days and nights; on the 8th the final assault was to be made. The French were to assail the Karabelnaya quarter at three points. Dulac's division was to storm the Little Redan; La Motterouge's division, in the centre, was to operate against the curtain which unites the Little Redan and the Malakoff, which McMahon was to assail on the left. The division of the Guard, under Mellinet, was to support, and the commander of the whole was General Bosquet.

The Great Redan was to be attacked at its salient by the British army, and General Simpson, in his dispatch, details his arrangements. "I determined that the Second and Light divisions should have the honour of the assault, from the circumstance of their having defended the batteries and approaches against the Redan for so many months, and from the intimate knowledge they possessed of the ground."

In accordance with this the following orders were issued on the eve of the assault :

The Redan will be assaulted to-morrow by troops taken from the Light and Second divisions, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir William Codrington, K.C.B., and Lieutenant-General F. Markham, C.B.

The column of attack will be formed as follows :

- 1st. A covering party of 200 men to keep down the fire from the enemy's embrasures.
- 2nd. An armed party of 320 men to carry and place forty ladders.
- 3rd. The main body of assault, 1,000 men.
- 4th. An armed working party of 200 men.
- 5th. The supports amounting to 1,500 men, the remainder of the two Divisions, equal to about 3,000 men, will be formed as a second support to the 3rd parallel, near the French Right Attack, Middle Ravine.

The 3rd Division, and one brigade of the 4th, were held in readiness to protect the left flank of the stormers. All troops were ordered to carry one day's provisions.

In arranging the details of what was to be the final assault, it was considered by all who took part in the Council of War that the key to Sebastopol was the Malakoff. It was determined that the French should assault the Malakoff, under McMahan, and the British were not to attempt the Great Redan, nor the French divisions to assault elsewhere until the signal should come telling of McMahan's success.

McMahan's troops gained the interior of the fortress amid deadly showers of grape ; but in spite of this and the desperate hand-to-hand fighting, when traverses were taken and re-taken, McMahan's soldiers occupied the work throughout its extent, and the signal was given which set the other troops in motion.

This brought the 33rd into the midst of that terrible and never-to-be-forgotten struggle. A few minutes after twelve the Light Division stormers who



were in the 5th parallel sprang out to the attack. They were supported by 300 men from each of the following, the 33rd, the 7th, and the 23rd Fusiliers.

The space to be crossed was not less than 230 yards before the embrasures of the Redan could be reached, and the open ground was swept by shot and shell. The troops were moving through a storm of cannon and musketry as heavy as they had ever before experienced, and at every step men fell. By the time they came to the ditch they were decimated. They crossed this ditch, which was fifteen feet wide, scaled the salient, either by the ladders, or up the broken masonry which had been shattered in the prolonged artillery fire of the previous days. At their appearance on the parapet the Russians fell back, but so thinned was the storming party in the rush to the Redan that they were too weak to make the bayonet charge which would have cleared out the enemy. In some inexplicable way the supports were not forthcoming. They were ready and eager, but the orders for advance were not given, so that the stormers were "crowded together at the apex of the triangle, and were exposed to a concentrated fire from every other portion of the work, which was completely commanded in the rear by some of the guns of the Barrack battery."

This may be emphasised as showing the condition of things when the 33rd had scaled the parapet. Russell describes the place into which the 33rd and their comrades penetrated, and when one reads the lines the mystery increases, that any such plan should have been pursued, as to send so small a force to perform such a tremendous task. He says, "The salient was carried at once, and the men entered the stronghold, which is a work traced on a most obtuse angle, requiring a large mass of men to assault it, not only at the salient, but at the same moment at both flanks, so as to turn them, and to enable the salient storming party to advance down the interior space of the works at once, taking the defenders in front and

flank, and indeed in rear, at the same moment. In consequence of attacking the salient only no front could be formed, on account of the small interior space at the point; the men were forced to advance by driblets, and at the same moment fired on from traverses on either flank, where they could not see their assailants, an evil at once obviated had the attack on the flanks and salient been simultaneous."

The whole thing seems inexplicable. The French sent up 40,000 men against Malakoff; little more than 4,000 men were in readiness to deal with the Great Redan, including the supports, who do not seem to have come out of the trenches. The men who were in the Redan clung heroically to the position they had gained for one long hour, expecting reinforcements. The fearful fire, and the increasing numbers of Russians that were massing against them resulted in their retreat to the side of the parapet. The odds proved overwhelming, and the stormers had to fall back, relinquishing their hold on what they had assailed with such marvellous intrepidity.

The officers of the 33rd who took part in this deadly struggle were Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, Captain Ellis, Lieutenants Willis, Trent, the Hon. de Montmorency, Ball and Donovan; Ensign and Adjutant Toseland, Paymaster Thompson, Quartermaster Vyse, Surgeon Muir, Assistant-Surgeons Ogilvy, Clark and Seddall. Of these Lieutenant-Colonel Gough and Lieutenant G. Donovan were killed; Captain Ellis, Lieutenants Willis and Trent, and Ensign Toseland were wounded, together with 19 men killed and 52 wounded. It was a long roll for a less than two hours' fight, but in such a deadly hail as that which assailed them, the loss might well have been greater.

But while the British assault on the Great Redan, and that of the French on the central bastion, had failed, the capture of the Malakoff compelled Gortschakoff to conclude that the defence of Sebastopol was no longer possible. The Malakoff, in the hands

of the Allies, dominated all the Russian works, and the Prince, realising this, proceeded to abandon the place.

Pelissier's words are worth quoting as conveying some idea of the vastness of the task set for the Allies in bringing about the fall of Sebastopol. "Thus terminated this memorable siege, during which the relieving army was twice beaten in the open field, and the means of defence and attack of which assumed colossal proportions. The besieging army had in its different attacks 800 guns in battery, which fired more than one million, six hundred rounds, and our approaches, dug during 336 days, of open trenches, through a rocky ground, with a development of more than 86 kilometres (about 54 English miles), were made under the constant fire of the place, and with incessant combats by day and night.

"The day of the 8th of September, on which the Allies gained the mastery over an army almost equal in number, not invested, entrenched behind formidable defences, provided with more than eleven hundred cannon, protected by the guns of the fleet, and the north batteries, still possessing enormous resources, will remain an example of what may be expected from a brave disciplined army hardened by war."

The loss at the final storming of Sebastopol was appalling. That of the British was 2,271 officers and men out of 4,000 actually engaged, while the dead and wounded among the French were 7,567 officers and men. But the Russians lost more heavily, the total of dead and wounded showing that 12,913 men fell in that last fight.

The war in the Crimea was astounding by reason of its achievements, in spite of the blunders at home and in the field. The summary given by one writer brings the task vividly before one's mind, as showing what was done in spite of all. "In one year we stormed the heights of the Alma, sustained the glorious disaster of Balaklava, fought the great fight of Inkermann, swept the Sea of Azoff and its seaboard, wasted

Kertch and seized upon Yenikale, witnessed the battle of Tchernaya, opened seven bombardments upon Sebastopol, held in check every general and every soldier that Russia could spare ; and after an endurance of every ill that an enemy at home and abroad could inflict upon us—after passing through summer's heat and winter's frost—after being purged in the fire of sickness and death, repulse and disaster, and above all, in the glow of victory, the British standard floated over Sebastopol."

NOTE.—At the distribution of war medals by Her Majesty at the Horse Guards, in May, 1855, the 33rd were represented by some of the officers who had come home wounded, or on sick leave. These were Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel Gough—who afterwards returned and was killed in the final assault on the Great Redan—Captain Nugent, Lieutenants Wallis, Siree, Greenwood, Owens, Kenrick, Colour-Sergeant William Mason, Sergeant William Keane, Privates James Gaffney, Jeremiah Crowley and William Burton.

In the June attack on the Redan the following officers were present with the regiment : Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone, Major Mundy, Captains Collings, Quayle, Wickham, Ellis, Fanshawe, and Corbett ; Lieutenants Bennett, Heyland, Trent, Willis, Carr, Rogers, Donovan, Johnstone ; Lieutenant and Adjutant Marsh, who again greatly distinguished himself, Paymaster Thompson, Quartermaster Vyse, Surgeon Muir, and Assistant-Surgeons Ogilvie and Clarke.

The names of the officers who took part in the final attack on September 8th, have already been given.

The regiment took part in all the operations of the siege of Sebastopol, and suffered heavily. Again and again in the account of the doings of the 33rd names have been mentioned of officers and men who fell in the tremendous struggle before the doomed fortress, but the summary is as follows : 36 men died of cholera in Bulgaria, and Paymaster McGraith ; 6 men died

on the voyage to the Crimea ; Lieutenant Thistlethwaite and 66 men died of cholera, likewise, in the Crimea ; 248 men died there of other diseases ; 541 men were wounded, and 44 of these died in consequence at later dates ; 12 officers, 2 staff sergeants, 2 colour-sergeants, 16 sergeants, 29 corporals and 535 men were killed in action, or died from sickness contracted in the field, while 293 were invalided ; 115 were disabled and discharged.

## CHAPTER XXXII

### CENTRAL INDIAN MUTINY SERVICE

THE war was not ended by the fall of Sebastopol, for, 1855.  
as Lord Palmerston had said in the Commons, Russia  
was so far from being beaten that she was making an  
immense effort to continue the struggle.

In England there were diverse opinions concerning  
peace. Napoleon III, satisfied with the success which  
his arms had secured, and conscious of the strain which  
war was causing to his finances, was anxious that it  
should end. In England, on the contrary, there was a  
feeling that hostilities should be carried on in order  
to make amends for the failure at the Redan.

In consequence there was every prospect of the  
war continuing into the next year. Pressure, however,  
was brought to bear on the Czar by Austria and  
Prussia, so that he consented to discuss peace terms.  
Until this was arrived at there were operations against  
Russia at Eupatoria and Kinburn, in which the Allies  
achieved some minor successes. The 33rd were not  
engaged in any way after Sebastopol had fallen, and  
after such strenuous work, up to the day when the  
great fortress was abandoned by the Russians, there  
was the possible reaction to listlessness. This was  
prevented. "The Generals of Divisions began to  
drill our veterans, and to renew the long-forgotten  
pleasures of parades, field-days, and inspections."

Yet certain calamities befell our army. On the  
14th of November there was a terrible explosion of  
several hundred barrels of Russian gunpowder which  
wrought fearful havoc. In the Light Division alone

10 men were killed, and of these the 33rd had 2 killed, and 13 injured. There were other casualties throughout the Allied army, and the French lost 6 officers killed, 13 injured, and while 65 of their men were killed, 170 were so injured that few of them recovered.

1856. At last peace was signed, and the Allies abandoned the Crimea. On the 17th of May, 1856, the 33rd marched to Kazatch, embarked in the "London," a warship of 90 guns, and sailed home. By the 21st of June the regiment was at Portsmouth, where Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone, now recovered, awaited its arrival to take over the command. The same day the regiment was taken to the camp at Aldershot, and after a few weeks' stay was reviewed by the Queen, before leaving for duty in Dublin, where the regiment arrived on the 17th of August.

With the ending of the war came the inevitable reduction of the Army; and the following officers of the 33rd were placed on half-pay: Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy, Captains Nugent, Siree, Carr, Greenwood, and Prescott. At the close of the year 1856, however, the 33rd were ordered to prepare for foreign service. Sailing for Mauritius on the 4th of February, 1857, they arrived at the island on the 5th of May.

1857. There was no anticipation of service in India, but news had come of the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. Within six days of the arrival of the regiment at Mauritius, India was in a ferment. The regiments of Sepoys at Meerut, a military station in the North West Provinces, mutinied, and every European the native soldiers could find was murdered before they marched to Delhi to proclaim the Mogul Emperor. The mutiny spread with alarming rapidity, and it was evident that England would have to put forth considerable effort to save India.

At the time of the outbreak the English army in India was startlingly small. The returns showed that at the utmost our troops did not exceed 45,332 men,

and these were scattered over the immense territories, whereas the Sepoys at the lowest estimate numbered 233,000. There were 12,000 native gunners to the 6,500 European artillery, "while for the 750 miles stretching from Barrackpur to Agra, there was only one European regiment, and that at Dinapur." The mutiny began with horrible atrocities towards the Europeans, who, because of the shortage of British troops, were at the mercy of the rebels.

To appreciate the seriousness of the situation it must be remembered that in the Bengal Presidency, where the Mutiny was most active, the British regiments were posted in positions strategically disadvantageous. Four battalions were guarding the Afghan frontier, and three others that of Pegu, "thus entailing an almost complete denudation of European troops for a distance of about 1,200 miles between Calcutta and the Sutlej."

The moment when tidings of mutiny reached Lord Canning, he realised that his fears when he assumed the office of Governor-General of India were but too well founded, and that his protests against the withdrawal of European troops from India were warranted. These had been of small effect, and the wonder was that there were even so many troops available for the emergency. Troops had been sent to Persia, and several regiments were on their way to China. Happily, on the ordering of forces to deal with the rebellion, the troops that were sent to Persia were available, since the Shah, alarmed at their approach, had conceded the British claims. Canning, moreover, felt that the chastisement of China might wait. Consequently he recalled the regiments that were actually on the way, as also such regiments as could be spared from Ceylon and the Punjaub. Indeed, his summons was for "every European that can carry arms and aid to the Government of India." The Governors of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies responded to the appeal, and "without any selfish thoughts of their own wants,



any heed of dangerous contingencies at home," were sending the Viceroy succours so much needed.

Canning was now in a position to deal with the mutinous Sepoys ; but the other Presidencies were so denuded of troops that the position was a highly critical one if Nana Sahib should send emissaries to incite the whole of India to rebellion. Troops were accordingly hurried out by the Home Government to provide against contingencies, or to strengthen the hands of those who engaged with the rebels along the Ganges. Orders came for the 33rd to proceed to India, and on the 23rd of July the regiment, with the exception of E and B companies, sailed for Bombay. The two companies were to remain in Mauritius to garrison Port Louis, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Donovan, until the arrival of the 4th Regiment from England.

When the 33rd reached Bombay, expecting to be sent into the Bengal Presidency to take part in the operations against the mutineers, the position in the Presidency was perilous in the extreme. Rebellion had spread in Central India, and throughout the Presidency many of the native regiments were intriguing with the rebels in the north. The news of Nana Sahib's triumph at Cawnpore had caused the waverers to decide, and at Kolapore the Sepoys mutinied.

The news created a panic at Bombay, where the Governor realised the weakness of the situation. He had risked much in order to send troops to the north to deal with the mutineers there, and Bombay and the neighbourhood were almost denuded of soldiers on whom he could rely. Even thus, while the European residents in Bombay were sending their wives and children to the harbour to be near the ships which would secure their escape, Lord Elphinstone was constrained to send some of his troops to Kolapore, under Colonel Jacob, to suppress the mutiny there. This left Bombay practically defenceless, for the military force there did not consist of more than 400 Europeans

under Brigadier Shortt, and 60 European police under Superintendent Forjett, who also had a number of native police at his disposal. There were, in addition, three native regiments which might or might not be relied on. To add to Elphinstone's anxiety, the Mohammedan Festival of the Muharram was approaching, and there were 150,000 Mohammedans in the city, who might suddenly declare for the mutiny.<sup>1</sup> The question was as to how far the Sepoys in the native regiments could be trusted. An untoward event might be the spark to create a fearful conflagration, with consequences as terrible as any that had yet occurred along the Ganges.

It is not difficult to conceive the sense of relief to the Governor and the Europeans of Bombay when the "Pottinger," with the 33rd on board, steamed into the harbour. The coming of nearly a thousand troops went a long way towards restoring confidence. There was still a consuming anxiety, for the passions of a Mohammedan mob might easily be goaded to extremes, and the festival might end in terrible scenes of bloodshed, rapine, fire—who could tell?

The 33rd, arriving on the 7th of August, went at once to the Town barracks, and were kept in readiness for any emergency. Forjett, the Chief of Police, felt increasing anxiety as the festival drew on. As Holmes narrates, he knew the natives thoroughly, and was convinced that while the townspeople would not dare to stir unless the Sepoys set them the example, the Sepoys needed to be safely watched. The officers, however, were sure of the native soldiers, while Forjett felt that they were perilously if not criminally trustful.

He inquired into the arrangements made for the disposition of the troops on the day of the Festival, and learned that "in accordance with the plan suggested by the Government, the European troops and police were to be split up into small parties, and posted in various quarters of the city; but that there would

<sup>1</sup> T. Rice Holmes: "History of the Indian Mutiny."

not be a single European soldier to oppose a mutiny among the Sepoys at the point where it would be likely to begin." His keen appreciation of the danger prompted him to urge on Brigadier Shortt the necessity for massing the Europeans and guns "on the spot which commanded both the Sepoy lines and the town." That officer flatly refused to follow out the suggestion, and forthwith Forjett went to Lord Elphinstone, and told him that he should be obliged to act as circumstances arose, even at the cost of disobedience to orders.

The tension that followed was indescribable. The troops remained scattered, but Forjett, alert and prompt to arrest where danger threatened, so acted that the Sepoys, not quite sure of his powers, were tranquil. With the passing of the Festival, the crisis also passed. Forjett, however, had discovered as he moved about the city in disguise in the night, that there was to be a mutiny at another Festival, that of the Diwali, a few weeks hence, when pillage and murder were to follow. Before long he was able to convince the Brigadier that his trust in the native regiments was gravely misplaced, for proof was given that the conspirators were actually concocting their plot.

The two Companies from Mauritius came on in a swift steamer, immediately on the arrival of the relieving regiment, and joined the 33rd in Bombay at the end of August. Now at full strength, the Colonel arranged with the Governor for the disposition of the regiment. There was some doubt at first how best to use the services of the 33rd. There were constant discoveries of plots to mutiny in various places in the northern portion of the Bombay Presidency. One broke out at Karachi, in Sind, and only by active measures were outbreaks prevented at Hyderabad and Ahmedabad. In the Southern Maratha country, the emissaries of Nana Sahib were known to be busy urging the Rajah of Kolapore to join the mutineers; but Colonel Jacob acted with such decision that the rebels

dispersed when he brought up his men. Holmes says that but for this prompt action, and the swift retribution which Jacob meted out to the prisoners, "the wave of rebellion might have streamed down the whole of the Southern Maratha country, and overflowed into the dominions of the Nizam," where, in Hyderabad alone, there were 100,000 "armed Mahommedan fanatics within the walls." The Nizam, it is true, was friendly to the British Government, but he was "young, ignorant, and liable to be led astray."

It was a matter for consideration whether to keep the 33rd in hand for emergencies, or break it up into detachments. It was ultimately decided to follow out the latter suggestion, and accordingly the companies proceeded to their several destinations, Headquarters and F Company and the Light Company marching to Poona. The remaining companies stayed in the Colaba Barracks until November, when it was found necessary to strengthen the garrison at Kolapore, to enable Colonel Jacob to deal more readily with the situation there. Later, the position becoming still more strained, the Colonel asked for reinforcements, and Lieutenant-Colonel Donovan proceeded thither with the Grenadiers. The remainder of the 33rd arrived there at the end of December.

The crisis at Kolapore having passed, Jacob felt that the force at his disposal might be diminished; accordingly the Grenadiers were sent to Shalapore, on the frontier of Hyderabad, to be in readiness either to move into the country, or march to Shorapur, the Rajah of which place was suspected of intriguing with Nana Sahib in mutinous undertakings. B Company at the same time marched out of Kolapore and joined E Company at Sattara.

Lord Elphinstone, early in the New Year, found it necessary to keep a watchful eye on the country about Ahmednuggur, on the frontier of his Presidency. Accordingly F Company proceeded thither under the command of Brevet-Major Quayle. It was deemed

1858.

advisable, by the parade of our military strength with rapidly moving contingents in various directions, to show the disaffected that the Government was alert. The celerity of the movements of the regiment, with that of others at Lord Elphinstone's disposal, was disconcerting, and deranged the plans of those who sought to bring about mutiny in various districts. Hence, although the services of the 33rd lacked distinction, as compared with those of others, the presence of such troops in Western and Central India were efficacious in preventing the spread of mutiny to any great extent. There was no general rising, and what outbreaks there were among the native regiments, as at Karachi, Ahmedabad, and Kolapore, were repressed with rigour.

The Governor, while the 33rd's companies were moving about from station to station, displayed a promptitude which served to save that side of India. There was no blind trust now, for every possible rebel was watched, and action taken at the first symptom of disaffection. In many instances Lord Elphinstone amazed the conspirators by showing how his knowledge of their doings had enabled him to frustrate them. The unexpected arrival of a detachment of European troops was disconcerting. They began to realise the fact that his lordship waited till the right moment, when he seized the ringleaders, and prevented the conspiracy from coming to anything.<sup>1</sup>

The 33rd were not idle at the stations. In more or less force detachments moved through the province at all hours. As a consequence the troops suffered greatly by reason of the continued arduous marching, sometimes in exhausting heat, and often through the difficult mazes of jungle regions. At times there were brushes with the rebels, these being invariably dispersed.

In the meantime Sir Hugh Rose received orders to march through Central India to Kalpi, a thousand miles distant, his task being to subdue revolted districts,

<sup>1</sup> "Dictionary of Nat. Biography."

and reduce the forts on the way, until he joined hands with the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>1</sup> "The advance of the Central Indian Field Force formed part of a large combination, and was rendered possible by the movement of Major-General Roberts, of the Bombay army, into Rajpootana, on the one side, and of Major-General Whitlock, of the Madras army, on the other; and by the support they respectively gave to Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, as he moved onwards in obedience to his instructions."<sup>2</sup>

The campaign carried on by these forces acting in concert has been spoken of as one which, for celerity and effectiveness, has rarely been equalled in India. Rose's principle was to go straight for the enemy wherever he found him, and pursue him until he had exhausted him.<sup>3</sup> He strengthened his posts in all directions, assigning the 33rd to this particular duty, while he swept through the districts with amazing swiftness, in spite of the heat. Two companies of the 33rd, under the command of Major Quayle, were called on to serve with the Field Force, and were present during operations in Mahee Kauta, and at the night attack of the Khosias at Bhryannah, as well as during the operations at Nuggur Parker. The main army in quick succession relieved Sangor, forced the pass of Madaupur, and not only defeated Tantia Topi, the rebel leader, but ultimately stamped out the rebellion in Central India. Scindia was restored to his capital, from whence he had been driven by his mutinous soldiery.

The pursuit of Tantia Topi was a long one, and the fact that he was at large was a perpetual harassment. Driven out of his strong position by the activity of Sir Hugh Rose, he took to the open country at times, devastating the districts through which our troops had to pass, and threatening our stations. As a consequence the 33rd, even while posted as they were in the outlying districts, were continually moving. They were

1859.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.    <sup>2</sup> Dispatches.    <sup>3</sup> "Dict. of Nat. Biog."

called out from time to time to take part in heading off the rebel chieftain. The Light Company at Deesa was ordered in January, 1859, under Major Fitzgerald's command, to follow up a band of rebels that threatened Erinporah. When they had driven these away they were kept on the move for the next two months, routing out small rebel parties. Captain Kenrick's company also left Deesa about the same time to join the Field Force which was proceeding to Pahlapore. Tantia Topi was pursuing his old tactics of harassing us by constantly threatening various posts, and compelling the troops to march out on fruitless expeditions. Even while he had the English troops at his heels he is credited with making an effort to induce the Mahrattas to join in the rebellion in the hope of turning certain annihilation into triumph.

The hot weather was spent by the various companies of the 33rd in a similar manner, although in April, Tantia Topi had been captured and executed. The Light Company returned to Deesa in March, but were called out on the 23rd of September with three other companies to go by forced marches to Dwarka, where a strong body of rebels had gathered. They took part in the siege, and when the place was captured, returned to their old quarters. By that time the rebellion had been completely stamped out, and the Mutiny ended.

The work done in Central India was brilliant, beyond all estimation; yet the troops received no recognition of their splendid services. In the "Dictionary of National Biography" is this sentence: "It cannot be said that the Central India Field Force was particularly well treated. They were not allowed to receive a silver medal with six months' batta, which Scindia was desirous to give them; they were only allowed one clasp to the war medal given to all troops employed in Central India, and they were prevented from sharing the Central India prize-money, by a legal quibble, after protracted legislation." As for the

33rd, who had been on duty in separate detachments, they were not even granted the medal because as a regiment they had not actually taken part in the operations of the Field Force. The principle on which these honours of the army were distributed was in many ways "past finding out."



# The Abyssinian Expedition

## CHAPTER XXXIII

### PREPARING FOR THE EXPEDITION

1860. WHEN the last embers of the Indian Mutiny had been stamped out, the 33rd resumed the ordinary routine of garrison life, remaining in India, and moving periodically from station to station. In 1860 the regiment was attacked by cholera, while at Deesa losing 31 men, and later, at Bawda, 20.

Throughout the stay in India the excellent record of the 33rd was admirably maintained, and again and again the reports on inspection pointed to the splendid discipline of the men, and the maintenance of *esprit de corps* alike among the officers and in the ranks.

1863. In the meantime affairs in Abyssinia were taking a course which was greatly to affect the career of the regiment. Theodore, King of Kings of Ethiopia, "the most remarkable man that has appeared in Africa for some centuries," as Sir Clement Markham declares, had quarrelled with the English Government, with the result that war was unavoidable. England had been desirous of cultivating friendly relations with Abyssinia, and when Consul Plowden was killed while returning to his post at Massowah, Captain Cameron, who was appointed his successor, was directed to consider Massowah as his head-quarters. He was also requested "to avoid becoming a partisan of any of the contending parties in Abyssinia."

There was a very real wish on Theodore's part to win the friendship of England, and to secure this he sent Cameron to England with a letter stating his desire. The letter, however, was put aside, no answer was returned, and the king was not unnaturally annoyed at the unexplained indifference. Sir Clement Markham says that the policy of Earl Russell, who was then at the Foreign Office, was to withdraw as much as possible from Abyssinian alliances. "His policy was founded entirely on the desire to promote trade, and he trusted that interference on behalf of a Christian country as such would never be the policy of the British Government."

Cameron was not sent back to Massowah, his former head-quarters, but was deputed to traverse the country round about, with a view to discovering the state of affairs in the border lands, and to collect information relative to possible future trade. When he had done his work, and being ill, he went to Abyssinia, in the absence of orders to the contrary, fully expecting that by this time the English Government would have replied to Theodore's letter. He found the king intensely annoyed at the contempt displayed in England. Angered, moreover, at the news that Cameron had been visiting Kassala and other places where his enemies were, he seized him and his suite, and threw them into prison. He had already imprisoned Stern and Rosenthal, two missionaries, and they were in irons at the time of Cameron's arrest.

From that hour Theodore's character underwent an unhappy change. "His early virtues were obscured, and irresponsible power had turned his head. He had become excessively suspicious, cruel, proud, sensuous, and intemperate." He had, moreover, brought trouble on himself by maintaining an enormous army—100,000 men—the taxation in consequence becoming such a burden on his people as to give rise to rebellions in all directions. He endeavoured to crush these

risings with exceptional severity, but one chief after another shook off the yoke, and declared his independence.

1864. Theodore's troubles were augmented by a remonstrance from England when news came of Cameron's imprisonment. The neglected letter was thought of, and Mr. Rassam was chosen as the bearer of the answer. He was accompanied by Dr. Blanc, of the Bombay Medical Establishment, and Lieutenant Prideaux. The letter demanded the release of Consul Cameron and the other Europeans held in captivity.

Arriving at Massowah in July, 1864, Rassam sent a message to King Theodore, requesting permission to visit him and discuss affairs. No answer came until the message was repeated, when a curt reply was received, giving the required promise of an interview. At the same time it was asserted that Cameron was released from his fetters, but still a prisoner. News that came convinced Rassam that the prisoners were being treated with greater severity than before. The danger confronting Mr. Rassam's party was great, but they resolved to go forward, and after many hindrances, and no small amount of insolence, the mission arrived at Theodore's camp, and an interview was obtained with the king. After considerable vacillation on the king's part, Mr. Rassam not only secured the promise of the captives' release, but they arrived in Mr. Rassam's camp on the 12th of March, 1866, eight in number, and the journey to the coast began. For a month all seemed well, but a letter came from the king, with "charges against the late captives, and instructions to Mr. Rassam to hold a sort of trial." Yet the letter asked him to send out artisans from England. Suddenly the whole company was seized and sent to Magdala, where they were put in chains.

Nothing now remained for the British Government but to demand the release of the prisoners, and to follow up the contemptuous refusal by constituting a force for their rescue. This step issued in the order to

certain regiments in India to prepare for service in Abyssinia, and of these the 33rd was one.

Meanwhile, Colonel Mereweather, the political resident at Aden, reported home that the release of the captives by any other means than force was out of the question. He occupied the interval in "collecting information respecting the approaches to the Abyssinian tableland." Mereweather knew the country through which the Army of Release would have to pass, and suggested that it should land at Mulkutto, in Annesley Bay, where there were good anchorage, a landing-place, and a water supply. It was, moreover, nearer than any other spot on the coast to Magdala, where the captives were immured. His investigations were of the greatest value, and finally he sketched the route, in readiness for the Army, whenever it should come. He did not, however, fail to point out the difficulties to be encountered in the march to Theodore's capital. The mountain pass of Magdala forms a crescent, of which Magdala itself is the eastern horn, and Fahla the western; midway between the two lies the plateau of Selassie, Magdala and Selassie being connected by the saddle of Fahla. The highest of these plateaux is Magdala, over 9,000 feet above the sea level, and 3,000 feet above the ravines of Menchara and Kulkulla. From the foot of the Fahla saddle the Wurki-Waha valley runs down to the Bashilo; here Theodore had constructed the road by which he had dragged his guns into position at Fahla.

Mereweather having made his observations, went to Bombay to consult with the Government and Sir Robert Napier, then Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, and the appointed commander of the army for the expedition. When his alternative routes had been submitted and discussed, Colonel Mereweather was put in command of a reconnoitring party, the task assigned to him being to select the anchorage and a landing-place, explore the passes leading into the interior, establish a footing in the country, and enter

into communication with the native chiefs.<sup>1</sup> This advanced brigade consisted of the 10th Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, the 3rd Regiment of Bombay Cavalry, a mountain train of four guns, with native gunners, and two companies of Bombay Sappers. Markham, who gives this note as to the composition of Mereweather's force, adds that with him were associated Colonel Phayre and Colonel Wilkins, who were to form a Committee, Mereweather acting as President.

These left Bombay on the 16th of September, 1867, and going along the Red Sea coast, finally selected Mulkutto, where they commenced the construction of a landing-pier, and carried out other important works. By November everything was ready for landing the advanced brigade, and a tramway laid for bringing the stores up from the beach. An exploring party also pushed inland to discover the best route for the main army. Mereweather not only sought for wells and provided the transport mules, but entered into arrangements with the chiefs of seven Shoho tribes to restrain their people from interfering with convoys, promising to each of them fifteen dollars per month.<sup>2</sup>

More excellent preliminary work could scarcely be conceived than this. Passes were explored and alternative passes examined, and fresh sources of supply for the army were sought for. Provision was made for every possible contingency ; nothing was left to chance, while in some places cart roads were made.

In December the advanced brigade was pushed up to the plain of Senafe, and arriving there on the 5th, Mereweather bargained with the chiefs for a continuous market.

Meanwhile Sir Robert Napier was busy in organising his force, which numbered 16,000 men, and was thus composed :

<sup>1</sup> Markham : "Abyssinian Expedition."

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

## 1ST BRIGADE

3rd Sind Horse  
 A Battery 21st Brigade R.A.  
 4th Regiment  
 23rd Punjab Pioneers  
 10th Company R.E.  
 Wing of 27th Native Infantry

## 2ND BRIGADE

3rd Bombay Light Cavalry  
 B Battery 21st Brigade R.A.  
 Naval Rocket Brigade  
 33rd Regiment

## 3RD BRIGADE

G Battery 14th Brigade R.A.  
 3 and 4 Companies Bombay Sappers and Miners  
 2 Companies Punjab Pioneers  
 K Company Madras Sappers and Miners  
 1 Company 33rd Regiment  
 1 Company 4th Regiment

The 45th Regiment joined on the 8th of April and was placed in the 2nd Brigade.

The total of the force may be thus summarised :

Infantry	10,231
Sappers and Miners	931
Artillery	657
Cavalry	2,064
Coolie and Army Works Corps	2,306

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16,189

3,233 followers must also be added, and 12,640 men belonging to the transport train, making a total of 32,062, exclusive of the Commissariat and Quarter-master-General's Departments, and of the officers and followers attached to the Head-quarters Staff, and those of the different generals.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Markham.

## CHAPTER XXXIV

### THE MARCH TO MAGDALA

1867. THE Regiment embarked from Kurrachee for Abyssinia in the "Salsette," "Indian Chief," and "Madras," the two first ships sailing on the 21st of November, 1867. The "Madras," leaving two days later, joined the others which had gone to Aden, and thence to Annesley Bay, off Mulkutto, on the 4th of December. On the day of his departure Colonel Collings, of the 33rd, was appointed Brigadier-General. The regiment was therefore under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Dunn, V.C., but unhappily during the advance the 33rd sustained a great loss through the death of this officer, which occurred owing to an accident while out shooting on January 25th, 1868.

Brigadier-General Collings arrived, not only with the 33rd, but with the G. 14 Armstrong battery of 6 12-pounder guns under Captain Murray; the Belooch Regiment, or 27th Bombay Native Infantry, together with the 33rd Sind Horse. Sir Charles Staveley, who was second in command of the Expedition, also arrived with this brigade.

The Beloochees were at once pushed up into the pass, to work at the bad places in the roads at Sooroo and Raha-guddy, the artillery were sent to Komayli, and their horses to Senafé, to escape the unhealthy conditions, and the 33rd were ordered up to Senafé, arriving on January 12th.<sup>1</sup> They were thus 68 miles from the coast, the marches being as follows: 1st March—from Zooloo, just outside the camp, to Koomayle, which

<sup>1</sup> Markham.

was 13 miles distant. Four other marches brought them to Senafé, the halting places having been Sooroo (13 miles), Undel Wells (15 miles), Ranaguddee (18 miles), and the remaining march of 9 miles to Senafé.

When Sir Robert Napier arrived at Mulkutto on the 2nd of January, 1868, he found that it would require at least thirty marches to reach the king, who was supposed to be at Magdala, but there were questions which demanded consideration. There was also the matter of supplies, for in spite of well-arranged plans of preparation by Mereweather, much was necessarily problematic. One question was as to the resources of the country available for transport and supply, while it was not well to trust implicitly to the purchased friendliness of the tribes along the line of march. Napier's conclusion was, that although it meant a more extended campaign, he would not go beyond Senafé until provisions sufficient for a force of 9,500 men were stored there. He was determined not to rely upon the country's supplies coming in. 1868.

Had he chosen the first of the two alternatives which presented themselves on his landing at Mulkutto, Napier might, by a swift march without guns, have reached Magdala within a few weeks, but the risks were too great, and he decided on the latter course of providing for all conceivable contingencies. Hence he devoted his chief care during January to the provisioning of Senafé, and the organization of an efficient transport train.

This latter task presented considerable difficulties. Markham's account of the ultimate result of Major Warden's endeavours is worth reproducing, especially as he was on the spot at the time. "The whole train was divided into fourteen divisions, each to consist of 2,000 animals; and the proportion of drivers to animals, at first fixed at one to three, was afterwards altered, during the advance on Magdala, to a soldier or muleteer for every mule. Each division consisted of 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 4 European inspectors



(being men who had volunteered from regiments in India), 20 troop-sergeants, 80 sergeants, 667 muleteers, 23 farriers and blacksmiths. The muleteers at first consisted of the vilest refuse of Eastern cities and of Bombay ; and their wanton barbarous cruelty to the mules, and the extreme insubordination, led to their being discharged. From January to March, 2,100 were sent back to Suez, and replaced by 5,000 respectable Punjabees. At the close of the campaign there were 12,000 muleteers, 400 native and 160 European inspectors, and 80 commissioned officers, in the transport train. Captain Hand, who had charge of what was called the Highland train from Senafé to Magdala, trained and drilled his men to their work, and kept them in a state of strict discipline ; but there was no chance of forming an efficient train without proper pack-saddles, and with a system of dragging, instead of driving the mules."

The conveyance of artillery demanded the gravest attention, and while all this was proceeding, the main force were in a sense idle at Senafé. It was the lot of the 33rd to do most of the advance work during the long and toilsome march to Magdala. Orders came on the 17th of January for certain sections to proceed, and accordingly, on the 18th, H and D Companies of the regiment pushed on to the Goona-goona Pass, 12 miles away. With them went two companies of the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and the work assigned to them was to "mend the road over the line of hills between the Shumazano and Mena valleys, . . . and to make an easier ascent from the Goona-goona vale to the plateau of Gullaba above." When they had been here three days the Sind Horse joined them, with the 3rd Bombay Cavalry not far in the rear, guarding the sick mules.

The vanguard pushed on farther at the end of the month, for Brigadier-General Collings marched on through Goona-goona to Adigerat, halting at Focado, 17 miles farther, and moving the remaining 13 miles

on the following day. The force which Collings had at Adigerat on the 31st of January consisted of four companies of the 33rd, four of the 19th, one company of Punjab Pioneers, one of Bombay Sappers, and a detachment of the Sind Horse. This camp was 110 miles from Mulkutto, and from the comparatively rapid advance, it was evident that Napier was determined to move more quickly than he had first designed. The force at Adigerat was considerably increased within a week, and a month's provisions arrived at the camp, with a battery of mountain guns.

So far King Theodore had done nothing to oppose the advance. News leaked through, owing to Mereweather's capable arrangements, as to the condition of the captives in Magdala, and the king's doings. Mereweather, now Brigadier-General, was rendering efficient service as a political agent by securing the friendship of the chiefs, who were induced to provide carriers, bullocks, and donkeys. He was keen on fair payment for all supplies and labour, so that the confidence of the natives was completely won.

Meanwhile the importance of the post at Adigerat was so far recognised that an entrenched position was ordered to be formed there; the 33rd, however, moved on with Collings' brigade, their orders being to reach Antalo, 90 miles nearer to Magdala. It involved a march among vast mountains, and later across treeless plains, through sheltered glens where the scenery was of great beauty. Ascents and descents opened out new vistas, sometimes bleak country, again wild gorges, and then plains covered with growing corn, rich pasture, and villages.

Antalo lay some miles off the direct line of march, but it was a great market centre, 10,000 feet above the sea, and with a climate which has been described as "the most delightful in the world." The road was found to be good, but in spite of this there was an unexpected delay. Napier found that it would take such a considerable time to push on six months' supplies as

far as Senafé, that he had in consequence to change his plans. Mereweather had come to the camp at Antalo, and by careful arrangement induced the natives to bring in provisions. At first they were shy, but when the news got round that everything was paid for, food came in in such quantities that Napier's fears as to the slackness of supplies in the country passed. He discovered that he need no longer delay the advance while he gathered in supplies, since he could fall back on the country's resources alike for provisions and transport.

Napier was at Adigerat, but at the front, at Antalo, were the 33rd, the 4th, the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, the Belooch Regiment, 2 companies of Punjab Pioneers, 2 companies of Sappers, the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, the 3rd Sind Horse, and a Mountain Battery. Napier moved on his Head-quarters from Adigerat to Buya, not far from Antalo, and, on the direct line of March to Magdala, had an interview with Kassai, Prince of Tigré, after which he felt that he might move on, must do so, in fact, if he would achieve his object before the rains set in. M. Munzinger was sent on to interview one of the chiefs, but mainly to report on the road, which was almost unknown. Dadjatsh Mashsha was an enemy of King Theodore's, so that the mission was successful.

The 33rd had been a month at Antalo, but now two of their companies moved on with Colonel Phayre, together with two of Native Sappers, one of Punjab Pioneers, and 80 sabres of Native Cavalry. The force left behind was divided into two brigades, one which Collings commanded, including the 33rd, with whom were the Commander-in-Chief and Head-quarters; the other composed of the 4th Regiment, a wing of Beloochees, a company of Sappers, the Punjab Pioneers, the Naval Brigade, the Armstrong guns, and two mortars with the elephants of the B battery of mountain guns, and the 3rd Bombay Cavalry. Markham, who has thus defined the division of the forces,

adds that Sir Charles Staveley was with this second brigade.

Magdala was now to be reached with all possible speed, a further distance of 200 miles having to be traversed. The country was such as to render the marching most difficult, but as Markham says, "the magnificent scenery lightened the fatigue in no small degree; for there can be no doubt that it is less tiring to march through a beautiful country than over a dead flat, although most of the men may be unconscious, or but half conscious, of the reason for this difference. They swore at the mountain passes while actually enjoying their grandeur. 'They tell us this is a table-land,' exclaimed one of the 33rd, in climbing up the Alaja ascent. 'If it is, they have turned the table upside down, and we are scrambling up one of the legs.'"

The marches became heavy immediately after leaving Antalo, and in consequence the progress was much slower than it had been at other stages. Thus, from Antalo to Musjee the march was not more than 8 miles, yet the mules were worn out and the men footsore. The next day's march was only 9 miles. Things went better on the following day, and after that there was an improvement, the march from Ashangi to Lat being as many as 18 miles. It took six marches to cover 55 miles.

The movements of the 33rd were singled out by Markham, and can be reproduced here in his words. "The Head-quarters and 1st Brigade had come up to and regularly overridden the original pioneer force. So there was a halt of half a day at Makhan, while the 33rd was sent on one short march ahead, to make the road practicable for laden mules. This 33rd had been the first English regiment to land at Mulkutto, and had worked hard and steadily ever since, though the men were addicted to strong language, and liked an occasional good growl. While on the coast they had caught many stray mules in the early days of the expedition that would otherwise have died of starvation, and

had regularly taken charge of them until relieved by the arrival of muleteers. They had gone out grass-cutting at Senafé, had laid out the camp at Antaló, and had worked hard at road-making along the whole line of march. If they could growl, they could also work—no men better. On the 18th the Head-quarters left Makhan for Ashangi, the first part of the road passing through a wood of juniper-trees, and over a beautiful but uninhabited country, like an English park. The road then crosses a spur from the western mountains by a very steep zigzag path, and leads round the sides and head of a deep and precipitous gorge. The long train of laden mules painfully scrambled round this difficult mountain path, with many long stoppages, while Sir Robert Napier took his station on a jutting rock above them to watch their progress. There is then a steep ascent through a wood chiefly of tree-heath, to the summit of the saddle, where the beautiful valley of Ashangi, with its bright blue lake, first bursts upon the view. The 33rd were hard at work along all the bad parts of this difficult, and previously almost impassable route, down to the point where the level grassy shores of the lake are reached.” It is a generous tribute to the work done by a regiment which added so greatly to its distinction in this arduous campaign.

There were tasks for the 33rd as difficult and demanding as those just referred to, but there was never any deterioration in the quality of the work. There was, it is true, something like displeasure on the part of the Commander-in-Chief when, after an unusually arduous march from Marawa to Dildi, extending over 18 miles, he addressed the 33rd, and ordered that they should no longer march with him in front, but fall back to the 2nd Brigade. “This was due to a want of reticence in expressing their opinions on things in general during that tough march.”

The army was moving on with steady determination. No difficulties in the road deterred it. When

Santara was reached on the 30th of March, Magdala was scarcely more than 60 miles distant.

It was something startling to find at Santara that the supplies from the natives were coming in but slowly, and that there was not more in camp than would last for another week. Steps were taken forthwith for the provision of supplies, and the activity of Major Grant, Captain Moore, and Lieutenant Shewell was such that in three weeks there was an abundance for the needs of the army.

Napier calculated that seven marches would bring him to Magdala, and he pushed on. Now came tokens of the savage conduct of Theodore and his troops. The king had swept down on the villages along the route, devastating and destroying, thinking to cut off supplies from the invaders ; but the people had hidden their grain in underground granaries, and when the army came their way they sold freely.

Thirteen miles from Magdala Napier sent a letter to Theodore, demanding the release of the prisoners, but he did not wait for the reply. He moved on to the Dalanta plateau, where his tired men and horses and worn-out mules could rest. Here he waited for five days. Food came in freely during that halting time, which also enabled the 12th Bengal Cavalry and 6 companies of the 45th to arrive in the camp. The latter force had covered the whole journey from the coast, more than 300 miles, in 24 days.

Napier's army, now almost within sight of Magdala, numbered 3,273 men, besides the cavalry. The numbers had been so diminished because of the breakdown of the transport train ; but with these the Commander-in-Chief resolved to make his attack on Theodore's capital, where the captives were understood to be.

## CHAPTER XXXV

### THE FALL OF MAGDALA

1868. KING THEODORE, by his tyranny and eccentric behaviour, had so alienated his people and army that his available fighting force had dwindled to little more than 3,000 men, "armed with percussion guns and matchlocks, and rabble of spearmen, and a number of pieces of ordnance" which his people knew not how to use. The contrast between this army and the British battalions, armed with the most up-to-date weapons, was remarkable. The marvel is, that the monarch did not yield when he realised the futility of opposition.

No message had come by the time Napier was in sight of Magdala, and consequently the army advanced on the stronghold where Theodore had determined to make his stand. As yet it was not known whether the Abyssinians occupied any ground between the British camp and the fortress, but none were visible.

In accordance with Napier's instructions, on the morning of the 19th of April, at six o'clock, the army was on the move in two brigades. The cavalry were to remain at the river Bashilo until their services were needed, Colonel Graves of the 3rd being in command. A small escort of cavalry, under Colonel Phayre, went on in front of the 1st Brigade, which Sir Charles Staveley commanded, the General's instructions being that the brigade should advance by way of the Gumbaji Spur and halt when a suitable camping ground was reached. This meant a considerable deviation to the right from the Warki-Waha valley, which provided a good road, and

in addition an arduous ascent to the Aficho plateau. The cavalry kept to the valley for a time, and then, moving to the right, they were enabled to climb the heights and await the slower coming of the infantry and guns.

The Commander-in-Chief left the camp three and a half hours later, accompanied by the 2nd Brigade; but the troops had to wade the Bashilo waist high. In front of them, after crossing, was the Warki-Waha valley, along which Napier did not propose to pass just yet. It was his intention to remain there until the result of Staveley's reconnaissance was known. News came very shortly, however, that Phayre had discovered that the valley was not threatened by the enemy, and in consequence the Commander-in-Chief moved on with the 2nd Brigade.

Phayre was always in front with his small force of cavalry, reconnoitring, but there was no sign of the enemy, not even when he had gone up the most difficult road the army had yet traversed, which led to the Aficho plateau. Staveley's brigade came on, but before it had reached the spot which Phayre considered favourable for camping, the men were greatly exhausted. They were not, however, to rest undisturbed. They were in sight of Magdala, "rising more than a thousand feet above the plain of Arogye—to the left the rocky peak of Selassye, to the right the flat-topped hill of Fala, the two heights being connected by a lower saddle. The sides of the ascent are furrowed by shallow gullies, and covered with low bushes."

There was no sign of life anywhere. What villages there were were deserted or destroyed, and it appeared as though Theodore had withdrawn to Magdala, resolute not to risk his fortune in the field. There was every prospect of a restful night, but suddenly a shot came from the hill of Fala; then another, and yet more. After that a great force appeared in sight, sweeping across the plateau with the evident intention of attacking the baggage-train coming along the difficult road



which is at the head of the Dam-wang ravine. Two companies of the 4th, and one of the 10th Native Infantry, were guarding the train of tired mules, and they prepared to receive the enemy who came on with defiant yells. Staveley saw them, and moving his brigade expeditiously, poured in a fearful fire on the Abyssinians before they could come within range suited to their antiquated weapons. They displayed a savage bravery which was admirable ; but against the Sniders and the rockets of the Naval Brigade this was hopeless, and they retired, "cheering defiantly." The baggage-guard were more heavily engaged, however, for the enemy had come to closer quarters, but they fought in splendid style, and drove the enemy back with great slaughter, made greater by the heavy fire of Penn's A battery on the left. In their retreat the Abyssinians met further disaster, for the Pioneers being reinforced by two more companies of the 4th, they were hemmed in, "both in front and on their left flank." The Dam-wang that night was choked up with dead and dying men, and the little rill at the bottom ran with blood. The Naval Brigade not only fired on the retreating mass, but also used their guns on the crest of the hill Fala until orders came for them to withdraw. It is recorded that out of 4,000 Abyssinians who took part in that wild rush on the advancing force, nearly 800 were killed, and some 1,500 wounded. Many of the fugitives did not return to Magdala. The English losses were slight, two being killed, and eighteen wounded.

The 2nd Brigade, hearing the heavy firing, came on quickly, and reached the plateau of Arogye, where it camped. The 1st Brigade was in a wretched plight—tentless, without water or food, and unable to get any fires. Yet they had little to fear from the enemy after that severe defeat. "The action," says Markham, "will be remembered in military history as the first in which the Snider rifle was used."

The defeat inflicted on Theodore was so serious

in its effect that he had but a broken and ruined army. Nearly all his principal chiefs had been left dead or wounded on the field. On the morning of the 11th of April he made overtures of peace, sending two of the captives as his messengers, Lieutenant Prideaux and Mr. Flad, accompanied by one of the chiefs. The only answer Napier felt it possible to give was that Theodore should make an unconditional surrender. The captives took this reply to the king, expecting the worst for themselves and their prison companions. They were sent back with the monarch's answer almost immediately, to the effect that he would not surrender. It was plain from the letter that Theodore, realising the hopelessness of his condition, had determined to fight to the last, and then end his life with his own hand. In reality he attempted suicide before the message reached the Commander-in-Chief, but his attendants frustrated him, and snatched the pistol from him.

Theodore did not kill his captives, as his chiefs advised. In the hope of winning favourable terms from Napier, he released some of the captives, and these arrived at the British camp in the evening. "The five Europeans who had attempted to escape, Mrs. Flad and her children, Bardel, Bender, several other Europeans, and all their wives and children, except Mrs. Rosenthal," were detained. In another letter, in which he almost pleaded for peace, he promised to set the remaining captives free, and offered a great present of cattle and sheep. Later, all the Europeans were sent down to the camp. Napier's reply had been that he insisted on unconditional surrender, but the man who carried it so garbled it that these captives came down under a mistaken impression.

Finding that Theodore did not make surrender, Napier prepared for the assault on Magdala. The appointed day for this was Easter Sunday, the 13th of April. Deserters had come into the camp by hundreds, and laid down their arms. In the meantime the British troops occupied Sellassy, while the Beloochees and the

10th Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Field, took possession of the plateau of Fala.

The artillery, consisting of 4 12-pounder Armstrong guns, 2 8-inch mortars, 12 7-pounder mountain guns, 4 rocket-tubes belonging to the steel batteries, and 12 rocket-tubes of the Naval Brigade,<sup>1</sup> were turned on Magdala, and began a furious bombardment, previous to the advance of the troops to storm the stronghold. The Koket-bir gate, in spite of the cannonade from the steel guns, was not burst in.

Meanwhile the troops destined for the assault assembled on a rocky ledge, awaiting orders, which came three hours later, and then the 33rd, preceded by a few Madras Sappers under Major Pritchard, advanced. Behind them came the 45th and 10th Native Infantry. The 4th were kept as reserve. The advance was made in the midst of a terrific storm of rain and thunder. Markham says that "the ascent from Islamgye to the *amba* is by an excessively steep and narrow path, covered with large boulders of rock, with perpendicular black cliffs of columnar basalt on the right hand. The path leads up to a roofed stone gateway, fifteen feet deep, with folding wooden doors, called the Koket-bir. On either side of the gateway the approach is defended by a thick hedge with stakes. Within the Koket-bir there is a rapid ascent of seventy feet to a second hedge on the crest of the plateau; and a narrow path leads over rocks, with a scarped cliff on the left hand, to a second gate which opens on the flat summit of the *amba*."

When the "Advance" was sounded, the 33rd, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Cooper, scrambled up the steep path, firing continuously as they went at the hedge and on the gate. When within 300 yards of the scarped rock which formed the last line of defence, the 33rd halted and poured in a fire on the defenders at the gate. Under cover of this the leading company of the 33rd, with the Sappers,

<sup>1</sup> Markham.

advanced up the pathway, arriving within a short distance of the gate. Then came an awkward pause. It was found that the Madras Sappers had forgotten to bring the powder with which to blow in the gate, and for a few moments it seemed as though the gallant charge up the rocky slope was to end in failure. Everything had been forgotten—powder, scaling-ladders, crowbars, and axes! Sir Charles Staveley at once sought shelter for his men, while he sent back the Sappers for powder from the artillery wagons. To wait so long was considered inadvisable, and it was decided that the 33rd should seek to make an entry without waiting for the return of the Sappers. They broke off from the path, and clambered up the hill-face right and left, under a somewhat heavy fire. On reaching the foot of the wall it was found to be a scarped cliff about seven or eight feet high, with a hedge of prickly bushes above.

It was here that a deed so gallant took place as to render the assault memorable, and it must of necessity have a place in the History of the 33rd. Private Bergin, a very tall man, contrived with his bayonet to destroy some of these bushes, and made a gap in the hedge. Turning to Magner, one of the drummers of the regiment, he asked him to help him clamber up. Magner however, scrambled up to Bergin's shoulders, and touched the top of the wall with his hands. A vigorous push from the butt of Bergin's rifle enabled the drummer to get on the wall, right among the bushes. Lying flat, he held down his hand for Bergin, who with the help of Ensign Connor and Corporal Murphy, clambered up to Magner's side. All this was done in the midst of a heavy fire from the defenders, but neither of the two men flinched. While Magner gave a helping hand to other soldiers of the 33rd, Bergin kept up a continuous fire, shooting down man after man, until those who were firing at him and his companions turned and fled through the second gate. Jumping from the wall, Bergin and Magner, with the others, ran to the

gate, which they opened from the inside to admit the troops. A rush was instantly made up the steep slope for the second gate, lest it should be slammed in their faces, but the men of the 33rd got in, and Magdala was practically won.<sup>1</sup> For this gallant service Bergin and Magnier received the Victoria Cross.

Not far from this second gate the dead body of King Theodore was found. He had shot himself when he saw that all was lost, at the time the 33rd were covering the ground between the first and second gates.

When Napier entered Magdala the 33rd and 45th were appointed to garrison the place, and an end was put to the plundering which had begun. The intention of the Commander-in-Chief in preventing looting was to collect all that the town contained, so that it might be sold and the money equitably divided among the troops.

Theodore was buried by his queen, but with little pomp, and the 33rd served as a guard to keep order. Then arose the question as to the disposal of Magdala. The chiefs who were captured were sent home with a warning. Magdala was offered to Wakshūm Gobazyè, the most powerful chief in Abyssinia, but he declined the gift on the plea that it would take too many warriors to hold it. Consequently the gates were blown up, the guns destroyed, and the huts and palace burnt.

Magdala had fallen on the 13th of April. On the 16th the released captives began their homeward march; on the 18th the army abandoned the place and crossed the Bashilo. A review was held on the 20th, after which the loot taken in Magdala was sold by auction, and distributed among the non-commissioned officers and men. On the 21st of April the march to the coast began, nothing being left of the stronghold where Theodore had made his last but ineffective stand beyond the scorched and blackened rock on which it had once stood.

<sup>1</sup> Records and Letters.

During the return march Sir Robert Napier halted at Senafé to confer with the friendly chiefs, but he resumed his journey amid floods which did damage to his stores, and was greatly annoyed by attacks from the Shohos in his rear. Ultimately the army embarked, the various regiments proceeded to their several destinations, the 33rd sailing to England, and arriving at Portsmouth on the 21st of June in H.M.'s Indian troopship "Crocodile."

NOTES.—1. The casualties during the campaign were remarkably few, only 2 men being killed out of the whole force, and 27 wounded; 5 of these latter belonging to the 33rd.

2. The strength of the 33rd on embarkation for England was 33 officers, 31 sergeants, 28 corporals, 14 drummers, 507 privates. The total strength was augmented to 903 when joined to the Service companies at home. Shortly after the 33rd arrived in England the numbers were reduced to 38 officers and 672 non-com. officers and privates.

3. Losses of the 33rd during the expedition almost nil. Quartermaster Vyse died at Senafé, May 22nd, 1868. Colonel Collings died by accident, owing to the explosion of his rifle while out shooting, January 25th, 1868. Captain Smythe died, Dec. 23rd, 1867, shortly after landing.

4. List of marches from the Red Sea to Magdala : (Taken from the note-book of Captain R. H. Fawcett, of the 33rd).

March	Miles	March	Miles
1 Zoolla		8 Focado	17
2 Koomayle	13	9 Addigerat	13
3 Sooroo	13	10 Mai Wahiz	18
4 Undel Wells	15	11 Adaberga	17
5 Ranaguddee	18	12 Dungalo	12
6 Senafé	9	13 Agula	9
7 Gonegona	12	14 Doullo	19

March	Miles	March	Miles
15 Eikullut	12	28 Gouza	10
16 Antalo	13	29 Abdicomb	16
17 Musjee	8	30 Beat Hor	11
18 Mushuk	9	31 Jiddah (about	
19 Athala	12	2,000 feet des-	
20 Muckdum	13	cent and 2,000	
21 Ashangi	13	feet ascent)	5
22 Lat	18	32 Dalanta Plain	
23 Mai Warra	14	(cross Bashilo	
24 Dildee	18	River)	10
25 Waudaitch	9	33 Plateau below	
26 Taccaze	11	Magdala	9
27 Santalla	7	34 Magdala	4

Total 397 miles.

5. Height of Magdala above sea = Height of summit of Mont Blanc.

Marches back over the same route as given above.

## CHAPTER XXXVI

### GARRISON DUTY

THE 33rd had not long been home when recognition of their services in the late campaign was thus made : 1868.

HORSE GUARDS, S.W.  
28th *September*, 1868.

Sir,

I have the pleasure, by the direction of His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, to acquaint you that Her Majesty the Queen has been graciously pleased to approve of the 33rd Regiment bearing on its Regimental Colour the word "Abyssinia" in commemoration of its services during the Abyssinian Expedition of 1867-8.

The War Office will be requested to issue the necessary scroll for the Attachment of the word to the Colours at present in possession of the Corps.

I have the honour to be, Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,  
W. PAULET, A.G.

The Officer Commanding  
33rd Regt., Portsmouth.

Among the regiments that received the medal the 33rd necessarily was included. This has been described by Carter as smaller and altogether different in design to those usually issued. The obverse was a crowned and veiled head of the Queen, surrounded by a star



of nine points, containing the letters A,B,Y,S,S,I,N,I,A. The reverse was a laural wreath with an inner circle, within which, in raised letters, was the recipient's name, rank, regiment, or ship; above the medal was a crown, with a ring for suspension. The ribbon was crimson, with broad white edges. Twenty thousand of the medals were struck, and given to both services.<sup>1</sup>

The regiment sustained a very real loss when Brigadier-General Collings retired on half pay, October 28th, 1868. He was succeeded in the command by Lieut.-Colonel Cooper, C.B. Upon Colonel Cooper retiring by the sale of his commission he was succeeded in the command by Lieut.-Colonel Fanshaw, who, it will be remembered, served with the regiment in the Crimea.

Subsequent to Brigadier-General Collings' retirement nothing of note transpired for some time. The regiment was stationed in various places in England and Ireland, discharging the ordinary duties of service until the 23rd of August, 1875, when orders were received to be in readiness to embark for India. The regiment was in Ireland at the time, but concentrating at Cork, their ranks were filled up by volunteers and transfers from other regiments to the number of 263. The regiment, with a total strength of 849 officers and men, arrived at Bombay on the 2nd of December, and proceeded to Kamptee, in the Madras Presidency, arriving the following week.

1879. On the 3rd of March, 1879, Major-General Mark Walker, C.B., V.C., presented New Colours to the Regiment, and while doing so, addressed the officers and men as follows :

“Colonel Chadwick, Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the ‘Duke of Wellington’s Regiment,’ I feel deeply the honour that has been conferred on me in having been asked to present you to-day with your new Colours. Such an honour is generally conferred on one far better known, and more distinguished

<sup>1</sup> Carter : “British War Medals.”

than I am, but it would seldom devolve on one who can say, as I can, 'I have served and fought alongside those old colours. I have seen them nobly carried midst the storm and smoke of battle.' As your old colours passed your ranks to the old familiar air, thoughts must have harked back to the years you stood by them, to old friends, old comrades who did so too, some of whom fell under them; many of whom have passed away, like them, to an honourable resting-place.

"As you look on your new Colours, thoughts will, I am sure, hark forward with a proud determination to uphold them as their predecessors have been for nigh two hundred years; also, if called upon, to add fresh names to those already there. Officers and soldiers, in confiding these Colours to your care, I do so with perfect confidence, and with the firm assurance that you will guard them and reverence them as soldiers should, that you will never sully them by unmanly and unsoldierlike acts, that with them you will uphold the honour of our most good and gracious Queen, and of our Country; also that of your own name and number, and that of the great and illustrious soldier whose crest and motto you proudly bear. If in the days to come I have the good fortune to see those Colours hoisted high, to cheer you on to victory, or if I hear it has been so, I will feel an extra pride in the thought that I presented them."

Colonel Chadwick retired, and his successor, Lieut.-Colonel Castle, was appointed on the 23rd of July, 1879,

An important General Order was issued on the 4th of July, 1881, bearing an Army Organisation from which the following extracts may be made: 1881.

II. The Infantry of the Line and Militia will in future be organised in Territorial Regiments, each of four Battalions for England, Scotland, and Wales, and of five Battalions for Ireland; the 1st and 2nd of these being Line

Battalions, and the remainder Militia. These Regiments will bear a Territorial designation corresponding to the localities with which they are connected, and the words "Regimental District" will in future be used in place of "Sub District" hitherto employed.

VIII. *Honours and Distinctions.* All distinctions, mottoes, badges, or devices, appearing hitherto in the "Army List," or on the Colours as borne by either of the Line Battalions of a Territorial Regiment, will in future be borne by both these Battalions.

IX. *Uniform.* The uniform of all the Battalions of a Territorial Regiment will be the same (except Scotch Militia Battalions). The Title of the Regiment will be shown on the shoulder strap.

XVII. The following will show the precedence, composition, title, and uniform of the new Territorial Regiments :

PRECED-

ENCE

TITLES

COMPOSITION

33rd	The Halifax Regt. (Duke of Wellington's)	1st Bn. 33rd Foot 2nd Bn. 76th Foot 3rd Bn. 6th W.Y. Militia 4th Bn. 6th W.Y. Militia
------	---	--

UNIFORM

<i>Head-qrs. of Regtl.</i>			<i>Pattern of</i>
<i>District</i>	<i>Colour</i>	<i>Facings</i>	<i>Lace</i>
Halifax	Scarlet	White	Rose

There was a change, however, from these orders before they came into effect, as shown by the following extract from the "London Gazette" :

WAR OFFICE,  
PALL MALL,  
1st July, 1881.

The Queen has been pleased to approve the following changes in the designation of Regiments of Infantry of the Line, which will take effect on and after the 1st July, 1881 :

<i>Present Title</i>	<i>Future Title</i>
33rd (Duke of Wellington's Regiment).	1st Battn. of the Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment).

A somewhat belated permission arrived in October, 1882, couched in the following terms :

Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve of the West Riding Regiment being permitted to bear on its Colours the word "Dettingen," in commemoration of the Battle fought at that place on the 27th June, 1743.

In the following month the Battalion proceeded from Lucknow for Nowshera by route march, on November 1st, 1882. Prior to the departure of the 33rd, Lieut.-General C. Cureton, C.B., Commanding Oudh Division, published the following farewell Order : "The 1st Battalion West Riding Regiment, 'The Duke of Wellington's,' being about to leave the Command, the Lieut.-General desires to place on record his high estimation of this fine Regiment, which has now served in the Oudh Division for a period of three years, and has fully maintained its reputation for smartness and efficiency, not only at drill, but at the more extended Field Manœuvres, where the Officers, Non-Commis-

sioned Officers, and Men have at all times shown zeal and intelligence.

"In Quarters, too, the Regiment is marked for its excellent system of interior economy, and its various well-managed Regimental Institutions, which afford instruction and amusement for the men.

"The discipline of the Corps generally is good, and the Lieut.-General trusts that the good conduct and soldierlike bearing of the older soldiers of the Battalion will lead to more emulation on the part of their younger comrades, whose endeavour it should be at all times to maintain the high character of the distinguished Regiment to which they belong.

"In wishing 'Good-bye' to Lieut.-Colonel Castle, the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men of the 'Duke of Wellington's Regiment,' Lieut.-General Cureton wishes them a pleasant march to their new quarters and every success in the future."

1883. Lieut.-Colonel Castle, whose name has been mentioned in the foregoing Order, was promoted to be Colonel, the date in the "London Gazette" being July 23rd, 1883. Colonel Castle handed over the command of the Battalion on the 15th of March, 1884, and in so doing, issued the following Order.

1884. "Colonel F. J. Castle, on handing over the Command of the Battalion after holding it for over four years, wishes to express his great satisfaction at its general efficiency and discipline. He would also wish to place on record his thanks for the hearty co-operation and support of the members of the different Staffs in the Battalion, and feels that it is in a great measure due to them that he has been able to carry on his duties of Command so satisfactorily to himself, and he hopes to others.

"He reminds the Battalion that this is not only his retirement from the Battalion, but Her Majesty's Service, which he entered some thirty-five years ago; and though he will never have the pleasure of meeting any of them on duty again, yet he will always have a

pleasant recollection of his sojourn amongst them, and heartfelt regret at parting from them now. He feels sure that the Battalion will continue to maintain the same high opinion of its efficiency so recently expressed by the Brigadier-General Commanding, and also of His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief."

Lieut.-Colonel W. Bally succeeded Colonel Castle, taking over the command of the 33rd on the 15th of March.

Orders were issued from time to time which contained the greatest praise for the Regiment from officers highly placed, and one especially shows the busy life which the Battalion led while serving in the Rawal Pindi Division. Issued by Lieut.-General Sir M. A. Biddulph, K.C.B., who commanded the Division, was one which bore date, October 3rd, 1885:

"The Lieut.-General has much pleasure in placing on record the satisfaction derived from his inspection of the Kuldannah Cantonments occupied by the 1st Battalion West Riding Regiment. 1885.

"The improvement effected during the time the Battalion has been in occupation of the station in the way of opening up of roads, and adding to the comfort of the men's institutions, etc., has been very marked, and reflects credit on the Battalion.

"The Lieut.-General was much pleased also to observe that the health of the Battalion was remarkably good, there being only 3 per cent in hospital, thus showing the healthful influence of such occupations as the Battalion has been in during the summer."

His Royal Highness, Prince Leopold of Prussia, expressed in the following year (1886) his keen appreciation of what he termed "the soldierlike appearance and bearing of the troops . . . and the steadiness and precision of their movements" when he inspected the Battalion in November. Further commendation came in the following year from Major-General Sir Martin Dillon, when the Battalion left Rawal Pindi by march 1886-7.

route for Mian Mir, on December 12th, 1887. His letter, which followed the Regiment, ran thus : " The discipline, shooting, and the marching power of the Battalion are very good. These essentials, and the high spirit of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, would carry it anywhere in the field." Invariably the 33rd maintained its high proficiency and won such commendation in the years that followed. But shortly after the Regiment had gone from Rawal Pindi, Major-General Dillon sent word to say that the Duke of Cambridge had forwarded his photograph—with an autograph—in the uniform of a Field-Marshal, and with it an expression of the pleasure he felt in being again associated with the old and most distinguished Regiment in which he served at Gibraltar, in 1838.

1888. Orders were received on the 29th of July, 1888, for the 33rd to proceed to Aden on the 17th of November, and to give volunteers to other corps remaining in India to such an extent as would not reduce its strength below 515 men, exclusive of invalids and time-expired men. Accordingly, all men who extended their Army Service with bounty, under Clause 85, India Army Circular, 1883, who had not completed their extended term, and all others who had not entered the last year of their Army Service, and who volunteered for further Indian Service, were transferred to various other corps. The volunteers who availed themselves of this extension numbered as many as 135 men. The Battalion, thus reduced, proceeded to Aden in due course, arriving there by way of Bombay on the 24th of November.

1889. An Army Order was issued on March 1st, 1889, relative to Regimental Distinctions. " In consideration of the services rendered by Battalions of the Regiments specified below, during the Campaigns in Southern India of 1780-84, and 1790-92, Her Majesty the Queen has been graciously pleased to permit those Regiments to bear the following distinction upon their Colours :

“The Duke of Wellington’s (West Riding) Regiment.  
‘Mysore.’”

The stay of the 33rd at Aden was not a lengthened one, orders being received on the 17th of September for the Battalion to embark for England.

While the 1st Battalion was at York, H.R.H. the 1890.  
Commander-in-Chief inspected it on September 26th, 1890, and addressed the troops: “Colonel De Wend, Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men, I have pleasing remembrances of the old 33rd Regiment, than which a better never existed in the old campaigns. I am very glad to see the men turn out so smartly and so well; and they are probably as good now as ever they were. The only part about them which I regret is that their numerical strength is so small. In 1838 it was the first Regiment I had the honour to do duty with in Gibraltar, and I sincerely hope that if ever it falls to my lot to inspect the Battalion again, I shall find it considerably increased in numbers.”

From this time on for several years there was nothing of importance to record beyond the change of officers, the strengthening of the Regiment, its movements from place to place, and its recurring inspections. On September 28th, 1895, the 33rd 1895.  
sailed from Southampton for Malta. The total strength of the officers and men numbered 1,012, nearly double the number which the Commander-in-Chief had inspected five years before. The Battalion returned to Southampton on the 15th of September, 1898, 1898.  
and proceeded to Dover, the strength being reduced to 781.

During these years the Regiment maintained its high state of efficiency, and it is interesting to note the remarks of Major-General Rundle after the annual inspection at Perham Down on July 27th, 1899. 1899.  
“This is a very fine regiment, and will do credit anywhere. They have a great idea of themselves, which is deserved. They respect their officers and N.C.O.’s.



They did well at manœuvres, and would do well on service. The C.-in-C. told their Guard of Honour he had never seen a better one turned out, and I have always found the same. They are one of the best-behaved Battalions I have ever come across, and this I attribute to Colonel Lloyd and the system in the Regiment."

On the 2nd of December the 33rd received orders to mobilise and prepare for service in South Africa—orders which were received by officers and men with unbounded enthusiasm after such a long term of uneventful garrison duty. The Battalion strength which left Aldershot on the 29th of December, 1899, to embark at Southampton, was as follows :

Lieut.-Col. G. E. Lloyd, D.S.O., commanding  
Major and Brevet Lieut.-Col. P. T. Rivett-Carnac,  
2nd in command

Majors H. D. Thorold and B. St. J. Le Marchant  
Captains F. J. de Gex, O. Harris, O. O. A. Taylor,  
E. R. Houghton, F. D. Berhend, H. D. E.  
Greenwood

Lieutenants F. J. Siordet, L. R. Ackworth,  
P. B. Strafford, E. N. Townsend, F. S. Exham,  
R. St. J. Carmichael

2nd Lieutenants E. V. Jenkins, H. J. L. Oakes,  
W. E. Maples, M. V. Le P. Trench, R. M.  
Tidmarsh

Lieutenant and Adjutant W. E. M. Tyndall  
Captain and Quartermaster J. T. Seaman  
Captain C. E. Anderson, R.A.M.C., attached  
1 Warrant Officer

53 Sergeants

15 Drummers

40 Corporals

877 Privates

Total Officers and Men, 1,013.

Owing to insufficient accommodation on board the

“Orient,” H Company, which had been formed into a Mounted Infantry Company, was left at Aldershot, to embark a few days later under the command of Captain A. F. Wallis, with Lieutenants H. K. Umfreville, R. J. Gatehouse, and 2nd Lieutenant J. H. B. Wilson, with 5 sergeants, 2 drummers, 5 corporals, and 121 privates, who are included in the numbers already given. The actual strength on the augmentation of the officers was therefore 1,030.

# South African War

## CHAPTER XXXVII

### THE RELIEF OF KIMBERLEY

1900. THE call of the 33rd to South Africa arose from the fact that hostilities existed between the British Government and the Boers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

War had been possible from the day when Dr. Jameson had entered the Transvaal at the head of an armed force (January, 1896). From that time ill-will increased, and complications set in. Negotiations were entered on concerning various grievances which then existed, and were productive of serious unrest ; but these proved futile. In 1899 the so-called "South African Republic" asserted its full independence, and this assertion culminated in "a formal denial of British suzerainty." President Kruger, speaking for the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, protested that the franchise, which was one of the vital questions in dispute, was an internal affair with which Great Britain had no right to interfere. From Kruger's point of view, "the admission of the Uitlanders to real political rights meant the doom of his oligarchical regime, and appeared in the light of a direct menace to Boer supremacy."

War seemed so certain by the autumn of 1899, that a contingent, 5,600 strong, was ordered from India to Natal, while Sir George White was given the command

of all the Natal forces. In England an Army Corps was held in readiness for dispatch to Cape Town, Sir Redvers Buller being nominated for the chief command. It was still hoped that war might be averted, but on the 9th of October Kruger presented his Ultimatum, couched in terms which the British Government could not possibly entertain. He demanded the immediate withdrawal of the British troops which had been assembled at various points on the frontier; that any British troops then on the high seas should not be landed in any part of South Africa; that all reinforcements of troops which had arrived in South Africa since June 1st, 1899, should be removed forthwith, and that all points of difference should be submitted to arbitration. Kruger further demanded an answer within forty-eight hours.

Naturally the reply was one of firm refusal. As a result the Boers crossed the Natal frontier on the 12th of October, and the war began.

The situation was a serious one for Great Britain. The British troops in South Africa were wholly inadequate to the exigency, for the Boers were in superior force. The official numbers given for our troops when the Boers crossed the frontier were :

In Natal, including 2,781 local troops	15,811
In Cape Colony—regular troops	5,221
Colonial troops	4,574
	<hr/>
Total	25,606

In Southern Rhodesia Colonel Baden-Powell had raised locally 1,448 men, which brought up the full total to 27,054.

Against these at the outset Kruger was able to bring 50,000 men, and it was confidently asserted that he had as many as 80,000 at his disposal. They were not what some military men had called "a disorganised rabble," for they had been preparing for the war, and

their marksmanship was brought up to a high degree of proficiency. As for organisation, the fighting element was by no means a haphazard machine. The writer of the article in the "Encyclopædia Britannica" says that the bulk of the Dutch levies were organised on the burgher system—that is, each district was furnished with a commandant, who had under him field- and assistant field-cornets, who administered the fighting capacity of the district. Each field-cornet, who, with the commandant, was a paid official of the state, was responsible for the arms, equipment, and attendance of the commando.

At the outbreak of the war every advantage lay with the Boers, with the result that the Boers achieved some remarkable successes. Colonel Baden-Powell was shut up in Mafeking by Cronje. Kimberley was enveloped by the burghers of the Orange Free State, commanded by General Wessels. Still worse was the position of Sir George White, who, after an engagement at Elandslaagte, was compelled to fall back on Ladysmith, where he was completely invested.

The difficulties which Lieut.-General Sir W. Butler had foreseen were realised. He had pointed out to the War Office how serious the position would be if war broke out, and how inadequate the forces in South Africa were by reason of the enormous area of the field of operations. His official statement, dated December 1898, nine months before the war began, dealt clearly with the question of frontiers. "The frontiers of the Transvaal and the Free State," he said, "are conterminous with English territory for over 1,000 miles, but the defence of this enormous frontier by Her Majesty's troops is impossible to contemplate. Southern Rhodesia, although a possible objective for a Boer raid, must rely entirely for its defence upon its own local forces, and, although the line from Kimberley to Bulawayo is of some strategic importance, yet its protection north of the Vaal River would be altogether out of our power during the earlier stages of the war.

Basutoland may also be eliminated from defensive calculations, as its invasion by the Boers would be improbable ; moreover, the Basutos, if invaded, would be able for some time to maintain an effective resistance.

“ The frontier, therefore, the observation and defence of which appear to need definite consideration, may be held to extend in Cape Colony from Fourteen Streams Bridge in the north to the south-west corner of Basutoland, and to include in Natal the triangle of which Charlestown is the apex, and a line drawn from Mont Aux Sources to the Intonganeni district of Zululand the base.

“ The mountains and broken country of Basutoland and Griqualand East, which lie between Natal and the Cape Colony, are unpierced by railways and ill-supplied by roads. It must be accepted, therefore, that a force acting on the defensive in Natal will be out of touch with a force in Cape Colony, and the two can only operate from separate bases.

“ As regards the Cape frontier, for the portion lying between Basutoland and Hopetown railway bridge ”—the railway bridge at Orange River Station —“ the Orange River forms a military obstacle of some importance, impassable, as a rule, during the first three months of the year, except at the bridges, and even at other times difficult to cross, owing to its quicksands, and liability to sudden flood. Between Hopetown railway bridge and the Vaal the frontier is, however, protected by no physical features, and lies open to invasion.

“ As regards the Natal frontier, its salient confers on the enemy facilities for cutting our line of communications, and for outflanking at pleasure the positions of Laing's Nek and the Biggarsberg. This facility is accentuated by the influence of the Drakensberg, which forms a screen behind which an enemy can assemble unobserved and debouch on our flanks through its numerous passes. These passes, however, have been recently examined, and found to be for the most part

but rough mountain tracks available for raids, but unsuitable for the advance of any large force accompanied by transport. To this, Van Reenen's Pass, through which the railway and the main road issue from Natal into the Free State, and Laing's Nek (across and under which the main road and railway pass into the Transvaal) are notable exceptions, and the possession of these two passes necessarily carry with them great strategical advantages.

"An appreciation of the relative importance of the defence of the two frontiers of Cape Colony and Natal would, no doubt, be assisted if the line by which the main advance on the Transvaal will ultimately be undertaken were determined."

These observations serve to display the very considerable difficulties which confronted the British Commanders at the commencement of the war. The Boers had the choice of points at which they could cross the frontiers, and it can readily be conceived that Sir George White, with the wholly inadequate force at his disposal, could do nothing towards effective defence when the enemy were able to advance in overwhelming numbers, and the area at their disposal for operations comprised tens of thousands of square miles. The ease with which the Boers might make their raids with 2,000 or more men, is conceivable, and how impossible with 27,000 men to cope with these, and yet prepare resistance to an invading force.

The official history of the war tells us that the situation in those early weeks was one of grave anxiety. The reinforcements which would form the field army were not due for some weeks. Meanwhile, in the eastern theatre of operations, the Boers would have made their supreme effort with all the advantages of superior numbers, greater mobility, and a terrain admirably suited to their methods of fighting. A considerable portion of the British troops under Sir George White were, moreover, mere units, lacking war organisation except on paper, unknown to their leaders

and staff, unacquainted with the country, and with both horses and men out of condition after their sea voyage. In the western theatre, the safety of Kimberley and Mafeking mainly depended on the untried fighting qualities of recently enlisted colonial corps, volunteers, and hastily organised town-guards; detachments of regular troops dotted along the northern frontier of Cape Colony were without hope of support either from the coast or each other, and would be cut off and crushed in detail in case of a serious attack or of a rising in their rear. Thus the initiative lay absolutely with the enemy, and, so far as could be foreseen, must remain in his hands until the British army corps and cavalry division should be ready to take the field about the middle of December.

This fear was realised. Except for the isolated units, too far away to be called in, the British forces concentrated speedily, two-thirds being massed at Ladysmith and Dundee, in the northern angle of Natal. A strong garrison held Kimberley, and Baden-Powell was at Mafeking, on the Transvaal frontier. The Boers might have left a force at each place sufficient to contain the troops there, while they overran the Colony at their will, a course which might, conceivably, have resulted in the conquest of South Africa. Their conceptions of strategy, however, were of an elementary character. Deciding to mass their troops about these places which they determined to capture, they failed to strengthen their forces to the fullest extent.

Reinforcements were sent out with the greatest possible dispatch when the Home Government realised the seriousness of the position. Buller, who had become Commanding General of the British forces in South Africa, was held back by the Boers in his endeavours to relieve Ladysmith, and Lord Methuen, who was in command of the First Army Corps dispatched to relieve Kimberley, was barred at the Modder River. The failures and disasters resulting led to determined effort on the part of the Government at home to



retrieve our reverses. It was clear that a greatly augmented force in the field was needed. Hence Lord Roberts was sent out to take over the supreme command, Lord Kitchener going with him as Chief of the Staff. The 33rd was one among the many infantry battalions whose services were demanded in connection with this increased field force.

On the 20th of January, 1900, ten days after the arrival of Lord Roberts, the 33rd landed at Cape Town. They at once received orders to proceed by special trains to Naaupoort, to join the 6th Division under Lieut.-General T. Kelly-Kenny. They arrived there on the 22nd, and remained there until February 2nd.

Lord Roberts, on reaching Cape Town, was confronted by a situation which was not free from complications. He found the Boers expending great effort on the capture of Ladysmith, and also barring the way to Kimberley, Methuen being definitely checked. Mafeking, too, was isolated, but making a gallant defence. General French, with his cavalry, had baffled the attempts of the Boers to advance into the central districts of Cape Colony, and, as the official history points out, had appreciably diminished the pressure in other portions of the theatre of war. Gatacre was at Sterkstroom, holding a great body of the enemy at Stormberg. Buller was about to advance to the relief of Ladysmith by Potgeiters. Roberts gave him a free hand, not knowing how far he was "committed to an immediate stroke or whether the situation before him or Ladysmith itself demanded prompt action."

As for his own movements, Roberts was ready to modify any plans he had made, according to the situation when he landed at Cape Town. When he had rapidly reviewed the situation his plan matured. We are told in the official history of the war that he had decided to choose the route along the western line of railway, on which side alone a bridge over the Orange River was in his possession. In order to possess

the freedom of movement essential to the execution of any sound schemes of war, he determined to make such arrangements as would enable him to cast himself loose from the railway and to march across the Free State eastward. His first idea was to strike the central railway as close as possible to Springfontein junction. He believed that the Boers would thus be compelled to evacuate their positions at Stormberg and Colesberg, and to abandon to him the Norval's Pont and Bethulie bridges over the river. The Commander-in-Chief was convinced, moreover, that this course, by menacing Bloemfontein, would oblige the enemy to relax his hold on the Modder River and Natal. But on the 27th of January, increasing anxiety as to Kimberley led him to decide that the prompt relief of that town had become necessary. This involved not a change of plan, but merely a modification of details. The initial march eastward was still to be carried out, but as soon as Cronje's flank had been thus effectively passed, a wheel northward would bring the British troops athwart the Boer line of communication, and, when the passage of the Modder was made, the way to Kimberley would be opened. After relieving Kimberley the Field-Marshal's movements would depend on the situation as it might then present itself, but should such a march appear possible he determined to make straight for Bloemfontein. The occupation of that capital would, he thought, make it easy to re-establish direct railway communication with Cape Colony through Norval's Pont and Bethulie.<sup>1</sup>

The 33rd were to share in Roberts' endeavour "to manœuvre Cronje out of Magersfontein, to relieve Kimberley, and strike for Bloemfontein." But the most absolute secrecy was maintained as to operations, and consequently the destination when regiment after regiment was sent to the front was unknown. The idea was to deceive Cronje, who was confident that the advance would be made by the railway, direct on

<sup>1</sup> "Official History of the War."

Bloemfontein. Cronje was the more convinced of this when he found that Methuen was being strengthened continuously. The deception was furthered by demonstrations made against the flank remote from that where the British army was to be placed, namely, athwart the line which Cronje had relied on for retreat if this became necessary.

French had been so active that the enemy had strengthened their posts considerably in order to frustrate him. Lord Roberts accordingly ordered Kelly-Kenny to take the 6th Division forward, giving him "a separate command from Naauwpoort southward, leaving French to continue his previous campaign against the enemy round Colesberg." The 12th Brigade was placed at French's disposal.

The composition of Kelly-Kenny's 6th Division was as follows :

The 76th and 81st Field Batteries

An ammunition column

38th Company R.E.

The 13th Infantry Brigade—Major-Gen. C. E.

Knox—composed of :

2nd Gloucester

2nd East Kent

1st West Riding (33rd)

1st Oxfordshire Light Infantry

The 18th Brigade—Brig.-Gen. T. E. Stephenson :

1st Yorkshire

1st Welsh

1st Essex

The 33rd left Naauwpoort on the evening of February 2nd by rail for a destination unknown. The journey ended at the Modder River, where the regiment bivouacked on the battlefield. They remained here till the 9th, exposed to sandstorms and exceptionally hot weather. Marching on to Enslin, and thence

to Graspan, the regiment returned to Enslin, where they awaited orders. The next move was to Ramdam with the 13th Brigade, the 33rd forming the left guard. This march brought the regiment to the Orange Free State.

What was to follow was not yet divulged. In reality Roberts designed the rapid relief of Kimberley, the place being considered in extremity. Colonel Kekewich, there in command, had reported that he could not hold out beyond February 28th, that Ferreira was bombarding the place with "Long Tom," a 94-pr. (Creusot), and so trying the nerves of the citizens that they were pressing for surrender. Roberts decided that Kimberley should be relieved at all costs, and on the 11th of February the cavalry division marched to Ramdam, there to be joined by Hannay's mounted infantry brigade. The 7th Division was also ordered to proceed to the same place. The 6th Division was to concentrate at Ramdam with Hannay's brigade of mounted infantry, and as a consequence some arduous marching resulted for the 33rd and other battalions in the Division.

The enemy were completely deceived as to Lord Roberts' intention, so that when Cronje saw what was happening, and sent to De Wet to bring reinforcements, the Cavalry Division had crossed the Riet at Kiel's Drift, De Wet having been too late to stop their crossing.

The 6th Division was at Ramdam on the 12th of February, and Kelly-Kenny, finding Hannay's mounted infantry brigade there, added it to his command. Lord Roberts ordered the cavalry to move on to the Modder for water, which could not be obtained north of the Riet; they were to be one day in advance of the infantry. This was accomplished with such fine celerity that the Boers were entirely outwitted, believing that Roberts meant to advance to Koffyfontein. Hence the "upper reaches of the Modder were left unguarded save for pickets of the Free State burghers

who had been found unsuitable for employment in the front line."

Kimberley's relief was now absorbing the attention of the 6th, 7th, and 9th Divisions, with the result that the 6th Division moved forward from Ramdam on the 13th, the intention being to get as far as Waterval Drift, nine miles distant. The 33rd moved at five in the morning as Advanced Guard to the Division. Klip Drift, on the Modder River, was reached on the 15th, the Regiment serving for that day as escort to a convoy. This movement to join French at Klip Drift necessitated a double march, in which, amid drenching rainstorms, 27 miles were covered in 23 hours, "no inconsiderable feat," says one narrator, "for troops who, just released from the confinement of a long sea voyage, made this march in very hot weather over a sandy, treeless, and almost waterless plain."

The arrival of the 6th Division relieved French, who thereupon left Klip Drift. By a rapid dash, and in irresistible force against the enemy, he cut through a very much extended line of Boer posts, causing the enemy to scatter east and west. The retirement enabled French to move north to Kimberley; for "open country now lay between the British cavalry and the outworks of the besieged town." Such Boer forces as remained in French's path fell back hastily, and he thus entered Kimberley.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII

### PURSUIT AND CAPTURE OF CRONJE

LORD ROBERTS' plan, seconded by what has been termed "audacity and skilful manœuvring" on French's part, resulted in something more than the relief of Kimberley. Roberts had "driven a wedge between Ferreira and Cronje, shortly to prove fatal to the general who had sat still in his trenches." Cronje had laughed at the idea of the English crossing the Modder, and was waiting complacently for the fall of Kimberley, but French's sudden dash to the relief of the invested town was a rude awakening. 1900.

Kimberley was relieved on the 15th of February, but now Cronje had to be dealt with. The 6th Division having reached Klip Drift with two Naval 12-pounders, remained there, faced by a large body of Boers, who, having cleared out of French's path and thrown themselves in front of Kelly-Kenny, and begun to entrench a hill 6,000 yards distant, were now to be swept away.

Other movements were contemplated by the combined action of the 6th and 7th Divisions, but the clearance of the Boers from the hill was a matter of pressing importance. The enemy clearly imagined that the difficulties confronting their opponents would enable them to hold the kopje, for the river at that point was deep, and the banks steep. The 9th Division had come up to Waterval Drift, and proceeded to cross in spite of the difficulties. The division, however, was not able to take on the convoy because of its exhaustion. Rest was necessary. On the 15th

of February the 33rd, acting as escort to the convoy, arrived at Klip Drift after six hours' marching.

While Tucker, with part of his 7th Division, was to co-operate with Kelly-Kenny in protecting the fords of the Modder, the remainder were to occupy Jacobstal, where a considerable force had been concentrated to "make certain of the new line of communications with Modder Camp." Part of the 7th Division, as already mentioned, were to remain at Wegdraai, awaiting orders, while the 6th Division was "to push through the Boer defensive line north of Klip Drift, and occupy Abon's Dam with one brigade, the other brigade remaining at the drifts; thus allowing Hannay's mounted infantry to join the cavalry division at Kimberley."

Meanwhile Cronje had deemed it wise to move from Magersfontein. With French at Kimberley, Tucker at Jacobsdaal, and heavy columns to the south-east, he at length realised the danger of his situation. Abandoning his entrenchments he moved up to the right bank of the Modder, hoping to reach Bloemfontein.

It now remained for Kelly-Kenny to deal with the Boers in his front. Cronje, however, was in view, and consequently Kelly-Kenny determined to deal with him as well as those of the enemy near by. Major-General Knox was ordered to pursue him and harass his transport. The mounted infantry succeeded in driving in the guards in the rear. The advance of Knox's 13th Brigade and the mounted infantry caused Cronje to hasten in order to ensure his crossing the river by the Vendutie Drift, and thus gain his communication with Bloemfontein. Cronje reached the southern knoll of the Drieputs kopjes; but Hannay's advance guard of mounted infantry seized the northern end of the ridge. The 13th Brigade was nearly three miles in the rear, marching eastward, parallel to the Modder. The 33rd were standing No. 3 in brigade to cover the march of the mounted infantry. In the

advance the battalion held the enemy, and drew near to the spot where fierce fighting was likely to follow.

Knox sent forward the 81st Field Battery to support the mounted infantry, thinking to drive the Boers from the drift. Hannay, at his orders, sought to get between Cronje and the Modder, but the Boer guns rendered this impossible. Knox thereupon attacked Cronje with the 13th Brigade. He kept the 33rd and the 2nd Gloucesters in reserve, but sent the 2nd Buffs forward, while the 1st Oxford Light Infantry were to find a crossing to the river's left bank, and work round to the Boer's flank. The 6th Mounted Infantry were to quit the ridge they had occupied, join the 2nd Mounted Infantry, and support the Oxford Light Infantry, who had succeeded in fording the river. These distracted the enemy by extending and advancing thus across the open veldt, while their Colonel, Dalzell, with two companies, crept up the bed of the river. The Oxfords were converging thus on the Boers, and the Buffs, the 33rd, the Gloucesters and the 81st Field Battery, in support, with the 76th Battery, which had been sent up by Kelly-Kenny, threatened Cronje's front, advancing slowly across the plain. Cronje was compelled to fall back on the second ridge.

This new position had now to be attacked. The Boers' "right and left centre rested on a kopje about a mile to the west of Klip Drift, and faced west and south; their left ran from this hill along a series of knolls, until it reached Klip Kraal Drift."<sup>1</sup>

Practically the tactics which cleared the first ridge had to be resorted to in driving the enemy from the second. The official account of the disposition of Knox's forces for the second attack runs thus: The Oxfordshire Light Infantry were to push up the left bank of the Modder and search for a crossing-place. This found, the battalion was to pass over the river, and supported by the 81st Field Battery, via Klip Drift, and the 6th Mounted Infantry, make a flank

<sup>1</sup> "Official History of the War."



attack upon the southern face of the kopje. The remainder of the mounted infantry, with the 76th Field Battery, were to prolong the line on the left bank towards Klip Kraal Drift. The Gloucestershire, West Riding (33rd) and the Buffs were to assault the western face of the right and centre of the position.<sup>1</sup>

The Oxfords accordingly crossed with the 81st Field battery, and assailed Cronje's rear-guard, while the 33rd, with the Gloucesters in the second line, made their frontal attack, being in close touch with the Oxfords' left. The Boers, however, firmly held the main ridge. On centre, right, and left, the English forces were unable to effect anything. The horses of the mounted infantry, on the right, were so exhausted that many of them fell dead. Things looked so hopeless that Kelly-Kenny gave the order to halt, water, and feed. This had such good effect that the column was able to reach the rising ground south-west of the Drift, a feat of which the horses were incapable before. The 76th battery got to the top, but had to retire before a heavy musketry fire, and occupy another position, which enabled them to drive out the Boers.

The part played by the 33rd was an important one. They held the enemy on the left flank, and supported the attack which Kelly-Kenny made on the kopje. The men were under fire all the day, and after driving the enemy out of the first laager, and holding him in front for eight and a half hours, they were ordered to advance with the Gloucesters on that part of the Boers' position in the Battalion's front. This was done brilliantly. The Boers were driven out of the two kopjes, but not without loss, for Corporal Newman was killed, and Captains Harris and Taylor and 21 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. The conduct of the 33rd in this day's fighting won the commendation of the General, who said that nothing could have been better than the behaviour of the Battalion. He made a special note of this to Lord Roberts, and ordered a

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

similar communication to be made known to all ranks of the battalion.

Cronje moved away in the night, and when day dawned on the 17th of February, he was striking eastward towards Paardeberg, as if purposing to get on the road to Bloemfontein, where there were no British troops to hinder him. Two hundred of his wagons succeeded in crossing the Modder. Kelly-Kenny followed in pursuit with the 6th Division. Kitchener, too, with Hannay's mounted infantry, moved on rapidly, and came in touch with the Boer rear-guard, while French, with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and the Carabiniers, arrived at Kameefontein. Broadwood, moreover, was at Vendutie Drift, midway between French and Cronje, and thus threatened to head off Cronje's advance. French surprised the convoy just as it was beginning to cross the Modder, and creating a panic, caused a halt. Cronje gave up the idea of retreat, and began to entrench in the river bed on both banks.

The 6th and 9th Divisions were advancing in the meantime with what speed was possible. The stress of the pursuit may be understood by a quotation from Kelly-Kenny's letter to Lord Roberts in the evening of February 17th. "Nothing can exceed the marching and spirit of our people. Marching day and night; we made an eleven-mile march this morning. After a rest we start again at 5 o'clock, and again, as your plan has suggested, we march at 3 a.m. to-morrow." Cronje's position with this fast-closing movement was serious in the extreme. He appealed to President Steyn for help from Bloemfontein, and 4,000 men were to be sent to him. De Wet, who was alarmed for his own safety, could not spare more.

Cronje's only chance of escape was to abandon his transport, and save his men, but he determined not to do that, since it is stated that all the transport was the property, not of the state, but of the farmers themselves, and in many cases formed a large part of their

capital and means of livelihood. The description given of the spot where Cronje elected to make his stand is thus described :

“The laager lay at the bottom of a basin about nine miles long by two miles wide, the rim of which is formed by a series of well-defined kopjes, whence the ground slopes gently down towards the Modder.”

“On hills, on the left or southern bank, the British artillery could be placed within easy reach of the river, while to the north French’s guns, whose shells had stopped the passage, were extended along the ridge near Kameelfontein. Across the basin thus enclosed the Modder winds its way, entering the basin at the east by a gorge under the southern slopes of Koodoosrand, and emerging at the west by a defile between Paardeberg and Signal Hills. The banks have here the same characteristics as those on the battlefield of ‘Modder River.’ The stream runs at the bottom of a channel about fifty yards wide, and thirty or forty feet deep. Its sloping sides are thickly covered with mimosa, thorn, and other bushes. In places thickets of these shrubs overlap the banks and spread for some distance into the plain, which is otherwise bare and shelterless. Into the Modder run numberless dongas, which are a formidable series of natural defences. Difficult to search with shrapnel, and thickly covered with thorn, they present successive lines of natural trenches obstructing attacks along the course of the river. . . . Within the basin there are several fords : the most eastern is Koodoos, then come in succession, Banks, Vanderberg, Vendutie, and Paardeberg Drifts.” The stream had risen, owing to the recent heavy rains, so that the fords were difficult to pass, and this added to Cronje’s embarrassment.

Kitchener, acting for Lord Roberts in his temporary absence, now took supreme command, and decided on immediate attack. He was, however, distressingly handicapped by lack of Staff “adequate to watch over for him the general scope of the action.” The plan

was all that could be desired, and if he could have succeeded in making known to each general his concerted scheme, disaster would have been inevitable for Cronje. It was thus : " He proposed from the south bank to engage and occupy the attention of the Boers whilst he attacked the laager from both west and east—that is, up-stream and down-stream." He entrusted the action from the south to Kelly-Kenny and the 6th Division. Hannay's mounted infantry were to move up the stream along the southern bank, and cross the river " high enough to be clear of Boer opposition." Stephenson's brigade from the 6th Division was to support Hannay. Thus one brigade only remained, namely, the 13th, strengthened by the 1st Yorkshire Regiment, to give the frontal attack. Lieut.-General Colville's division—the 9th—was to move up the stream from the west. His 19th Brigade was to cross at Paardeberg Drift, and work up along the right bank, while the Highland Brigade (3rd) marched eastward along the river. The laager was to be assailed simultaneously from east and west, down-stream from the east by four mounted infantry corps, and by two battalions of infantry, to whom were assigned the 81st and later the 76th batteries. It was to be assailed up-stream from the west by the whole of General Colville's division (the 9th) and by two mounted infantry corps, to whom were attached the 82nd Battery. The remainder of the artillery of Kelly-Kenny's and Colville's divisions " was to take advantage of the hills on the south bank, so as to prepare the way for the infantry attack by a vigorous bombardment."<sup>1</sup>

The lack of Staff for Kitchener was unfortunate. As showing how this bore on the day's action, Stephenson was not informed of Kitchener's intention that he should join Hannay in the attack on the laager down-stream, while Kelly-Kenny and Colville acted in advance of orders.

But to follow Kelly-Kenny's movements : Knox,

" Official History of the War."

with the 13th Brigade and the Yorkshires (on his right) deployed along the front. On the Yorkshires' left were the 33rd; to their left again the Oxfords. These battalions advanced towards the river at 8 in the morning. Knox's task seems to have been to engage the enemy's attention while his flanks were being enveloped. The Yorkshires, "with four companies extended as firing line and supports, and the remainder in reserve, advanced towards the river by rushes of alternate sections, covered at first by section volleys, and afterwards by individual firing." No Boers were in sight, yet several men were struck down. When the Yorkshires reached the river the firing was too hot for any crossing to be possible.

The 33rd advanced in extended lines, and since Colonel Lloyd had been ordered not to press the attack home, he waited under moderate cover. The Oxfords, on their left, acted similarly. Later on, however, the 33rd, with a detachment of the Oxfords, went forward without cover, and drove the Boers out of their trenches, which they themselves occupied, the enemy hurriedly crossing the river. The 33rd were about to follow, but Kelly-Kenny ordered them to take cover in the dongas. The 13th Brigade did all, and more than was asked of them, that was, to hold the enemy on the left bank.

The fighting had meanwhile gone on fiercely in every part of the field, and in the end it was seen how futile everything had been by reason of Kitchener's lack of Staff, which led to disjointed action. Kitchener's kopje was lost to the reinforcements which De Wet was enabled to send, the Canadians were repulsed on the north of the Modder, so also were the Cornwall Light Infantry, while Hannay, misinterpreting the spirit of an order from his commander, charged and was killed. The day's fighting ended, not disastrously, but unsatisfactorily, with no advantage commensurate to the heavy losses. Kitchener's report in the evening to Lord Roberts was :

"We did not succeed in getting into the enemy's convoy, though we drove the Boers back a considerable distance along the river bed. The troops are maintaining their position and I hope to-morrow we shall be able to do something more definite. Late this afternoon the Boers developed an attack on our right which is still going on, but is kept under control by our artillery."

The 33rd lost heavily in this action, for Lieut. F. J. Siordet and 22 N.C.O.'s and men were killed, while Captains F. J. de Gex and Greenwood and 104 N.C.O.'s and men were wounded. Such losses show the fierce nature of the fighting. It was a large proportion out of the full total for the day, the figures for the whole engagement being 1,270. The official comment on the failure to achieve the success which Kitchener hoped to gain was as follows: "The Chief of the Staff's position, as well as that of General Kelly-Kenny, was an unusual one, and over no other battle during the war did the lack of a trained General Staff and of clearly expressed operation orders exercise a more marked influence." The Boers, however, suffered severely. "Cronje's mobility was destroyed, his oxen and horses killed or scattered, the spirit of his burghers crushed. The Boer commandos imprisoned in the bed of the Modder were, in fact, crushed."

Reinforcements were sent forward to Kitchener, in order to concentrate all possible strength against Cronje, who was not to escape. The 7th Division was sent from Jacobsdaal, with the naval guns, namely, four 4.7 in., and two 12-pounders, and some other troops. Lord Roberts himself arrived at Paardeberg on the morning of the 19th. Cronje asked for an armistice in order to bury his dead, but Roberts refused, and demanded an unconditional surrender, whereupon the Boer general replied, "If you are so unreasonable as to refuse me time to bury my dead, you must do as you please." He added, later, "I shall not surrender alive. Therefore bombard as you please."

The bombardment began, whilst the cavalry demonstrated against Kitchener's Kopje, and later the infantry attacked it, but the fighting was stopped by the darkness. The 33rd, having suffered so severely on the 18th, undertook outpost duty at nightfall on the 19th. Roberts would have attacked Cronje's laager, but the troops were so fatigued that it was necessary to allow them a rest. Apart from this there were other matters of the gravest nature which compelled him to a change of plan, and a decision to reduce the laager "by sap, bombardment, or starvation," to send away his wounded and wait for supplies. Lord Roberts resorted to sap by night, and bombardment by day, while he contemplated a cavalry advance on Bloemfontein. Before this could be attempted, however, De Wet must be driven from Kitchener's Kopje. This was done on the 21st of February, and De Wet, afraid of being surrounded, retreated, although this involved the loss of Cronje's chance of escape. His idea naturally was, better part escape than all be compelled to surrender. That disaster seemed to him inevitable if he should be caught in the net. He retreated to Table Mountain, to the east, towards Poplar Grove. Lord Roberts then made the investment of Cronje complete, and gave the 6th Division charge of Kitchener's Kopje.

The Boers from without made a fresh attack on this point on the 23rd, but De Wet, Froneman, and Botha were driven back. Another assault on Cronje's laager resulted in the Boer leader raising the white flag. A letter came from him on February 27th, announcing his surrender. The 33rd, who had bivouacked on the other side of the river on the 23rd, with the 14th Brigade in the 7th Division, and coming under fire frequently in the succeeding days, received orders to recross the river and rejoin the 13th Brigade. The fighting so far as Cronje was concerned was at an end, for the whole of his force fell into Lord Roberts' hand. The prisoners numbered 3,919 men. Four field guns,

one pom-pom, and a large quantity of rifles and ammunition were also captured. In addition to this ammunition, ten or twelve tons weight of Mauser cartridges, a good number of field-gun shells, and some 6-inch projectiles, were dug up from the laager by a search party sent, two months later, to Paardeberg, by the Military Governor of Bloemfontein.

The consequences of this so-called "mere incident" were, when combined with other circumstances, so vastly important that it is worth while here to present the summary of the situation as set forth in the "Official History of the War." "The British Commander-in-Chief had in truth ample reason to be generous to his vanquished foe. Sound strategy and a well-equipped and sufficient army, combined with the gallantry, energy, and endurance of the troops alike in the western and eastern theatres of war, had in less than three weeks completely changed the whole aspect of the campaign. The end of the investment of Paardeberg on February 27th, and Buller's entry into Ladysmith on March 3rd, were events of importance very different from the mere capture of four thousand men. The whole of the enemy's plan of campaign was destroyed, and the prizes for which the Boers had fought for five months were wrested from their grasp. A few days later not only was Cape Colony practically clear of the main body of invaders, but the southern half of the Free State lay open to Lord Roberts. The struggle, it is true, lingered on for another two years, but the hoisting of the signal of surrender in Cronje's laager and the victory of the 27th of February on the Tugela mark the final disappearance of Kruger's and Steyn's power for offence and ensured the triumph of the British flag in South Africa. Henceforth no other design inspired the Boer strategy than to save, if it were possible, from the wreck of their ambitions the independence of the two Republics."<sup>1</sup>

As for the service rendered by the 33rd in the

<sup>1</sup> "Official History of the War."



Modder River and Paardeberg campaign it is of interest to recall the Battalion Orders that were issued at the time, and they are quoted here as supplementing what has been already said. They were issued by Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Lloyd, D.S.O.

“Battalion Order No. 1, of 22.2.1900.

“I wish to express my thanks to all ranks for the way in which the very hard and arduous duties for the last few days have been carried out.

“At Jacobsdaal the Battalion, called out at short notice, marched 20 miles during the day, and went to the assistance of the Mounted Infantry, and enabled them to retire, at the same time covering the march of the 6th Division for the Modder River.

“On the 16th of February the Battalion took a part in the action at Drieput Drift, were under fire all day, and after driving the enemy out of the first laager and holding him in front for 8½ hours, were ordered to advance on the part of the enemy's position in the Battalion's front. This was brilliantly carried out, the two kopjes on the left being carried, thus taking the big kopje in front of the right of the Brigade in flank, and causing the enemy to retire.

“Captains Harris and Taylor and 27 N.C. Officers and men were wounded, and 1 N.C. Officer (Corporal Newman) was killed in this action.

“Nothing could have been better than the conduct of the Battalion in these operations, and I noticed the same quickness, intelligence, and determination in carrying out orders which I have been proud of at our peace manœuvres at Malta and Salisbury, since I joined the regiment.

“With regard to the fight at Drieput Drift, I have said what I think of the doings of the Battalion, and I am proud to be able to tell you that its successful efforts have been noticed and appreciated by both Generals Knox and Kelly-Kenny. The latter, when watching the Battalion pass, told me nothing could

have been better than the behaviour of the Battalion in battle, and that he had written to F.-M. Lord Roberts to tell him about it. He also ordered me to communicate this to all ranks of the Battalion."

"Battalion Order No. 7, 22.2.00.

"The Commanding Officer wishes to thank his comrades of all ranks, whom he has the honour to command, for the gallant attack on and capture of the Boer trenches on the left bank of the Modder River near Paardeberg on the 18th instant.

"We were to the best of his belief the first Battalion to drive the enemy across the river, and to have commanded the Battalion during this attack and assault under a well-aimed and terrible fire, will always remain a treasured possession to him as long as he lives.

"The fact that we carried out what we were asked to do under the most trying circumstances of a direct attack without cover, will help us to reconcile ourselves to the sad loss of comrades and friends who have been killed, and to the sufferings of those who are lying wounded in hospital.

"The final order to take the bushes and trenches on the river bank was received by the Commanding Officer from Major-General H. Macdonald, and the Commanding Officer has informed the G.O.C. 6th Division how gallantly that order was responded to in face of a terrible fire."

The record of the 33rd in this operation against Cronje will not be complete unless we take notice of the movements of Colonel (Major-General) Clements, who, when French was ordered to lead the Cavalry Division of the main army on the 6th of February, remained in charge of the detachment at Rensburg. It was Clements' formidable task to hold back the Boers at Colesberg, "and prevent them from swooping upon the lines of communication south of the Orange—a movement which, if successful, would have caused

an outbreak of active disloyalty in large districts of Cape Colony, hitherto sullenly quiescent." Clements was attacked again and again by strong forces of the Boers who "circled round his flanks." The persistency of the enemy was remarkable, but Clements drove them off again and again. He found it wise, however, to fall back on Arundel, where, after a hard night's march, he arrived on the 14th of February. Unfortunately two companies of the Wiltshires were cut off, after some desperate fighting. Reinforcements arrived at Arundel, which enabled Clements to advance and enter Colesberg.

It was in this advance that some hard fighting occurred at Plowman's Farm, when Captain A. F. Wallis of the 33rd was killed, and Lieutenant Wilson and 5 N.C.O.'s and men were wounded. These were the Mounted Infantry Company of the Regiment who had been placed under Clements' command. Clements was not only regaining ground, shelling the enemy out of successive positions, but he threatened the Boers' flanks with his mounted troops, with the consequences just named. The engagement secured for Sergeant W. Firth the coveted Victoria Cross. The official relation of the gallant deed is thus recorded: "During the action at Plowman's Farm, near Arundel, Cape Colony, Sergeant Firth picked up a comrade (Corporal Blackman), who was wounded and exposed to fire, and carried him to cover. Later in the day, when the enemy had advanced within a short distance of the firing line, Sergeant Firth carried 2nd Lieutenant J. H. B. Wilson, dangerously wounded, and lying in a most exposed position, to a place of shelter, being shot through the nose and eye while performing this heroic act of duty."

## CHAPTER XXXIX

### THE FALL OF BLOEMFONTEIN

LORD ROBERTS found it necessary to give his men and horses rest before he advanced on Bloemfontein. He also required more adequate supplies, and while waiting thus, he gave orders for the main army to concentrate at Oosfontein, to be as far removed as possible from the tainted atmosphere of Paardeberg. 1900.

The advance on Bloemfontein became more serious when Ladysmith was relieved. The Boers who had been detained there were now free to move, and De Wet would thereby be strengthened. He moreover took up a position which practically closed the road to Bloemfontein, with Poplar Grove as his Head-quarters. The "main line ran north and south, taking in Table Mountain, and across Nooitgedacht Farm to the southward. On that side its left flank ended at a distance of about six miles from the river in an open plain. The right flank was prolonged by an under-feature of Table Mountain, which, flung back to the north-east, stretched down to the Poplar Grove Drift. Thence it was continued across the river due northward by Leeuw Kop, a steep sugar-loaf hill, commanding the drift at a range of about 4,500 yards. Beyond Leeuw Kop a series of kopjes, bending round to the north-west towards Panfontein, offered good posts, from which an attack of Leeuw Kop could be outflanked, if the numerical strength of the defenders should suffice for their occupation."<sup>1</sup> This line was greatly extended as reinforcements came in.

Lord Roberts set forth his plan of attack to his General

<sup>1</sup> "Official History of the War."

Officers at Osfontein on March 6th, the main points of which were as follows : 1. To send a cavalry division with Alderson's and Ridley's mounted infantry and 7 batteries of R.H.A. to threaten the enemy's line of communication with Bloemfontein. That meant a detour of 17 miles, to avoid the enemy's fire, and bring them two miles above Poplar Grove Drift. 2. The 6th Division, with its brigade division of artillery, and the Howitzer Battery, and Martyr's mounted troops, to follow the same route as the cavalry for 6 miles, thus to reach Seven Kopjes, the southernmost limit of the Boer position. General Kelly-Kenny was to drive the enemy out of these. The Boers would then retire to Table Mountain, disheartened at finding that the cavalry had passed round their rear. The 6th Division must follow them, with brigade of Guards and Naval guns and others to assist the attack. Lord Roberts considered the Table Mountain the key of the enemy's position, and the capture of it would compel the Boers to retire to the Modder. 3. The 7th Division, occupying the ground until now held by the 2nd and 3rd brigades of cavalry, was, with its artillery and Nesbitt's Horse, and New South Wales and Queensland Mounted Infantry, to draw off the enemy's attention from the attack on Table Mountain, and harass the Boers if they retreated to the river. 4. The 9th Division were to act in the same way north of the Modder. The Headquarters would be with the Guards Brigade. The troops were to take cooked food with them, but all baggage was to be left in camp.

The movement began on the morning of the 7th of March, the 6th Division, to which the 33rd still belonged, following the cavalry. By 7.30 French had turned the enemy's flank, and was following his retreat with Horse Artillery fire, so that, to quote French's message, Seven Kopjes should be quite open to Kelly-Kenny. French was then moving round to attack the Boer laager in the rear of the flat-topped hill. Later, instead of the enemy being cut off, he had moved so

fast away that French was in pursuit. Thus the large captures hoped for were apparently impossible. French, however, hoped by striking north-east to get across the line of the Boers' retreat.

Roberts urged the advance of the 6th Division, and Kelly-Kenny in the movement found that the enemy had re-occupied Seven Kopjes, while there were strong bodies of Boers in front. He deployed his brigades, the 13th on the right, the 18th on the left, and the attack began. The scouts of the 6th Division crossed the Table Mountain at eleven, and reported it clear of the enemy. Kelly-Kenny had possession of Seven Kopjes, and Tucker, with his division, moving forward, reached Poplar Grove in the afternoon. The 6th Division struck to the north, and reached the river about the same time, just west of Poplar Grove. The movements of the other brigades were made in accordance with Lord Roberts' instructions. There was every sign that the Boers, realizing French's advance, had fled in something approaching a panic. But on the whole the result was far from satisfactory. The Boers, better mounted, had succeeded in avoiding capture by outpacing our tired horses. De Wet was beginning to show how elusive he could be.

A day or two later that leader, having succeeded in restoring confidence in his demoralized troops, occupied Abraham's Kraal and Spitz Kop, determined to hold Roberts back while Bloemfontein was being prepared for defence. Roberts thereupon decided to march in three columns, slipping past Abraham's Kraal, and turning Spitz Kop, thus to strike for a point south of Bloemfontein. His orders on the 9th of March accordingly were :

1. The force will advance on Bloemfontein in three columns, composed as follows :

*Left Column.* Lieut.-General French—6th Division, 1st Cavalry Brigade, Alderson's Mounted Infantry.

*Centre Column.* The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief. 9th Division. Guards' Brigade, 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Martyr's and Le Gallais' Mounted Infantry, 6th Howitzer Battery, Heavy Artillery, Naval Brigade, Ammunition Reserve Supply Park, 9th Field Company Royal Engineers.

*Right Column.* Lieut.-General Tucker—7th Division, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, Ridley's Mounted Infantry.

2. The movement will commence to-morrow morning, 10th inst., and the points to be reached each day will be as follows :

<i>Date</i>	<i>Left Column</i>	<i>Centre Column</i>	<i>Right Column</i>
10th	Baberspan	Driefontein	Petrusburg
11th	Doornboom	Aasvogel Kop	Driekop
12th	Venter's Vallei (Cavalry to Leeuw- berg)	Venter's Vallei (Cavalry to Leeuw- berg)	Panfontein
13th	Leeuwberg	Leeuwberg	Venter's Vallei

3. The General Officers commanding left and right columns will be responsible for keeping up communication during the march with the centre column.

4. On Saturday—10th—the right column will march at 5 a.m.; the centre and left at 6 a.m.

5. Army Head-quarters will march with the centre column, and the Director of Telegraphs will arrange for keeping up telegraphic communication between it and the rear.

Everything depended on the capture of Leeuwberg. Once there the road to Bloemfontein was open, there being no spot where the Boers could make a prolonged defence.

On the 10th of March the 13th Brigade moved at 6 in the morning with orders to march to Baberspan, but the enemy were found in position near to Abraham's Kraal. In this march the 33rd formed left flank guard to a very large column of baggage. According to a letter written by Captain Houghton, the first intimation of the enemy being near was "the mounted infantry being driven in on our left flank. The regiment immediately formed for attack, but with the exception of firing a pom-pom gun the enemy did not press the attack. Meanwhile the remainder of the 6th Division became heavily engaged in front, and the enemy's big gun on the left flank opened fire on the convoy, but doing little damage. In fact some shells buried themselves in the ground, without bursting. The regiment luckily came off without loss, but the Buffs, Essex, Welsh, and Glosters all lost considerably both in officers and men. The enemy about 5 p.m. were driven back with loss, and about 80 prisoners captured."

Kelly-Kenny had found it necessary to force his way, successfully carrying the kopjes which threatened his division, and assured him of trouble in the night unless the Boers were driven thence. In the end, after some hard fighting, he carried Driefontein, and De Wet had to fall back, pursued by Broadwood. The exhaustion of the horses put an end to the pursuit. That night the 6th Division bivouacked near Yorkshire Kopje.

Kelly-Kenny's resolute advance had caused a panic among the Boers, who fell back during the night towards Bloemfontein, "a disorderly crowd of terrified men blindly flying before the enemy."

Those were De Wet's words. De Wet, however, determined to make a stand at Spitz Kop. Roberts, in spite of this, moved on towards Bloemfontein on the 11th. The centre column followed French along the Bloemfontein road to Doornboom, but the instructions for the marches of the columns stood as made on the 9th of March. Kelly-Kenny was told by French to March to Venter's Vallei at 5.15 in the morning, the baggage, ammunition, and supply columns of the cavalry and M.I. to follow the cavalry; but the General was to make his own dispositions for the march of his division and baggage, while the centre column would follow the left column to Venter's Vallei.

The 33rd still acted as escort to the convoy. Throughout the 11th and two following days the march continued, and for the 33rd there was no incident of any importance. On the 14th they arrived before Bloemfontein, after a night's march in pouring rain. De Wet's commando had been so seriously shaken at at Driefontein that it offered no resistance to Roberts' advance, and consequently, when the British force reached Bloemfontein, the mayor came out to make formal surrender. The Regiment's "Digest" says that "while breakfasts were in preparation orders were received to enter Bloemfontein with the Division, and we marched off at 9 a.m. with what Drums and Fifes could be mustered." Captain Houghton's letter



says, "We marched into the town about midday without opposition, President Steyn and all the armed Boers having flown on hearing of the advance of our force. So here we are encamped about a mile outside the town, able at last to buy some of the comforts of civilisation which we have not been able to get for the last month. Lord Roberts is greatly pleased with the work done by the 6th Division. It is reported that we remain here about ten days, then I conclude advance on Pretoria, unless the Boers give in. We are all glad of the rest. The Regiment during the advance has lost about 250 officers and men killed and wounded."

In the Order issued from the Government House at Bloemfontein on the 14th of March, Lord Roberts says of the marches and actions since the advance began, that it was "a record of which any army may well be proud, a record which could only have been achieved by earnest, well-disciplined men, determined to do their duty, and to surmount whatever difficulties or dangers might be encountered."

The war, however, was by no means over. De Wet succeeded in inflicting disaster by ambush on Broadwood at the end of March, and this put such heart into the enemy that the continuation of the struggle was determined upon by the Boers. "Peaceful burghers," it is said, "became active enemies," and the situation gave cause for anxiety. Lord Roberts thereupon decided to follow up the Boers. Making his plans, he left the 6th Division at Bloemfontein. He had, however, to wait a considerable time before moving his army forward, owing to the exhaustion and depletion of his cavalry and artillery. He had but 34,000 men, and in order to carry out his scheme fully 50,000 were needed, of whom 15,000 must be properly mounted as a striking force. There was an ever-increasing number of sick. In addition the horses required rest and forage, while railway communications demanded attention. The army, moreover, needed to undergo complete reorganisation.

## CHAPTER XL

### THE "DRIVING" CAMPAIGNS

LORD ROBERTS had marched north, to Pretoria, and 1900.  
Kelly-Kenny, with the 6th Division, was holding Bloemfontein under adverse conditions. Christian de Wet was causing trouble; elusive in action, and occasioning much fatigue to the forces employed to drive him, or turn him from positions which he threatened. The end to apparent inaction for the 33rd came on the 29th of May, when orders were received for the Battalion to move with a flying column to Winburg under the command of their Lieut.-Colonel, G. E. Lloyd. The force, which besides the 33rd comprised a squadron of the 9th Battalion Welsh Imperial Yeomanry, marched on May 31st to Dessel's Farm, ten miles to the north of Bloemfontein, reaching the place shortly after midday. Again on the move early next morning, they marched to Kruitfontein Drift, on the Modder, 14 miles distant, where 53 Boer burghers surrendered.

After arduous marches from place to place, the column occupied Winberg, and strengthened the defences of the town and the surrounding kopjes. A considerable stay there was ended by an order for the 33rd to join the command of Major-General A. H. Paget, who had returned with his column from the Wittenbergen with General Prinsloo and 5,000 Boer prisoners. The Regiment accordingly entrained on the 11th of August for Pretoria, where they arrived on the 13th. Their bivouac was at Arcadia Camp.

Three days later the Battalion, with Major-General

Paget's force, composed of the 33rd Regiment, the K.O.Y. Light Infantry, the Wilts Regiment, and the Royal Munster Fusiliers, with artillery and mounted troops under Colonel Hickman, moved from Pretoria, and took part in the operations north of the capital, along the Magaliesberg. Moving on to Waterval, then to Haman's Kraal, and Pienaar's River, they rested after a trying march through thick bushveldt and along dusty roads in excessive heat. There had been some brisk fighting on the 18th for the half battalion composed of A.G.B. and the Volunteer Companies. The enemy were hidden on a kopje to the east, with two guns, and their shells burst suddenly among the soldiers. Major le Marchant, who was in command, returned the fire with rifles until evening, and reported no casualties. This was the first occasion in which the Volunteers were under fire.

While at Pienaar's River the battalion was principally employed in constructing defences. It also took part in making a railway deviation across the river to replace the bridge which the Boers had destroyed before the English force arrived. General Paget retired with his whole force on the 10th of September, but later advanced at Waterval, capturing several Boers and a number of cattle and sheep. The battalion moved with the column to Sybrands Kraal.

Similar movements continued, without any serious fighting, until November 23rd, when the 33rd proceeded to Eerstfabriken. The commandos, under General B. Viljoen, were raiding and threatened the railway at two points, namely, Balmoral and Wilge River. Paget immediately turned his attention to Viljoen, and came up with him at Rhenoster Kop, where he held a strong position in a natural fortress of kopjes. The place has been thus described: "Facing north-west, and with its horns coming forward nearly 12,000 yards apart to the Bronkhorst-spruit, Rhenoster Kop track lay in a semi-circular necklace of small and separate kopjes, each covered with bush

and boulder, and divided from its neighbours by ground so broken as to afford safe communication between them all. About the centre of the arc a rocky knoll projected like a salient towards the north-west, separated by the road from the main position behind, and from the British by open meadow-land which stretched along the whole front of the position. Rhenoster Kop itself, the highest of the series by many hundreds of feet, lay somewhat detached on the Boer left (south-western) flank. Their right was guarded by deep and rocky ravines; the staircases to lofty and level grass-land which stretched north-eastward."

Viljoen resolved to make a stand here, risking the danger of his retreat being cut off. He was aware of the double danger which threatened him. Carleton was approaching from Middleburg, and Paget's force was moving rapidly. The latter, after a halt, advanced at four o'clock on the morning of November 29th, not waiting for Carleton. Numerically no stronger than Viljoen, the odds were against Paget. "Everywhere in front of the British troops spread hundreds of yards of bare grassland, which afforded a perfect field for the rifle-fire of the defence, and a dangerous glaxis to the attack. Viljoen's situation, then, was as tactically formidable as it was strategically risky, and none could foretell how the cards would fall."

Paget's attack was formed thus: The infantry on the right, the line to the left being continued by Plumer's two mounted brigades. The lead was taken by Hickman's brigade: Cradock's Bushmen followed, and when they had crossed the Spruit, Hickman swung off to the east. Behind was the field artillery. The leading infantry were under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Lloyd of the 33rd. Under him were seven companies of his own battalion, and four of the 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers.

Lloyd advanced about 400 yards to the front, and immediately his men were met by an overwhelming fire, Lieutenant Townsend being wounded. He was

relieved by Lieutenant Oakes who had been with the F. & G. companies in reserve, and he, too, was wounded. Lloyd led one of his companies to the top of the ridge, but it was impossible to advance. After an hour's fighting, with the line at a standstill, Lloyd moved forward ten paces to obtain a better view, and study possibilities ; but he was shot dead, and after that the day was characterised by an incessant firing on either side, neither British nor Boer gaining any advantage. "Ammunition and water were supplied to the men by comrades who crawled through the grass backwards and forwards all day for this purpose." The artillery maintained a constant fire throughout, but their main difficulty was to find advantageous positions for the guns ; to add to their disadvantages the Boers were constantly shifting.

The mounted brigades did some excellent work during this engagement, but it was impossible to hold the captured crests for long, owing to the Boer fire. Orders were given that at dusk the infantry should retire, leaving C Company to support the cavalry to the left, and F Company on outpost. Paget's intention was to hold the position next day, since he expected General Lyttleton would attack the enemy on the south. The casualties for the 33rd in the day's fighting were : Killed, Lieut.-Colonel Lloyd, and 5 men. Wounded, Captain Ackworth, Lieuts. Townsend and Oakes, and 24 N.C. Officers and men.

At two o'clock the next morning C and D companies proceeded to support Colonel Cradock's M. I. on the left, while G and F, who had entrenched during the night, remained as they were. E Company was left as Camp Guard, while the remainder of the 33rd went to their positions and threw up a hasty shelter. It was found, however, that Viljoen had abandoned the place, which Paget immediately occupied. The Boer leader successfully evaded Carleton's column, and made good his escape.

1901. Lloyd was succeeded in the command of the Bat-

tion by Lieut.-Colonel Rivett-Carnac on January 6th, 1901.

Some casualties occurred in various encounters with the enemy at localities when companies were sent out from Rhenoster Kop. In one instance a hundred men of the 33rd, some of the Royal Munster Fusiliers, and a gun of the R.F.A. were engaged in an attack on a Boer commando. They succeeded in capturing 250 Boers and all their belongings, the 33rd losing one man killed and six wounded, but Lieutenant Carlyon and his servant were missing.

In the Battalion Orders about this time was one from Major-General Paget, on his departure for England, and in it were these sentences: "Your Battalion has proved it can march. I am thinking particularly of the march they made from Waterval to De Wagon Drift; and at Rhenoster Kop it fully showed its fighting power. These are only particular instances of good work the Battalion has done whilst under my command."

The post at Haman's Kraal, held by Captain Greenwood with F company and 40 Morley's Scout's and Stock Rangers, was attacked by a party of Boers, who attempted to capture cattle during the night of July 10th, but they were driven off with loss.

Under date September 3rd, General Barton issued the following Order: "Your officers and men (of the 33rd) have done excellent work." This referred to the efforts of B and F companies in conjunction with a column operating along Magaliesburg during the month of July. During these desultory and trying weeks several officers and men of the Battalion distinguished themselves, one in particular, Lance-Corporal H. Walker, of H Company, in the mounted infantry. He was promoted to be Sergeant, the note concerning him being as follows: "On the 13th July, 1901, in the Kroonstad District was the first man up in a charge on the Boer position, though previously wounded. Has been brought to notice on two pre-

vious occasions." Sergeant Walker was also awarded the silver medal for "Distinguished Conduct in the Field."

The idea became prevalent that for a considerable time past the Boers had been hopelessly beaten. Their forces were so disintegrated that anything like a determined stand was an impossibility; but rather than yield, even to terms which might well be held to err on the side of generosity, they continued the struggle by pursuing guerilla methods. Captain Maurice Grant, in dealing with the concluding stages of the war, points to the fact that an army of nearly 200,000 men, splendid on every count, was unable to crush the remaining 40,000 to 50,000 Boers now that they had cast off "the trammels of formal warfare," breaking up into a thousand bands, and moving about the country in all directions with no apparent object beyond that of wearing down their enemies.

This indicates the character of the service which distinguished the movements of the 33rd on to the end of the war. One reads of nothing but wearisome marches, tantalising pursuits of the enemy, sudden calls to distant stations to check raids of marauding parties of elusive Boers, or taking part in those exceptional "drives" peculiar to the South African War. To chronicle such movements would be wearisome in the extreme, yet, if taken in detail they would display much readiness and resourcefulness, and endurance, all worthy of a bolder scheme of operations than this "campaign of small affairs." The situation is admirably summarised by the writer just named in the following terms: "Rarely was the campaign marked by any permanent development of the situation; never until the end by one that affected it at all. If the enemy appeared few and dispirited on one day, they were numerous and aggressive on the next; the clearance of one area did but embroil its neighbour; defeats and victories of columns and commandos followed one another with a regularity in which the gradual attri-

tion of the weaker side was scarcely to be perceived. In short, it could never be said precisely how matters stood at any given moment ; those who attempted to do so from the seat of war were sadly at fault. Now, as then, only the size of the campaign can be truly stated, for shape it had none."

The further duty which fell to the 33rd became the almost continuous one of garrisoning the blockhouses along the Pretoria-Pietersburg Railway from Waterval to Nylstroom, including those at Haman's Kraal, Pienaar's River, Warmbaths and Nylstroom : and these they held right on to the termination of the war. There were as many as seventeen of these posts in the line of communication between Pietersburg and Pretoria, and the 33rd formed part of the force detailed for their defence under the command of Colonel F. H. Hall, R.A.

The greatest trouble at first came through the Boer leader, Beyers, and while he was free to move with his commando through Northern Transvaal the service of every regiment or detachment was trying in the extreme. Bands were perpetually moving in the near neighbourhood of the line, especially near to Warmbaths ; but with Wilson and McMicking and Grenfell constantly on the move, and the garrisons of the blockhouses alert, there was some spirited fighting which resulted in serious losses and frequent captures on larger or lesser scale for the Boers. The officers in command of various British regiments were never idle.

Another form of mischief was that of train-wrecking, and in one case especially, when the Boers had blown up a train with dynamite, they poured in a musketry fire on the injured, and on those who attempted to render aid to the suffering ones. In such a wreck some of the 33rd were killed or wounded.

Horse sickness put an end to Beyer's activity for a time, but early in March, 1902, he was again on the move. He was, however, severely punished more than once, and only escaped annihilation with difficulty. The

1902.



regiment maintained its efficiency throughout, for when Major-General Barton made his last visit of inspection along the railway line to Nylstroom on the 3rd of April, he expressed himself as "much pleased with the satisfactory appearance of the blockhouses and other defences. The Regimental Orders proceeded to say that "a great deal of excellent work had been done by all ranks of the West Riding Regiment, and it is satisfactory to note that interest is constantly kept up in continual improvements to strengthen the line."

The war was declared ended in June, when a message was received from Major-General Barton, Commanding the Pretoria District, that Peace had been signed. This was received on June 1st, 1902, and the Posts along the line occupied by the Battalion were informed by signal and telephone. The troops were in a condition to appreciate the message which came from the King, congratulating them on having brought the long and difficult campaign to such a successful conclusion. The message from the War Office came two days later, June 5th, in the following form: "His Majesty's Government offer to you their most sincere congratulations on the energy, skill, and patience with which you have conducted this prolonged campaign, and would wish you to communicate to the troops under your orders their profound sense of the spirit and endurance with which they met every call made upon them, of their bravery in action, of the excellent discipline preserved, and of the humanity shown by them during this trying period."

The Battalion concentrated forthwith at Warmbaths, with some exceptions, on June 24th. Previously Lieutenant M. V. Trench and the following N.C.O.'s and men had been selected to represent the Battalion at the King's Coronation, and then proceeded to Capetown for the homeward voyage: Sergt. W. Seaman, Corporals J. Menzies and Myatt, and Privates W. Earls, J. Atling, J. Milne, C. Leeder, T. Law, W. White, and J. Barrett.

On August 12th the Battalion proceeded from Warmbaths to Capetown, and on the 11th of September disembarked at Southampton, and journeyed thence to York.

An interesting ceremony was witnessed on the 14th of April, 1903, at Fulford Barracks, York, when the regiment paraded on the green and received the King's South African Medals with clasps, "South Africa, 1902," at the hands of Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny, K.C.B., Adjutant-General to the Forces. At this ceremony the Medal for Distinguished Conduct in the Field was presented to Private R. Flynn, for the following act: "In the White Hills, while in the Mounted Infantry in South Africa when out skirmishing, kept eight Boers at bay until reinforcements arrived." 1903.

What General Kelly-Kenny said after the distribution is sufficiently important to have a lasting place in the History of the 33rd. "I consider it a very great honour to have been invited to York to-day by my old comrades, and to present to them the medals which they so worthily gained in the late campaign.

"I appreciate the compliment all the more because this Battalion formed part of the Old Division (the 6th) which I had the honour of commanding in South Africa, and they with me made a very memorable, and I think I may say, an historic march from Enslin on the railway into Bloemfontein. You will not, I think, be surprised that my coming here among you recalls recollections of very stirring times. I believe that when the history of the war comes to be written, the people of the West Riding will be satisfied with the work done by their soldiers.

"Perhaps it is too soon to write the history, but it is not too soon for us, commanders and officers, to appear among our old friends and to tell them how satisfied we were with the work they did under trying conditions; the wearying day and night marches, ever with great tenacity holding on to the enemy, and with

great bravery and endurance attacking them, when they stood up to us and gave us the opportunity of doing so. I am sure, men, that the West Riding is proud of what you did. You are no doubt very proud of being associated with the name of our great soldier, the Duke of Wellington. You are proud of the deeds of the Regiment in bygone days, in many climes—in India, at Seringapatam, which gave to us the southern part of India, at Waterloo, and more recently in the Crimea, at Alma, at Sebastopol, at Inkermann. I think you may be proud of the past, and I hope you will not forget the more recent events. I hope you won't forget the marches, and what those marches led up to; the fighting at Klip Drift, Paardeberg, Poplar Grove, and Driefontein. You will, I am sure, remember that action in which you lost your gallant Colonel. There were many other less known actions in which the Regiment showed its gallantry and endurance. Every single officer who lost his life in the Field or through wounds or illness was a personal friend of mine, and while I congratulate the regiment on its splendid work in South Africa, I deeply mourn the loss of those officers and friends.

“I am extremely pleased to see on parade so many reservists of the Regiment. I am sure they have come here at some personal inconvenience. I take that as a personal compliment to myself, but it also shows the good feeling which exists between the reservists and the men serving with the colours. The well-being and comfort of reservists in civil life was an important question for the consideration of the military authorities. We feel this with regard to it: If a soldier in the recent war brought back an assurance to the people of this country that the old spirit of fighting and endurance remained, on the other hand the British people showed a great generosity towards the Army, and the generosity was very practically expressed by their kindness towards the families of reservists while the latter were serving in South Africa. I take this

opportunity of recognising what has been done, and I hope reservists will also show their gratitude by being loyal to those who employ them in civil life.

“The West Riding Regiment, and especially this Battalion, are old friends and comrades of mine. Next to my old Corps, of which I am Colonel, there is no regiment in the Army that I am more pleased to visit than this. I congratulate you on your appearance, and on the good deeds which the Regiment has accomplished. I can only hope that you will long live to wear the King’s Medals so worthily gained.”



## Appendix A

### THE UNIFORM OF THE THIRTY-THIRD DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S (WEST RIDING) REGIMENT

By F. E. WALLIS

IN the absence of any special information of the uniform worn by the Regiment when it was raised in 1702, we must assume that it was armed and equipped in the same way as other regiments of the period. Tradition says that the facings were always red, and the officers' lace silver until 1830.

The uniform of the period was a loose scarlet frock coat, with turnback cuffs of the regimental facings, and long flapped waistcoats with large pockets. Officers wore long wigs, a crimson silk sash over the right shoulder, with long ends, and silver fringe, the lapels of the coat which hooked down to the waist were edged with lace and buttoned back with silver buttons, and ornamented with silver lace buttonholes; these buttons and loops were also carried on below the sword belt. The cuffs were also ornamented with four buttons and loops, scarlet breeches were worn and high white gaiters above the knee. The belts and gloves were buff. The sword-belt worn outside. The company officers carried besides their sword a halberd, i.e. a pike with an axe head.

Officers also wore silver gorgets, and three-cornered hats laced with silver. The uniform of the privates in cut and ornamentation followed that of the officers. They were armed with heavy muskets, and a sword or hanger.

In 1742 water-coloured illustrations were made for George II of nearly every regiment then in existence. This work is now in the Library of the British Museum and is entitled "The Clothing of His Majesty's Troops."

That of the 33rd is as follows: An easy fitting coat without any collar, with skirts looped back and lined with white. The chest had a lapel on each side edged with lace, and eight buttons and buttonholes in pairs, the cuffs red with a strip of lace marking the cuff, and three buttons and loops of lace below, and three loops of lace above. The red waistcoat long

(with sleeves) and breeches of the same colour, high white gaiters, broad buff leather belts. The arms—a musket, with a sword and bayonet in a frog from the waistbelt, which was worn over the coat.

Reference must be made to the regimental lace with which the cuffs, lapels, and buttonholes were ornamented. Regiments had different patterns which, together with the facings, were all to distinguish one regiment from another, no numbers as yet showing on the buttons, and the regiment being known by the name of its colonel. The lace worn by the 33rd was white with a red stripe in the middle, and the loops set on in pairs.

The uniform of the officers was the same pattern as that worn by the men, except that silver lace instead of regimental lace was worn, and an aiguillette was worn on the right shoulder. The hair was powdered and clubbed. Privates wore their hair short, and not powdered.

In 1751 the uniform remained the same with the exception that the waistbelt was worn under the coat with a black pouch-belt strapped on in front. On the 9th of November, 1751, the Clothing Board of General Officers directed all marching regiments to have their breeches made to button and tie at the knee in the same manner as those of the Foot Guards.

In Windsor Castle is a series of paintings by David Morier of a grenadier of each regiment, that of the 33rd is shown with a high mitre-shaped cap with G.R. and crown in white, and a scarlet flap with the white horse of Hanover with the motto "*Nec Aspera Terrent*" above it, and a small red and white tassel on the top of the cap. They wore short red wings, ornamented with the regimental lace. A broad buff belt over the left shoulder supporting a large leather pouch. In full marching order was added a goatskin bag holding the necessities suspended by a strap over the right shoulder, and over the same shoulder was suspended by a cord a tin canteen, a plain canvas haversack balanced it on the other side. Overcoats, called "watch coats," were only used for night duties.

The privates' swords had a basket hilt, like a claymore. The lace on the red waistcoats was plain white; these waistcoats formed the undress.

Sergeants wore plain white tape lace, and a red and white striped sash round the waist.

There were various methods of wearing the lace loops on the privates' uniform, some were square-headed, some pointed, others of the bastion or flowered shape, and were set on at equal distances, or in pairs. The 33rd wore the bastion shape.

According to the Warrant of the 14th of September, 1743, the front of the grenadier caps was to be of the same colour as the facings of the Regiment, with the King's cipher and crown embroidered upon it, the little flap in front to be red with the white horse of Hanover and motto. The back part of the cap was to be red, the turn-up to be the colour of the facings, the number of the Regiment in figures on the middle part behind. This is the first mention of the number on the equipment, and until the authorisation of the number on the buttons some eighteen years later, the backs of the grenadiers' caps was the only place on which it was

shown. It was, however, a leading feature on all regimental colours made after the date of this warrant.

The grenadier company also wore a brass match-case fastened to the shoulder belt; it was a cylinder, four inches long, pierced with holes to allow air for the ignited slow match, and as an ornament it lingered as a special mark of distinction of the grenadier company for more than fifty years. Though called Grenadiers, no hand grenades had been used for twenty years.

On the 14th of October, 1765, the uniform was altered, the red waistcoats and breeches abolished, and in the case of the 33rd, ordered to be white; black pointed bearskin hats introduced for the grenadiers, having in front the King's crest in white metal on a black ground.

The Warrant of the 21st September, 1767, ordered that the numbers should appear on the buttons.

There is a MS. work in the Prince Consort's Library at Aldershot giving a coloured sketch of a grenadier of every regiment (except the Guards), dated 1768. The large roomy coat has changed to a more closely fitting garment with a turned-down collar, fastened down at each end to the top button of the lapel with a button and loop. The coat only just met across the chest, showing the white waistcoat. The lapels, three inches wide, serving little more than to show off the lace-looped buttonholes. Cuffs three and a half inches deep having four buttons and loops in pairs. Turnbacks of coat white, and high black gaiters with small stiff white tops, black buttons, and garters with uniform buckles.

The silver aiguillette of 1751 was superseded by silver epaulettes. Officers of grenadiers wore an epaulette on each shoulder—battalion officers one on the right shoulder only, crimson sash tied round the waist, and a silver gorget with the royal arms and the number of the Regiment engraved upon it, fastened to the neck with scarlet silk rosettes and ribbon. Hats laced with silver, and the usual black cockade. Grenadier officers wore the black bearskin cap like the men of their company, they carried fusils and had white shoulder belts and pouches, as well as their shoulder belt for their sword, this being the reason why they wore two epaulettes. Officers' swords silver hilts, and crimson and gold sword knots. Battalion officers carried espartoon or light pikes, seven feet long. Sergeants had buttons of white metal and narrow loops of plain white tape, hats laced with silver, crimson and white sashes, and carried swords and halberds. Corporals a silk epaulette on the right shoulder. Drummers and fifers wore white coats faced, lapelled and lined with red, red waistcoats and breeches. They wore black bearskin caps, on the front the King's crest in silver-plated metal on a black ground, with trophies of colour and drums, the number of the Regiment on the back part.

The drums were of wood, painted the colour of the facings, with the King's cypher and crown, and the number of the Regiment.

A light company was added to the Regiment in 1771. The men would wear short red jackets, red waistcoats, short gaiters, and a leather



cap, and a powder horn and bullet bag. Officers and sergeants carried fusils and pouches. Officers of the light company wore two epaulettes.

Cross belts were introduced to all regiments of infantry by Circular letter, dated 20th March, 1784, and General Orders, May, 1784, i.e. the bayonet belt removed from the waist to the shoulder and a brass breastplate (probably oval, with the regimental number engraved upon it) affixed to the latter. Officers' swords to be also suspended from a white belt over the right shoulder, at first a simple buckle and tip may have been used in front as an ornament, but afterwards a small oval silver plate was worn with most likely only "33" and a crown engraved upon it.

In 1783 the Regiment received the title of 1st Yorkshire West Riding Regiment, and from that date until 1855, when they received the title of the Duke of Wellington Regiment of Foot, this designation appeared upon their appointments. The officers' breastplate was altered to an oval silver plate with the number within a garter surmounted with a crown with the title of the regiment on the garter, all being engraved. This plate appears to have been worn until about 1817.

In 1786 battalion officers were ordered to discontinue the use of espontoons (half pikes). The same order directed officers to wear gaiters on all duties except on the march when high boots might be worn. Officers and men to wear their hair clubbed, and black leather stocks.

By order dated 10th December, 1791, effective field officers were directed to wear two epaulettes, and officers of flank companies to wear a grenade or bugle upon each of theirs.

In 1792 sergeants' halberds were replaced by pikes. The sergeants of the light company however retained their fusils. Shortly afterwards the officers of flank companies were ordered to discontinue the use of fusils and cross pouch belt, the sword to be their only weapon.

The officers' uniform at this date was a long-tailed scarlet coat, with white turnbacks, and scarlet lapels, collar and cuffs probably edged with white, as worn by the 53rd and 76th, ten buttons and loops in pairs on the lapels, and four buttons and loops in pairs on the cuffs. The coat was fastened below the neck, and then opened to show the white waistcoat and breeches, short black gaiters to below the knee. Three-cornered cocked hats, edged with silver lace, black cockade with silver button and strip of lace. Silver gorget worn below the frill of the shirt. The gorget, the last remains of the breastplate, was an ornament half-moon in shape, and had been the distinctive mark of officers' rank since the time of Queen Anne. Regiments wearing silver lace wore a silver gorget until 1796, when it was ordered to be in gilt metal for all regiments of infantry. It was finally abolished in 1830.

The privates' uniform was extremely like that worn by the officers in cut and shape, with loops of regimental lace and shape worn in pairs.

The Warrant of 1796 directed the sword for officers to have a gilt guard, and the sword knot to be crimson and gold. The scabbard to be black leather with gilt mounts. The sword hilt was surmounted with a

crown, the grip was of silver or copper, and one half of the hilt turned down for the sword to lie flat in the frog of the shoulder belt.

The Warrant of 1796 also ordered officers and men of infantry, except flank companies, to wear their hair queued, to be tied a little below the upper part of the collar, and to be ten inches in length, including one inch of hair to appear below the binding.

About 1800 an oval silver breastplate was worn with the royal arms, and a trophy of flags, etc., under the arms 33 and "Serengapatam" on a scroll.

Towards the end of the century, following the Prussian fashion, the coats of officers and men were fastened down to the waist, doing away with the waistcoats. The officers' coats were double-breasted with lapels of the facings continued to the waist; this coatee might be worn in various ways, either buttoned over, forming a plain, double-breasted coatee, or with the top lapels turned back showing just the pointed turn-over of the facings, or with the lapels turned and buttoned back to the waist, and fastened with hooks and eyes. The cocked hat was altered in shape, being without binding, and cocked back and front, being in shape much like the well-known hat of Napoleon. It also had a red and white feather on the right side. The coatee for the rank and file was single-breasted, having ten buttons and loops of regimental lace in pairs across the chest, with shoulder straps of the facings edged with the lace and ending with white woollen tufts. The cocked hat was discontinued by the men in 1800, a cylindrical shape taking its place, ornamented by a brass plate, bearing the King's cypher and crown and having a red and white tuft in front. Officers retained a cocked hat which was more the shape of a general's, and was worn fore and aft with a red and white feather on the right side. They appear, however, to have worn a shako on some occasions, perhaps on service, as the officers' shako-plate 1800-1813 is described as a gilt plate with the King's cipher within the garter, surmounted with a crown, and below the garter a lion with 33 on each side, and a trophy of flags, drums, etc., from the sides of the garter.

In 1807 officers of some regiments wore bright blue pantaloons with Hessian boots and black tassels.

In 1802 chevrons for non-commissioned officers were introduced, sergeant-majors four, sergeants three, and corporals two; the first silver, second white, and the third regimental lace.

Staff-sergeants of all regiments wore silver lace until 1855. In 1808 the queue was abolished, and the hair cut short. December, 1811, officers to wear a shako like the men, and a double-breasted short-tailed coat, turned back with white, grey trousers, and a grey overcoat. This was the service dress, and was worn at Waterloo. Officers of the light infantry carried a curved light infantry sword, suspended by slings from the shoulder belt; generally on service this sword was carried by all officers.

Officers still wore the long-tailed coatee for parades, levees, etc., white breeches and black leggings or boots. For balls and levees, the coat

was worn, with the lapels buttoned back, white breeches, silk stockings and silver buckled shoes, no sash, and a straight dress sword carried in a frog, no belt visible, and a cocked hat.

Field officers wore two epaulettes, a colonel having a gold crown and star on the strap, lieutenant-colonel a crown, major a star, and captains and subalterns a silver star on a single epaulette on the left shoulder, officers of flank companies silver wings with gold grenades or bugles. The adjutant in addition to his epaulette had an epaulette strap on his left shoulder.

Paymasters and surgeons wore the regimental coat single-breasted, with silver buttons and long red silk cords across the chest, no epaulettes or sash, and the sword suspended by a plain waistbelt under the coat.

Privates had single-breasted jackets, laced across the chest with the regimental lace in pairs, four inches long, the same lace round the collar (showing a white shirt-frill in front), also round the shoulder straps which terminated with white tufts in the battalion companies, and in wings of red cloth trimmed with stripes of lace and edged with white fringe in the flank companies, grey trousers and spats for service, and breeches and gaiters for home.

Sergeants' uniform, like the privates, only that it was of finer cloth, the chevrons and lace on the coat white tape, sash crimson with a white stripe. They carried a straight, brass-hilted sword in a shoulder belt, and a pike. The sergeant-major had silver lace.

The head-dress for all ranks was a felt shako higher in front than the back, with a black leather peak, a cockade and small red and white feather on the left side (green or white for light or grenadier companies), a gilt oval plate in front with a crown, G.R., and the number of the regiment, across the front a crimson and gold cord with tassels on the right side. The men had cords and tassels of white worsted. On service cap covers of black japanned material were worn; according to the late Lord Albemarle, all ranks wore cap covers at Waterloo.

The men were armed with a flintlock musket, the well-known "Brown Bess." Its weight was 10lb. 2oz. Weight of bayonet 1lb. 2oz., length of barrel 39 inches, diameter of bore .753 inches. Its effective range was 60 yards.

In 1816 a broad-topped shako was introduced. It was eleven inches in diameter at the top, and seven and a half inches deep. The men had brass chin-scales which, when not required, could be fastened to the black cockade in front, ornamented with an upright red and white feather, twelve inches high, and a brass star having the regimental number. The light company had a green feather, and the grenadier company a bearskin or a white feather. The officers' shako had silver lace two inches wide round the top, and three-quarters of an inch round the bottom. Below the feather was a black boss or cockade. Silver chin-scales generally fastened up the cockade, in fact a black leather chin-strap was generally worn. The officers' shako plate was a silver star with gilt mounts, in the centre of the star a girdle on which was the title of the Regiment, viz.,

"1st York West Riding," with the crown above the garter, and "Waterloo" on a scroll below and "Seringapatam" on a scroll above the star, the number being within the garter. They also had a new breastplate, an oblong silver plate, with the ornaments in raised silver, viz., the garter with the title of the Regiment surmounted with a crown and "Waterloo" on a scroll below.

The late Mr. Milne, who was a great authority on everything to do with uniform, sent me a sketch of an officer's shako-plate of 1816, which is as follows: two laurel wreaths with 33 in the centre, "Waterloo" on a scroll above surmounted with a crown, the whole surrounded with one inch gold lace with a red stripe in the centre. This badge may have been worn for a short time, and then been replaced with the silver star. Mr. Milne gives the star as 1820.

In 1820 the short-tailed coat or jacket was abolished for all ranks, in 1822 the breeches and leggings, and trousers, grey in winter and white in summer, were worn.

Officers' trousers very full Cossack shape of French grey cloth, and may have had a silver stripe two inches wide. In 1826 the privates' chest loops of regimental lace were made broader at the top tapering down to the waist, and the lace taken off the skirts.

The officers' shako, as described, but half an inch higher. The coat tails long and lined with white, the scarlet lapels cut broad, making what was known as the cuirass breast, ten silver buttons and strips of lace across the breast, the collar, fastened in front, laced all round top and bottom, and with one silver button and loop.

1826. Officers, a blue frock coat for undress, with crimson sash round the waist, and the sword suspended in a frog from a black waist-belt. In undress the shako was worn without a feather, and covered with oilskin, or a light shako of oilskin was used. The waist-buckle worn with the undress was all silver, a circle upon which may have been the title of the regiment, a garter and crown with 33 in the centre, and on the garter the battle honours "Seringapatam" and "Waterloo."

The paymaster, quartermaster, and surgeons wore single-breasted coats, as described in 1814, with regimental collar and cuffs, and a black leather sword-belt under the coat. All wore cocked hats, the first two with silver loop and tassels, the former without a feather, the surgeons plain black silk loop without feather. The quartermaster had a red and white feather (or green?).

In December, 1828. The silver lace was stripped off the shako, and the height reduced to six inches, and the cockade disappeared for ever. The only ornament was a new universal gilt shako plate or star with crown. In the centre regiments placed such regimental devices as they chose. The 33rd used the silver star described for 1816. The officers had gold cap lines, having a heavily braided festoon in front, terminating in two tassels looped up to one of the coat buttons.

The rank and file wore brass star shako plates of similar design to the officers. This plate was worn until 1845.

The men had white and the light company green cap lines.

January, 1829. The feather was ordered to be white for all regiments (light infantry excepted), twelve inches high.

To such an extent had the practice of wearing a superabundance of lace grown, that the authorities determined to introduce a universal pattern coat for officers, hence the Warrant of February, 1829, authorising the well-known double-breasted coat, which remained with very little alteration the dress of the officers until the Crimean War.

The coat for the officers of the 33rd had two rows of flat silver buttons, two and two down the front, and on each side of the collar, two loops of silver lace, with two buttons completely covering the front part of the collar; a scarlet slash up the arm, thereon four silver loops and buttons, scarlet slash pockets in the skirts placed obliquely with four silver-laced loops and buttons. Large silver epaulettes were worn on both shoulders (for the first time in the case of captains and subalterns); officers of flank companies wore large curb chain wings. Field officers had a gold crown and a star on the epaulette strap. Oxford mixture trousers, and a blue forage cap with a broad, stiff top, and red band for undress. Privates' coat very little altered, except collar was laced all round, red slashed cuffs, with four buttons and loops.

1830. Red flannel fatigue jacket for rank and file—cap lines and gorget abolished. Officers to wear gold lace, shako feather reduced to eight inches, green ball tufts for light company, fusils instead of pikes for sergeants. Musicians to be dressed in white. The officers wore the old flat buttons, only gold instead of silver. Breastplate—a dead gilt plate with bevelled edges, silver gilt mounts, a garter surmounted with a crown, on the garter “1st Yorkshire West Riding Regiment,” below the garter, “Serengapatam” and “Waterloo” on two scrolls, and within 33 in silver surrounded with gilt laurel wreaths. With very little alteration this remained the officers' breastplate until they were abolished in 1855.

30th April, 1832. Field officers ordered to discontinue the shoulder belt (with breastplate) and slings for the sword, a white leather waist-belt with gilt plate being substituted. Field officers to have brass scabbards, and adjutants steel; the adjutants still to use the shoulder belt and slings. The field officers' waistplate was an oblong gilt plate with the crown, W.R. and 33 in silver.

January, 1833. A narrow red welt introduced down the seam of the trousers.

1834. The officers' cap superseded by one rather smaller in the crown, having a black silk oak leaf pattern band with 33 in front. The shoulder cords of gold and crimson, replaced by shoulder straps of blue cloth, laced round with gold lace and terminating in gilt metal crescents. The sword was worn in a frog from a black waistbelt worn over the sash. A gilt waistplate of much the same pattern as the silver one of 1826.

1839. New shako plate for the rank and file, a round brass plate, three inches in diameter, surmounted with a crown, the regimental number raised in the centre; this was worn until 1855.

1844. The Albert shako introduced, six and three-quarter inches high, one quarter of an inch less in diameter at the top than the bottom, red and white ball tufts for battalion companies, grenadiers white; light company green; gilt chin scales, and a new shako plate for the officers. This was a gilt eight-pointed star, four and a quarter inches deep, by four and a quarter inches wide, surmounted with a crown, and in the centre the girdle, etc., as described for the breastplate, except that the 33 in the centre was gilt on a raised dome of bright gilt metal with the laurel wreaths round it. Officers of the grenadier company had a small flame above the 33, and the light company may have had a bugle. Full dress uniform was worn at mess.

1845. Sergeants' sashes to be plain crimson.

The band wore white double-breasted coatees with red facings and shoulder tufts.

The drum-major wore a staff-sergeant's coat with silver epaulettes. Drummers wore scarlet coats laced in front the same as the rank and file, but also laced up the seams of the sleeves, back and side, and chevrons up the arm; the lace was white with a red line in the centre, between the two back coat buttons, the drummers fringe of red and white, the wings white with red patches.

Officers' coats ceased to be piped. The officers' skirt ornament was an eight-pointed gold star with the white rose of York in silver in the centre.

1848. A scarlet shell jacket introduced with plain collar and cuffs of the facings gold shoulder cords. The red shell jacket worn by the men had no piping. Black leather sling sword-belt worn with shell jacket, a great coat of blue cloth instead of blue cloak.

In 1848 the skirt pockets were abolished.

1850. Men's cross belts done away with; a plain shoulder belt to carry the pouch, and the bayonet carried in a frog from the waist-belt.

1855. Tunics introduced. The first issue was double-breasted with rounded collars and brass buttons for the men (hitherto the buttons were white metal), the buttons placed at equal distances, instead of in pairs, no lace used excepting round the buttons on the cuffs and skirts. The coat piped all round with white cloth, dark blue trousers with a red welt. The shako smaller and lighter with a universal gilt star for the officers, surmounted with a crown with 33 on a black leather ground, surrounded with the garter with motto pierced out and showing bright metal underneath.

Officers' and sergeants' sashes worn over the left and right shoulders respectively, instead of round the waist.

The bandsmen wore white tunics with red facings.

The buglers and drummers the same tunics with regimental lace.

1856. The tunic to be single-breasted, and the drummers' coats changed back to red. Officers' rank shown by the amount of gold lace and by crowns and stars on the collar, viz., a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign had an edging of gold lace round the top of the collar and cuffs;

three loops of lace, diamond-shape, round the buttons on the cuff, slash and skirt; field officers, additional lace round the bottom of the collar, and round the cuffs and slash. Collar badges for a colonel, gold crown and star; lieut.-colonel and major, gold crown or star respectively; captain, silver crown and star; lieutenant and ensign, crown or star only.

Double-breasted blue frock coat for undress with plain stand-up collar, gilt buttons and sash over left shoulder, sword-belt white with slings, clasp gilt, silver-gilt circle with "Duke of Wellington's Regiment," and 33 with crown in silver in the centre.

1858. Flank companies abolished.

1862. A lighter shako of blue cloth introduced, and a new shako plate, a universal gilt star with crown, and garter with motto, and 33 pierced out in centre.

1866. The regimental lace for drummers abolished and a universal pattern of white, with small red crowns introduced for the whole Army.

1867, April. Officers' blue frock coats replaced by a blue patrol jacket. Steel scabbards introduced.

1868. The slashed cuff on the tunic replaced by pointed cuffs. Officers to wear a gold and crimson sash, gold laced trousers, and sword belt for levees. The shako ornamented with a gold cord, the star replaced by a universal pattern garter and crown, the number inside and surrounded by a wreath of laurel all gilt.

1872. A regulation mess jacket and waistcoat introduced.

White clothing for the band discontinued, and loose scarlet frocks replaced the shell jackets worn by the men.

1874. Glengarries replaced the Kilmarnock bonnet. The old regimental button, worn by the rank and file, replaced by a universal pattern army button.

1880. The helmet introduced, blue cloth with gilt metal spike, etc.; helmet plate a universal gilt star with a laurel wreath surmounted with a crown in the centre, the garter with motto, and in the centre of the garter, on a black velvet ground, the crest of the Duke of Wellington surrounded with the motto "Virtutis Fortuna Comes" in silver and the figures 33 on the lowest point of the star.

1881. The regiment lost its number and facings and became with the 76th, the 1st and 2nd Battalion of the Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) Regiment, with white facings.

The following are the alterations in the officers' badges:

*The helmet plate* was as follows: In gilt metal, a star surmounted by the crown; on the star a laurel wreath, within the wreath a garter inscribed "Honi soit qui mal y pense," within the garter, in silver on a black velvet ground the crest of the Duke of Wellington with motto on a scroll below. On the bottom of the wreath on a silver scroll "The West Riding Regiment."

*The buttons.* Within the designation "Duke of Wellington's West Riding Regiment," the elephant with howdah.

*On collar of tunic.* The elephant in dead gilt metal with howdah in silver.

*On waist-plate.* On a frosted gilt centre the elephant with howdah in silver, on the circle "The West Riding Regiment."

*On the round forage cap.* In gold embroidery the crest of the Duke of Wellington, with motto on scroll below.

*On forage cap for active service and manœuvres.* In gilt metal, the garter with motto surmounted with crown badge and ground as for helmet plate. This cap was a Glengarry; pattern similar to that worn by non-commissioned officers and men, but not so deep.

The round forage cap was blue cloth, straight up three inches high, with black patent leather drooping peak and chin strap; the peak ornamented with half an inch full gold embroidery; band one and three-quarters of an inch wide of black oak-leaf lace. Field officers to have a gold French braid welt round the top of the cap.

Scarlet serge patrol jacket for officers in India and warm stations during the hot weather, the same shape and size as the blue patrol, with white collar and badge. The sleeve braided as the shell jacket, according to rank.

1882. Saddle cloths hitherto used by the mounted officers in review order were discontinued.

1893. A field service cap of a special pattern came into use.

1900. The mounted officers' sabretache, steel chain reins and bearskin cover to wallets, and gold and crimson sash for levees abolished.

1902. Throughout the South African War infantry great coats were mostly of khaki-coloured cloth, and at its conclusion numerous changes took place. Brass scabbards and brass spurs for field rank were replaced by steel, and the great coat was to be carried on the saddle. The following articles were introduced: a double-breasted blue frock coat for officers, a new forage cap for all ranks, with a large flat stiffened top and sloping peak, a new pattern skirt to officers' tunics, the sword-belt worn under the tunic and the sash round the waist; khaki service dress universally worn as undress uniform on all parades and regimental duties with putties and Sam Brown belt.



## Appendix B

### HONOURS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

IN the "London Gazette" an entry was made in the following terms :  
"The following Officers, N. C. Officers and Men of the Regular, Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, who with their various Units have rendered Special and Meritorious Service, are brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War by the Commander-in-Chief in his dispatch dated 4th Sept., 1901." Then follow among others many names of soldiers connected with the 33rd. Thus :

#### STAFF

Major F. J. de Gex—West Riding Regiment

#### THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S (West Riding Regiment)

Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Lloyd, D.S.O. (killed in action)

Major B. St. J. Le Marchant

Captain E. R. Houghton

" L. R. Ackworth

" P. B. Stafford

Lieutenant W. E. M. Tyndall

" F. S. Exham

" E. V. Jenkins

" H. J. L. Oakes

Quarter-Master and Hon. Captain J. T. Seaman

Sergeant-Major G. Kerns

2241 Colour-Sergeant W. H. Throupe

2958 " G. Parkinson

3545 Sergeant R. Baxter

3744 " A. Owen

2437 " F. McGovern

2673 " J. McMahon

3278 " D. Looney

2486 Band Sergeant J. Columbine

6075 Lance-Sergeant J. Hollings (Volunteer Company)

4683 Corporal A. Maynard

2953 Lance-Corporal T. Hinchcliffe

998 Private A. Wood

4742 Private C. Horsley  
 1762 „ F. J. Williams  
 2938 „ W. Halligan  
 3178 „ F. Barton  
 2778 „ D. B. King  
 4050 Drummer C. Haigh

#### MOUNTED INFANTRY (West Riding Regiment)

Captain O. Harris  
 „ J. A. C. Gibbs  
 „ N. B. Bainbridge  
 „ P. Coode  
 Lieutenant H. K. Umfreville  
 2215 Colour-Sergeant A. Butterworth  
 2302 „ R. D. Moore  
 4542 Sergeant F. H. Barron  
 2879 „ O. Buckley  
 4847 Lance-Corporal A. Grayson  
 3439 Private D. Donaghue  
 4127 „ J. Parr  
 2702 „ H. Tyas  
 3738 „ F. Whitaker  
 3070 „ C. Wright

#### THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S (West Riding Regiment) 3rd Battalion

Major F. A. Hayden, West Riding Regiment

Other rewards were indicated in the "London Gazette," and under date, September 27th, 1901, the following was entered: "The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointments to the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (additional), The Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George (additional) and the Distinguished Service Order, for the following promotions in the Army, and for the grant of the Medal for Distinguished Conduct in the Field, to the undermentioned Officers and Soldiers, in recognition of their Services during the Operations in South Africa, the whole to bear date 29th November, 1900, except when otherwise stated.

#### STAFF

To be Brevet Lieut.-Colonel:

Major F. J. de Gex, the Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment)  
 dated 1st December, 1900.

#### THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S (West Riding Regiment)

To be a Companion of the Order of the Bath:

Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Lloyd, D.S.O. (killed in action).

## 434 HISTORY OF THE 33RD FOOT

To be Companion of the Distinguished Service Order :

Lieut. (now Captain) W. E. M. Tyndall.

Lieut. E. V. Jenkins.

To be Brevet Lieut.-Colonel :

Major B. St. J. Le Marchant.

To have the Distinguished Conduct Medal :

Sergeant-Major Kerna, Colour-Sergeant W. H. Throupe ; Privates

A. Wood, C. Horsley, F. J. Williams, W. Halligan, and Drummer

C. Haigh.

### MOUNTED INFANTRY (West Riding Regiment)

To be a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order :

Captain N. B. Bainbridge (1st Bn. Mounted Infantry)

To be Brevet Major :

Captain O. Harris (15th Bn. Mounted Infantry).

To have the Distinguished Conduct Medal :

Sergeant H. F. Barron (15th Bn. Mounted Infantry).

### BURMAH MOUNTED INFANTRY

To be Companion of the Distinguished Service Order :

Captain P. Coode, The Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment).

To have the Distinguished Conduct Medal :

Private D. Donaghue, The Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment).

### 3RD BATT. DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S (West Riding Regiment).

To be a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order :

Major F. A. Hayden, The Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment).

The following Officer was mentioned for good services in the dispatch of the General Commanding-in Chief, South Africa.

### WEST RIDING REGIMENT (Mounted Infantry)

Lieutenant (now Captain in the Northumberland Fusiliers) R. F. Gatehouse.

For distinguished gallantry on the 13th July, 1901, in attack on Boer position, when he led the attack. His horse was shot, and he had three bullets in his clothes.

At this same time recognition was made of services rendered by Officers of the 33rd in China, and they are here inserted.

"London Gazette," dated 12th December, 1901.

The King has been graciously pleased to give Order for the following promotions in the Army in recognition of the services of the undermentioned Officers during the operations in China.

*Brevet*

To be Major :

Captain W. M. Watson, The Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment).

The King has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Medal for Distinguished Conduct in the Field to the undermentioned Non-Commissioned Officer, in recognition of his gallant conduct during the operations in China.

No. 396. Quarter-Master Sergeant E. Brook, The Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment), attached to the Chinese Regiment of Infantry.

The "London Gazette" of July 29th, 1902, published the following names as having been mentioned for good service by the General Commanding-in-Chief in South Africa :

Major C. V. Humphrys

Captain J. A. C. Gibbs

Captain H. W. Becher

Captain P. B. Strafford

Colour-Sergeant A. Butterworth

Colour-Sergeant O. Buckley

Sergeant Bramley

Sergeant W. Allen

Lance-Corporal J. Kelly

Private J. Leonard

There was an entry in the "London Gazette" later, dated October 31st :

To have the Distinguished Conduct Medal :

Acting Sergeant-Major A. Butterworth

Lance-Corporal J. Kelly

Reference is made in connection with the distribution of medals to the presentation of the Medal for Distinguished Conduct in the Field to Private R. Flynn.

The "London Gazette" for July 8th, 1903, also stated that Private W. H. Dyer was awarded the Silver Medal and a gratuity of £5 for long service and good conduct.

NOTE.—The following appeared as relating to a soldier in the regiment who had rendered conspicuous service, dated October 28th, 1903 :

"The Commanding Officer (Lieut.-Colonel P. T. Rivett-Carnac), publishes the following order to the Battalion under his command.

"Quarter-Master and Hon. Major J. T. Seaman, who will have completed 40 years' service on 9th November, 1903, is about to leave the Battalion with which he has been so long and closely connected.

"The Commanding Officer makes this announcement with deep regret, which he feels assured will be shared by all Officers, N.C. Officers

and men now serving, or who have served with the Battalion as Major Seaman's comrades.

"Starting as a boy, Major Seaman has steadfastly worked his way up progressively step by step until he has attained the rank of a Field Officer, with which rank he retires. All who have had the privilege of knowing Major Seaman can but regard him with feelings of esteem and affection, and the Commanding Officer is assured that he but expresses the sentiments of the "Old 33rd" in wishing Major J. T. Seaman long life, health, and prosperity."

On November 5th, 1903, at Fulford Barracks, York, there was a ceremonial parade, held to commemorate the Battle of Inkermann (November 5th, 1854), when the General Officer Commanding (Brig.-General E. S. Brown, V.C.) presented Silver Medals for Long Service and Good Conduct to the following :

Private W. Dyer, Bn. West Riding Regiment.

Quarter-Master Sergeant Yeoman, Depot, West Riding Regiment.

Colour-Sergeant J. McMahon, Pensioner, late West Riding Regt.

Colour-Sergeant Foster, Staff, 2nd Vol. Bn. West Riding Regt.

Return of casualties which occurred during the South African War, showing the losses which the 33rd (1st W.R.) Regiment endured (for Regular Forces only) :

	Officers	Warrant N.C.O.'s and Men
Killed	3	55
Died of disease		75
Wounded	13	188
Captured by enemy	1	1
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	17	319

## Appendix C

### SUCCESSION OF COLONELS

1702. **LORD HUNTINGDON.** George, 8th Earl. No reliable data forthcoming.

1704. **COLONEL HENRY LEIGH.** No information.

1705. **COLONEL DUNCANSON.** Was Major and second in command at the massacre of Glencoe, 1692, but arrived too late to join in this. Appointed Lieut.-Colonel of the 33rd in 1702. Promoted to the Colonelcy of the 33rd in 1705. Fell at the siege of Valencia de Alcantara the same year.

1705. **MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE WADE.** Ensign in the 10th, 1690. Served at Steinkirk and promoted Lieutenant, 1692-3. Promoted Captain-Lieutenant, 1694. Captain of grenadier company, 1695. Served in Flanders. Promoted Major in 1703, and in the same year became Lieut.-Colonel. Volunteered for service in Portugal under Lord Galway, and was made Adjutant-General with brevet rank of Colonel, 1704. On Duncanson's death Wade became Colonel of the 33rd. Commanded as Brigadier-General in the Spanish army the 3rd Brigade of British infantry at Almanza. Promoted Brigadier-General in the British army and returned to Spain, 1708. Commanded a Brigade of infantry at the Battle of Saragossa, and was promoted Major-General of the forces in Ireland, 1714. Made Colonel of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1717. Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, 1724. His road-making there. Promoted Lieut.-General, 1727. Governor of Berwick and Holy Island. General of Horse in 1739. Lieut.-General of the Ordnance in 1742. Field Marshal in 1743, on his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Flanders. Resigned the Command through ill-health, 1745. In Scotland on the coming of the Young Pretender, 1745. Death in 1748.

1717. **LIEUT.-GENERAL HENRY HAWLEY.** Appointed Ensign in the 19th Foot. Served in Spain, and was at the Battle of Almanza, 1707. Was Captain of the 4th Queen's Hussars, 1706-10. Became Major in 1711. Lieut.-Colonel in 1712, and Brevet-Colonel the same year. Wounded at Dunblane in 1715. Lieut.-Colonel of the 4th Dragoons. In 1717, was made Colonel of the 33rd. Was transferred to the 13th Dragoons in 1730. Brigadier-General in 1735, and Major-General in

1739. Colonel of the 1st Royal Dragoons in 1740. Second in Command in the second line of Horse at the Battle of Dettingen. Lieut.-General, 1744. Second in Command of the cavalry at the Battle of Fontenoy, 1745. Succeeded to the Command when Sir James Campbell was killed. Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, 1745. At Culloden and in Flanders in 1747, in Command of the Cavalry. Died, 1759.

1730. LIEUT.-GENERAL ROBERT DALZELL. Name wrongly spelt as Dalziel. Uncertain whether he served as Lieutenant in the 20th in Ireland in 1694. In the list of Captains of the 28th as Robert Daliel in 1698-9. Name appears as Lieut.-Colonel, also Colonel in 1708. Brigadier-General in 1711. Major-General in 1715. In 1709, raised a regiment of foot in Spain. Lieut.-General in 1727. Colonel of 33rd in 1730. Transferred to the Colonelcy of the 38th in 1739. Became General in 1745.

1739. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN JOHNSON. See account in Appendix F.

1752. COLONEL LORD CHARLES HAY. Second son of the 3rd Marquess of Tweeddale. Gazetted Ensign in 1722. In 1729 preferred to a troop in the 9th Regiment of Dragoons. At the siege of Gibraltar in 1727. Volunteer under Prince Eugene on the Rhine in 1734. Command of a Company of 3rd Foot Guards, 1743. Virtual, if not actual, Lieut.-Colonel of 1st Foot Guards at Fontenoy, with conspicuous distinction, 1745. Appointed King's A.D.C., 1749. Colonel of 33rd in 1752. Major-General in 1757, during the Seven Years' War. Received a high command in General Hopson's force to Nova Scotia to attack the French. Court-martialled for comments on the action of the General, 1760.

1760. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN GRIFFIN GRIFFIN. Captain of 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards, 1744. Served with the Allies in the Netherlands and Germany during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War. In Command of the 33rd stationed in Germany. Promoted Major-General in 1759. Lieut.-General, 1761. General, 1778. Field Marshal in 1796.

1766. COLONEL CHARLES EARL CORNWALLIS. Ensign in Grenadier Guards, 1756. Present at Minden. Promoted to Captain in 85th in 1759. Lieut.-Colonel of the 12th, 1761. In the Netherlands Campaign. Constable of the Tower of London, 1770. Promoted Major-General, 1775. To America in 1776. Took Command of the Reserve Division. Co-operated with Howe in operations in Staten Island and Long Island, in the Battle of Brooklyn, and capture of New York. Took Fort Lee, and subdued the state of New Jersey. Came home and was promoted Lieut.-General, 1778. Again in America, under Clinton. Resigned, but the King refused to accept. Covered the retreat from Philadelphia to New York. Campaign in South Carolina. Obligated to capitulate at Yorktown. Asked to go to India as Governor-General in 1782. Refused, but ultimately acquiesced in 1785. His political and military work in India comprehensive and important. Treaty with Tippoo Sahib. Special mission to advise co-operation of England, Russia, and Austria against France, 1794. Accepted office of Major-General of Ordnance, 1795.

Supervision of defences. Again Governor-General of India and Commander-in-Chief, 1797, but remained in England to serve as Commander-in-Chief in Ireland and Viceroy. Suppressed the rebellion of 1798. Took up the Command of the Eastern District in 1801. British Plenipotentiary to negotiate peace with Buonaparte, 1801. Again in India to deal with Scindia and Holkar, 1805.

1807. MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. ARTHUR WELLESLEY, K.B. The career of Wellington is embodied in the text of this volume.

1813. LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN COPE SHERBROOKE, K.B. Ensign in 4th Foot, 1780. Lieutenant, 1781. Appointed to a Company of the 85th in 1783. Captain of the 33rd in 1784, at Nova Scotia. Promoted Major and Lieut.-Colonel in 1794 of the 2nd Battalion. Joined the Duke of York in the Netherlands. In 1796 to the Cape, thence to India, and took part in the Mysore War, 1799. At the storming of Seringapatam. Comes home through sickness, on half pay. Was made Colonel of the Army in 1798. Commanded the 4th Reserve Battalion in the Eastern Counties in 1803. Promoted Major-General, 1805. Commanded in Messina. Negotiated with the Beys in Egypt, 1807. In temporary Command of the British troops in Sicily, 1808. Transferred to the 68th in 1809. Went to Cadiz to Command the Garrison, and on to Lisbon, 1809. Lieut.-General—local—in same year. Second in Command to Wellesley in the Campaign of 1809. Lieut.-General in 1811. Appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia in 1811. His defence of the Colony in 1812, against the Americans, caused the Commons to vote him £1,000 to purchase plate. Appointed Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of Canada, 1816. Transferred from the Colonelcy of the 68th to the 33rd in 1813. Promoted General in 1825.

1830. GENERAL LORD CHARLES HENRY SOMERSET. No reliable information forthcoming.

1831. LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WALKER, K.C.B. Joined the 88th Foot in 1779. Served in Jamaica. Obtained a Company in the 12th Foot in 1783. Exchanged to the 46th in 1786, and served in Ireland and Channel Islands. Became Adjutant of the Cambridgeshire Militia in 1793. Major in 1794, on half pay. Lieut.-Colonel in January, 1798. Returned from half pay to full pay as Captain of the 20th. In the expedition to the Helder. Promoted to a Majority in the 85th in 1800. Lieut.-Colonel of the 67th in the same year, and going to Jamaica, returned with his Regiment in 1801. Went to Bengal in 1805, but exchanged in England into the 66th in 1808. Colonel on April 25th, 1808. Appointed Brigadier-General in West Indies in 1809. Commanded the Reserve in the expedition in Beckwith's Expedition to Guadaloupe 1810, and was wounded. Received a medal. Promoted Major-General in 1811. Appointed Governor of Martinique in 1812. Promoted Lieut.-General in 1821, and General in 1838. Colonel of the 33rd on February 25th, 1831. Died, March 19th, 1845.

1845. MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HENRY SHEEHY KEATING, K.C.B. No reliable information forthcoming.



1847. **MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY D'O'LY.** Served in 1st Foot Guards. Ensign, 2nd August, 1797. Lieutenant and Captain, 25th November, 1799. Major, 4th June, 1811. Captain and Lieut.-Colonel, 27th May, 1813. Colonel, 12th February, 1830. Major-General, 28th June, 1838. Lieut.-General, 11th November, 1851. Colonel 33rd, 28th September, 1847. Served in the Campaign in North Holland in 1799, under Sir R. Abercromby and the Duke of York, taken prisoner in the action of the 19th September. Served in the army in the North of Spain under Sir John Moore in 1808-9 and was at the Battle of Corunna. Accompanied the expedition to Walcheren in 1809. Served at Cadiz during the siege in 1811-12 under Lord Lynedoch and Sir G. Cooke as A.D.C. Served in Flanders under Lord Lynedoch in 1814, and subsequently with the Army under the Duke of Wellington, severely wounded at Waterloo. Medal with clasp for Corunna.

1856. **MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES YORK.** Appointed Colonel of the Regiment, 27th September, 1855. Lieut.-General, 13th February, 1859. K.C.B. Transferred to Rifle Brigade, 1st April, 1863. Served in the Peninsula with the 51st Regiment and was present at the Battles of Vimiera, Fuentes d'Onor, Salamanca, Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelle (wounded), Nive and Orthes (severely wounded), and at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz (wounded), for which he received the war medal with ten clasps. He served also in the Waterloo Campaign.

1863. **MAJOR-GENERAL WM. NELSON HUTCHINSON.** Appointed Colonel of the Regiment, 1st April, 1863. Lieut.-General, 1st August, 1865. General, 29th May, 1873, died 1895.

1896. **GENERAL GEORGE ERSKINE.** Joined the 33rd as Ensign, 17th August, 1832. Lieutenant, 3rd June, 1836. Captain, 14th April, 1843. Brevet Major, 20th June, 1854. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 12th December, 1854. Lieut.-Colonel in Command of Provisional Depot, 12th December, 1854. Lieut.-Colonel in Command of Military Train, 26th October, 1855. Colonel, 12th August, 1860. Major-General, 9th June, 1868. Lieut.-General, 1st October, 1877. General, 1st July, 1881. Colonel, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 9th June, 1888. Appointed Colonel of the Regiment, 30th June, 1895. Served with the 33rd, in the Eastern Campaign, 1854-5, including the Battle of Inkermann and Siege of Sebastopol, he commanded the pickets of the Light Division on the 14th October, 1854, when they repulsed the attack made on them by the enemy. Medal with two clasps. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 5th Class of the Medjidie and Turkish Medal.

1897. **GENERAL HUGH ROWLANDS, V.C., C.B.** Served in the Eastern Campaign of 1854-5 with the 41st Regiment, including the Battles of the Alma and Inkermann (seriously wounded), siege and fall of Sebastopol, sortie of 26th October, attack in the Quarries on the 7th June, and twice in the Rifle pits, attack of the Redan on the 18th June, and 8th September (wounded). Medal with 3 clasps, V.C. Brevet of Major, Knight of the Legion of Honour, 5th Class of the Medjidie and Turkish Medal. Received V.C. for rescuing Colonel Haly of the 47th from Russian soldiers, he having

been wounded and surrounded by them, and for gallant exertions in holding the ground occupied by his advanced picket against the enemy at Inkermann. Served in the Kafir War, 1877-9 on special service at Luneberg, commanded the troops at the engagement at Tolako Mountain (mentioned in dispatches), Medal with Clasp. Appointed Colonel of the Regiment, 8th October, 1897. K.C.B. Died 1st August, 1909.

1909. MAJOR-GENERAL HERBERT EVERSLEY BELFIELD, C.B., D.S.O. Served in the Ashanti Expedition, 1895-6 as Chief Staff Officer. Honourably mentioned, Brevet of Lieut.-Colonel, Star. Served in the South African War, 1899-1902. On Staff. Took part in the operations in the Orange Free State, February to May, 1900. Operations in the Transvaal, west of Pretoria, including actions at Venterskroom (7th and 9th August). Served in operations in Orange River Colony, including actions at Lindley (1st June), and Rhenoster River. In the Transvaal, 30th November, 1900, to July, 1901, and January to 31st May, 1902. In Orange River Colony, March and April, 1901. Also in Cape Colony, January and February, 1901, and July, 1901, to January, 1902. Twice mentioned in dispatches. Queen's Medal with 3 Clasps. King's Medal with 2 Clasps, C.B., D.S.O. Appointed Colonel of the Regiment, 2nd August, 1909. Lieut.-General, 10th August, 1912. K.C.B., 1914.

## Appendix D

### SUCCESSION OF LIEUT.-COLONELS

ROBERT DUNCANSON, appointed 10th February, 1702.

GEORGE WADE, vice Duncanson, 9th June 1705, to be Major-General to command 33rd, 25th March, 1715.

O. D'HAREWOOD, Captain, 10th March, 1702. Lieut.-Colonel, 1707 to 1714, 2nd Battalion.

P. HONEYWOOD, Captain, 10th March, 1702. Lieut.-Colonel, 1707 to 1714. 1st Battalion.

E. STANHOPE, Lieut.-Colonel, 1707-1714.

T. HOWARD, Captain, 8th March, 1707. Major, 1715. Lieut.-Colonel, 25th March, 1715. Prisoner at Almanza. Left Regiment, 5th October, 1721.

RICHARD CHALONER COBB, Captain, 25th March, 1715. Lieut.-Colonel, 5th October, 1721. Retired half pay, 7th June, 1741.

ROBT. SAMPSON, Captain, 1st May, 1729. Major, 23rd April, 1740. Lieut.-Colonel, 7th June, 1741. Retired in 1744.

GEORGE MURE, Major, 24th September, 1744. Lieut.-Colonel, 27th May, 1745. Retired 2nd February, 1746/7. Wounded at Fontenoy.

JAMES LOCKHART, Lieut.-Colonel, 2nd February, 1746/7.

JAMES ROSS, Lieut.-Colonel, 2nd February, 1746/7. Retired, 7th June, 1756.

CHARLES, DUKE OF RICHMOND, from Captain, 20th Foot, to be Lieut.-Colonel, 7th June, 1756. Retired, 8th May, 1758.

LORD G. H. LENNOX, to be Lieut.-Colonel, 8th May, 1758. Retired, 30th April, 1762.

HILDEBRAND OAKES, Major, 2nd August, 1760. Lieut.-Colonel, 3rd April, 1762. Retired, 9th April, 1774.

JAMES WEBSTER, Ensign, 19th June, 1758. Lieutenant, 10th May, 1760. Captain, 14th May, 1763. Major, 27th February, 1771. Lieut.-Colonel, 9th April, 1774. Retired from Regiment, 1780.

JOHN YORKE, Ensign, 17th March, 1761. Lieutenant, 3rd December, 1762. Captain, 8th August, 1776. Promoted Lieut.-Colonel, 22nd Foot, 1778. Reverted to 33rd, 24th April, 1781. Colonel, 18th March, 1783. Left Regiment, 1793.

THE HON. ARTHUR WESLEY (afterwards spelt Wellealey). Lieut.-

Colonel, 30th September, 1793. Colonel in the Army, 3rd May, 1796. Major-General, 29th April, 1802. Lieut.-General, 25th April, 1808. Full Colonel of Regiment, 20th June, 1806.

JOHN COPE SHERBROKE from Captain, 85th Foot, 1783. Captain-Lieutenant and Captain, 23rd June, 1784. Major, 30th September 1793. 2nd Lieut.-Colonel, 24th May, 1794. Colonel in Army, 1st January, 1798. Left Regiment, 1802. Lieut.-General, K.B. Appointed full Colonel of the Regiment, 1st January, 1813, on the Marquis of Wellington being appointed to the Blues. Served in the Peninsula.

ARTHUR GORE, 2nd Lieut.-Colonel, 29th October, 1802. Colonel in the Army, 4th June, 1811. Killed in Command of a Brigade at Bergen-op-Zoom, 1814.

WALTER ELLIOTT, Ensign, 28th May, 1884. Lieutenant, 3rd March, 1790. Captain, 9th May, 1794. Major, 8th September, 1796. Lieut.-Colonel in Army, 29th April, 1802. 2nd Lieut.-Colonel in Regiment, 20th February, 1806. Left Regiment, 1807.

JAMES CAMPBELL, Lieutenant in Army, 28th October, 1760, in Regiment, 26th October, 1764. Captain-Lieutenant, 15th January, 1772. Captain, 25th May, 1772. Major in Army, 24th November, 1802, in Regiment, 27th September, 1803. 2nd Lieut.-Colonel, 6th August, 1807. Left Regiment, 1810.

F. RALPH WEST, Ensign, 14th December, 1791. Lieutenant, 31st July, 1793. Captain, 9th March, 1799. Major, 6th August, 1807. 2nd Lieut.-Colonel, 3rd December, 1810. Retired, 30th September, 1813.

WM. KEITH ELPHINSTONE, 2nd Lieut.-Colonel, from 15th Light Dragoons, 20th September, 1813. Ex. to 16th Light Dragoons, 12th April, 1821. Wounded severely at Bergen-op-Zoom. Commanded the Regiment at Waterloo. C.B.

SAMUEL MOFFATT, Lieut.-Colonel from 1st Ceylon Regiment, 3rd May, 1821. Left Regiment, 10th September, 1830.

CHARLES KNIGHT, Captain in Regiment, from 56th Foot, 26th December, 1811. Major in Army, 21st January, 1819, in Regiment, 25th November, 1821. Lieut.-Colonel, 10th September, 1830. Died in 1841. Wounded at Waterloo.

J. M. HARTY, K.H., Ensign, 23rd April, 1807. Lieutenant, 1st May, 1807. Captain, 11th March, 1813. Major, 20th December, 1827. Lieut.-Colonel, 22nd July, 1841. Retired on full pay, 14th June, 1842. Wounded at Waterloo.

RICHARD WESTMORE, Ensign, 28th May, 1812. Lieutenant, 1st April, 1813. Captain, 23rd June, 1825. Major, 30th October, 1840. Lieut.-Colonel, 14th June, 1842. Retired on full pay, 14th April, 1843. Present at Waterloo.

GEORGE WHANNELL, Ensign, 1st March, 1811. Lieutenant, 16th March, 1814. Captain, 3rd November, 1825. Major, 22nd July, 1841. Lieut.-Colonel, 14th April, 1843. Retired, 1848.

BLAKE FRED RUDOLPH, Captain, from 94th Foot, 18th January, 1833. Major, 14th April, 1843. Lieut.-Colonel, 28th November, 1854.

Colonel, 28th November, 1854. Retired, 9th March, 1855. Commanded the Regiment at the Alma.

JOHN DOUGLAS JOHNSTON, Lieutenant, 28th September, 1830. Captain, 19th October, 1838. Major, 3rd October, 1848. Lieut.-Colonel, 9th March, 1855. Colonel, 9th March, 1858. Retired, 17th April, 1860. Commanded the Regiment in the trenches at the taking of the Redan, 7th June. Commanded Regiment in the assault on the 18th. Severely wounded, arm amputated. C.B.

GEORGE V. MUNDY, C.B., Captain from Coldstream Guards, 10th September, 1841. Major, 29th December, 1854. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 12th December, 1854. Lieut.-Colonel in Regiment, 19th September, 1855. Placed on half pay, 10th November, 1856. Served with the Coldstream Guards in Canada during the Rebellion of 1837. In the Crimea at the Alma (horse killed). Inkermann, siege and fall of Sebastopol (wounded in the trenches), and assault on the Redan, 18th June (wounded). Medal and Clasp. Sardinian and Turkish Medals, C.B.

JOHN E. COLLINGS, C.B., Ensign, 21st June, 1839. Lieutenant, 22nd January, 1842. Captain, 3rd October, 1848. Major, 19th September, 1855. Lieut.-Colonel, 17th November, 1857. Colonel, 1861. Placed on half pay, 28th October, 1868. Served in the Crimea. Alma, Inkermann, siege of Sebastopol, assault on the Redan, 18th June, Medal and Clasp. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, Knight of the Legion of Honour. Sardinian Medal, 5th Class of the Medjidie, Turkish Medal. Commanded a brigade in Abyssinian Campaign, 1868. Mentioned in dispatches. C.B. and Medal.

EDWARD WESTLEY DONOVAN, Ensign, 10th June, 1840. Lieutenant, 14th June, 1842. Captain, 22nd December, 1848. Major 26th October, 1855. Lieut.-Colonel, 17th October, 1860. Exchanged to 100th Foot, 25th June, 1861. Served in the Crimea, Alma, Inkermann, and siege of Sebastopol. Severely wounded in the trenches 16th April. Medal and Clasp. Brevet of Major, Knight of the Legion of Honour, 5th Class of the Medjidie.

ALEXANDER ROBERT DUNN, V.C. Exchanged from 100th Foot as 2nd Lieut.-Colonel, 25th June, 1861. Died from an accident whilst serving with the Regiment in the Abyssinian Campaign of 1868. Served in the Crimea as Lieutenant, 11th Hussars, and obtained the V.C. for having in the Light Cavalry charge at Balaklava on the 25th October, 1854, saved the life of Sergeant-Major Bentley of the 11th Hussars, by cutting down two or three Russian Lancers, who were attacking him from the rear, and afterwards cutting down a Russian Hussar, who was attacking Private Levett of the 11th. Crimean Medal with 4 Clasps and Turkish Medal.

ARTHUR SISSON COOPER, C.B. Promoted from 25th Foot, as Major, 12th March, 1861. Lieut.-Colonel, 28th October, 1868. Commanded the 33rd after the death of Colonel Dunn, in the Abyssinian Campaign and led it in the assault of Magdala. Mentioned in dispatches. C.B. and Medal. Sold out, September, 1873.

T. BASIL FANSHAW, Ensign, 14th April, 1846. Lieutenant, 3rd

October, 1848. Captain, 29th December, 1854. Major, 18th August, 1865. Lieut.-Colonel, 24th September, 1873. Retired Colonel, full pay, 1878. Served in the Crimea, siege of Sebastopol, assault on the Redan on the 18th June. Medal with Clasp, Turkish Medal. Served in the Abyssinian Campaign, Medal.

EDWARD FRED CHADWICK, appointed Major from 59th Foot, 26th June, 1866. Lieut.-Colonel, 2nd March, 1878. Retired Colonel, full pay, 23rd July, 1879.

FREDERICK JOHN CASTLE, exchanged with Major Johnstone, from 107th Foot. Retired with rank of Major-General, 1884. Served with the 48th Regiment in the Crimea from 21st April, 1855. Medal with Clasp, Turkish Medal.

WILLIAM BALLY, from Ensign 32nd Foot. Lieutenant, 9th September, 1855. Captain, 18th April, 1865. Major, 15th March, 1879. 2nd Lieut.-Colonel, 29th October, 1881. Placed on half pay, 1887, with rank of Major-General. Served in the Abyssinian Campaign as A.D.C. to Brigadier-General Collings. Mentioned in dispatches, Medal.

DOUGLAS CAMPBELL DE WEND, Ensign, 4th July, 1860. Lieutenant, 12th July, 1864. Captain, 15th April, 1874. Major, 1st July, 1881, all in 76th Foot. Lieut.-Colonel 33rd, 6th October, 1886.

FERDINAND JAMES TIDMARSH, Ensign, 14th June, 1864. Lieutenant, 29th June, 1866. Captain, 24th September, 1873. Major, 1st July, 1881. Lieut.-Colonel, 25th February, 1885. Retired as Colonel, 25th February, 1889. Served in the Abyssinian Campaign. Medal.

CZCIL CONOR, Ensign, 9th March, 1867. Lieutenant, 19th January, 1870. Captain, 7th January, 1877. Major, 6th September, 1882. Lieut.-Colonel, 6th October, 1892. Retired as Colonel, 6th October, 1896. Served in the Abyssinian Campaign.

GEORGE EVAN LLOYD, D.S.O., Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment, 18th November, 1896. Killed in Action in South Africa, 1900. Served with the 51st Light Foot, in the Lowaki Campaign, 1877. (Medal with Clasp). Served with the 51st Light Foot, in the Afghan War, 1878-9 and was present at the attack and capture of Ali Musjid (Medal with Clasp). Served during the Nile Expedition, 1884-5. Commandant at Tangur (mentioned in dispatches, Brevet of Major, Medal with Clasp, 4th Class of the Medjidie and Khedive's Star), also served with the Soudan Frontier Field Force, 1885-7, including the engagements at Giniss (mentioned in dispatches, D.S.O.) and Sarra (3rd Class of the Medjidie) in the operations near Suakin in December, 1888, including the engagement at Gemai-zah (mentioned in dispatches, Clasp). In the operations in 1889, including the engagement at Toski (mentioned in dispatches, Clasp.). Served with the Dongola Expeditionary Force under Sir H. Kitchener in 1896, in Command of a Field Column which he organised from the Suakin and Tokar Garrisons (mentioned in dispatches, promoted Lieut.-Colonel). Nominated to 2nd Class of the Medjidie for service under the Egyptian Government. Served in South Africa in command of the 33rd (mentioned in dispatch, C.B., Medal with Clasp).

**PERCY TEMPLE RIVETT-CARNAC**, Sub-Lieutenant, 6th Foot, 3rd July, 1872. Transferred 45th Foot, 27th August, 1872. Lieutenant, Oxford Light Infantry, 3rd July, 1872. Captain 76th, 19th December, 1883. Major, 6th October, 1892. Lieut.-Colonel, 33rd, 30th November, 1900. Colonel, Reserve of Officers, 30th November, 1904. Served with the Egyptian Expedition, 1884. Medal and Khedive's Star. Operations in South Africa, 1896-7. Served with Mounted Infantry, and afterwards as Chief Staff Officer (mentioned in dispatches). Brevet Lieut.-Colonel. Medal with Clasp. Served in the South African War, 1899-1900 on the Staff, also commanded troops at Kraaipan, was present at the relief of Kimberley. Took part in the operations in the Orange Free State including Paardeberg. In command of the Regiment, 5th June, 1901, to 31st May, 1902. Was present during the operations in the Transvaal, 30th November, 1900, to 21st May, 1902 (mentioned in dispatches, Queen's Medal with 2 Clasps, King's Medal with 2 Clasps).

**HAYFORD DOUGLAS THOROLD**, Lieutenant, 76th Foot, 14th June, 1880. Captain, 76th, 28th October, 1885. Major 33rd, 2nd November, 1895. Lieut.-Colonel, 30th November, 1904. Retired, 30th November, 1908. Served in South Africa, 1896, on special service. Commanded at Gwelo, where he reorganised the Volunteer Garrison. Mentioned in dispatches. Served in the South African War, 1900-02. Commanded at Warmbaths, took part in the relief of Kimberley. Present during the operations at Paardeberg, Poplar Drift, and Driefontein, also in the operations in the Transvaal, August, 1901, to January, 1902, also in the Orange River Colony, 30th November, 1900, to January, 1901. Queen's medal with 4 Clasps. King's Medal with 2 Clasps.

**CHARLES VESKY HUMPHREYS**, Lieutenant, 76th, 9th September, 1882. Captain, 33rd, 19th September, 1888. Adjutant, 9th December, 1891. Major, 18th December, 1899. Lieut.-Colonel, 30th November, 1908. Left for the Staff, 3rd February, 1912. Served in the South African War, 1899-1901, on Staff. Afterwards, Administrator, No. 1 Martial-Law Area, Cape Colony District. Mentioned in dispatches. Queen's Medal with 3 Clasps.

**WILLIAM MILWARD WATSON**, Lieutenant, 7th February, 1885. Captain, 76th, 2nd March, 1891. Battalion Major, 29th November, 1900. Major, 18th December, 1903. Lieut.-Colonel, 3rd February, 1912. Took part in the operations in Matabeleland, 1893-4. Medal. Served during the operations in South Africa, 1896, with M. I. Clasp. Served in China, 1900, in command of Chinese Regiment, 28th July-1st December, 1900, at the relief of Tientsin and Peking. Mentioned in dispatches. Brev. Maj. and Clasp.

## Appendix E

### THE WATERLOO ROLL CALL

#### 33RD (OR 1ST YORKSHIRE WEST RIDING) REGIMENT OF FOOT

Rank	Name	Rank in Regt.	
<b>Lt.-Col.</b>	1 Wm. Keith Elphinstone	30th Sept., 1813	
<b>Major</b>	2 Edward Parkinson	17th Mar., 1813	Wounded slightly
<b>Captains</b>	3 Wm. McIntyre	3rd Dec., 1810	Wounded severely
	4 Charles Knight	26th Dec., 1811	Wounded slightly
	John Haigh	6th Aug., 1812	Killed, 16th June
	5 J. M. Harty	11th Mar., 1813	Wounded slightly
	6 Ralph Gore	28th July, 1814	
	7 John Longden	8th Sept., 1814	
	8 Thomas Reid	20th July, 1806	Wounded severely
<b>Lieuts.</b>	Peter Barailler	7th Sept., 1809	
	9 George Barrs	14th November	
	Henry Rishton Buck	16th Nov.	Killed 18th June
	10 Arthur Hill Trevor	1st Jan., 1810	
	John Boyce	1st Jan., 1811	Killed, 16th June
	John Hart	25th April, 1811	Killed, 18th June
	11 James Murkland	1st June, 1811	Wounded slightly
	12 Fred Hope Pattison	24th Sept., 1812	
	13 Arthur Gore	11th Mar., 1813	Killed, 16th June
	14 Richard Westmore	1st April, 1813	Wounded severely
	Thos. D. Haigh	29th July, 1813	Died of wounds on 19th
	15 James Gordon Ogle	17th Mar., 1814	Wounded severely
	16 Sam. Alex. Pagan	7th April, 1814	Wounded severely
	17 Edward Clabon	18th Aug., 1814	
	18 Joseph Lynam	8th Sept., 1814	
	19 John Archbold	27th Oct., 1814	
	John Cameron	9th Feb., 1814	Died of wounds on 19th



Rank	Name	Rank in Regt.	
Ensigns	20 Henry Bain	15th Oct., 1812	Wounded severely
	21 James Forlong	11th Mar., 1813	Wounded severely
	22 John Alderson	21st April, 1813	Wounded severely
	23 Wm. Bain	22nd April, 1813	Wounded severely
	24 Jas. Arnot Howard	6th May, 1813	Wounded slightly
	25 Wm. Thain, Adj.	13th May, 1813	Wounded severely
	26 Andrew Watson	10th June, 1813	
	27 Charles Smith	24th June, 1813	
	28 Wm. Hodgson	21st April, 1814	
	29 Gerald Blackall	12th May, 1814	
	30 George Drury	9th Feb., 1815	Wounded severely
Paymr.	31 Edward Stoddart	2nd April, 1807	
Qr.-Mr.	32 James Fazarckerley	25th Sept., 1808	
Surgeon	Robert Leaver	31st Mar., 1814	
Asst. Surg.	Wm. D. Fry	12th Nov., 1812	
Do.	D. Finlayson	31st Mar., 1814	

## NOTES ON THE OFFICERS

1. Afterwards Maj.-Gen. W. Keith Elphinstone, C.B. Commander-in-Chief in Bengal; third son of the Hon. Wm. Fullerton Elphinstone, and grandson of the tenth Baron Elphinstone. C.B. and K.S.A. for Waterloo. Served in Afghanistan, and in the retreat from Cabul was taken captive by Akhbar Khan, and died 23rd April, 1842.
2. Made Bt. Lt.-Col. for Waterloo. Served with the 33rd in India, and was on the staff of the expedition which captured the Island of Bourbon. Served in the campaign in Holland in 1814. Was severely wounded at Quatre Bras. Attained rank of Lt.-Gen. and Colonel-in-Chief 93rd Highlanders. C.B. Died 14th January, 1858.
3. Promoted Major 30th December, 1818. Exchanged to 1st W. I. Regt., 15th February, 1821. Died 23rd April, 1828.
4. A native of Charleville. Succeeded to the command of the 33rd, 10th September, 1830, and died 21st July, on board S.S. "Pandura" at St. Thomas's on his way home from Barbadoes.
5. Afterwards Colonel Joseph M. Hart, K.H. retired f.p. Entered the army in 1807. He served at the capture of Bourbon and the Isle of France (1810); the campaigns in Germany and Holland, including the attacks on Merxem, and the assault of Bergen-op-Zoom (1813-14). His commissions are dated: Ensign, 23rd April, 1807; Lieut., 1st May, 1807; Capt., 11th March, 1813; Major, 20th December, 1827; Lt.-Colonel, 22nd July, 1841; Colonel, 28th November, 1854. Retired f. p. 1842; living 1874.

6. Retired from the Regt. as Capt., 1821.
7. Brevet-Major 1st November, 1821. H.p. unattached 1st May, 1827.
8. Capt. 16th June, 1815. Retired f.p. 10th January, 1837. Living in 1846.
9. Capt. 7th April, 1825. H.p. 25th May, 1826.
10. Afterwards K.H. and Lt.-Colonel of 59th Regt. Inspecting Field Officer Recruiting Staff, 1855. Major-General 1858. Living 1860.
11. Left the Regt. in 1817.
12. Placed on h.p. as Lieut., 18th May, 1821. Fifty years later he published for private circulation a short account of his Waterloo experiences.
13. Eldest son of Lieut.-Colonel Ralph Gore of the 33rd, by Sarah, daughter of George Wynne, Mayor of Plymouth, 1791.
14. Became Capt., 23rd June, 1825; Major, 30th October, 1840; Lieut.-Colonel, 14th June, 1842. Retired f.p., 1843. Living in 1865.
15. Belonged to an Irish family. Died as Lieut. in the Regt. at Hull, 12th September, 1817, aged 26; buried in Trinity Church, Hull.
16. Half pay, 55th Foot, 14th February, 1822.
17. Capt., 19th September, 1821. Exchanged to 58th Foot, 30th January, 1822.
18. Lieut. 54th Foot, 27th November, 1822.
19. Half pay, 1817.
20. Lieut., 11th August, 1815. H.p., 1817.
21. Lieut., 22nd December, 1814; Capt., 20th September, 1821; Exchanged to 58th Foot, 1822. Major 43rd L. I., 1st July, 1828; Lieut.-Colonel, 7th May, 1841; retired, 17th October, 1851; K.H. Died at Toronto.
22. Lieut., 13th August, 1815. H.p., 1817.
23. Lieut., 14th August, 1815; h.p., 1817; died, February, 1860.
24. Lieut., 10th August, 1815; h.p., 1817.
25. Lieut. 15th August, 1815; Capt., 17th November, 1825; exchanged to 21st Foot, 19th July, 1839.
26. Lieut., 24th Foot, 18th June, 1818; h.p., 1823.
27. Lieut., 14th August, 1815; h.p., 1817.
28. Lieut., 19th August, 1815; h.p., 1817.
29. Died or left the Regt., 1816.
30. Lieut., 23rd November, 1815; h.p., 1817.
31. H.p., 1817.
32. Lieut. 1st Royal Veteran Battn., 19th October, 1815. Retired, f.p., 1816.

From the "Waterloo Roll Call," C. Dalton.

RETURN OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND PRIVATES KILLED IN  
ACTION OR DEAD OF WOUNDS IN THE ACTIONS OF THE 16TH,  
17TH AND 18TH.

Rank	Name	When Killed
Sergeants	Thos. Elliott	Killed in Action, 16th June
	Benj. Clark	Do. 18th June
	Jas. Holroyd	Do. 16th June
Corporals	Jas. Bottor	Do. 16th June
	Jas. Johnson	Do. 18th June
	Fredk. Nix	Do. 18th June
	Geo. Templeton	Do. 16th June
	Jno. Lille	Do. "
	Jas. Lowe	Do. "
	Saml. Petty	Do. "
	Wm. Rose	Do. "
	Jno. Smith	Do. "
	Wm. Staples	Do. "
	Jno. Armitage	Do. "
	Chas. Evans	Do. "
	Jas. Moorhouse	Do. "
	Benj. Gibbons	Do. "
	Geo. Armitage	Do. 18th June
	Geo. Burrow	Do. "
	Jas. Priggs	Do. "
	Eli Carter	Do. "
	Wm. Dryden	Do. "
	Ralph Marsh	Do. "
Privates	J. Ramsden	Do. "
	Mich. Kinn	Do. "
	Benj. Bailey	Do. "
	Thos. Beech	Do. "
	Michl. Beverely	Do. "
	Wm. Bannison	Do. "
	Saml. Callard	Do. "
	Josh Hartley	Do. "
	Jas. Tayler	Do. "
	Wm. Tippleton	Do. "
	Josh Webb	Do. "
	Geo. Harrison	Do. "
	Thos. Horsfall	Do. "
	Jno. Kent	Do. "
	Josh Morse	Do. "
	Jas. Hardacre	Do. "
	Ralph Matthew	Do. "
	Samuel Pollard	Do. "

Rank	Name	When Killed.
Privates	{ Jno. Sale	Killed in Action, 18th June
	{ Robt. Herd	Do. "
	{ Jno. Robson	Do. "
	{ Luke Shaw	Do. "
	{ Henry Patrick	Do. "
	{ George Ratcliffe	Do. "
	{ Jno. Rastrick	Do. "

From the Medal Roll at the War Office

F. E. WALLIS.

## THE BRITISH AND HANOVERIAN ARMY AT WATERLOO

AS FORMED IN DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES ON THE  
18TH JUNE, 1815

CAVALRY, LIEUT.-GENERAL THE EARL OF UXBRIDGE,  
G.C.B.

### 1ST BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL LORD E. SOMERSET, K.C.B.

1st Life Guards	Lieut.-Colonel Ferrior
2nd Life Guards	Lieut.-Col. The Hon. E. P. Lygon
Royal Horse Guards	Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robt. Hill
1st Dragoon Guards	Colonel Fuller

### 2ND BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WM. PONSONBY, K.C.B.

1st Royal Dragoons	Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Clifton
2nd Royal N. B. Dragoons	Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Hamilton
6th Inniskilling Dragoons	Colonel Muter

### 3RD BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL W. B. DORNBERG

23rd Light Dragoons	Colonel The Earl of Portarlington
1st Light Dragoons, K.G.L.	Lieut.-Colonel J. Bulow
2nd Light Dragoons, K.G.L.	Lieut.-Colonel C. de Jonquiera

### 4TH BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN O. VANDELEUR, K.C.B.

11th Light Dragoons	Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Sleight
12th Light Dragoons	Lieut.-Colonel The Hon. F. C. Ponsonby
16th Light Dragoons	Lieut.-Colonel J. Hay

## 452 HISTORY OF THE 33RD FOOT

### 5TH BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL SIR COLQUHOUN GRANT, K.C.B.

7th Hussars	Colonel Sir Edward Kerrison
15th Hussars	Lieut.-Colonel L. C. Dalrymple
2nd Hussars, K.G.L.	Lieut.-Colonel Linsingen

### 6TH BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HUMPHRY VIVIAN, K.C.B.

10th Hussars	Colonel Quentin
18th Hussars	Lieut.-Colonel The Hon. H. Murray
1st Hussars, K.G.L.	Lieut.-Colonel A. Wissell

### 7TH BRIGADE, COLONEL F. ARENSCHILDT, K.C.B.

13th Light Dragoons	Lieut.-Colonel P. Doherty
3rd Hussars, K.G.L.	Lieut.-Colonel Meyer

### COLONEL BARON ESTORFF

Prince Regent's Hussars	Lieut.-Colonel Count Kielmansegge
Bremen and Verdun Hussars	Colonel Busche

### BRITISH HORSE ARTILLERY

Major Bull's (Howitzers)	Captain Whinyarte's (with rockets)
Lieut.-Colonel Webber Smith's	Captain Mercer's
Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robt. Gardiner's	Major Ramsay's

## INFANTRY

### FIRST DIVISION, MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE COOKE

#### 1ST BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL P. MAITLAND

1st Foot Guards, 2nd Battalion	Major H. Askew (Colonel)
1st Foot Guards, 3rd Battalion	Major Hon. Wm. Stewart

#### 2ND BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL SIR J. BYNG

Coldstream Guards, 2nd Battalion	Major A. S. Woodford (Colonel)
3rd Foot Guards, 2nd Battalion	Major F. Hepburn (Colonel)

#### ARTILLERY, LIEUT.-COLONEL ADYE

Captain Sandham's Foot Battery	Major Kuhlman's Horse Battery, K.G.L.
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## SECOND DIVISION, LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR H. CLINTON, G.C.B.

### 3RD BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL F. ADAM

52nd Foot, 1st Battalion	Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Colborne, K.C.B.
71st Foot, 1st Battalion	Lieut.-Colonel T. Reynell
95th Rifles, 2nd Battalion	Major J. Ross (Lieut.-Colonel)
95th Rifles, 3rd Battalion	Major A. G. Norcott (Lieut.-Colonel)

### 1ST BRIGADE, K.G.L., COLONEL DU PLAT

1st Line Battalion, K.G.L.	Major W. Robertson
2nd Line Battalion, K.G.L.	Major G. Muller
3rd Line Battalion, K.G.L.	Lieut.-Colonel F. de Wissell
4th Line Battalion, K.G.L.	Major F. Reb.

### 3RD HANOVERIAN BRIGADE, COLONEL HALKETT

Militia Battalion, Bremervorde	Lieut.-Colonel Schulenberg
Duke of York's, 2nd Battalion	Major Count Munster
Duke of York's, 3rd Battalion	Major Baron Hunefeld
Militia Battalion, Salztitter	Major Hammerstein

### ARTILLERY, LIEUT.-COLONEL GOLD

Captain Bolton's Foot Battery (Brit.)	Major A. Sympher's Horse Battery (K.G.L.)
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## THIRD DIVISION, LIEUT.-GENERAL BARON ALTEN

### 5TH BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL SIR COLIN HALKETT, K.C.B.

30th Foot, 2nd Battalion	Major W. Bailey (Lieut.-Colonel)
33rd Foot	Lieut.-Colonel W. K. Elphinstone
69th Foot, 2nd Battalion	Lieut.-Colonel Morice (Colonel)
73rd Foot	Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Harris (Colonel)

### 2ND BRIGADE K.G.L., COLONEL BARON OMPTEDA

1st Light Battalion, K.G.L.	Lieut.-Colonel L. Bussche
2nd Light Battalion, K.G.L.	Major G. Baring
5th Line Battalion, K.G.L.	Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Linsingen
8th Line Battalion, K.G.L.	Major Schroeder (Lieut.-Colonel)

### 1ST HANOVERIAN BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL COUNT KIELMANSEGG

1st Battalion, Duke of York's	Major Bulow
Field Battalion, Grubenhagen	Lieut.-Colonel Wurmb

## 454 HISTORY OF THE 33RD FOOT

Field Battalion, Bremen  
Field Battalion, Luneburg  
Field Battalion, Verdun

Lieut.-Colonel Langrehr  
Lieut.-Colonel Kleucke  
Major de Senkopp

### ARTILLERY, LIEUT.-COLONEL WILLIAMSON

Major Lloyd's (British)

Captain A. Cleves (K.G.L.)

### FOURTH DIVISION, LIEUT.-GENERAL THE HON. SIR CHARLES COLVILLE, K.C.B.

#### 4TH BRIGADE, COLONEL MITCHELL

14th Foot, 3rd Battalion

Major F. S. Tidy (Lieut.-Colonel)

23rd Foot, 1st Battalion

Lieut.-Colonel Sir H. W. Ellis,  
K.C.B.

51st Foot

Lieut.-Colonel H. Mitchell (Colonel)

#### 6TH BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL JOHNSTONE

35th Foot, 2nd Battalion

Major C. M'Alister

54th Foot

Lieut.-Colonel J. Earl Waldegrave

59th Foot, 2nd Battalion

Lieut.-Colonel H. Austin

91st Foot, 1st Battalion

Lieut.-Colonel Sir W. Douglas,  
K.C.B. (Colonel)

#### 6TH HANOVERIAN BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL LYON

Field Battalion, Calenberg

Lieut.-Colonel

Field Battalion, Lanenberg

Lieut.-Colonel Benort

Militia Battalion, Hoya

Lieut.-Colonel Grote

Militia Battalion, Nieuberg

Militia Battalion, Bentheim

Major Croupp

### ARTILLERY

Major Brome's (British)

Captain von Rettberg's (Hanoverian)

### FIFTH DIVISION, LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR THOMAS PICTON, G.C.B.

#### 8TH BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JAMES KEMPT, K.C.B.

28th Foot, 1st Battalion

Colonel Sir C. Belson

32nd Foot, 1st Battalion

Major J. Hicks (Lieut.-Colonel)

79th Foot, 1st Battalion

Lieut.-Colonel N. Douglas

95th Foot, 1st Brigade

Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. F. Barnard,  
K.C.B. (Colonel)

#### 9TH BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL SIR DENIS PACK, K.C.B.

1st Foot, 3rd Battalion

Major C. Campbell

42nd Foot, 1st Battalion	Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robt. Macara, K.C.B.
44th Foot, 2nd Battalion	Lieut.-Colonel J. M. Hamerton
92nd Foot, 1st Battalion	Lieut.-Colonel J. Cameron (Colonel)

## 5TH HANOVERIAN BRIGADE, COLONEL VINCKE

Militia Battalion, Hameln	Lieut.-Colonel Kleucke
Militia Battalion, Hildesheim	Major Rheden
Militia Battalion, Peina	Major Westphalen
Militia Battalion, Giffhorn	Major Hammerstein

## ARTILLERY, MAJOR HEISE

Major Rogers (British)	Captain Braun's (Hanoverian)
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## SIXTH DIVISION

## 10TH BRIGADE, MAJOR-GENERAL J. LAMBERT

4th Foot, 1st Battalion	Lieut.-Colonel F. Brooke
27th Foot, 1st Battalion	Captain John Hare (Major)
40th Foot, 1st Battalion	Major A. Heyland

## 4TH HANOVERIAN BRIGADE, COLONEL BEST

Militia Battalion, Lüneburg	Lieut.-Colonel De Ramdohr
Militia Battalion, Verden	Major Decken
Militia Battalion, Osterode	Major Baron Reden
Militia Battalion, Minden	Major De Schmidt

## ARTILLERY, LIEUT.-COLONEL BRUCKMANN

Major Unelt's (British)	Captain Sinclair's (British)
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From Dalton's "Waterloo Roll Call."

NOTE TO 33rd FOOT.—Wellington never forgot his old Regiment, the 33rd, and it is recorded that he honoured Sir Colin Halkett's Brigade with several visits during the day of Waterloo. In one visit late in the afternoon, he enquired how they were. The answer was that two-thirds of their number were down and that the rest were so exhausted that leave to retire for even a short time was most desirable, some of the foreign corps who had not suffered to take their place. General Halkett was told that the issue of the Battle depended on the unflinching front of the British troops, and that even a change of place was hazardous in the extreme. Halkett impressively said "Enough, my Lord, we stand here until the last man falls."



## Appendix F

### SOME ACCOUNT OF LIEUT.-GENERAL JOHN JOHNSON, 33<sup>RD</sup> REGIMENT

He was born in 1690, of a family connected with Glaston, Rutlandshire, but whether he was born there or not I cannot say.

At the age of sixteen he joined the Army in Spain, and after thirty-one years' service became Lieutenant-General.

His commissions (the originals of which are in the possession of his great-great-great-grandson, Charles Kemys-Tynte, Esq. at Haleswell, Bridgwater, Somerset), are as follows :

Appointed " Cornet to that Troop in the Regiment of Horse commanded by Major-General Daniel Harvey, whereof Colonel Edward Rooper is Captain. Given at the Camp before Ciudad Rodrigo this Thirteenth day of May, Anno Dni. 1706.

(Signed) GALLWAY."

Appointed " Captain in the Regiment of Foot Commanded by Brigadier Thomas Pearce, vice Captain Edward Spragg. Given at Lisbon the first day of August, 1708.

(Signed) GALLWAY."

Appointed " Major of Foot, given at Lisbon the Twenty-fourth day of June, 1710.

(Signed) GALLWAY."

Appointed " Lieutenant Colonel of the Regt. of Dragoons commanded by Coll. Constantine Magny, as also Captain to a Troop in the same. Given at Lisbon the Twenty fourth day of Decemb<sup>r</sup> 1710.

(Signed) PORTMORE."

Appointed " Captain of that Company whereof William Vachell Esq<sup>r</sup> was Captain in Our Second Regiment of Foot Guards called the Coldstream, Commanded by our R<sup>t</sup> Trusty & R<sup>t</sup> Welbeloved Cousin & Councillor Richard Earl of Scarborough, and to take the rank as Lieut.-Colonel of

Foot. Given at Our Court of St. James's the First day of March 17  $\frac{7}{8}$ .

(Signed) HOLLES NEWCASTLE."

Appointed "Colonel of Our Regiment of Foot, whereof Robert Dalzel Esq<sup>r</sup>. Lieutenant-General of Our Forces was late Colonel, and likewise to be Captain of a Company in Our said Regiment. Given at Our Court at St. James's in the sixteenth day of November 1739.

(Signed) HARRINGTON."

Appointed "Brigadier General. Given at Our Court at St. James's the Twenty Fifth Day of February 17  $\frac{4}{4}$ .

(Signed) CARTERET."

Appointed "Lieutenant General. Given at Our Court at Kensington the Nineteenth Day of September 1747.

(Signed) HOLLES NEWCASTLE."

It appears from the above that Johnson was promoted from a Captaincy and Lieut.-Colonelcy in the Coldstream Guards to the command of the 33rd Regiment, November 16th, 1739, which Regiment he commanded four years later at the battle of Dettingen, June 16th, 1743. General John Johnson was twice married; firstly to Roberta, daughter of John Latton, Esquire, of Usher Place, Walton-on-Thames, (she died in 1729); and secondly to Dorothy, widow of J. Acton, Esquire, and daughter of the Rev. J. Laughton, of Ibstock, co. Leicester (by Dorothy, youngest daughter of Anthony Tate, Esquire, of Burleigh Park, co. Leicester), and by this marriage he had an only son, John.

In 1720, General Johnson inherited by the Will of Mr. Peter de la Porte, one of the South Sea Directors, the estate of Burhill, in the parish of Walton-on-Thames, Surrey, which he made his ultimate residence. This property was disposed of by my grandfather in 1848, and was again disposed of some five or six years ago, and now forms the Club House and golf links of the "Burhill Golf Club." General Johnson died in Clarges Street, London, November 19th, 1753, *ætat* 63, and is buried in Thames Ditton churchyard. There is a portrait of him at Halswell.

His son, John Johnson, of Burhill, Surrey, born 1738, was appointed ensign in the First Regiment of Foot Guards in 1753, and retired as a Lieut.-Colonel in 1775. He then became a groom of the Chamber and Comptroller of Household to George, Prince of Wales (afterwards George IV.).

He married in 1765, Jane, daughter of Major Ruishe Hassell, of the Royal Horse Guards (Blues), by his marriage with Jane, *sister* of Sir Charles Kemeys Tynte, 5th Bart., of Halswell, Somerset, and Cefu Mably, Glamorganshire.

On the death of Sir Charles Kemeys Tynte, in 1785, without issue, he left his considerable estates to his niece Mrs. Johnson, on condition of her and her husband and issue assuming the surnames and arms of Kemeys and Tynte, which they were agreeable to do!

ST. D. M. KEMEYS-TYNTE.







## INDEX

- Abyssinian Expedition, Causes, 344;  
33rd ordered to prepare for service  
in it, 347; Mereweather presents  
alternative routes to Magdala,  
347; landing of the advanced  
brigade at Mulkutto, 348; push  
up to the plain of Serrafe, 348;  
composition of the army, 349;  
marches of the 33rd, 350; advance  
of the vanguard, 352; Theodore  
devastates the remaining route,  
357; within sight of Magdala,  
357; defeat of the Abyssinian  
army, 360; preparations for assault  
of Magdala, 361; list of marches,  
365
- Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of, agreed to,  
60
- Alcantara, Capture of, by Galway,  
16, 17
- Alma, Battle of, 280, *et seq.*
- Almanza, Battle of, defeat of  
Galway, 23, *et seq.*; order of  
battle, 28
- American Stamp Act, how it con-  
tributed to the War of Indepen-  
dence, 89; repealed, 89
- American War of Independence,  
causes of, 88, *et seq.*; rioting at  
Boston, 90; the Tea Tax, 90;  
English troops attacked at Lexing-  
ton, 91; Washington collects his  
army, 91; 33rd and other regi-  
ments ordered to America, 92;  
Howe evacuates Boston, 92. *See*  
Brooklyn; Clinton, Gen.; Corn-  
wallis; Howe. South Carolina,  
Thirty-third Regt.; Washington  
Anne, Queen, joins the Grand  
Alliance, 6; her order for the  
formation of the 33rd Foot, 7
- Antwerp, its importance, 212;  
endeavour to drive out the French,  
212; Graham announces its evacua-  
tion by the French, 214
- Army, British, unrest at its treatment  
by the Allies, 77; its strength in  
the Seven Years' War, 78; strength  
after the Treaty of Fontainebleau,  
85
- Austrian Succession, War of, 37,  
*et seq.*; the attitude of England  
and other Powers, 38
- Balaclava, Battle of, 291, *et seq.*
- Barracks in the 18th century, 86
- Bergen-op-Zoom, failure of the  
Allies' attack on, 202; correspon-  
dence as to the failure, 202, *et seq.*;  
Parkinson's justification of his  
action, 206; General Cooke's re-  
ply, 206; his report of the fight,  
209; gates opened to the Allies,  
213; Thain's account of the  
attack, 215
- Berwick, Duke of, French Com-  
mander in Spain, War of Spanish  
Succession, 16; his Fabian policy,  
17; defeated at Las Ventas  
Massonga, 17; marches on Al-  
manza, 22; defeats Galway, 23,  
*et seq.*
- Beyers, General, his mischievous  
course during the "driving"  
campaigns, 415
- Bligh, General, chosen for the  
command against Cherbourg, 66;  
his force, 66; capture of Cher-  
bourg and St. Malo, 67; his  
disastrous retreat, 68
- Bloemfontein, Roberts advances on,  
403; main points in the plan of

- attack, 404; Roberts' orders for the advance, 405; capture of Leeuwberg necessary to open the road to, 406; fight at Abraham's Kraal, 406; Boer retreat, 407; Roberts enters the town, 408; flight of Steyn and all armed Boers, 408; Roberts on the marches and actions, 408
- Blücher, General, assembles his army to co-operate with Wellington, 224; attacked by Napoleon, falls back on Tilly, 226; approaching Waterloo, 237; drives back the French at Meudon, 252
- Bombay, the situation there on the outbreak of the Mutiny, 336; arrival of the 33rd, 337; arrival of the two companies left at Mauritius, 338
- Boston, Howe evacuates it, 92
- Brooklyn, Battle of, Sullivan defeated and taken prisoner, 95
- Buller, Sir Redvers, appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in S. Africa, 383; advances to relieve Ladysmith, 384; relieves Ladysmith, 399
- Butler, Sir Wm., his warning as to danger in S. Africa, 380
- Cambridge, H.R.H. Duke of, attached to the 33rd, 264; takes part in the Crimean War, 282, *et seq.*
- Camden, Battle of, Gates beaten, 124; Cornwallis makes Camden a storehouse for his Army in S. Carolina, 125
- Campbell, Lt.-Col., in command of the 33rd in the expeditions to Mauritius, 190; captures the island, 192; his death, 192
- Castle, Lt.-Col., becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 369; his order to the 33rd when handing over the command, 372
- Chadwick, Col., retires from the Colonelcy of the 33rd, 369
- Charles of Austria, Archduke, obtains an army from England to reduce Spain, 12
- Charles II of Spain, his death and will, 3
- Charlestown, Clinton lands at, and invests the city, 121; city surrenders, 122
- Chatham, Earl of, his warning against England's American policy, 91
- Cherbourg, expedition against, 66; captured, 67
- Clements, Lt.-Col. Henry, of 33rd, death at Fontenoy, 51
- Clinton, General Sir Henry, sweeps through S. Carolina, 93; attacks Sullivan, 94; Sullivan taken prisoner, 95; disappointment of the army when he supersedes Howe, 111; arrival in Philadelphia, 112; evacuates the city, 113; defeats Washington at Freehold, and enters New York, 115; carries the war into Georgia, 116; captures La Fayette, 117; urged to carry the war into S. Carolina, 119; Clinton's army for S. Carolina, 121; his successes, 121
- Coalition, Seventh, against Napoleon, 222
- Collings, Brig.-General, arrives in Abyssinia with the 33rd and other regiments, 350; in command of the vanguard, 352; retires on half pay, 368
- Colonels of 33rd. *See* Succession of Colonels in the Appendix
- Cooper, Lt.-Col., becomes Colonel of the 33rd and retired, 368
- Cornwallis, Earl, becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 87; career and character, 87-8; designs a surprise on Fort Lee, 100; Greene's hasty flight, 100; moves on to the Delaware, 101; returns from England, 103; has to wait for camp equipment, 104; marches to New Jersey, 115; and West Chester, 116; takes over the command at the investment of Charlestown, 122; in South Carolina, 123; leaves to join Clinton at New York, 123; hurries back to meet Gates, 123; gives up his attempt to sweep North Carolina, 125; compelled

- to fall back because of Fergusson's defeat, 126; is given an independent command in S. Carolina, 126; moves to meet Greene, 126; march on the Catawba, 127; crosses the river, 128; beats Greene, 128; retreats to Guildford, 128; his Pyrrhic Victory at Guildford, 132; his inadequate army in Carolina, 133; march into Virginia, 133; surrenders at York Town, 135; death, 186
- Crimean War, causes, 270; course of the war, 270, *et seq.*; war declared, 274; Battle of the Alma, 280; Battle of Balaklava, 291; Battle of Inkermann, 298; winter hardships, 306; Russian sortie from Sebastopol, 312; surrender of Sebastopol, 329; summary of the war, 330; peace signed and Allies abandon the Crimea, 334
- Cronje, General, manœuvred out of Magersfontein, 390; his danger, 390; Kelly-Kenny's pursuit, 390; fight at Klip Kraal Drift, 392; retreat, 393; final stand, 394; Kitchener's attack, 394; Cronje's mobility destroyed, 397; surrender, 398
- Culloden, Battle of, Young Pretender's defeat, 55
- Cumberland, Duke of, succeeds Wade as Commander-in-Chief in Flanders, 46; raises the siege of Tournay, 47; defeat at Fontenoy, 47-53; defeat at Lauffeld, 57-9; retreat, 59
- Dalsell, Col. Robert, becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 35; his record, 35; transferred to the 38th Regiment, 36
- Das Minas, General, his strange conduct in Galway's campaign, 19
- D'Estrees, Marshal, supersedes Broglie, and decides on a defensive policy, 81
- Dettingen, Battle of, Grammont ordered to hold the village, 41; the battle, 42-5
- De Wet, General, commences his elusive policy, 405; beaten at Abraham's Kraal, 406; again at Driefontein, 407; ambushes Broadwood, 408; revival of Boer antagonism in consequence, 408; Captain Grant's memorandum on the "driving" campaign, 414
- Dhoondiah collects Tippoo's scattered army, but is driven into the Mahratta country, 181; Wellesley pursues, 181; killed, 182
- Donovan, Lieut., of the 33rd, falls in final attack on the Redan, 322, 329
- Drury, General, his rearguard action in the retreat from St. Malo, 68
- Duncanson, Col., commands the 33rd in Spain, 14; death in Valencia, 15
- Egerton, Col., killed in the assault on the Redan, 314
- Elector of Bavaria, Charles VII, his candidature for the Austrian Empire, 37, 38
- Elphinstone, Lord, his promptitude in Bombay disconcerts the mutineers, 340
- Ferdinand, Prince, challenges Broglie, 72; falls back before the augmented French army, 72; Broglie's retreat, 76; compels Soubise to retire, 79; his stand at Lippstadt, 80; French right routed, 80; captures Zappaburg, 82; surprises De Castres, 82
- Firth, Sergeant, of 33rd, wins the Victoria Cross, 402
- Florence Nightingale, her hospital work in the Crimean War, 315
- Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 83
- Fontenoy, Battle of, Allies defeated, 47-53
- France, her aim to force the dismemberment of the German Empire, 38; her intrigue against England's interests, 38
- Frederick II of Prussia, his bargain with Maria Theresa, 37
- French, Sir John, baffles the Boers in attempt to advance in Cape Colony, 384



- Gage, General, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in America, 90; his warning to the people of Rhode Island, 90; superseded by Howe, 92
- Galway, Lord, commands the English army in Spain, 13; advance on Madrid, 16, *et seq.*; defeats Berwick at Las Ventas Massonga, 17; enters Madrid, 19; decides to join Peterborough, 20; in chief command in Spain, 21; his offensive policy, 21; his inadequate force, 22; his defeat at Almanza, 23; re-forms his army, 29
- Garrison life, shameful neglect of the Home Government, 86, *et seq.*
- Gatacre, General, holds the Boers at Stormberg, 384
- George I, his small army, 34; rehabilitation of disbanded regiments because of Jacobite rising, 34
- George II, eager to participate in the War of the Austrian Succession, 38; his interference with the Earl of Stair, 40-1; joins the army in Flanders, 40; takes command, 41; retreat to Hanau, 41; victory at Dettingen, 42-5
- Germantown, Washington determines to attack, 108; the fight, 109; Greene's defeat, 109
- Gortschakoff, Prince, surrenders Sebastopol, 329
- Gough, Lt.-Col., of the 33rd, killed in assault on the Redan, 329
- Grand Alliance, how composed, 4
- Griffen, Maj.-Gen. (Lord Howard de Walden), becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 72
- Harris, General, in command of the army against Tippoo, 161; his advance on Seringapatam, 163
- Hastings, George, Earl of Huntingdon, first Colonel of the 33rd, 8
- Havercake Lads, how the name came to the 33rd, 142
- Hawley, Col. Henry, becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 35; appointed to a cavalry regiment, 35
- Hay, Lord Charles, becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 64; his criticism of Loudoun's dilatoriness in Nova Scotia, 71; tried by court-martial, 72; death, 72
- Hereditary Prince, The, attacks Leighenhain, 73; French abandon their camp on his advance, 73; defeats the French at Warburg, 74-5; advance on Mengeringshausen, 78; disastrous reverse at Grunberg, 78; French right routed by him, 80; desperate fighting at Schiedingen, and defeat of the French, 80; follows up Soubise, 80; turns to meet, 81; attacked by Condé and falls back, 83
- Hesse, advance on, 78
- Heyland, Lieut., of the 33rd, killed at the Redan, 322; Private Worrell's heroic attempt to save him, 323
- Howe, Sir Wm., supersedes Gage, 92; composition of his army, 93; determines to take New York, 94; his pusillanimity, 96-7; attacks Washington on the Heights of Harlem, 97; his main army in the rear and flank of Washington, 98; moves on towards the White Plains, 99; strength of his army, 102; fails to draw Washington into pitched battle, 105; determines to go to Philadelphia, 105; at Staten Island, 105; his order for battle, 106; Washington beaten at Brandywine, 107; enters Philadelphia, 108; successes at Edge Hill, Mud Island, and Red Bank, 109; superseded by Clinton, 111
- Huntingdon, Earl of, ordered to raise the 33rd Foot, 7
- Indian Mutiny, the outbreak, 334; the British army in India, 334; Canning's measures to deal with it, 335; the situation in Bombay, 336; the 33rd in Bombay, 337; the campaign in Central India and movements of 33rd, 339, *et seq.*; Mutiny stamped out, 342

- Inkermann, Battle of, the weakness of the position, 297; account of the battle, 298, *et seq.*
- Jaar, Battle of, Allies' victory, 55
- Jacobites, Rising of 1715, 34; rehabilitation of many disbanded regiments, 34
- Johnson, Col., becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 36; made Lt.-Gen., 64; death, 64
- Johnstone, Lt.-Col., of 33rd, falls in the attack on the Redan, 322
- Kelly-Kenny, General, in command of the 6th Division in S. African War
- Kimberley, our force there, 383; Roberts' aim to relieve it, 387; relieved, 389
- Kitchener, Lord, sent out as Chief of Staff to S. Africa, 384; attack on Cronje, 394; his lack of adequate staff, 394; his report to Roberts, 397; reinforced, 397
- Knox, Major-Gen., in pursuit of Cronje, 390; attacks him, 394
- Kruger, President, his demands, 379; forces at his disposal, 379
- Ladysmith, our forces there, 383; Buller's advance to its relief, 384; relieved, 399
- Las Ventas Massonga, defeat of Berwick, 17
- Lauffeld, Battle of, Allies' defeat, 57-9
- Lexington, fight at, 91
- Light Brigade, charge into the "Valley of Death," 295
- Lloyd, Lt.-Col., of 33rd, killed at Rhenoster Kops, 412
- Louis XIV, Grand Alliance against him, 4; his influence in Europe, 5; death, 35
- Louis XVIII, proclaimed King of France, 213; his position assured after Waterloo, 254
- Mafeking, Baden Powell's force there, 383
- Magdala, its situation, 347; Napier prepares for the assault on, 361; captured, 364; death of King Theodore, 364; question of disposal of the capital, 364; abandoned by the British army, 364
- Mahrattas, The, throw in their lot with the Indian Government against Tippoo, 162
- Mahratta War, the Mahratta Confederacy, 182
- Malakoff, The, assault by the French, 327; capture, 329
- Mamelon, The, assault on the Russian stronghold, 313; reduced to silence, 316
- Marlborough, Duke of, chosen Generalissimo of the Allied army, 10; in command for Seven Years' War, 64; fails at St. Malo, 65
- Marsh, Lieut. Hans, of 33rd, killed at the Redan, 323
- Mereweather, Col., reports that force is necessary to gain release of Abyssinian captives, 347; collecting information as to the route at Madgala, 347; his suggestion as to landing the army, 347; discusses the alternative routes with Napier, 347; commands the reconnoitring party, 347; explores the passes, 348; secures the friendship of the chiefs, 353
- Methuen, Lord, commands the 1st Army Corps at Modder River, 383; to relieve Kimberley, 383
- Militia, uneasiness at the want of a well-regulated, 63
- Minden, Battle of, rout of the French, 71
- Minorca, seized by the French, 63
- Mundy, Lt.-Col., succeeded in the command of the 33rd on the death of Col. Egerton at the Redan, 314
- Napier, Sir Robert, Commander of the Abyssinian Expedition, 347; chooses his route, 351; demands the release of the captives, 357; within sight of Magdala, 357; demands Theodore's unconditional surrender, 361; prepares for the assault on Magdala, 361; captures Magdala, 364

**Napoleon Buonaparte**, his intrigue with Tippoo Sahib, 157; Sixth Coalition against him, 198; defeat at Leipsic, 198; compelled to retreat, 212; Louis XVIII proclaimed, 213; in exile, 221; his return to France, 222; Seventh Coalition against him, 222; his choice of lines of operations, 225; assumes the offensive, 225; fails in his attack on Blücher, 226; beaten at Quatre Bras, 227; his defeat at Waterloo, 233; his criticism of Wellington's choice of position, 233; the disposition of his army, 233; intention to continue hostilities, 250; his abdication demanded, 250; ordered to quit Paris, 251

**Netherlands Campaign, 1794**, what led to it, 147; conduct of the campaign, 149; composition of the English army, 150; disastrous retreat, 154; British army withdrawn, 155

**New England Colonies**, dispute with the Home Government, 88, *et seq.*

**Nizam of Hyderabad**, would he join Tippoo Sahib? 161; offended by Tippoo, 162; his forces join our army, 162; advance with Wellesley on Seringapatam, 164

**Ormond, Duke of**, Commander of the Peninsular army, 10; his descent on Cadiz, 11; his successes and failure, 11

**Paardeberg**, Cronje invested there. See Cronje

**Peterborough, Earl of**, in command of the army in Spain, 12; concentrates on Barcelona, 13

**Philadelphia**, Howe's entry, 108; Clinton supersedes him there, 112; Clinton decides how to evacuate the city, 113

**Philip, Duke of Anjou**, appointed successor to and by Charles II of Spain, 3; the consequences to Europe, 4

**Placentia**, submits to the Allies, 17

**Pretender, The Young, Louis XIV** acknowledges him King of England, 5; his venture in England, 53, *et seq.*; recall of English regiments from Flanders, 54; his march to the south, 54; his defeat at Culloden, 55

**Quarries, Crimea**, assault, 316; capture, 317

**Quatre Bras, Battle of**, Wellington attacked by Napoleon, 226; Ney's defeat, 227

**Raglan, Lord**, appointed to the command of the British in the Crimean War, 272; instructed to lay siege to Sebastopol, 276; his claim to occupy Balaclava, 292; death, 324

**Recruiting**, difficulties and costs, 143

**Redan, Sebastopol**, attack on the pits, 313; attack on the Redan, 318; Evelyn Wood's and Fanshawe's accounts, 320; Raglan justifies the assault, 322; losses of the 33rd, 322; final assault, 326; orders on the eve of the assault, 327; 33rd in the final effort, 328

**Rhenoster Kops**, fight with Viljoen, 411; Lt.-Col. Lloyd killed, 412

**Roberts, Lord**, sent out as Commander-in-Chief to S. Africa, 384; the situation on his arrival, 384; modifies his plans, 384

**Roucoux, Battle of**, Allies' reverse, 56

**St. Malo**, expedition against, 64, *et seq.*; strength of the expedition, 64-5

**Schiedingen, Battle of**, French defeat 80

**Scindia**, joins the Mahratta Confederacy, 182; defeated by Holkar, 182; makes peace with Holkar, 183; orders Collins, the British Resident, to leave his camp, 183; Wellesley's victorious campaign, and Scindia's plea for peace, 184

**Sebastopol, Siege of**, Raglan instructed to undertake the siege,

- 276; the course of the siege, 277, *et seq.*; combined assault, 294; Battle of Inkermann, 298; bombardment by the Mamelon, 313; assault on the Redan, 314; preparations for the 3rd bombardment, 315; Mamelon silenced, 316; Battle of Tchernaya, 318; computation of Russian losses, 325; bombardment and final assault, 326; surrender, 329; losses of British and French at final storming, 330
- Seringapatam, British advance on, 163; Tippoo's defences, 166; Chetwood's account of the night attack of the 33rd, 167; storming the city, 172; capture and plunder, 172, *et seq.*; prize money, 176
- Seventy-Second Regiment (2nd Batt. of the 33rd), raised and disbanded, 63
- Seven Years' War, 62, *et seq.*; began, 64; the Allies of England, 70, 71; discontent of British generals at their treatment, 77; British strength, 78; and of the war, 83; results of the war, 83
- Sherbrooke, General Sir John C., becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 197
- Simpson, General, succeeds to the English command in the Crimea on Raglan's death, 324
- Sjordet, Lieut. F. J., of the 33rd, killed in the attack on Cronje, 397
- Snider rifle, first used in battle in the attack on King Theodore, in Abyssinia, 360
- South African War, causes, 378; Kruger's ultimatum, 379; strength of British army in S. Africa, 379; Boer advantage at the outset, 380; concentration of British forces, 383; movements, engagements, etc., end of the war, 416  
*See* under various headings in relation to the South African War
- South Carolina, Germain urges Clinton to carry the war there, 119; 33rd embark for S. Carolina, 120; British fleet scattered by a storm, 121; landing at Charles-town, 121; capture of the city, 122; Clinton marches to meet Gates, 123; Gates' great defeat, 124
- Spain, campaigns in, 12, *et seq.*
- Spanish Succession, War of, campaigns in Spain, 12, *et seq.*; assault on Valencia and surrender, 15
- Stair, John, Earl of, appointed Commander-in-Chief for the campaign in Flanders, 39; his plan of campaign, 40; obstacles in his way, 40; resigns his command, 46
- Stanhope, 1st Earl of, reputed the first Colonel of the 33rd, 8
- Staveley, Sir Charles, in command of the 2nd Brigade in Abyssinia, 355; reconnaissance before Magdala, 359; his brigade attacked, 360; in command at the assault on Magdala, 363
- Stuart, General, commands the Indian army of the West against Tippoo, 162
- Sullivan, General, holds the road to Flatbrush against Howe, 94; beaten at the Battle of Brooklyn, and taken prisoner, 94-5
- Tantia Topi, leader of mutineers in Central India, defeated, 341; pursued by Rose, 341; attempts to induce the Mahrattas to join the mutineers, 342; captured and executed, 342
- Tarleton, General, routs the Americans in N. Carolina, 122; defeated by Greene, 127; rallies and retakes his lost baggage, 127; drives back the Americans, 128; further success near Guildford, 129
- Tchernaya, Battle of, 318, *et seq.*
- Theodore, King of Abyssinia, his conduct, leading to the Abyssinian War, 344, *et seq.*; refusal to release the captives, 345; his dwindling army, 358; makes his stand at Magdala, 358; attack on Staveley's force, 360; overtures for peace, 361; releases some of the captives, 361; defeat and death, 364

Thirty-Third Regiment, Earl of Huntingdon ordered to raise it, 7; how and where raised, 9; campaign in Spain, 12, *et seq.*; Battle of Almanza, 23, *et seq.*; surrender, 26; losses, 27; re-formation of the regiment, 31; ordered to Ireland, 31; disbanded, 32; Jacobite rising leads to rehabilitation, 34; sent to Isle of Wight, 35; ordered to Flanders, 37; embarkation and march to Mons, 39; at Dettingen, 42-3; at Fontenoy, 47-53; service in Scotland, 53, *et seq.*; Edinburgh, 54; to Glasgow, 55; fight at Fort William, 55; back to Flanders, 55; Battle of the Jaar, 55; reverse at Roucoux, 56; Battle of Lauffeld, 57-9; on garrison duty in Minorca, 62; ordered home, 63; in Edinburgh, 63; raising of the 2nd Battalion, 63; Lord Charles Hay becomes Colonel, 64; engaged in the St. Malo expedition, 65; proceed against Cherbourg, 66; retreat from St. Malo, and heroic rearguard action, 68; in the Seven Years' War, 70, *et seq.*; ordered to Flanders, 72; Battle of Warburg, 74-5; pursuit of Du Muy, 75; capture of Zierenberg, 75; in the return before Wesel, 76; retreat and rearguard action, 76-7; advance on the Mengerlinghausen, 78; reverse at Grimberg, 78; desperate fighting at Schiedingen, and French defeat, 80; French defeat at Wilhelmstahl, 82; the last fight of the 33rd in the Seven Years' War, 83; return to England 84; 2nd battalion disbanded, 85; ordered to Minorca, 86; Cornwallis becomes Colonel, 87; garrison duty at Cork, 88; ordered to America, 91; disembark at Charlestown, 92; Battle of Brooklyn, 94; Howe's tribute to their fighting, 95; in the attack on Washington at New York, 97; fight on the Heights of Harlem,

98; Howe's attack on Washington's army, 99; landing on the Jersey shore, 100; Greene's flight, 100; capture of Brunswick, 100; hardships of the winter campaign, 104; fight at Germantown, 108; evacuation of Philadelphia, 113; Battle of Freehold, 114; at New York with Clinton, 115; destroy shipping at Fairhaven, 115; with Cornwallis to New Jersey, 115; expedition up the Hudson River, 116; Americans driven out of Verplanks, 116; capture of La Fayette, 117; garrisoning Verplanks, 117; embark for South Carolina, 120; British fleet scattered, but 33rd land at Charlestown, 121; investment and capture of Charlestown, 122; march into North Carolina, 122; garrison Camden, 123; Gates menaces Camden, 123; Gates beaten, 124; move to meet Greene, 126; cross the Catawba, 127; in the fight at Wetzell's Mill, 128; Battle of Guildford, 129, 132; at York Town, which Cornwallis surrenders 135; what became of the colours, 140; at Taunton, 141; at Halifax, 142; change of title, 142; "Havercake Lads," 142; Regiment recruits, 144; sent to West Indies, 144; experiences there, 145; Arthur Wellesley joins the regiment, 148; ordered to the Netherlands, 149; Battle at Schyndel, 151; Battle of Geldermalsen, 153; disastrous retreat, 154; recalled to England, 155; ordered to India, 159; arrival at Calcutta, 159; advance on Seringapatam, 162; Tippoo's attack, 164; attack on Seringapatam, 166; capture, 172; congratulations from Cornwallis, 177; "Seringapatam" on the colours, 180; battle honours, 180; sent to Hurryhur to join in the invasion of Scindia's country, 183; fight with the Pindarees, 184; to Vellore, 185; Wellesley appointed

Colonel, 186; tribute to Wellesley on leaving for Europe, 188; expedition to Mauritius, 191; capture of the island, 192; ordered home, 194; recruiting in England, 195; Wellington ceases to be Colonel, 196; General Sherbrooke succeeds him, 197; ordered for service in the Netherlands, 197; join Graham's army, 199; movements against Napoleon, 199 *et seq.*; in the attack on Bergen-op-Zoom, 201; failure and correspondence, 202, *et seq.*; fall of Antwerp, 214; ordered to Dendermond, 220; Clinton's tribute, 220; movements on Napoleon's return from exile, 222; Battle of Quatre Bras, 227; Ney's defeat, 227; Waterloo, 232; advance on Paris, 249; enter Paris, 253; return to England, 254; at Hull, 257; in the Channel Islands, 258; departure for Jamaica, 259; dealing with the rebel blacks, 261; Colonel Sherbrooke's death, and appointment of Lord Charles Henry Somerset as Colonel, 262; Somerset's death and appointment of Lieut.-General Wale, 263; further insurrection of negroes, 263; embarkation for England, 263; service in riots in Midlands, 264; Gibraltar, 264; West Indies, 265; death of Lieut.-Col. Knight, 265; death of Wale, 266; Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Sheehy Keating, the new Colonel, 266; his death, 266; Major-Gen. Henry D'Oyley his successor, 266; arrival at Leith, 267; attend the funeral of Wellington, 268; the regiment named after him, 269; departure for the Crimea, 273; at Scutari, 274; en route to Sebastopol, 277; Battle of the Alma, 280; approach Sebastopol, 290; Battle of Balaclava, 291; Battle of Inkermann, 298; winter hardships, 306; distribution of the 33rd, 309; attack on the Redan pits, 313; engaged in the Battle of Tchernaya, 318;

in the final assault on Sebastopol, 327; officers present in the June attack on the Redan, 331; losses during the siege, 331; sail for home, 334; reduction of the regiment, 334; outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, 334; go to Bombay, 336; broken into detachments for various destinations, 339; arduous marches in Central India, 340; no recognition of their services, 342; to prepare for Abyssinian service, 347; embark for Abyssinia, 350; advance work during the march to Magdala, 352; at Antalo, 354; why put into the 2nd Brigade, 356; in the assault on Magdala, 362; Private Bergin and Drummer Magner win the Victoria Cross, 363; garrison Magdala, 364; casualties in the expedition, 365; "Abyssinia" to be placed on the colours, 367; Brig.-General Collings retires, and Lt.-Col. Cooper becomes Colonel, 368; Lt.-Col. Fanshaw succeeds him, 368; new colours presented, 368; back in India, 368; settlement of the regimental title, 370; "Dettin-gen" on the colours, 371; Lt.-General Cureton's tribute to the 33rd, 371; Lt.-Gen. Biddulph's tribute, 373; tribute of Prince Leopold of Prussia, 373; ordered to Aden, 374; title granted, "Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) Regiment," 375; "Mysore" added to the colours, 375; Duke of Cambridge's tribute, 375; leave Southampton for Malta, 375; at Dover, 375; Major-Gen. Rundle's tribute, 375; orders for South Africa, 376; actual strength on embarkation, 377; landed at Cape Town, 384; assist in manœuvring Cronje out of Magersfontein, 385; in the 6th Division, under Kelly-Kenny, 386; arrival at Modder River, 386; to Graspan, 387; movements, 388; pursuit of Cronje, 390; fight at the Klip

- Kraal Drift, 392; Cronje's stand, 394; attack on his laager, 394; battalion orders by Lt.-Col. Lloyd as to 33rd's brilliant service, 400, also as to attack near Paardeberg, 401; movements of Col. Clements and Mounted Infantry, 401; Capt. A. F. Wallis killed at Plowman's Farm, 402; Sergeant Frith wins the Victoria Cross, 402; advance on Bloemfontein, 403; De Wet commences his elusive policy, 405; guard baggage in the advance, 406; fight at Abraham's Kraal, 406; Boer retreat, 407; capture of Bloemfontein, 408; "Driving" campaigns, 409, *et seq.*; under Major-Gen. Paget, 410; description of Rhenooster Kops, 410; fight there with Viljoen, 411; Lt.-Col. Lloyd killed, 412; Gen. Paget's tribute, 413; also Gen. Barton, 413; regiment's work in garrisoning the blockhouses, 415; appreciation of their conduct, 416; list of deputation of regiment for the Coronation, 416; return to Southampton, 417; Kelly-Kenny distributes medals at York, and his tribute, 417
- Thistlethwaite, Lieut., died of cholera in the Crimea, 332
- Tippoo Sahib, his correspondence with Napoleon, 157; menace to the Indian Government, 158; challenged by the Indian Government, 161; decision to march against him, 161; British advance, 163; attacks Wellesley's force, 164; combined assault on Seringapatam, 172; Tippoo's death, 172; prize money, 173
- Treaty of Bassein, between Peishwa and the British Government, 183; *See* Mahratta War
- Valencia, assault by 33rd, 14; surrender of the city, 15
- Verplanks, Americans driven out, 116; 33rd garrison it; failure of Americans to recapture it, 118
- Victoria Cross, Private Bergin and Drummer Wagner received it for conduct at Magdala, 363; won by Sergeant Firth of the 33rd at Plowman's Farm, 402
- Viljoen, General B., beaten at Rhenooster Kops, 411; retreat, 412
- Wade, Col. George, becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 15; wounded at the Convent of St. Francis, 16; appointed Colonel of the 3rd Dragoons, 35
- Wade, General, succeeds Stair as Commander-in-Chief in Flanders, 46; resigns, 46; Commander-in-Chief in Scotland to meet the Young Pretender, 54
- Walden, Lord Howard de, becomes Colonel of the 33rd, 72
- Walker, Sergeant H., promoted from Lance-corporal and awarded D.C.M., 413
- Wallis, Capt. A. F., killed in the fight at Plowman's Farm, 402
- Walpole, his attitude towards the Austrian Succession, 38
- Warburg, Battle of, Hereditary Prince defeats the French, 74-5; Ferdinand makes Warburg his headquarters, 77
- Warden, Major, his task of provisioning the army in Abyssinia, 351
- War Medals, Crimean, distribution of these, 331
- Washington, General, gathers his army, 91; strengthens his defences, 94; evacuates Long Island, 96; hesitates to set fire to New York, 97; his strong position, 97; Putnam's retreat, 97; retires from the Heights of Harlem, 98; changes his camp on Howe's advance to the White Plains, 99; Howe's attack, 99; surrender of Fort Washington, 100; takes advantage of Howe's dilatoriness, 102; given a free hand by Congress, 102; strength of his army, 102; dash on Trenton, 103; recrosses the Delaware, 103; overruns Jersey, 104; his elusive

- policy, 105; march to Philadelphia, 105; his genius for strong positions, 105; serious defeat at Brandywine, 107; determines to attack Germantown, 108; defeated, 109; British successes at Edge Hill, Mud Island, and Red Bank, 109; pursues a Fabian policy, 110; cuts off British food supply in Philadelphia, 113; beaten in the Battle of Freehold, 115; abandons Verplanks, 116; loses La Fayette, 117
- Waterloo, Battle of, Wellington falls back from Quatre Bras to Waterloo, 228; description of the battle, 232; order to place "Waterloo" on the colours and appointments of regiments that fought in the battle, 244; Ensign Howard's description of the battle, 248; Wellington's dispatch on movements after Waterloo, 249; Waterloo medal, 254
- Webster, Lt.-Col., commands the 33rd at Charlestown, 121; defeats Americans and completes the investment of Charlestown, 122; reinforced, 122; beats Gates before Camden, 123; demonstration to mislead the enemy, 127; routs Greene's right at Guildford, 130; death, 132
- Wellesley, Arthur. *See* Wellington, Duke of
- Wellington, Duke of, his early career, 148; joins the 33rd, 148; his first experience under fire, 151; stand at Geldermalsen, 153; contemplates leaving the army, 156; Tippoo Sahib refuses to receive him as envoy, 161; corresponds with the Governor-General as to the campaign, 161; advance on Seringapatam, 163; attacked by Tippoo, 164; night attack, 167; storming and capture of Seringapatam, 172, *et seq.*; congratulation to Wellesley of the 33rd, 177; his treatment of plunderers, 178; prepares to invade Scindia's country, 183; asks leave to return to Europe, 186; becomes Colonel of 33rd, 186; tribute of the 33rd on his departure for Europe, 188; made an Extra Knight of the Bath, 189; response to the 33rd, 189; raised to the peerage, and becomes Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards, 195; his farewell to the 33rd, 196; plan of campaign against Napoleon on return from Elba, 223; the disposition of his army, 223; strength of army, 224; orders an advance on Quatre Bras, 226; defeats Ney, 227; retires to Waterloo, 228; the battle, 232, *et seq.*; advance on Paris, 249; dispatch on his course after Waterloo, 249; enters Paris, 253; commands the Army of Occupation, 253; suggests a Waterloo medal for rank and file, 254; death, 267; tribute to his worth, 267; 33rd called after him, 269
- Whiteboys, The, 144
- William III and Balance of Power, 4; Commons vote an army for him to frustrate Louis XIV, 5; death, 5
- Worrell, Private Richard, Heroic effort to save Lieut. Heyland's life, 323
- York, Duke of, commands in the Netherlands campaign of 1794, 150
- Zappaburg, captured by Prince Ferdinand, 82
- Zierenberg, captured by the Hereditary Prince, 76



***Jarrold & Sons, Limited, Printers, The Empire Press, Norwich***



